



COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EMERGENCY CASH COORDINATION MECHANISMS

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This study has been commissioned by the Cash Learning Partnership



The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP)

is a consortium of humanitarian organisations which aims to improve knowledge about cash transfer programmes and improve their quality throughout the humanitarian sector. The CaLP was created to gather lessons from post-tsunami relief programmes in 2005. It is currently made up of Oxfam GB, the British Red Cross, Save the Children, Norwegian Refugee Council and Action Against Hunger / ACF International. The 5 organisations that make up the steering committee came together to support capacity building, research and the sharing of experience and knowledge about cash transfer programmes. In 2010 the CaLP established a partnership with the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in order to develop and implement new activities with funding from ECHO.

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The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors alone.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Objective of the study

Based principally on three cases studies (Pakistan, Haiti, and the Horn of Africa), the objective of this comparative study is to draw on lessons learnt for better coordination of cash transfer programmes (CTP) in future emergencies and to help build the CaLP's advocacy strategy on cash coordination at global level. This study has been commissioned by the CaLP and conducted by Groupe URD.

What is cash coordination?

The definition of cash coordination used here is a broad one, it includes both technical functions that focus on process (such as sharing lessons learnt, harmonising approaches to delivering cash, developing guidelines) and strategic or operational functions that focus more on results and impact (such as coordinating the aid response so as to avoid gaps and duplications, conducting advocacy to promote appropriate CTP and influencing policy).

What form has cash coordination taken so far?

Depending on the context, cash coordination has taken various different forms:

Creation and duration of the coordination group: at an early stage, cash coordination groups were often at the instigation of a small number of NGOs. However, cash coordination forums also evolve with the phases of the crisis; as the context and needs change, cash coordination also adapts.

Leadership: different leadership models have been used in different contexts and at different phases of the emergency. Cash coordination has been either led by a CaLP focal point, by an NGO (member of the CaLP

or other), by a UN agency (UNDP, WFP, FAO, UNICEF) or by host governments (Kenya, Pakistan).

Community of practice: cash coordination groups were first and foremost technical working groups. They provided platforms to share good practice and innovative delivery methods, harmonise approaches and transfer amounts, negotiate with service providers and provide technical support to members.

Multiple forums and differentiation between technical and strategic functions: Cash Transfer Programs are often discussed in several forums (3 forums for CFW in Haiti in the first months after the earthquake, 2 forums in Kenya, 3 forums in Somalia, 2 forums in Pakistan). If this led to overlapping of forums in some cases (Haiti), in other contexts (Kenya and Somalia) it was an attempt to separate strategic cash coordination (the extent to which needs are met) from technical cash coordination (how to deliver cash).

Links to the clusters: technical working groups have frequently been independent of the clusters (Somalia, Kenya and Haiti immediately after the crisis). In other cases there has been integration, in the form of a Technical sub-Working Group under the Inter-cluster, Food Security or Early Recovery clusters. Attempts to link-in strategic coordination with the clusters have been made in Kenya and Somalia, where there are complex mapping exercises to assess how both cash and in-kind are meeting humanitarian needs.

Enabling factors for effective cash coordination

Leadership by the CaLP and NGOs of technical coordination creates a spirit of partnership and mutual accountability that helps transparent information sharing during

meetings (sharing of good practice, but also of failures).

Good facilitation skills, a high level of CTP expertise, and the commitment of coordinators are important attributes to establish successful coordination meetings and to create a 'learning' atmosphere.

Dedicated resources and appropriate communications means (e.g. dedicated webpage) are essential to develop relevant tools and guidelines, conduct country-specific research, conduct well-organised and focused meetings, keep track of discussions and store relevant documents.

In addition to meetings, training, learning events and joint visits to programmes provide an opportunity to reach out to a wider audience: staff from host governments, national NGOs and donor representatives.

Constraints and limiting factors for cash coordination

Coordination of cash transfer programming is not formally linked to the cluster approach, which leads to a lack of recognition and involvement of donors, host governments, UN agencies and the Humanitarian Coordinator and limits the strategic function of cash coordination in terms of advocacy and decision-making.

The lack of predictability in leadership can cause confusion and delayed deployment when setting up cash coordination during an emergency.

The lack of dedicated human resources as well as the high-turnover of coordinators, limits the capacity for external representation and advocacy (to clusters, HCT, host government, donors),

The lack of dedicated human resources limits the capacity to develop guidelines and shared tools, conduct research and evaluations, etc.

The existence of multiple forums where cash was discussed can lead to a difficulty in

harmonizing approaches and having a common stance.

Recommendations: the place of cash coordination within the aid architecture

For coordination to be effective, it is recommended that technical discussions, (about how to deliver cash) are separate from strategic coordination (about the extent to which needs are being met). While technical discussions need a cash-specific group, the strategic discussions need to be better integrated into the existing sector-based coordination (such as the clusters).

The role cash coordination plays in linking longer-term social protection programmes to emergency response and vice-versa (to improve both "scaling-up" and "scaling-down") should be reinforced.

Recommendations: strategic cash coordination

Cash is a way to meet needs rather than an end in itself, and this should be reflected in the way it is discussed within coordination. The principle of 'coordinating by objective, not modality' must underpin the integration into other coordination mechanisms.

Cash can be used multi-sectorally and therefore cash coordination should not be limited to food security and livelihoods, but should be integrated into a variety of sectoral discussions (also shelter, education, health, WASH, etc.), to improve the mapping of gaps and duplications of both cash and in-kind programming.

Cash coordination should also focus more on outcome rather than output, to measure not just the quantity of aid but also how needs are being met by *all* assistance (cash and in-kind). We therefore encourage the integration of CTP at key moments in the decision-making process: assessment, response analysis, monitoring and impact evaluation.

Recommendations: technical cash coordination

The independence of technical working groups from the cluster coordination can create a more informal and inclusive atmosphere, which is conducive to sharing good (and bad) practice, amongst both larger and smaller organisations.

Recommendations: maximising resources for effective cash coordination

Sufficient resources are necessary in order to properly support cash coordination. This includes human resources and financial support to develop guidelines, conduct studies and evaluations, etc.

The number of forums should be kept to a minimum. Where forums overlap in terms of objectives and audiences, they should be merged.

Conclusion

This comparative study has found that a coordination system that is adapted to the multi-sectoral nature of cash – as a modality rather than an end in itself – is beginning to develop, but its parameters must be better defined. This is a necessary step to improve the quality of the aid response as a whole in any future emergency. The implementation of this model requires further discussions with other key stakeholders, particularly donors, the IASC and OCHA.

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

3W	Who does What Where
4W	Who does What Where When
ACF	Action Contre la Faim
BRC	British Red Cross
CaLP	Cash Learning Partnership
CBRWG	Cash Based Response Working Group (for Somalia)
CFW	Cash-For-Work
CRWG	Community Restoration Working Group
CTCG	Cash Transfer Coordination Group
CTP	Cash Transfer Programme
CTTWG	Cash Transfer Technical Working Group (for Kenya)
CVMG	Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group (for Somalia)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK Government)
DG ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection <i>Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement</i> - National Directorate for Water
DINEPA	Supply and Sanitation
EMMA	Emergency Market Mapping Analysis
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
HoA	Horn of Africa
HSNP	Hunger Safety Net Programme
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICCV	Inter-Cluster on Cash & Voucher
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
ILO	International Labour Office
IM	Information Management
KFSSG	Kenya Food Security Steering Group
LMMS	Last Mile Mobile Solutions
LWG	Livelihoods Working Group
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PEFSA	Pakistan Emergency Food Security Alliance
RCM	Red Cross Movement
RCVT	Regional Cash and Voucher Transfer Working Group
SDC	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme

1 Introduction

Cash Transfer Programmes (CTP) have been used in recent humanitarian responses on a larger scale than ever before; particularly in Haiti, Pakistan and the Horn of Africa. This has been both because the conditions on the ground have permitted it (functioning markets, cash economies and reliable delivery mechanisms) and because delivering cash was at times more feasible than delivering in-kind assistance – as was the case in south central Somalia. However, the biggest factor that has enabled CTP to be implemented at such scale is that the attitudes of humanitarian agencies, donors, host governments and the general public, have changed considerably. Considerable progress has been made since the Tsunami in convincing the humanitarian community that cash is a viable alternative to in-kind assistance. Though some actors are still somewhat “anti-CTP”, the main current challenges include: how to rapidly scale-up responses, integrating CTP into assessments and response analysis, improving delivery mechanisms, building institutional capacity and adapting organizational procedures to the particularities of cash delivery.¹ In order to achieve this, coordination is essential. A coordination system that is adapted to the multi-sectoral nature of cash – as a modality rather than an end in itself – is beginning to develop, but its parameters must be better defined. This is a necessary step to improve the quality of the aid response as a whole in any future emergency.

When the Humanitarian Response Review was undertaken in 2005, cash transfer programming did not yet play a significant role in aid response. The cluster system that was subsequently set up under the Humanitarian Reform process was primarily sectoral in nature, though there was provision for cross-cutting clusters (such as Protection and Early Recovery) to link-in with other sectors. Since 2005 two major evaluations of the cluster system have taken place² and at the end of 2011 the Transformative Agenda was launched to propose solutions to the current difficulties in the system (Grünwald 2012). One of the key themes of this Agenda is the importance of adapting the clusters to each specific context. Though there is again no specific provision for CTP, this initiative of change offers significant opportunities to re-think the place of cash within the wider aid architecture (Maunder 2012: 37).

The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) is also undergoing a period of change, partnering with IFRC and revising its specific objectives for the next phase. The CaLP Strategy for 2012-2015 aims to continue promoting CTP in the humanitarian sector, but at a higher strategic level, in order to reach a critical mass whereby cash will be considered a “normal” response. When this is achieved, it is expected that the role of the CaLP will change and its form will possibly evolve. In light of this strategy, it is thus essential that CTP be institutionalized at all levels, including the coordination system. With regards to leadership and coordination, box 1 presents the objectives and indicators outlined in the CaLP Strategy. (cf. Annex 3). This comparative report has been written with this CaLP strategy in mind.

¹ As Nick Maunder writes “The dialogue has clearly progressed beyond the initial debate about whether cash distributions are a valid option at all – to a general acceptance of their added value in the right context.” (2012: 11)

² Stoddard et al. 2007. Cluster Approach Evaluation, and Steets, J., Grünwald, F. et al. 2010. Cluster Approach Evaluation 2.

Box 1. The CaLP Strategy 2012-2015 (extract)

Specific objective 3: *By 2015, there should be a clear leadership / coordination structure for cash transfer programming within the humanitarian sector at both global and country levels, ensuring shared learning, a consistent approach, and the evolution of best practice.*

Indicators:


- By 2015 an effective inter cluster CTP coordination system/mechanism is set up at the global level
- By 2015 cash coordination and learning platforms are established in all countries and contexts with humanitarian interventions (not under the responsibility of CaLP)
- By 2015, CTPs are evaluated and documented across all different sectors of assistance
- By 2013 a more systematic sharing of learning/resources exists between agencies for mutual learning

For this comparative study, the **definition of ‘cash coordination’** used is a broad one; it includes both technical functions that focus on process (such as sharing lessons learnt, developing guidelines, harmonising approaches to delivering cash, negotiating with service providers) and more strategic or operational functions that focus on results and impact (such as coordinating the aid response so as to avoid gaps and duplications and conducting advocacy to promote appropriate CTP). In terms of emergency cash coordination mechanisms, two key principles have underpinned this study, namely, that:

1. Coordination around cash transfers should have the overall goal of improving the aid response, so that the needs of affected populations are met in terms of both quantity and quality.³
2. Cash transfer programming is a *tool* used to meet needs; cash should not be an end in itself. Cash can therefore be used within many different sectors; food security, livelihoods, nutrition, health, WASH, education, shelter, etc.

³ This principle is stated clearly in the IASC Transformative Agenda Reference Documents: “Coordination is a means to an end – the ultimate aim of the humanitarian community is to serve vulnerable populations effectively” (IASC 2012:1).

Figure 1. How cash can be used as a tool to meet needs across sectors



This review begins by presenting **what members actually expect from coordination groups**, what they want to know and what they want to share.

The second part of the review assesses the **functioning of cash coordination**: it discusses relevant inputs, including: leadership, human and financial resources, communications means and tools. It also looks at key processes including thematic focus and management, the role of the CaLP, participation and partnership fostered between members and with host government, and importantly, the links with wider coordination systems, such as the cluster approach.

The next chapter discusses **the main achievements and shortcomings of cash coordination** in terms of meeting stakeholders' needs and expectations, as well as reflection on how emergency cash coordination can take into account longer-term approaches (such as safety nets and social protection initiatives), and prepare for future disasters.

The concluding section summarises the key characteristics of cash coordination so far and looks at **ways to move forward in the future**. Recommendations are made to help make emergency cash coordination more efficient, effective, accountable, and rapid to set up in disaster response.

2 Objectives, methodology and limits of the study

2.1 Objectives of the study

Based principally on three cases studies (Pakistan, Haiti, and Horn of Africa), the objective of this comparative study is to draw on lessons learnt for better coordination of cash transfer programmes (CTP) in future emergencies and to help build the CaLP's advocacy strategy on this issue at global level. More specifically, as defined in the Terms of References (cf. Annex 2), the study intends to:

- Extract common learning and best practices;
- Identify key elements of effective coordination around CTP;
- Identify context specific factors that have been source of success or challenges;
- Make recommendations for humanitarian actors including the CaLP, NGOs, donors and the UN coordination system on how to set up coordination around CTP in future emergencies of various scales;
- Provide examples of useful documents, tools and formats that could be used by future cash coordination groups.

2.2 Methodology and limits

2.2.1 Overall approach

The comparative study used a bottom-up approach, drawing inferences from the results of the three case studies and analyzing the implementation of cash coordination mechanisms at country and regional levels. The authors, who each conducted one case study (Haiti and the Horn of Africa), have closely collaborated to identify common key findings and country-specific differences. The third consultant, who conducted the Pakistan case study, was contacted by phone to ensure a thorough understanding of her results by the authors.

The comparative analysis of the country case studies was guided by a common analytical framework (presented in Annex 4). In order to assess the achievements and shortcomings of the emergency cash coordination, the authors considered these results in light of the inputs provided to coordination, and the processes involved.

The data collection methodology used was based on three complementary approaches:

- **Document review:** principally conducted at country level to improve understanding of activities implemented by the CTP coordination mechanisms, and of the studies and tools developed. For the sake of the comparative study, existing global studies, pieces of research and the CaLP strategy 2011-2015, which all tackle the issue of cash coordination, were also reviewed.
- **Series of semi-structured interviews:** with a variety of actors (mainly International Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (CRM) and United Nations (UN) agencies, but also host governments, donors, national NGOs, and the private sector) to evaluate the achievements and difficulties encountered. In total, 77 people were met; including those interviewed for the Horn of Africa and Haiti case studies. For the comparative

study, additional interviews were conducted with the CaLP Focal Point from Ivory Coast, and with one person involved in Global cluster management for Early Recovery (cf. Annex 1).

- **Online survey:** In addition to the qualitative data from the case studies, an online survey was designed to gather further experience and feedback on coordination of cash transfer programmes in emergency situations (from the contexts studied, or from others). The online survey questionnaire was organised around 6 main topics: leadership and aid architecture, scope and quality of the coordination, partnership and ownership, communication means, exit strategy, hand-over and disaster preparedness, and main challenges. 36 responses have been taken into account in the analysis including 27 fully completed and 9 partially completed. Most of the respondents (78%) were from international humanitarian organizations (respectively 59% from International NGOs, 17% from UN agencies and 8% from Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement). Out of the 36, 30 respondents had had previous experience in participating in a CTP coordination mechanism.

2.2.2 Scope of the review: country, crisis and period of time

The comparative study mainly draws lessons from emergency cash coordination mechanisms that have been established since 2010.

Table 1 (below) represents the main features of the three cases studies reviewed: Haiti, Pakistan and the Horn of Africa. In Haiti and Pakistan, emergency cash coordination was established to respond to an emergency situation caused by natural disaster, whereas in the Horn of Africa, it was a more complex crisis involving both natural disaster and conflict (Somalia). All case studies were conducted more than one year (and up to two years in Haiti) after the peak of the crisis.

Table 1. Case study context

	Pakistan	Haiti	Horn of Africa (Kenya, Somalia)
Date of case study	July 2011	February 2012	April 2012
Date of crisis	July 2010	January 2010	From early 2011
Type of crisis	Natural disaster (floods)	Natural disaster (earthquake in urban settings)	Complex crisis (drought, famine and conflict)
Type of cash response (on a large scale)	Unconditional cash grants, CFW	Mostly CFW in emergency (national response) + vouchers and cash grants in recovery phase	Unconditional cash grants, CFW, vouchers

In the on-line survey, 12 different countries (Afghanistan; Haiti; Ivory Coast; Kenya; Niger; Pakistan; Philippines; Somalia; Sri Lanka; Uganda; Yemen; Zambia) were represented, but the bulk of the respondents referred to the case study countries: Haiti, Kenya, Somalia and Pakistan (2/3 of respondents). The period covered is from 2005 to 2012 (cf. Table 2).

Table 2. Distribution of respondents per type of organization and country (n=36)

Type of Organization	Number of respondents	Countries where respondents had previous cash coordination experience
International NGO	19	Afghanistan (2011); Haiti (2011); Ivory Coast (2011); Kenya (2006, 2009, 2011); Pakistan (2010); Philippines (2011); Sri Lanka (2011); Uganda (2009, 2010); Zambia (2010)
National NGO	2	Pakistan (2010), Somalia (2012)
UN agency	6	Kenya (2011); Niger (2012); Somalia (2011); Sri Lanka (2005); Yemen (2011)
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement	3	Haiti (2010)
Institutes, Universities, Academic/Research	0	
Independent consultant	4	Pakistan (2010)
Donor agency	0	
National institution	2	Kenya (2009)
TOTAL	36	

2.2.3 Limits

Difficulties in gathering data from donors, national actors and authorities: though it was relatively easy to make contact with those actors who had been very involved in the coordination mechanisms and who had therefore shown an interest in it, it was much more difficult (especially in Haiti and Pakistan) to interview the other actors, such as donors, national NGOs and governmental institutions. It was therefore difficult to understand their perceptions, positioning and the reasons for their “non-involvement”. In Haiti, there was a challenge in identifying which ministries or other national actors to meet, as no members of the coordination group had any real interlocutor at government level. In Kenya, some government line ministry representatives were met, but this was not possible for Somalia, mainly due to the fact that interviews were only conducted in Nairobi. Unfortunately the online survey did not succeed in collecting feedback from donors or national actors.

No contact with the field level coordination: in the Horn of Africa and Pakistan, there was no first-hand observation or analysis of how coordination operated at a local field level because interviews were only conducted in the capitals. This was not the case in Haiti due to the fact that the capital city, Port-au-Prince, was itself the centre of the disaster and was therefore also the location for coordination mechanisms.

High turnover and lack of institutional memory: in Pakistan and Haiti, the case studies were conducted respectively one and two years after the emergency arose in the country. Given the high turnover within humanitarian organizations, few of those who were present at the beginning of the crisis were still present in-country at the time of the study. This created challenges to understand how emergency cash coordination was first set up.

Inconsistent depth of understanding across the three case studies: the comparative study is a collaborative work conducted by the two consultants who worked on Haiti and the Horn of Africa, but not on Pakistan. They tried to acquire a satisfactory understanding of the Pakistan case study by

an in-depth review of the report and a phone conversation with the author, but this could not replace the first-hand experience of conducting the review.

Limited contact with people working at the global level: at global level, many key stakeholders had already been contacted for other studies commissioned by the CaLP (i.e. on Advocacy, on Scaling-up CTP) and the authors were advised not to re-contact them for this study, in order to avoid “interviewee fatigue”. Therefore, this study is mainly based on a case study-level understanding, and provides less detail on reflections and developments occurring at global level. This creates limitations in terms of detailed steps required to implement some of the global level recommendations. However, the presentation of findings to the CaLP steering committee members and food security staff from two CaLP steering committee organisations (in Oxford, May 2012) enabled some reflections at global level to be incorporated into the final report.

3 The CTP coordination needs of different stakeholders

This section focuses on the coordination needs of various stakeholders: what they need to share in coordination forums, the information they need to know, in order to make what individual and collective decisions, etc. Coordination is accepted as good practice within the humanitarian community, however individual and regular participation of organisations are dependent on people's willingness and motivation.⁴ Therefore it is important to understand the driving forces of participation. Understanding these coordination needs and expectations is a fundamental starting point - a yardstick against which we can measure the effectiveness of any cash coordination mechanisms.

The stakeholders considered here are: NGOs (international and national), UN Agencies, donors, the private sector, host governments and local authorities. What emerged very clearly throughout the course of this review is that different stakeholders have different coordination needs. The coordination needs of stakeholders have been regrouped into five categories, presented below.

3.1 A community of practice

Participation in a community of practice is frequently cited as the number one expectation for NGOs, especially smaller NGOs with less technical expertise in CTP. A community of practice is defined as a group of aid workers (mostly project managers and/or staff with an understanding of field-level issues) who share good practice, technical and process innovations, agreements with local authorities and difficulties experienced in implementing CTP. Negotiating better terms with service providers is also an important function of a community of practice (for example the Hawala money transfer companies in Mogadishu, banks or mobile phone companies in Kenya, local traders, etc).

When a level of trust is built up, particularly around admitting challenges, the group can provide significant mutual technical support and learning. It should be noted that good practice around CTP is not necessarily limited to a certain geographical or technical area, and could even come from other countries (learning-in). For this reason, regional coordination plays an important role, as do on-line resources, learning events and training courses.

Stakeholder interest: NGOs, especially smaller NGOs with less technical expertise and capacity in CTP.

⁴ This can be described as "voluntary cooperation, motivated by goodwill or even by the threat of sanction from society" (Gillinson 2004: 5). However, coordination in the humanitarian sector sometimes verges on "coerced cooperation", i.e. when a central authority, such as donors, make participation in certain coordination mechanisms a condition for receiving funding. However, this is not the case for the majority of the cash coordination mechanisms discussed in this review.

3.2 Harmonising approaches to cash programming

Many NGOs, UN agencies and donors are interested in improving the harmonization of their programmes, which involves: harmonizing transfer amounts, harmonizing CFW daily rates and harmonizing targeting criteria. The objective is to create a shared approach that is fairer for beneficiaries and does not have a negative impact on local markets or increase conflict in the communities. The advantages are not only ethical, but also pragmatic, as a harmonised approach increases the levels of acceptance by local communities of all aid organizations, not just the one which has the highest transfer amount (Cf. section 5.4 for achievements in terms of harmonising approaches and targeting).

Host governments are also interested in coordinating with humanitarian actors on harmonizing approaches, as there are important implications for the local job market, as well as linking in with government-led social protection mechanisms.

Stakeholder interest: NGOs, UN agencies, donors, host governments

3.3 Identifying funding opportunities and implementing partners

Many participants in coordination mechanisms see the meetings as an opportunity to network and create partnerships for project implementation. Smaller NGOs seek partnerships with larger NGOs or UN agencies, while UN Agencies often look for NGOs that can be ‘implementing partners’ for their programmes. A group of NGOs may also join forces together to write a common project (as was the case with the Somalia Cash Consortium, consisting of four large INGOs). NGOs are also keen to understand what delivery mechanisms are offered (by the private sector) and to form partnerships with them.

Private sector actors who participate in coordination mechanisms state networking as their main expectation, promoting their specific expertise and finding NGO or UN agencies they could work with. One bank in Kenya explained that this can even have benefits across a wider region, i.e. participation in a meeting in Kenya led to a project in Uganda.

Stakeholder interest: National NGOs, International NGOs, UN agencies, private sector, looking to form partnerships for project implementation

3.4 Advocating for appropriate CTP

Coordination mechanisms can provide a platform from which to build consensus, and advocate for appropriate cash programming. This advocacy can be directed towards a number of different audiences; most often donors, UN agencies and host governments, but also local authorities and affected populations. A recognizable coordination forum was felt to be necessary in order to give a voice and certain legitimacy when talking to donors and the UN Humanitarian Country Team (HCT). INGOs are particularly keen to have an identifiable platform from which they could advocate for appropriate cash transfer programming in certain geographical areas.


Stakeholder interest: Mainly international NGOs, especially larger NGOs who take a stance on issues

3.5 Identifying gaps and avoiding duplication

Analysing coverage is a key expectation of top-level management, decision-makers, donors, government, etc., who want cash coordination to go beyond the question of modality or discussions about how to implement cash programmes and assess gaps and duplication. Indeed, key decision-makers currently have little interest in attending technical cash coordination meetings. What they do expect from cash coordination mechanisms is more closely linked to the overall objective of any “formal coordination system”, i.e. gaps filling and greater coverage. Identifying gaps and avoiding duplications was mentioned as the number one concern of donors and UN agencies, and was frequently cited by the bigger more experienced NGOs (such as Care, Oxfam GB, etc.). Ideally, actors would like cash coordination to contribute to the global coordination system by providing relevant information which allows an overview, not just of what has been done (output) but of the impact (outcome) and, most importantly, the extent to which needs are being met in different geographical areas. The expectation is that coordination mechanisms can produce **information on gaps and duplications that feeds into the decision-making processes**. However, though it was often cited that this information is difficult to collect, and there was little agreement on the right level of detail necessary, this remains a key expectation for cash coordination.

Stakeholder interest: Donors, UN agencies, bigger more experienced NGOs who have numerous projects and wide geographical coverage.

Figure 2. The CTP coordination needs of different stakeholders



4 The functioning of cash coordination

In the three case studies, different models for cash coordination have been established. This section summarizes the main features of these cash coordination mechanisms, highlighting similarities and differences and the comparative advantages of various models. Cash coordination has differed in terms of leadership and its place within the wider aid architecture, the level of participation and partnership, the resources allocated and the focus and management of cash coordination. It is worth mentioning that cash coordination forums are also dynamic and evolve over time (in terms of leadership, focus, place in the aid architecture, etc.). These changes are often linked to the phases of the crisis; as the context and needs change, cash coordination also adapts.

4.1 Different models for cash coordination in the three case studies

Table 3 summarizes the main characteristics of cash coordination mechanisms in the three case studies: Haiti, the Horn of Africa and Pakistan.

Table 3. Main features of cash coordination mechanisms in the three case studies

	Pakistan	Haiti	Horn of Africa (Kenya, Somalia)
Leadership & cash coordination groups	<p>Emergency phase (until January 2011): 2 groups</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inter-Cluster on Cash and Vouchers (ICCV) with a focus on global coordination and policy, led by CaLP and WFP - Technical Working Group, sub-working group under the ICCV with a focus on technical issues <p>Recovery phase: 2 groups</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Pakistan Emergency Food Security Alliance (PEFSA) led by NGO / CaLP with a focus on Food Security issues - Community Restoration Working Group (CRWG) led by UNDP with a focus on works realized through CFW 	<p>Emergency phase (until Sept. 2010): 3 groups</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cash Transfer Coordination Group (CTCG) led by CaLP and NGOs (Oxfam GB, ACF, CRS) with a focus on all types of CTPs - CFW working group led by UNDP and Government of Haiti with a focus on CFW - USAID's CFW partners meetings led by USAID with a focus on CFW <p>Recovery phase (since Sept. 2010): 1 group</p> <p>Livelihoods Working Group led by Oxfam GB, then UNDP, with a focus on cash and livelihoods</p>	<p>6 cash coordination mechanisms:</p> <p>Kenya: 2 groups</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Sub-group on Cash Based Response (CBR) under the Kenya Food Security Steering Group (KFSSG) led by Government of Kenya and CaLP - Cash Transfer Technical Working Group (CTTWG) led by CaLP <p>Somalia: 3 groups</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Cash Based Response Working Group (CBRWG) led by Adeso and COOPI - Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group (CVMG) led by ODI and UNICEF - Inter-cluster cash coordination led by FAO <p>Regional: 1 group</p> <p>Regional Cash & Voucher Transfer Working Group (RCVT) led by CaLP and FAO</p>
Integration with cluster/sector coordination	Included as an Inter-cluster working group in the emergency phase, then in the CRWG	Included as a sub-working group of the Early Recovery cluster since Sept. 2010	Technical working groups (i.e. CBRWG and CTTWG) remain independent of clusters Inter cluster cash coordination for Somalia funded through the Food Security cluster Regional coordination part of the Inter Agency Working Groups (covering 13 countries)

	Pakistan	Haiti	Horn of Africa (Kenya, Somalia)
Pre-existence of cash coordination groups	Government-led sector working groups	Development-orientated coordination (i.e. Tables sectorielles) did not include coordination on social protection	Somalia: Since 2008 CBRWG led by Adeso and Coopi
Level of in-country CTP expertise	High (had previous large-scale cash responses to emergencies + existing social protection programmes)	Low, especially for CTPs other than CFW	High but some anti-cash preconceptions in Somalia Kenya: Government and NGOs, experience of social protection programmes (ex. HSNP)

4.2 Leadership and place of cash coordination within the aid architecture

4.2.1 More than 5 different leadership models

5 different types of stakeholders have chaired or co-chaired cash coordination mechanisms at one stage or another, with some coordination mechanisms having a series of different leads:

- A CaLP Focal point, deployed to the country (eg. Haiti, the Horn of Africa, Pakistan, Niger, Ivory Coast, etc.). These Focal points are often staff seconded to the CaLP from NGO members of the CaLP steering committee (eg. In Ivory Coast, the CaLP focal point was seconded from Oxfam GB);
- Members of CaLP steering committee: in several contexts (Pakistan, Haiti), staff from CaLP-consortium NGOs, notably Oxfam GB (as for Haiti) or ACF (as for Ivory Coast), facilitated the cash coordination mechanism in addition to their other responsibilities;
- “Non-CaLP” NGOs: as for Somalia, Adeso and Coopi who lead the Cash-Based Response Working Group (CBRWG) since 2008;
- UN agencies: UNDP (Haiti, Pakistan), FAO (Horn of Africa), WFP (Pakistan, Horn of Africa);
- Host government: Kenya, Pakistan (for sector coordination group).

Table 4 highlights possible advantages/disadvantages of each of the leadership arrangements, with regard to the issues of legitimacy, capacity to be immediately operational, capacity to build effective partnership, to address more strategic issues, etc.

Generally, it is clear that there is little, if any, **predictable leadership**⁵ with regard to cash coordination after an emergency. This will be further developed in the next sections as this has led in some cases to a multiplication of forums in which cash issues are discussed, often with some duplications.

⁵ GPPI and Groupe URD. *Evaluation of the Cluster approach Phase II*. 2010. “The existence of a clearly designated and accepted organization responsible for organizing coordination is a critical factor for making coordination work.”

Table 4. Advantages and disadvantages of different leadership models

	Advantages	Disadvantages
CaLP, NGOs and RCM	<p>Common features:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Brought high level of technical expertise and often good facilitation skills - Independence from cluster approach enables better partnership and sharing of practice <p>CaLP focal Point</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Linkage with expertise and resources available with the CaLP at global level - No direct interest in implementing the humanitarian response (no conflict of interest) - Not related to a specific sector <p>CaLP Steering committee members (ACF, Oxfam GB, BRC, NRC, SC, IFRC)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Encourages high level of commitment from other agencies (notably NGO), especially if the coordinator facilitates the cash coordination mechanism in addition to their other responsibilities. - Easier linkage with expertise and resources available with the CaLP at global level <p>Non-CALP NGOs (eg. Adeso, COOPI, CRS, etc.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Encourages high level of commitment from other agencies - Open forum with less risk of creating “restrictive” membership 	<p>Common features:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Difficulties in establishing a more “strategic-level” coordination and in influencing decision-making processes at higher level (donors, government) due to a lack of legitimacy in the global coordination system, i.e. no formal recognition in the cluster approach and no accountability towards the HC <p>CaLP focal Point</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Often delays in deployment of emergency focal point due to difficulties in mobilizing financial and human resources <p>CaLP Steering committee members (ACF, Oxfam GB, BRC, NRC, SC, IFRC)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Often related to a specific sector (i.e. Food Security) - Risk for cash coordination of being perceived as having restrictive membership when cash coordination group is established by a limited number of NGOs - Challenges in terms of time allocation if no dedicated position <p>Non-CALP NGOs (eg. Adeso, COOPI, CRS, etc.)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Often related to a specific sector (ie. Food Security) - No direct linkage with the CaLP expertise and resources - Challenges in terms of time allocation if no dedicated position
UN agencies (UNDP, WFP, FAO)	<p>All UN agencies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Accountability towards the Humanitarian Coordinator - Sustained presence in-country (before and after the crisis) - Strong political weight with the host government - Opportunities to link with more development-focused programs in some contexts <p>UNDP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - May offer the opportunity to mainstream cash in all clusters through the Early Recovery network - Overview of rehabilitation, non-agricultural livelihoods and CFW <p>WFP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Current development of CTP capacity at global level - Overview of food assistance and cash responses <p>FAO : Overview of livelihoods and agriculture, and CFW responses</p>	<p>All UN agencies:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Risk of overload if no dedicated coordinator - Uneven expertise in CTP, depending on the country <p>UNDP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Often low-level of expertise on CTPs other than CFW - Often delays in establishing the Early Recovery cluster in emergency and Early recovery network rarely effective <p>WFP: Responsibility in Food and Food Security cluster often limits the inclusion of cash in other relevant clusters</p> <p>FAO: Responsibility in Food Security cluster often limits the inclusion of cash in other relevant clusters</p>
Host government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increased national ownership - Opportunities to develop national capacities - Potential to improve linkage between emergency and development programmes (depending on host government’s capacity to make links between different line ministries) - Opportunities to directly discuss policy issues 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Low facilitation capacity - Often low expertise on CTPs - Lack of interest - Reluctance of some humanitarian actors to share certain information with authorities

4.2.2 Multiple forums can lead to some duplication and difficulties in overall coordination

In the three case studies, there were multiple cash forums and some duplication between them.

In the Horn of Africa, though there are six different coordination mechanisms, only two overlap in terms of objectives and audience: the CaLP led Cash Transfer Technical Working Group and the government-led sub-group on cash under the Kenya Food Security Steering Group. Though there are moves to integrate the two in the near future, there is also some resistance and this has not yet happened.⁶

In Haiti, at the emergency phase, there was a certain level of overlap between cash coordination groups, particularly with regard to the issue of CFW. Two separate groups were set up to discuss only CFW, each initiated by different actors: one by USAID, another by UNDP and DINEPA (Haitian government). One group was 'by invitation only', for the partners of USAID. In parallel, NGOs then established a Cash Transfer Coordination Group to discuss all kinds of cash transfer programmes, including CFW, grants, vouchers, etc.

In Pakistan, there was clear duplication of cash coordination forums. The Technical Working Group (TWG) was an open forum, integrated into the cluster system. However, the Pakistan Emergency Food Security Alliance (PEFSA)⁷ was an exclusive group catering only to the six agencies involved in implementing a large food security project.

Such duplication can lead to a number of problems and risks in terms of coordinating the CTP response:

- Though often communication does exist between forums, it is informal and therefore cannot be relied upon;
- If groups are centred around only one modality (such as CFW) this does not encourage the possibility of using other modalities (such as grants or vouchers);
- Confusion over who is leading the CTP response;
- Difficulties in the harmonisation of approaches (such as CFW amounts) if discussed in different groups.

⁶ Resistance is based on two concerns (1) that the KFSSG is food security focused and cash is a multi-sectoral tool, and (2) that the GoK has so far shown low capacity and motivation in facilitating meetings (slow to call meetings, weak facilitation skills, minutes not rapidly sent out, etc.).

⁷ PEFSA I was an ECHO funded alliance consisting of 6 agencies (Oxfam GB (OGB), Save the Children (SCUK), Action Contre la Faim (ACF), ACTED, CARE and International Rescue Committee (IRC)). The six agencies were awarded €15 million in total for six emergency response programs, each six months in duration, starting September 1, 2010.

4.2.3 Confusion over the CaLP's role – supporting all aid actors, or an exclusive group?

As demonstrated above, some cash coordination groups chose to remain 'by invitation only'. Though this is understandable - because partners have similar interests and want the coordination to be efficient – CaLP's association with such groups can lead to confusion over the CaLP's role, which is a wider one of promoting appropriate cash transfer programming more generally. This specific issue was raised in Pakistan, where the CaLP focal point was financed 50% by a 'closed' group (via the PEFSa), and 50% via the CaLP. This dual loyalty meant that the CaLP's role was seen as partly exclusive, i.e. for a particular group's interest. Funding arrangements should aim to avoid this situation, which has negative implications for the image of the CaLP.

In Haiti, the coordination group, initially known as the "CaLP group", was set up with somewhat unclear lines of communication between the CaLP Head Office, the five members of the CaLP Steering Committee and other organisations that were engaged in CTP in Haiti, such as Mercy Corps. The Cash/CaLP Focal Point indicated in her handover report that it was really challenging to understand to whom to report and highlighted the limits of the CaLP governance structure, i.e. the Steering Committee, centred around five organisations, whereas a number of other players were also highly active and her position was funded by a group of CaLP and non-CaLP NGOs and hosted by Save the Children US.⁸

4.2.4 Some integration of cash coordination within the cluster/sector system, depending on context

Cash coordination has not been integrated into the cluster system in all contexts; some coordination bodies have voluntarily decided to remain independent of the clusters (such as the CBRWG in Somalia, the CTTWG in Kenya). However, where integration into the clusters has occurred, there are three ways in which this has happened:

1. **As a technical working group**, under the umbrella of one of the clusters/sectors. Examples include: the Technical Working Group (TWG) in Pakistan, and the Livelihoods Working Group in Haiti, under the Early Recovery Cluster.
2. **As an inter-cluster forum**, a separate meeting which links in with all the other clusters. An example was the Inter-cluster on cash and vouchers (ICCV) in Pakistan.
3. **Mainstreamed into existing clusters**, as an inter-cluster mechanism that does not hold separate meetings but reports to other clusters. An example is the Inter-cluster coordination mechanism for Somalia, led by FAO under the umbrella of the Food Security cluster. Its objective is to collect information from and report to all clusters regarding CTP, however in reality it is very food-security focused.

In the cluster approach, there is no predefined place for CTPs. This gives a large amount of flexibility to establish the most appropriate coordination mechanism depending on needs and context. If cash coordination is included in the cluster approach, there is a strong tendency to link with either food

⁸ Truelove, S. *Haiti CaLP Coordination - CTP Focal Point Handover and Proposed Work Plan [July updated edition]*.

security (as in the Horn of Africa), or with livelihoods and recovery (as in Haiti and Pakistan). This has been dependent on the type of disaster, the needs of affected populations (basic needs or livelihoods recovery), and therefore dependent on the primary objectives of the majority of CTPs. **It is clear that cluster integration should not be pre-determined but context-driven**, in-line with the approach of the Transformative Agenda. It should also be highlighted that by connecting CTPs to only one sector, there is a risk that multi-sectoral coordination on cash suffers.

The online survey results show that there is a consensus that cash coordination should, at some point, be formally integrated into the cluster system.⁹ This integration must be achieved multi-sectorally, i.e. whilst still maintaining the fact that cash is a modality and not an end in itself. There was concern expressed in the on-line survey that cluster integration would mean cash being confined to one sector, and this must be avoided.¹⁰

Nevertheless, if done in the right way, cluster integration would bring with it many advantages: higher-profile for CTP within the aid architecture, regular consideration of cash as a modality for aid response across sectors, better coordination mechanisms, increased coordination predictability (especially in terms of leadership).

4.2.5 Technical and strategic functions often integrated in different ways, if at all

There is a sliding scale from technical to strategic functions of CTP coordination (cf. Figure 2: The CTP coordination needs of different stakeholders). Technical functions focus more on the *process* of cash delivery (such as sharing lessons learnt, delivery mechanisms, negotiating with service providers, developing guidelines, harmonising approaches) while more operational or strategic functions focus on the *results and impact* of cash programmes (advocacy to promote appropriate CTP and coordinating the aid response so as to avoid gaps and duplications).

Technical and strategic functions have often been integrated in different ways into the aid architecture:

- **Separation of technical functions:** technical issues have generally been discussed in separate forums from strategic issues of needs coverage. Whether integrated in the cluster system as technical working groups (like the TWG in Pakistan) or independent from the cluster system (CBRWG for Somalia, CTTWG in Kenya, Cash and Voucher Technical Working Group in Man, Ivory Coast) technical working groups discuss the 'how to' of delivering cash, and this is specific to cash as a modality, and this has been separated from strategic functions.

⁹ Interestingly respondents were divided with regards to the question "should cash be formally integrated into the cluster system?" 87% replied 'yes', but highlighted that it should be mainstreamed into *all* the clusters. 13% replied 'No', fearing that integration would be too linked to one particular cluster and reduce the multi-sectoral nature of the modality. To conclude, all respondents agreed that integration should be into all sectors.

¹⁰ This risk is also highlighted in Maunder's paper on Advocacy, "there is considerable resistance to placing leadership for cash transfers under any one UN agency" (2012: 47).

- **Attempts to integrate strategic functions across sectors:** various initiatives show an attempt to map CTP and link it in with other sectors (such as the ICCV in Pakistan). Though the connection remains strongest with the food security sector (like the Inter-cluster cash coordination mechanism in Somalia which reports to the Food Security cluster, and the mapping activities led by FAO in Kenya) the objective should be essentially multi-sectoral. The integration of the strategic level of coordination was weaker in Haiti than in the Horn of Africa.

In summary, technical functions are specific to the modality of cash delivery, whereas strategic functions are more about how needs are met, across sectors, and therefore must be viewed in terms of both cash and in-kind responses.

4.3 Participation and partnership

4.3.1 Successful creation of partnerships and collaborative network between humanitarian organizations

International NGOs and Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement are the main participants in cash coordination. As already explained, at an early stage, cash groups often are the initiative of a small group of interested humanitarian organizations (eg. in Haiti) or of a consortium (eg. the PEFSa in Pakistan, the Cash & Voucher group in Ivory Coast, the Cash & Voucher Monitoring group in Somalia), occasionally with some restrictions to participation. As the group develops, it often becomes more open to participation from other members.

In the case study countries, the coordination groups have overall succeeded in having active participation from humanitarian NGOs and RCM, enabling joint initiatives for developing studies and research, sharing practices, advocacy, etc. However, in the longer-term, it appeared that bigger NGOs, who already had strong experience in CTPs and who often had been innovative in implementing CTP (cf. Section 5.2.1), were less keen to regularly attend coordination meetings. After strong participation at the beginning, their participation dropped off when the climax of the emergency had passed (as was the case for Oxfam GB and Save the Children in the Horn of Africa, or for Mercy Corps in Haiti). This could reduce opportunities for mutual learning with less-experienced NGOs. The multiplication of meetings also led to irregular participation: different people come to different meetings.

4.3.2 Presence of UN agencies dependant on level of coordination and sector perspective

The presence of UN agencies (such as WFP, FAO, UNICEF, etc.) in cash coordination is irregular and highly dependent on context, personality and level of coordination. If coordination is running as part of the cluster system they are more likely to be present, but this will also depend on the level of

discussions: technical or more strategic¹¹, as well as on their interest to share some specific information (i.e. about their on-going initiatives, needs for identifying implementing partners, etc.).

However, OCHA is rarely involved in cash coordination groups. In Haiti, for example, OCHA was not fully aware of the existence and of the work done by the cash group. In Kenya, until now, OCHA had only attended the CTTWG once. One reason for this, as previously explained, is that links between cash coordination groups and the coordination system managed by OCHA and the HC, (i.e. the cluster approach), are not yet formalised. Furthermore, when cash coordination groups are led by NGOs, linkages with OCHA and the HC are even more vague as NGOs are not part of the UN system and therefore not formally accountable to the HC in the same way that UN agencies are.

4.3.3 Targeted participation of private sector

In most cases, private sector actors, such as banking institutions and mobile phone companies, have an open invitation to meetings but do not attend regularly. They usually participate for a particular reason, i.e. when they are invited to present their products and services. Some humanitarian actors consider that the private sector should actually be kept as an “outsider” to maintain the group’s independence (as too close links should not be formed, in order to maintain a competitive environment for service providers), while still allowing group members to get information about them. Others however saw no risk in the private sector attending coordination meetings regularly.

4.3.4 Limited involvement of donors

There is no consensus amongst humanitarian actors as to what extent donors should take part or not in meetings¹². At a more technical level, there is less need for donors to participate; in fact their presence could reduce the informal sharing and learning mechanism (reluctance to share failures in front of funding partners). However at a more strategic level, the participation of donors (both humanitarian and development oriented), should be encouraged. Unfortunately, in reality they are rarely present (e.g. Haiti) despite the efforts made to involve them.

4.3.5 Weak involvement of host governments and national civil society


As illustrated in figure 3, in three-quarters of the 10 countries surveyed, state institutions and/or civil society are either not involved or have no regular involvement in cash coordination meetings, activities or decision-making processes. Only in Kenya, where the government has started to run its own cash coordination mechanism, and in Pakistan, where the government is leading the sector working group, does better ownership¹³ exist. Nevertheless, it should be mentioned that, in many countries, training courses (CaLP Level I) provide an important opportunity to involve government partners and national NGOs.

¹¹ UN bodies often work through implementing partners and are therefore less concerned by pure technical discussions.

¹² As an illustration, quotation from the on-line survey on cash coordination: “the inclusion of donors may not help create an atmosphere which is conducive to sharing ‘bad’ practice, which of course is so important in order to learn and not repeat the same mistakes.”

¹³ In this report, ownership” refers to national and local governmental and civil society / private institutions

Figure 3. Ownership by the government and the national institutions of the cash coordination mechanisms (On-line survey results; n=22)



It is not surprising that this review has found the involvement of host governments and national civil society to be weak; this was already identified as one of the shortcomings of humanitarian coordination in emergencies (Cluster approach evaluation phase II 2010). Increased involvement of host governments is also one of the driving principles of the Transformative Agenda. It should be highlighted that this is more relevant with regard to natural disasters, rather than conflict situations, where involvement of the host state can affect the humanitarian mandate.

With regard to national NGOs and CBOs, INGOs feel that the representatives of these organizations are often more interested in finding sources of funding rather than discussing practices. From a national NGOs' perspective, they feel that they lack information and knowledge about international organisations' coordination mechanisms. In some cases, the language (for example the use of English in a French-speaking country, or the overuse of "humanitarian jargon") could also act as a barrier to participation from nationals NGOs.

The Diaspora is another major player from civil society which, in some countries (as in Haiti and Somalia), provides substantial support to relatives through cash transfers, most of which are on an individual basis. It is not clear to what extent cash coordination should be tied with the Diaspora, as they are not implementing CTP *per se* but only sending money from abroad and rarely have representatives in-country. However for humanitarian organisations, there might be interesting lessons to be learnt from them in terms of *how* to deliver cash.¹⁴ Remittances are also an important coping mechanism for many families, playing a significant role in people's livelihoods. It is important that aid actors take remittance contributions into account when assessing needs at household level.

¹⁴ For example, in Somalia, the Diaspora frequently uses the Hawala agents to transfer money and NGO-led CTPs have learnt from this experience and also used the same delivery mechanism.

4.4 Resources allocated

4.4.1 Dedicated and sustained human resources not always available

It has been demonstrated that the effectiveness of any coordination mechanism is highly reliant on the existence of a dedicated and sustained coordinator (Cluster approach evaluation phase II). However, globally speaking, deploying dedicated human resources to cash coordination mechanisms has been a challenge in many countries. As highlighted by one of the respondents of the on-line survey: “In many contexts the CTP coordination role is not a full time job therefore there is not sufficient leadership and technical work cannot progress as well as it should.”

CaLP Focal Points have been deployed in all countries studied but with different modalities: some were funded to respond to specific emergencies (Haiti, Pakistan, Ivory Coast) and others were funded, on a long-term basis, to promote the appropriate use of CTPs in the region and were therefore already in the country when the crisis arose (Kenya, Niger). Those Focal Points who were in place prior to the crisis had several advantages, knowing the context and the stakeholders, plus being in-country and therefore immediately operational. For the others, the deployment has often been late – a couple of weeks – after the crises.

Though the CaLP coordinators have been effective, many challenges remain in the capacity of the CaLP to deploy Focal Points quickly, and on a medium-term basis, with consequences on leadership, capacity to develop guidelines as well as on the timelines of the deployment. Challenges include:

- Limited capacity to mobilise funds quickly
- Difficulty in funding the post for longer than 3 months
- Difficulty in identifying person to commit for a long contract (beyond 6 to 8 weeks, implying rapid turnover or gaps)

When dedicated human resources were not available from the CaLP, staff from implementing NGOs (Oxfam GB in Haiti) tried to fill the gap on a voluntary basis. Another option that was often considered was a rotating chair among a group of committed organizations (i.e. unfunded externally). However, although the voluntary commitment from the coordinator creates a positive atmosphere, it overloads the operational staff who are also coordinating, and is not a sustainable solution.

Finally, it is important to mention that rarely was a proper Information Management (IM) officer seconded to the cash coordination groups, and this has a strong impact on the capacity of the coordination group to identify gaps and duplications as explained in section 5.5. Information management comprises information collection and analysis, sharing and storing (institutional memory) and dissemination. An Information Management officer therefore should be responsible for managing data collection tools and analysis (i.e. development of appropriate data collection tool, regular up-dates and maintenance), for building institutional memory (i.e. storing of relevant documents, studies, etc) and for disseminating information through meetings, email updates, responding to specific requests, etc. Ideally, an IM system for cash coordination should be developed

in connection with other data collection systems (such as the OCHA global information system¹⁵) in order to ensure that one feeds into the other.

4.4.2 Valuable financial resources allocated for research, studies and evaluations

Some additional resources were allocated to conduct specific studies or pieces of research. In Haiti, and Somalia and Pakistan this was done through hiring consultants. Funding came from UNDP in Haiti, WFP (SDC funds) in Pakistan. Also in Somalia, some funding has been channelled through UNICEF for the shared monitoring tools developed by Adeso and ODI. Globally, donors seem to be receptive to support research, monitoring and evaluation proposed by the coordination group in order to build up an evidence-base on appropriateness and impact on CTP.

One of the lessons learned from Haiti is that studies should be done in a way that ensures a timely impact on the humanitarian response, i.e. results should not come too late. This implies taking into account possible delays in recruiting consultants, the necessary time for the consultative process, the mobilisation of financial resources, the writing and validation of the report, etc. If research cannot be timely and have an impact on the emergency response, available evidence from other contexts (learning-in) could be of use.

4.5 Coordination group focus and management

4.5.1 Good practice in facilitating meetings and in organizing events (training, learning events, joint visits to programmes)

Cash coordinators have proven to have good facilitation and inter-personal skills, as well as a high level of commitment. This was tremendously important in maintaining a high level of participation (as achieved in Haiti) and allowing collective discussions and participatory processes. Some of the good practice that deserves mentioning is:

- Formalising Terms of Reference for the working group;
- Organising meetings around particular themes and inviting organizations or private sector to make presentations on the selected theme: this approach was adopted early on in Haiti; Kenya is in the process of doing it too;
- Informing participants of the topic and the presentations to be made before meetings and sending meeting reports with a summary of discussions and a copy of presentations very swiftly afterwards;
- Making time available to respond bilaterally to a large number of requests for information from organizations (who were or were not part of the coordination meetings).

In addition to meetings, training¹⁶, learning events and joint visits to programmes (such as in Haiti) were organised. All of these initiatives were highly appreciated and provided opportunities to include

¹⁵ In the formal coordination system (i.e. the cluster approach), clusters are responsible for information management within clusters, whereas OCHA is responsible for information management between clusters.

some organizations that did not regularly attend coordination meetings, such as staff from host governments, national NGOs and donor representatives.

4.5.2 Considerable resources available but no toolbox formalized to support coordination leads

Considerable resources (documents, technical sheets, reports, guidelines, etc.) have been produced over recent years on CTP, and numerous documents are already accessible on the CaLP website, or with the NGO members of the CaLP. However, it could be important to have a 'ready-to-use' toolbox (including example of ToR, case study templates, example of joint monitoring tools, etc.) to support coordination leads in an emergency, both to allow rapid and effective deployment and also to avoid "reinventing the wheel". This has not yet been formalized for coordination purposes. The authors have gone through a document called "*Cash & Voucher Technical Working Group discussion primers*", but have not been able to assess to what extent it was used by CaLP Focal Points deployed in emergencies.

4.5.3 Appropriate communication means but developed ad hoc in each context

Members are generally satisfied with the way coordination groups communicate, which is principally based on diffusing meeting information and documents via an email list. This was confirmed by the results of the on-line survey where 90% of respondents from 11 different countries answered yes to the question: "Is the type of communication used relevant and appropriate?" However, they also mentioned that a webpage is essential to keep track of discussions and store useful documents, especially for newcomers. In some countries, coordination groups managed to establish an on-line resource, but the webpage hosting depends on the leadership of the group. Thus, Pakistan developed an 'independent' webpage (but with a link on the OCHA humanitarian response website), in Haiti the page was created directly within the OCHA humanitarian response website (but only when the LWG became a sub-working group of the Early Recovery Cluster), while in Kenya the groups have their own page within the CaLP website. Other communication means are used on an ad hoc basis, such as an on-line forum or newsletter. Finally, the use of mobile phones to communicate about meeting times and locations was frequently cited as an effective means that should be more widely used.

¹⁶ The CaLP has conducted training courses in Nairobi (level 1 and 2), while Adeso has also conducted similar courses in Nairobi and in the field in Somalia.


5 Main achievements and shortcomings of emergency cash coordination

5.1 A strong community of practice

As outlined in figure 4 (which represents results from the on-line survey), coordination mechanisms are primarily perceived as platforms for sharing information on technical issues. These “platforms” enabled the creation of a community of practice, the forging of partnerships and the building of consensus on key issues. Generally, through discussions in meetings, members were able to share project processes, results, lessons learned and challenges in project implementation. The use of matrices and databases (such as 3W) helped actors to gather information and contacts about organisations and projects, as well as to identify potential partners. This process was a necessary condition that enabled cash coordination to achieve the results outlined in the next sections.

Figure 4. Cash coordination mechanisms: Current and future functions (n=24, n=30))

In this figure, the blue bars represent the “present” status of cash coordination according to 24 respondents who have been active participants in cash coordination, i.e. what cash coordination currently is. The yellow bars illustrate the ideal status of cash coordination mechanisms, i.e. what the respondents expect from cash coordination in the future. The number of respondents (30) is higher in the yellow series (30) than in the blue one (24) as it includes the opinions of those who have not yet participated in cash coordination.



5.2 Some coordination of assessment and monitoring (needs, markets, project impact) but many gaps remain

5.2.1 Sharing of market analysis and monitoring remains patchy

Good market analysis and monitoring is essential to implementing both cash transfer programmes and in-kind aid assistance, and much data is already collected (WFP, FAO, Fewsnets, etc). The level of scrutiny around cash has, some argue, highlighted the need for good market analysis, making it necessary for all organisations conducting CTP to perform a certain level of market assessment and monitoring. Cash coordination mechanisms alone have been unable to make much progress in this area; few countries have conducted joint market analysis and monitoring. However, as market analysis is of course not confined to CTP, **the main achievements have been in conjunction with other coordination mechanisms**, and this is as it should be. Here are a couple of examples:

- **Somalia CVMG market price meeting:** initiative of the CVMG in Somalia to share market price information within a select group (WFP, FAO/FSNAU, ODI, UNICEF, FEWSNET, Cash Consortium actors). The objective is to compare market analysis and monitor whether there is any correlation between large injections of cash or in-kind assistance, and inflation. Results so far have been reassuring in that any inflation spikes have not been linked to the influx of aid or cash. A good initiative, but the coordination remains limited to a closed group and is not done across sectors (or available to donors)
- **Haiti EMMA studies:** there was a certain level of information sharing on market assessments, particularly the EMMA studies just after the earthquake, which were widely used. However there was very little coordination afterwards on actually conducting joint market assessments or monitoring. Agencies did conduct monitoring and evaluation of markets for their programmes but what was missing was a market monitoring mechanism for the response as a whole, and a leading organisation to take this initiative. This work could have been put in place by the *Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire* (CNSA), the national institution in charge of monitoring food security and markets trends, in partnership with Fewsnets, the VAM and the cash coordination group. However, at the time of writing this had not yet happened.

5.2.2 Some success developing joint tools for CTP monitoring and evaluation

In a number of contexts cash coordination mechanisms have been at the heart of developing shared monitoring and evaluation tools. Donor interest in this area is also very high. Achievements include:

- **Developing shared monitoring and evaluation in Somalia:** developed by the Cash Consortium and the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) for the CVMG for Somalia, these harmonised monitoring tools are now used by 9 NGOs. A multi-donor funded evaluation is now also underway (May – December 2012), evaluating the majority of cash transfer programmes in Somalia.
- **Haiti:** the Joint Agency monitoring tool that was developed by the CTCG was frequently cited by NGOs as a much appreciated success. This tool made it possible to compare different CTPs and identify good practice (for example on gender).

5.2.3 Difficulty integrating cash into general assessment tools

Although there has been some success in developing shared monitoring tools amongst cash actors, what is still lacking are tools that are applicable to both cash and in-kind. This is particularly important at the assessment stage, when the assessment of needs, context and markets should enable aid actors to decide whether in-kind or cash is most appropriate. In order to make this decision, certain specific information regarding the functioning of markets, the level of market integration, the attitudes of traders, delivery mechanisms, security and diversion risks, etc, are necessary. The lack of shared assessments of this kind is a shortcoming of coordination in general; however, it has a particular impact for cash coordination because if markets are not properly assessed it becomes de-facto the role of cash groups to do this (yet the market assessment information is also useful for those delivering in-kind assistance). At assessment level cash is by no means mainstreamed into tools such as the Multi-Cluster / Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA), or the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), and this remains a major challenge for cash coordination mechanisms in terms of trying to initiate multi-stakeholder assessments.¹⁷

5.3 Supporting humanitarian actors in implementation and delivery

5.3.1 Sharing technological innovation in cash delivery

Innovative delivery mechanisms were frequently discussed in cash coordination groups, allowing organisations to share tips with each other whilst also giving the private sector an opportunity to present their systems for delivering money. Though innovation does of course not necessarily have to involve new technology, many of the successes have indeed been of this nature:

- **Mobile Money in Haiti**, one of the main innovations of the response to the crisis was the introduction of Mobile Money in Haiti (due to a partnership between Mercy Corps and Voilà Foundation). The opportunities that mobile payment services brought were debated at length within the group, presentations were made and comparative analysis of different service providers was carried out. The LWG therefore allowed this new technology to be more widely known amongst actors who subsequently tested it in their programmes.
- **Last Mile Mobile Solutions** technology, a system for beneficiary registration that has been developed for World Vision, was also the subject of a presentation in the cash coordination groups in Haiti and Zimbabwe.¹⁸
- **E-payments for cash transfer**, in the Kenya CTTWG, Riverbank Solutions Ltd presented the payment solutions they have developed, and drawing lessons from their experience of similar programmes in Zimbabwe.

¹⁷ Maunder highlights this point in his paper on CaLP's Advocacy strategy: "The NATF¹⁷ has been active in developing guidelines and methodologies for the Multi-Cluster / Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA) approach. However, this methodology makes no significant reference to either market analysis or cash transfers. Linking to the work of this group may be an effective avenue for promoting the CaLP-related advocacy messages." (2012: 38)

¹⁸ The authors currently have no information on whether these presentations have resulted in other organisations adopting LMMS or considering to do so in the near future.

5.3.2 Negotiating better terms with services providers

This has been a tangible achievement of cash coordination mechanisms. The sharing of terms negotiated with service providers (banks, mobile phone companies, money agents, micro-finance institutions, etc) has enabled smaller aid organizations to benefit from the negotiating power of larger organizations. As these issues are very cash specific and not linked to any technical sector, this kind of information is not likely to be discussed within the clusters, for example.

To give smaller organisations the same ‘bargaining power’ as larger organisations or UN agencies, the following successes can be noted:

- **Haiti:** a study on cash disbursement was carried out at the instigation of the Livelihoods working group with financial support from UNDP. The terms of reference were developed in a highly collective manner and 17 NGOs were involved in the study. The results were very quickly shared and allowed actors to improve their disbursement mechanisms.
- **Somalia:** the Inter-cluster mapping tool lists the amount paid to money vendors for each transfer, this varies from 2% to 7% depending on the region and the actor, enabling all implementing agencies in the same region to negotiate the same payment.
- **Kenya:** WFP shared the terms it negotiated with service providers enabling NGOs to also negotiate the same payment terms.

5.3.3 Some country-specific CTP guidelines developed

Developing specific guidelines requires considerable resources and time, but is deemed necessary in certain contexts (though by no means all, as many useful guidelines already exist at global level). The principle constraint is in terms of the available human resources necessary to formalize such technical guidelines.

- **In Somalia,** because of the complexity of the security situation, Adeso hired a consultant (under the CBRWG) to produce guidelines on cash transfer programming.¹⁹ These guidelines were subsequently adopted by the Somalia Agriculture and Livelihoods cluster (before it was merged with the Food Cluster).
- **In Western Ivory Coast,** specific guidelines were developed by the CaLP coordinator during the 3-month contract, with an overview of stakeholders, the local context, projects underway, case studies, etc.
- **In Haiti,** although the extensive sharing of practice and active dissemination of meeting presentation and minutes filled an information gap in many ways, some actors expressed that specific guidelines or technical information sheets would also have been useful.

¹⁹ Dunn, S. 2010 *Guidelines for Cash Interventions in Somalia*. Prepared for Horn Relief (as the Chair of the Cash Working Group). Nairobi.

5.4 Harmonising rates and targeting: an essential function of cash coordination

Harmonising rates (CFW, grants, vouchers) and targeting criteria is highly important to cash coordination, but also highly contentious for many. In each of the case studies, harmonising approaches was discussed in-depth and many actors had high expectations for the process, with varying results. A number of achievements should be noted, however:

- **In Haiti, the government set rates:** initially different partners were using different CFW rates (the USAID rate, for instance, was higher than others). In order to harmonise transfer rates, the Government set a national rate for CFW. However, this was felt to be too high in rural areas (thereby having a negative impact on the local job market). The CTCG was very active in advocating vis-à-vis different coordination groups, donors and the government for different rates of pay between urban and rural contexts. The government consequently adopted two different rates, rural and urban.
- **In Ivory Coast, harmonising cash and in-kind:** the Cash & Voucher working group²⁰ took the initiative to harmonise transfer amounts with the value of in-kind assistance. The group consulted with clusters to calculate cash amounts in line with the Food basket and the Non-Food items distributed. Cash amounts were therefore established to enable families to purchase the same items.
- **In Kenya, smaller programmes harmonising with larger programmes:** a level of success, as some NGOs have harmonised their monthly payment rates with the amount paid to households via the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP)²¹. Donors have also played a role in encouraging partners to adopt the same transfer amounts. In Kenya, harmonising amounts has been chiefly discussed in the CTTWG.

The main difficulties in harmonising transfer amounts are the following:

- **Transfer amounts cannot be harmonised independently of project objectives:** project objectives are based on an analysis of needs (taking into account the mandate of the aid actor). For example, it is difficult to harmonise a project which aims to cover basic food security needs with a project that aims to re-build livelihoods – the transfer amounts are likely to be different. As was stated in the on-line survey: “Multiple organizations with varying mandates and programmatic objectives make harmonization and coordination more challenging”
- **Delays to the set up of the coordination mechanism:** attempts to harmonise approaches often comes too late, i.e. when projects are underway. Changing rates or transfer amounts mid-way is difficult and can cause conflict with the community, or difficult negotiations with the donor.

²⁰ The Cash & Voucher working group was a technical working group about cash, based in Man (Western Ivory Coast). The group was initially composed of a small number of NGOs (SC, OXFAM, ACF, IRC), all of whom were already implementing cash and voucher programmes. The group was created at the instigation of these NGOs and was intentionally separate from the clusters. A CaLP Focal Point was deployed to facilitate the group during three months.

²¹ Hunger Safety Net programme (HSNP), under the Ministry for Northern Kenya implemented by Care, Oxfam and Save the Children and funded by DFID. In 2011, the programme had approximately 68,000 beneficiary households in the arid and semi-arid lands of Northern Kenya. Source: http://www.hsnp.or.ke/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=153

Ideally rates should be discussed between agencies from the start, and built-in flexibility discussed with the donor and written into the project from the start.

- **Multiple forums lead to a lack of harmonisation:** in Haiti the duplication of cash coordination mechanisms (USAID had their own cash meetings with their implementing partners) led to different approaches by different groups. Better links are necessary between forums.

Though there are many benefits to harmonising rates, it is not always feasible, mainly due to differing needs of affected populations, differing mandates of organisations and therefore differing project objectives. When harmonising is not possible, there should at least be greater transparency on how rates are calculated and what needs the amount is intended to cover. The host government also clearly plays a role in the harmonisation of rates and may impose rates nationally or regionally. The fixing of rates by the host government is usually based on its analysis of the local labour markets and the amount given to households in any existing government-run social protection schemes.

5.5 Timely and effective advocacy difficult, but some successes

The necessity for advocacy around CTP clearly depends on the existing attitudes, i.e. to what extent there is a need to convince stakeholders of the relevance of cash programming. For example, in Pakistan the fact that the Government and other stakeholders had previous experience of CTP meant that advocating for CTP rather than in-kind assistance was not necessary - it was already part of the aid response.²² In other contexts there has been resistance to CTP in general, or more specifically to unconditional cash grants (from host governments, donors and UN agencies). For example, FAO and UNDP have been generally very pro-CFW and anti-unconditional grants. Advocacy was therefore necessary, coordination mechanisms have helped get the ball rolling, though usually one or two key actors have taken the lead within the forum. There have been some successes:

- **Conferences and roundtables:** At the instigation of the CTCG (with support from the ILO and the approval of UNDP) in Haiti a conference entitled “Kick Start Recovery Haiti” was organised. This conference provided a good opportunity to increase knowledge about CTPs amongst Haitian institutions, although as it took place six months after the emergency, its immediate impact on the emergency response was limited. For Somalia, the FAO organised a roundtable in November 2011 to dispel concerns about CTP causing inflation. The roundtable played an important role in presenting an evidence-base to key stakeholders (donors, UN agencies etc), showing that there was no clear correlation between CTP and inflation, therefore advocating for appropriate CTP to continue.
- **Targeting decision-makers:** for Somalia, the CBRWG led by Adeso (then Horn Relief) brought together a group of NGOs to advocate strongly for cash programming in Somalia, leading to the setting up of the ‘Cash Consortium’ (ACF, Adeso, DRC, Save the Children). One of the key documents Adeso produced was a succinct 3-pager: *Q&A on How to scale up Cash Programming in South Central Somalia*, which helped to considerably raise the profile of CTP amongst donors and UN agencies. In July 2011 the consortium began to receive funding from a range of donors, and implementation of the programme began around September 2011.

²² However, in Pakistan, there were considerable protection concerns around the way in which cash was delivered via the WATAN cards, but little or no advocacy was successfully done in this area.

- **Conducting case studies:** in both Haiti and Ivory Coast, case studies were conducted to develop an evidence base, which were used to contribute to advocacy initiatives. Examples from Ivory Coast included ACF using fresh food vouchers, and Oxfam GB using food vouchers.²³
- **Training and learning events:** these forums also serve an important function in terms of advocacy, reaching out to a wide range of stakeholders, including national actors (government and civil society). However, they may attract those people who are already open to the idea of CTP (particularly those involved in food security programmes) and there remains a lack of tools to reach out to wider audiences in different sectors (shelter, education, health, etc.).

However, a certain number of factors have clearly limited the ability of cash coordination groups to lead on advocacy issues, or to achieve the intended results in a timely manner:

- **Lack of predictable leadership and recognition:** current cash coordination mechanisms focused on technical issues may not be able to provide strong, strategic leadership and recognition within the wider aid architecture. There have been exceptions, but these are dependent on an individual or institution and cannot be relied upon.
- **Lack of dedicated human resources:** the CaLP focal point or other coordination chair has limited time available for face-to-face advocacy, attending other meetings than the cash meetings, developing country-specific advocacy tools, etc.
- **Lack of targeted advocacy tools:** each advocacy initiative had to somewhat ‘invent’ their own tools from scratch. Ready-made tools (that advocates can rapidly deploy) should be developed, and include awareness-building information such as: half-day training course, basic one/two page documents on why CTP can be appropriate, PPT presentations, etc.
- **Delayed response from the aid system:** though advocacy may be started early, the response may be delayed, as many argued was the case in the Horn of Africa.

5.6 Challenges in identifying gaps and avoiding duplication

5.6.1 Difficult to manage the right level of detail in mapping exercises

The primary tool used to identify gaps and avoid duplication was some form of 3W or 4W. In all the case studies there have been attempts at creating these (Haiti, Pakistan, Kenya, Somalia, Ivory Coast). These databases are hard to keep up to date and NGOs understandably complain about having to fill out multiple excel spreadsheets. Where many cash coordination groups exist, mapping becomes even more difficult. Even when cash coordination is linked into the clusters the role of OCHA in identifying gaps and duplications has been weak.

The experience from Haiti (cf. Box 2) highlights an intrinsic tension in trying to map gaps and duplications, which came out of all the case studies as well as the on-line survey: when mapping is too simplistic it tells you very little; when it is too complex it becomes impossible to update, and so is then inaccurate, and also tells you rather little. The challenge is clearly to find the right level of information. However, in none of the case studies was it felt that mapping of CTP had yet produced

²³ Included in the Cash Transfer Guide for Western Cote d’Ivoire, available on the CaLP website.

information that showed a clear indication of gaps and duplications. Rather, the databases were used more simply to see who does what where, with bilateral follow-up if more details were required.

Box 2. 3W matrix for cash transfer organisations and programmes in Haiti

Established at the beginning of the crisis (February 2010), the 3W matrix for CTPs in Haiti collected very detailed information: contact details of organisations and their local partners, details of programmes, methods of payment and financial partners, and monitoring and evaluation. During 2011, the matrix was reviewed and simplified to collect information about organisations and their projects (What? Where? What results?), and about local partners, including those from the private sector. However, over time, as stakeholders had less need for such types of information this matrix became increasingly difficult to keep up to date.

5.6.2 Some success in assessing gaps and duplications in terms of cash and in-kind, focusing on outcome rather than output

Some coordination mechanisms²⁴ have recognized that a strategic overview of gaps and duplications involves a combined analysis of both cash transfer programming and in-kind assistance. Knowledge of how much money or food has been transferred does not necessarily help decision-making, unless it is known to what extent needs have been met. A meaningful analysis and mapping exercise that enables an identification of gaps in terms of needs must therefore include:

1. **A cross-sectoral approach:** both the in-kind and cash response, across the sectors
2. **Emphasis on outcome rather than output:** rather than focusing on a highly complex mapping tool (which would include monitoring of how cash is being spent), the emphasis should be more the impact for affected populations, and therefore, what humanitarian needs remain unmet.

Box 3. Mapping cash and in-kind responses in Somalia

The Inter-cluster mechanism in Somalia focuses on the 3W of coordination, i.e. centralising data on who does what where and when, in order to avoid gaps and duplications in assistance. A complex mapping tool for CTP has successfully been developed. The information from the database is then used within the Food Security cluster to assess how cash (with food security objectives) is contributing to meeting food and livelihoods needs in Somalia. The calculations are done according to project objectives, i.e. are based on the programmatic assumption of the percentage of the cash grant that is intended for food and/or livelihoods. This amount is then calculated into Kcal (using local market prices) and combined with food distributions to produce a map of how both cash and in-kind are meeting needs.

Though this remains a food security and livelihoods focused exercise that has not yet been properly linked into other sectors, it is an example of strategic coordination of cash and in-kind responses that could be used across sectors.

²⁴ The Inter cluster coordination mechanism in Somalia, and the Googlemaps tool for Kenya, both developed by FAO. The Googlemaps tool is available at: http://www.disasterriskreduction.net/kenya_cash

5.7 Linking emergency, development and disaster preparedness

As a modality, cash transfer programming in emergencies provides significant opportunities to support rehabilitation and move into longer-term development. By its nature, cash programming can support local markets and local livelihoods, easing the transition out of the emergency phase. For instance, longer-term social protection mechanisms, when well designed from the outset, can provide a level of disaster preparedness if the same system for registration and payments can be used for rapid scale-up in future emergencies. The challenge for emergency cash coordination is to enable / promote the inter-connectedness between short and longer-term responses.

This also implies, in many cases, better involvement of host states.²⁵ In Haiti, for example, aid actors were keen to hand over coordination mechanisms to state actors; however, there was a lack of government counterparts in place. In Kenya the government has recently launched a 'sub-group' on cash, but its role in coordination is still relatively weak. However, cash coordination has built consensus on the need for improved links between emergency CTP and longer-term social protection (whether government-led or NGO-managed), resulting in an important re-think of the HSNP project (see below). Care Kenya, Oxfam GB and Save the Children UK, are all involved in this process, with funding from DFID.

Box 4. Designing social protection programmes with the in-built potential for CTP scale-up in an emergency

In Kenya, the second phase of the Hunger Safety Net Programme (HSNP), which begins in 2012, has been designed with the potential to rapidly scale-up in the event of a future disaster. All the households in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) where HSNP is operating (approximately 6 million) are now being registered with key information to enable flexible targeting. Each household is also being issued with card onto which payments can be made quickly. The system set up can potentially be used by any NGO or government ministry to make payments to beneficiaries, it is not limited to DFID partners. The card is also not linked to a single bank as it was in phase 1, thereby permitting competition can be maintained between different service providers.

²⁵ The role of host states obviously depends on the kind of humanitarian crisis - natural disaster or conflict situation. In situations of natural disaster the host state has a strong role to play, and humanitarian actors are keen to handover to national governments, providing the capacity and will is there.

6 Conclusions

6.1 Moving from technical working group to strategic coordination

Existing cash coordination mechanisms are first and foremost technical working groups, which have enabled highly relevant and effective **information and experience sharing**. They also provide an important platform for **harmonising approaches between aid agencies**, especially with regard to rates and amounts. In certain cases, such as in Haiti, cash coordination groups went further and provided a real mechanism to support learning and innovation.

However, although the technical aspect of coordination is paramount to establishing a community of practice, the need for more strategic coordination should not be overlooked. Indeed, the role of these working groups has often been limited to the sharing of good practice, with little direct involvement in the development or orientation of policies, and in the improvement of needs coverage. Nevertheless, this strategic role is crucial to improve the quality of the humanitarian response. It is possible to imagine a two-tiered coordination mechanism, with a strategic level and a technical level, as has been implemented successfully in other cases.²⁶

6.2 Unpredictability in rolling-out cash coordination mechanisms in emergencies and links not yet formalised with the wider coordination system

There is a great deal of uncertainty around the way in which cash coordination is established after an emergency. Experience has shown that the CaLP by itself can neither ensure an effective mobilization of funds for coordination nor a timely deployment of dedicated cash coordinators – nor should it be expected that CaLP should be solely responsible for doing so. The predictability of cash coordination mechanisms still needs to be improved both in terms of leadership and interaction with the wider coordination system, i.e. the cluster approach. Indeed, there are as yet no formalized links between cash coordination and the cluster approach. Though this is an advantage in terms of building trust and confidence between members and maintaining the multi-sectoral nature of cash, it is also a real handicap as it limits access to OCHA-based resources (i.e. information management systems, funding, inter-cluster communication, etc.) and its strategic overview of humanitarian coordination and response. This has an impact on the likelihood of cash coordination being set up in emergencies, as well as on its visibility. The integration into the cluster approach is also a question of legitimacy, and even accountability, towards the Humanitarian Coordinator, the host government and donors.

²⁶ Binder, A., Grünewald, F., Georges, Y., *Real-time evaluation in Haiti : 3 months after the earthquake*, GPPI, Groupe URD, Août 2010. “The experience of Haiti shows that it is possible to separate the different coordination functions of clusters: information sharing and the development of strategy. Though the strategic function needs to be run in a transparent manner but involving a limited number of actors (the government, the cluster lead and a few experienced actors), the sharing of information should be very wide and open to all actors.”

6.3 Challenges in addressing the multi-sectoral nature of CTPs

Among the various forms that cash coordination has taken, this review has shown that it is often closely connected to one sector (i.e. Food Security or Livelihoods), and consequently linked to specific 'sector-based' objectives (i.e. meeting basic food needs, reducing food insecurity in a target area, restoring households' livelihoods, etc.). Yet, CTPs are also widely used to meet other objectives, such as shelter, WASH, health, etc. In some cases, this has led to a multiplication of different forums in which cash issues are discussed, from technical working groups to sector-based cluster coordination. This raises the following question: should cash coordination be based on project objectives, or on the modality itself? If cash as a modality is used to meet *all* a family's basic needs, for example, how do we separate this out into distinct sector-based objectives and monitoring?

In terms of mapping gaps and duplications, it is clear that CTP must be considered as a *way* to meet needs, rather than as an end in itself. The rationale of CTP is that it gives people the choice to decide how to spend their cash transfers, whether for buying food, paying school fees, restoring livelihood assets, or improving their housing, etc. It is this very flexibility of cash transfer programming which is so appreciated by affected populations, yet makes it so difficult to design an appropriate coordination structure that allows gaps and duplication to be effectively mapped.

Cash is challenging the aid sector to think 'out of the box', and envisage a system which is not just improved, but radically different. As one of the respondents of the online survey said, "cash is a tool offering the opportunity to deconstruct the current humanitarian coordination and response architecture and redesign it for the best, bridging the gap between humanitarian and development and offering a multi-sectoral approach." How can better coordination be encouraged, not just around cash-based interventions, but with the way assistance is provided as a whole? The multi-sectoral nature of cash is challenging 'boxed' thinking and may help the aid community to move towards a systems approach rather than a sector-based approach. This systems based approach would also look less at coordinating the outputs (activities) and focus more on coordinating outcome (results and impact).

7 Recommendations

7.1 Developing a complete “toolbox” for supporting coordination leads in emergency situations

Actors concerned: the CaLP (with possible collaboration with Global cluster resources)

In emergency situations, it is essential to be able to **rapidly** establish effective cash coordination mechanisms. Experience has shown that cash coordinators have often lacked adequate tools to support them in running different coordination activities. Each coordinator has therefore created his or her own set of tools, causing some delays in being operational in their post and consequently limiting their capacity to properly tackle the diversity of tasks that were assigned to them.

In order to support cash coordinator deployment in emergency situations, it is recommended that the CaLP develop a “cash coordination toolbox”.

The development of this toolbox should be done by building on the existing body of knowledge about cash coordination (i.e. collecting and analysing cash coordinators’ hand-over reports, PowerPoint presentations, and all the tools which have already been designed in many different countries). The CaLP should also try to link-in with learning from the clusters, particularly the handbooks which have already been developed by each thematic cluster to support cluster coordinators at country level (eg. the FAO Cluster Coordination Guidance, the Health Cluster Guide prepared by the global Health Cluster or the WASH Cluster Coordination Handbook prepared by the global WASH cluster).

The toolbox should be made available on the CaLP website. In addition, the existing CaLP Level 2 training course module on coordination should explicitly analyse the challenges and advantages of cash coordination, how it links into the wider coordination systems, and refer to the existence of this toolbox for cash coordinators.

Such a toolbox should include:

❖ Specific guidance on the role of cash coordination in the humanitarian system

The toolbox should include a guide that gives essential information on the global humanitarian coordination system (the clusters, responsibilities of different agencies, role of OCHA, role of the HC, etc.) and how cash coordination fits into this wider system (which may be dependent on the cash coordination model that is used).

❖ Advice and tips for facilitating the group and examples of tools

To ensure the quality of cash coordination, methods and tools should be made more widely available, such as a list of themes to be discussed, tools (for follow up and monitoring, the 3W matrix and other matrices), and models for creating technical files and organizing joint visits.

❖ Means of communication to support the work of the coordinator

A communication kit should be made available, including: an email address, business cards, information on how to set up an email discussion group and a page on a website (hosted on the CaLP and/or humanitarian response website).

❖ Awareness-raising tools and basic training on CTPs

These tools should enable capacity building for those in-country actors who have little or no prior experience of implementing CTPs in emergency situations (UN agencies, the government, donors, international and national organizations, etc.) The awareness-raising tools should include brochures, advice and templates for developing a PowerPoint presentation, advice on conducting awareness-raising activities, case study models, a short introductory training course (approximately half a day), etc.

❖ A learning mechanism to pool experiences of CTP coordination in emergency contexts and disseminate lessons learned within the CaLP and amongst the other coordinators in place

Finally, in order to continually improve CTP coordination in emergency contexts and avoid having to re-invent the wheel every time, it is important to formalise a learning mechanism after each experience of coordination. This mechanism could be based on: models of handover reports; an end of mission debriefing with the CaLP coordinator and a member of the steering committee; the dissemination of lessons learned, good practice and useful tools amongst the other coordinators in place and the organization of learning sessions bringing together the coordinators.

7.2 Formalizing the integration of cash coordination mechanisms within the wider humanitarian system and developing a decision-making model

Actors concerned: the CaLP, IASC and OCHA, Global cluster leads (including GFS & CWGER)

The formalisation of cash coordination should resolve two current shortcomings: lack of predictability in leadership and setting up, and weakness to address strategic issues. However, integration does not mean that only one uniform model of cash coordination has to be rolled out in all emergencies. One of the plus points of the coordination of cash transfer programmes so far has been its flexibility in adapting to needs and contexts. The objective should not be to formalise a strict modus operandi for cash coordination within the cluster approach. Rather, it should be to discuss the different scenarios that are possible. The idea is therefore to develop a decision-making process for defining which model for cash coordination is the most appropriate depending on the context.²⁷ To do so, the CaLP should engage discussions at global level with the IASC and OCHA²⁸. It will be also important to follow-up on current initiatives taken by FAO on cash coordination²⁹ as well as on the reflections of the Cluster Working Group on Early Recovery about creating an effective cross-cluster network for Early Recovery.

²⁷ A similar approach is being adopted for the clusters, through the Transformative Agenda. A decision-making model sets out a timeline of who makes decisions when and the resulting coordination structure is adapted to the specific context (Grünwald 2012)

²⁸ In particular to link with the person within OCHA in New York, who is responsible for cash issues at global level

²⁹ FAO has been specifically tasked by IASC to set up the Virtual Technical Reference Group on Cash and Vouchers. The first meeting was held via teleconference in January 2012, with 10 participants from the CaLP, FAO, WFP, Oxfam and World Vision International. No further meetings have taken place to date (May 2012)


Figure 5 suggests a model of cash coordination mechanism. This model is based on the following principles, which should guide decision-making for each context:

- The need to differentiate technical from more strategic coordination; both do not need to be integrated in the same way. Technical working groups could remain more “independent” (e.g. as an informal working group), while strategic coordination must be integrated across-sectors.
- The recognition of cash as a modality with a multi-sectoral nature
- The need to institutionalise strategic cash coordination within the cluster system, to establish clear communication lines with OCHA and to increase accountability towards the Humanitarian Coordinator.
- Leadership on technical cash coordination by the CaLP or NGOs experienced in CTPs has shown to be highly effective in establishing a strong community of practice.

A number of contextual factors should also be taken into account during the decision-making process, including:

- The level of CTP experience of actors and their capacity;
- The type of crisis (natural disaster, conflict, displacement, etc.) and the type of needs. For instance, in chronically disaster prone countries, UN agencies that regularly implement CTPs (through development programmes), could be best suited to take the lead on CTPs. In the case of an emergency occurring, a CaLP-seconded person could provide additional support to the agency.
- The phase of the crisis (emergency or reconstruction);
- The role of the host government and its expertise in CTP;
- The pre-existence of coordination mechanisms; the pre-existence of social protection programmes.

Figure 5. Proposed model for cash coordination in future emergencies



7.3 Developing a strategy for resource mobilisation (human and financial) that would be endorsed by the CaLP's steering committee, donors and integrated in the wider coordination mechanism system

Actors concerned: the CaLP and steering committee members, IASC and OCHA, donors

Experience has shown that the success of cash coordination is highly dependent on the presence of a skilled and dedicated coordinator, deployed in a timely manner, as well as on a level of financial support. However, cash coordination has often suffered from a lack of specifically dedicated human resources, which limits the involvement of the coordinator in strategic functions such as representing the group in other clusters, advocating for appropriate CTP to the government and donors, or developing guidelines and technical files. The lack of financial resources allocated to support coordination activities has also impacted on the capacity of the coordination to fulfil both its technical and strategic functions such as promoting appropriate CTPs.

In order to address the need for coordination resources, the CaLP, in discussion with donors, OCHA and the IASC, should develop a strategy for resource mobilisation. This strategy should include:

❖ Solutions for deploying human resources dedicated to CTP coordination

A range of solutions can be envisaged for choosing a coordinator:

- Create a pool of coordinators who can be mobilized in an emergency situation;
- Use CaLP members' rosters or other high-level rosters (i.e. SDC or UN agencies) and ensure that they receive training in CTP coordination before their deployment to the field;
- Negotiate with the steering committee members (or other experienced NGOs and/or UN agencies) to second one of their heads of emergency CTP programmes to spend part of their time on coordination, and recruit an assistant for secretariat support. The tasks of the assistant could include taking notes during meetings, writing up minutes, keeping the 3W matrix and the contact list up to date, sending emails and managing the website.

These solutions should ensure that the coordinator:

- Has a high level of expertise in CTPs and previous experience of these issues in emergency contexts;
- Makes a commitment to the coordination post for at least 4 to 6 months;
- Knows about the CaLP resources, the tools developed for CTPs and those specifically available for coordination (cf. section 7.1 on the toolbox for coordination)
- Has working group facilitation skills

In certain situations, it could be useful to second an Information Management (IM) officer to the coordinator. An IM officer could be in charge collecting information, maintaining and disseminating database (for example 3W matrixes).

❖ Solutions for mobilising emergency funds to finance coordination in emergency situations (recruitment of the coordinator, specific research and studies, training, etc.).

Here again a number of strategies are possible to mobilize these funds: negotiating with donors for the creation of an emergency fund, raising funds from members of the steering committee or

funding the coordination mechanism via the projects of the steering committee members. In the long term, better links with the cluster approach could also provide opportunities for funding cash coordination.

7.4 Ensure that the CaLP is perceived as an open and participatory forum

Cash coordination is often the initiative of a restricted group of NGOs (usually members of the CaLP). Although this has shown strengths in terms of a high level of commitment and quality technical discussions, this has created some confusion over the role of the CaLP. In some instances, the CaLP has been perceived as a “tool” for a limited number of NGOs (especially when a CaLP Focal Point was deployed to facilitate this small exclusive group, as was the case in Pakistan). This is a risk in terms of inclusiveness and mutual learning for the broader humanitarian community, and consequently could become an obstacle for the CaLP to meet its overall objective of promoting appropriate CTP more generally.

In line with the CaLP strategy 2012-2015, it is important for coordination purposes that the image of the CaLP is that of an open and participatory partnership, working to promote CTP amongst the aid sector as a whole. Indeed, the latest phase of CaLP activities will include an exploration of some more concrete ways of collaboration with other interested stakeholders.

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ANNEXES

Annex 1. List of people consulted

The list below includes the people consulted for the Horn of Africa case study (52), the Haiti case study (22) and additional interviews conducted for this global study. The list is by country, by category, and in alphabetical order by organisation/institution.

- **Haiti**

INTERNATIONAL NGOS		
Chloé Milloz	Food Security Coordinator	ACF
Ruth Aggiss	Livelihoods Delegate	British Red Cross
Nicolas Barrouillet	CaLP Coordinator	CaLP
Kate Ferguson	Haiti Emergency Officer	Christian Aid
Kevin Osborne	Temporary Coordinator of the CTCG	CRS
Philippa Young	Coordinator of the CTCG / LWG	OXFAM
Régis Dantin	Food Security Consultant	Solidarités
Herby Clerge	Head of Livelihoods	
UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES		
Laura Sheridan	Coordinator of the Livelihoods Working Group	UNDP
Jean-Marie Duval	Director of Waste Management Project (ex-director of CFW programmes)	UNDP
Esteban Sacco	Head of National coordination Unit	UNOCHA
Maria Rosario Bruno	Humanitarian affairs officer	UNOCHA
Stephania Trassari	Humanitarian affairs officer	UNOCHA
PRIVATE SECTOR		
Megan Berwick	Corporate Partnerships Manager	Digicel
Carine Roenen	Director	Fonkoze
Kokoévi Sossouvi	Director, Strategic Partnerships (ex-director of Mercy Corps programme)	Voilà Fondation
GOVERNMENT		
Dr Michel Chancy	Secretary of State for Animal Production	MARNDR
NATIONAL NGOS		
Getro Mathieu	General coordinator of the PONT platform	Action Secours Ambulance
Dr Ronald Laroche	Coordinator of the PONT platform Health sector	DASH
Jeanrock Mahothiere	Coordinator of the PONT platform Immediate Recovery sector	DEH
Kesnel Augustin	General coordinator of the PONT platform	MIRIPSUD
Others		
Sharon Truelove	Ex-CaLP Focal Point Haiti	Independent Consultant

- **The Horn of Africa**

NGOs & Red Cross Movement		
Paula Tenaglia	Director Regional Training Centre	ACF Regional Office
Degan Ali	Executive Director	Adeso (formerly Horn Relief)
Jean-Christophe Saint-Esteben	Country Director Somalia	Adeso
Andrea Arigelle	Area Coordinator South Somalia	Adeso
Alexa Swift	Programme Officer	Adeso
Agnes Shihemi	Somalia Cash Based Response Working Group/Cash and Voucher Regional Advisor	Adeso
Glenn Hughson	Cash Transfer Technical Working Group for Kenya	The CaLP
Doris Kaberia	HSNP Programme	CARE Kenya
Catherine Marangu	Somalia Cash Based Response Working Group	Coopi
Abdullahi Mohamed	Program Officer (Food Security and Livelihoods)	HARDO
Leticia Amuduki	Program Coordinator	HARDO
Stephen McDowell	Regional Advisor	IFRC
Sumanjali Mohanty	Food Security and Livelihoods ??	Oxfam Kenya
Leith Baker	Regional Monitoring and Evaluation Manager	Norwegian Refugee Council
Matt Croucher	Deputy Regional Director (Emergencies)	Save the Children Regional
Lisa Parrott	Regional Programme Manager – East Africa	Save the Children Regional
Thomas Tarus	Program Officer, Food Aid Programming	World Vision International
Junus David	Program Development Advisor (<i>based in Bangkok</i>)	World Vision International
UN AGENCIES		
George Odingo	Crops Production Officer	FAO Kenya
Paul Omanga	Crops Production Officer	FAO Kenya
Astrid de Valon	Regional Emergency Advisor	FAO Regional
Philip Fong	Regional Data Information Officer	FAO Regional
David Obong'o	Regional Food Security Analyst	FAO Regional
Julie Lawson-McDowall	Deputy Manager for Cash Based Interventions	FAO Somalia
Giuseppe Simeon	Cash for Work Coordinator (UN Inter-cluster coordination on cash transfers)	FAO Somalia
David Mugo	Programme Assistant Inter-cluster Coordination	FAO Somalia
Lucy Dickinson	Humanitarian Affairs Officer	OCHA Kenya
Kristine Verhoeven	Head of Coordination Unit, SHAO	OCHA Somalia
Oyundi Nehondo	Early Recovery	UNDP
Claire Mariani	Cash transfers/vouchers programme	UNICEF Somalia

	coordinator	
Allison Oman	Senior Regional Nutrition and Food Security Officer	UNHCR Regional
Cheryl Harrison	Coordinator, Programme Innovations	WFP Kenya
Paul Von Kittlitz	Programme Officer, Programme Innovations Unit	WFP Kenya
Mads Lofvall	Regional Programme Advisor New Aid Modalities (Cash and Vouchers)	WFP Uganda/Regional
Mark Gordon	Food Security Cluster Coordinator	WFP Somalia
Nichola Peach	Programme Officer (Cash & Vouchers)	WFP Somalia
Simon Renk	Head of VAM	WFP Somalia
DONORS		
Chris Price	Livelihoods Adviser	DFID Kenya
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Calum McLean	Food Assistance / Food Security Advisor	DG ECHO Regional
Sara McHattie	Regional Food Assistance Expert	DG ECHO Regional
Isabelle D'Haudt	Technical Assistant Kenya	DG ECHO Kenya
Andrea Siclari	Program Officer Kenya	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC
Clara van Praag	Program Officer Somalia	Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC
GOVERNMENT		
Paul Kimeu	Kenya Food Security Steering Group, Sub-group on Cash	Ministry for the Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands
Henry Narangui	Hunger Safety Net Programme	Ministry for the Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands
Keith Fisher	Senior Coordinator	Ministry for the Development of Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands
PRIVATE SECTOR		
Apphia Ndungu	Hunger Safety Net Programme	Equity Bank
Brian Awori	Technical Support	Equity Bank
Nicholas Mwendwa	CEO	Riverbank Solutions Ltd.
RESEARCHERS / CONSULTANTS		
Kate Longley	Team Leader for the Cash and Voucher Monitoring Group	Overseas Development Institute (ODI)
Gerry McCarthy	Founder, Director	People First Impact Method

- **For the global study:**

CONSULTANTS		
Zehra Rizvi	Consultant (conducted study of cash coordination in Pakistan for the CaLP)	Independent
CALP COORDINATOR		
Joanna Friedmann	Ex-CaLP Coordinator Ivory Coast	Ex-CaLP
UN AGENCIES		
Stuart Kefford		Global Early Recovery Cluster

Annex 2. Terms of Reference

Reviewing/Documentation of emergency Cash Transfer Coordination in the Horn of Africa

Introduction: The Horn of Africa as a whole has been severely affected by at least two failed rainy seasons in December 2010 and April-May 2011, leading to a large scale humanitarian situation (IPC classification phase 5 in some regions of south-central Somalia).

The multi-sectoral emergency response has seen some of the largest scale cash transfer programming in this region. As a result, the humanitarian community as a whole has strengthened its coordination mechanisms around cash transfers. The CaLP has played a catalyst role in initiating this discussion among humanitarian agencies for both Kenya and Somalia, with the support of the numerous NGOs, UN-led clusters and donor agencies.

The cash coordination mechanisms for the Horn of Africa were initiated at various periods of time. **The Cash Based Response Working Group for Somalia** was established in 2007, the **Cash Transfer Technical Working Group (CTTWG) for Kenya** was started in July 2011. Both of these bodies contribute to technical coordination on key issues pertaining to CT. Operational coordination on the other hand did not entirely take place in either Kenya or Somalia until the IASC, WFP, FAO and UNICEF put forth an **Inter-cluster facilitation body** in September 2011, which brought together cash initiative focal points from each of the UN clusters for Somalia. FAO is currently the facilitator of the body. The government of Kenya (GoK) has also initiated a cash working group as a sub-group of the **Kenya Food Security Steering Group**. The body is chaired by the Ministry of Northern Kenya and Ministry of State for Special Programs. It is co-chaired by the CaLP. The CTTWG is chaired by the CaLP and has been regularly attended since inception. **A Regional Cash Transfer Working Group** will be launched February 16th, 2012.

Some of the key achievements of these coordination forums have been - (i) spearheading sustainable coordination systems on cash transfers, (ii) capacity building of agency staff on CTPs, (iii) documenting best practice and sharing it within the coordination group, (iv) integration within the UN clusters to ensure better coordination, (v) facilitating discussions and debates on CTPs in the country. However, it is clear that some gaps and challenges still remain.

The development, improvement and streamlining of cash coordination mechanisms in the Horn of Africa presents an important opportunity for learning that could be extremely useful in future emergencies. The CaLP would like to review/document this effort with the overall aim of strengthening coordination around CTPs, as well as informing the high-level debate around cash transfer coordination and the cluster system in emergencies. CaLP would also like to compare this experience to coordination efforts from Pakistan and Haiti, which have also been supported by the CaLP and previously documented.

To this end the CaLP would like to solicit expressions of interest from interested consultants to conduct this review with the following objectives:

Objectives: To review/document the coordination mechanisms for Cash Transfer Programmes in the Horn of Africa, to capture learning and key elements for better coordination in future emergency cash transfer programmes. In addition, to compare and integrate learning from existing CaLP reviews of the inter agency coordination mechanisms in Haiti and Pakistan with the current review.

Expected Outputs:

Output 1: Two reports (not more than 30 pages each) capturing the following:

- A. A report on coordination around CTPs in the Horn of Africa emergency response, including the following components:
 - A **mapping** of the different cash coordination bodies currently operating in the HoA, including:
 - Main characteristics of each group (members, stakeholders, ownership, longevity, geographical and policy/technical area of focus);
 - Lines of communication / reporting between groups;
 - Linkage with clusters and other coordination bodies;
 - Gaps in communication / coordination;
 - A review of the **effectiveness** of the overall cash coordination effort, with consideration given to:
 - Documenting the main achievements of cash transfer coordination in the HoA response
 - Stakeholder mapping and views/perspectives on the cash coordination mechanism (did it work in meeting their specific needs, why and how, what more needed to be done for cash coordination to have done better etc)
 - Linkages with government on cash transfer programming (coordination, linkages with longer term social transfers where they exist, etc...).
 - Ownership and accountability of the cash coordination mechanism
 - Lessons learned, best practices and innovations
 - For the two main technical coordination forums (the CTTWG in Kenya and the CBRWG for Somalia):
 - A **description of the process of initiating/starting the cash coordination in the Horn of Africa and its status/form/shape now**. This must capture information on the need for coordination in CTPs, time taken to set up the coordination mechanism, what were the initial challenges, how were they overcome, what more needs to be done, factors to explain longevity of the coordination mechanism, etc.
 - Linkage with clusters (what were/are the links with the existing UN cluster systems, what are the specific challenges faced in coordinating with clusters and how can these be overcome)
 - Linkages with private sector actors, interaction and challenges, what could have been done better in terms of disaster preparedness, etc.
 - Copies of any tools developed and/or formats used (e.g. for 3W, monitoring & evaluation, setting transfer values etc.)

There are currently 6 existing bodies of coordination around cash in the Horn of Africa (Kenya and Somalia) that should be included in this part of the review.

1. CTTWG for Kenya – chaired by the CaLP
2. CBRWG for Somalia – chaired by Horn Relief and Coop
3. The inter-cluster coordination by FAO for the UN clusters for Somalia
4. The GoK sub-group on cash transfers – chaired by the Ministry of Northern Kenya, Ministry of State for Special Programs and co-chaired by the CaLP
5. The Regional cash working group co-chaired by the CaLP and FAO – launching February 16th
6. The Cash and Voucher monitoring group for Somalia – coordinated by UNICEF

B. A comparative study of the Horn of Africa experience with 2 previous case studies from the CaLP on coordination around CTP in Haiti and Pakistan. The report should:

- Extract common learning and best practices;
- Identify key elements of effective coordination around CTP;
- Identify context specific factors that have been source of success or challenges;
- Make recommendations for humanitarian actors including the CaLP, NGOs, donors and the UN coordination system on how to set up coordination around CTP in future emergencies of various scales;
- Provide examples of useful documents, tools and formats that could be used by future cash coordination groups.

Output 2: Two short PowerPoint presentations (not more than 15 slides) that capture the following for each of the reports detailed above:

- Purpose of the study
- Methodology used
- Key Findings
- Recommendations for the Horn of Africa
- General recommendations on cash transfer coordination mechanisms

Proposed methodology: The consultant will review existing documentation, case studies, articles and reviews on cash transfer coordination, including the 2 previous case studies conducted by CaLP. The consultant is expected to conduct detailed interviews with relevant people/organisations to capture their needs, perspectives on processes & functioning of cash coordination, important learning and recommendations/suggestions for future. This information can be captured through telephone interview and/or face to face discussions. A visit to Nairobi to observe and understand the existing cash coordination mechanisms, their evolution and transition to its current form and important learning is expected to be an essential part of the methodology.

Time line: This review is expected to take approx. 20 - 25 days time and the final product will be completed and submitted to CaLP by 25 April 2012.

Management: The consultant will be managed by the CaLP Coordinator or any other member of the CaLP team as delegated by the CaLP Coordinator.

Expression of Interest must be sent to Nicolas Barrouillet (Nbarrouillet@oxfam.org.uk) by 19th of February 2012 along with the CV and a one page note highlighting the process that the consultant would like to follow in doing this task.

Annex 3. Extract from the CaLP Strategy 2012-2015

Specific objective 3: *By 2015, there should be a clear **leadership / coordination structure** for cash transfer programming within the humanitarian sector at both global and country levels, ensuring shared learning, a consistent approach, and the evolution of best practice.*

3.1 Indicators

- By 2015 an effective inter cluster CTP coordination system/mechanism is set up at the global level
- By 2015 cash coordination and learning platforms are established in all countries and contexts with humanitarian interventions (not under the responsibility of CaLP)
- By 2015, CTPs are evaluated and documented across all different sectors of assistance
- By 2013 a more systematic sharing of learning/resources exists between agencies for mutual learning


3.2 Rationale

- Although cash and voucher transfer programming has increased in the past years, no formal coordination mechanism exists for quality control and facilitating sharing/learning. This in part reflects the tension between aid systems organised by sector and CTP which breaks down distinctions between sectors. Informal coordination mechanisms exist on the ground, but they are not very inclusive.
- As CTP requires the effective coordination of not only NGOs and implementers but also private sector and Governments this coordination will not necessarily sit within the cluster system. CaLP will also look into the possibility / appropriateness of supporting coordination of emergency CTP within long term structures, especially in countries facing frequent slow onset or complex emergencies.

3.3 Activities

- Lead the process to develop/Influence the structure, the composition and home of the global and national coordination mechanism and in emergencies/countries.
- Where possible, provide support to set up inter-cluster cash coordination group in large scale humanitarian crises to ensure appropriateness, quality and consistency of response by agencies.
- Advocate for the creation of a global and national cash coordination mechanism to ensure new quality control standards are developed and/or are adhered to.
- By 2013, develop a more systematic mechanism of sharing and learning between agencies for mutual learning. (Documentation, learning events, website)
- Identify gaps in knowledge and bridge these through research and evidence collection (ongoing)

Annex 4. Analytical framework





*This work was commissioned by the Cash Learning Partnership,
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