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# External Evaluation of the IOM-led Shelter/NFI Cluster in Pakistan 2010-2013

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### Acronyms / Abbreviations

4W	Who, What, Where and When Matrix (Information Management Tool)
ACTED	Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (France-based INGO)
DFID	Department for International Development (UK Donor Agency)
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (Multilateral Donor Agency)
ERF	Emergency Response Fund (Multilateral Funding Mechanism)
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Province of Pakistan)
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee (Intergovernmental Organisation)
IM	Information Management
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IOM	International Organisation for Migration (Intergovernmental Organisation)
KP	Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Province of Pakistan)
NDMA	National Disaster Management Authority (Pakistan Government Agency)
NFI	Non-Food Item (Relief Item)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council (Norwegian-based INGO)
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN Agency)
OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (US Donor Agency)
PAK	Pakistani Administered Kashmir (Province of Pakistan)
PDMA	Provincial Disaster Management Authority (Pakistan Government Agency)
SAG	Strategic Advisory Group (sub-group of the cluster)
TWiG	Technical Working Group (sub-group of the cluster)
UC	Union Council (Administrative Division of Pakistan)
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development (US Donor Agency)

### Disclaimer

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The views expressed herein reflect those of the author and the stakeholders interviewed during the course of the evaluation.

## **Acknowledgements**

Among the many people that helped me with this evaluation, I would like to single out for thanks the many organisations that took time from their schedules to talk to me about their experiences with the Shelter/NFI Cluster in Pakistan. I was universally greeted with open arms and felt from all the stakeholders of the cluster involved in this evaluation a real desire to share their experiences and lessons learned with me.

Additionally, from IOM I would like to single out the excellent support from Katherine Smalley, who did an excellent job of facilitating this evaluation and introducing me to a wide variety of stakeholders.

Acknowledgment should be given to those who contributed significantly to the evaluation, and interviewees and documents consulted should be listed to the extent that this does not breach the privacy and confidentiality of those concerned. <sup>i</sup>
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## **About the Donor for this Evaluation**

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## Executive Summary

This external evaluation looked at the Shelter and Non-Food Item Cluster led by IOM in Pakistan between 2010 and 2013. IOM managed the cluster for over three years during this period in response to three successive monsoon floods in the country. Overall, the evaluation noted that the cluster was effective at coordinating the response in the shelter and non-food item sectors, and regularly identified as one of the best clusters activated in Pakistan.

Specifically the cluster was very strong at information management and advocacy for funding in its sector. The information management materials produced by the cluster were of excellent quality and ubiquitous in their use by all stakeholders of the humanitarian response in Pakistan. Based on all the evidence and stakeholders encountered by the evaluation, the amount of duplication in the response was kept to a strict minimum thanks largely to those information materials and local coordination mechanisms supported by the cluster. Additionally, the cluster played an important role in helping to mobilize funds for the humanitarian response, with many donors noting that it was the cluster's material that helped them convince their headquarters to allocate resources to the sector.

The cluster, however, had significantly less impact in terms of establishing clear technical standards for shelter programs. While by 2013, they had a robust library of technical designs and guidelines that was really driving the work in the sector, for most of its activation it was not particularly influential in standardising the designs or approaches for early recovery or transitional shelter programming. Its consensual approach ensured a large amount of participation in technical discussions, but also seemed to delay taking important decisions on standards in the sector.

All in all, however, the cluster was run extremely effectively and provided excellent coordination of shelter and non-food item programs in Pakistan. Recommendations to improve the cluster's integration with the government, transparency, technical guidance and continuity of cluster coordination are included in section five of this report, as well as a list of the lessons learned from three years of cluster coordination in section four according to the stakeholders interviewed by the external evaluation.


## 1. Introduction

Large-scale flooding during the monsoon season affected Pakistan for three consecutive years between 2010 and 2013. As a result the Shelter and Non-Food Items Cluster (referred to here as the Shelter/NFI Cluster) was activated to respond to the humanitarian needs resulting from these natural disasters. The scale of the recurring disasters was such that even the significant humanitarian programmes launched to meet these needs struggled to fill sizable gaps in need in three consecutive humanitarian responses:

- 2010 flood response (Aug 2010 – July 2011): Over 1.5 million houses damaged or destroyed / 11 million people affected;
- 2011 flood response (Aug 2011 – Aug 2012): 350,000 – 500,000 houses destroyed / 2.5 million people affected;
- 2012 flood response (Sept 2012 – Dec 2013): 300,000 – 450,000 houses destroyed / 2 million people affected.

IOM had begun leading the Shelter/NFI Cluster in Pakistan during the 2005 South Asian Earthquake, with periods of support from other agencies in between humanitarian emergencies. From 2010 to 2013, IOM received financial support from DFID, USAID/OFDA, ECHO and the Government of Japan to support the functioning of the cluster to conduct field assessments, identify shelter needs, develop response strategies and organise appropriate assistance with its partner organisations. During this three-year period, the cluster itself went through successive deactivations and reactivations in view of the changing humanitarian needs.

During this period IOM also led the Provincial Shelter Cluster in Sindh and coordinated the work of district-level coordination structures management by local NGO partners. Other humanitarian agencies were coordinating the Shelter/NFI Cluster in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (UNHCR), as well as in Balochistan Province (NRC). Also in 2010, FOCUS and the Agha Khan Development Network (AKDN) were leading clusters in Pakistani Administered Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. This evaluation focused on the situation surrounding the IOM-led cluster coordination in the areas in blue below:



### **1.1 Aim and Scope of this Evaluation**

The main aim of this evaluation is to share key lessons and recommendations from the Pakistan Shelter/NFIs Cluster to the floods response from 2010 to 2013 in order to improve and inform future shelter cluster responses, by evaluating the impact and effectiveness of the coordination services delivered during that period.

More specifically the terms of reference for this evaluation (attached as Annex D), define five clear objectives for this evaluation:

- 1) Document, review and analyse the experience of the IOM-led country Shelter Cluster team with respect to the establishment and operation of the Shelter Cluster, with a particular emphasis on standard operating procedures and lessons to be learnt for future operations;
- 2) Appraise the service provided by the shelter cluster team to shelter cluster participants (Government, UN agencies, NGOs both national and international) at national, provincial and sub-provincial level;
- 3) Review the national coordination model with specific reference to use of multiple agencies coordinating the response nationally, provincially, and at the district level;
- 4) Assess the impact of the shelter cluster in promoting a coordinated shelter response;
- 5) Appraise and provide recommendations with regard to future emergency shelter cluster coordination activities at both national and provincial levels.

### **1.2 Evaluation Methodology**

The evaluation was conducted using two complementary tools that gave the evaluator a better understanding of the activities of the cluster and its influence on the humanitarian response to the flooding in Pakistan between 2010 and 2013. First, the evaluator conducted a desk review of documents available both publically online through the cluster's website ([www.shelterpakistan.org](http://www.shelterpakistan.org)) and internally in shared 'Dropbox' folders used by the cluster coordination team.

Secondly the evaluator conducted a series of semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders of the cluster. These interviews were conducted partially over the phone or through Skype, whenever the stakeholders were no longer present in Pakistan, and partially in person during the evaluation's field work in Pakistan.

A total of 42 stakeholders<sup>iii</sup> were interviewed during the course of this evaluation, which included:

- 14 Cluster personnel deployed by IOM;
- 10 International NGO stakeholders;
- 5 Intergovernmental Organisation stakeholders; (one stakeholder also listed as former cluster personnel)
- 8 National or Local NGO stakeholders;
- 3 Donor organisation stakeholders;

### 3 Government of Pakistan stakeholders.

A full list of the stakeholders interviewed is attached as Annex A to this report. Please note that all the interviews were conducted anonymously and the quotes included in this report will only refer to five categories of respondents: cluster personnel, international humanitarian stakeholders (IO/INGO), national humanitarian stakeholders (National / Local NGO), donor agencies and Government of Pakistan stakeholders, and not to the names or organisations of the person being quoted.

#### 1.2 Evaluation Timeline


The evaluation was carried out between August 13<sup>th</sup> and September 14<sup>th</sup> of 2014 for a total level of effort of 25 working days. The evaluator worked remotely for the first three weeks and then travelled to Pakistan between the 2<sup>nd</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> of September in order to meet stakeholders of the cluster in person.

#### 1.3 Challenges and Constraints

The evaluation faced the considerable challenge of assessing a long period of cluster coordinator significantly after the period of activation of the cluster. In fact, the evaluation guidelines developed by the global shelter cluster called "*Evaluating the Shelter Cluster: Overview and Tools*" notes that evaluations conducted after the end of the deployment of a cluster should take place "shortly after cluster closure or handover"<sup>iv</sup> of the cluster.

In fact the evaluation was launched over nine months after the deactivation of the cluster in December of 2013. That meant that the evaluator was looking at cluster coordination that occurred between 9 months and 4 years previously. The long time that passed since the deactivation of the cluster often made it difficult for key stakeholders to recall events and details from the cluster's work.

Additionally, the long period between the cluster's activation and this evaluation made it difficult for the external evaluator to contact people that had been involved or in contact with the evaluation. The evaluator combed contact lists, Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) members' lists, Technical Working Group (TWiG) members' lists to find stakeholders that had interacted with the cluster between 2010 and 2013. Of the 290 stakeholders whose emails were found and contacted by email, only 17 responded (6% of all contacts) and only nine agreed to be interviewed for this evaluation (3% of all contacts). This low level of response could have been significantly improved had the evaluation taken place either during the cluster's activation or directly after the deactivation.



## **2. Operation of the Shelter/NFI Cluster**

The evaluation's Terms of Reference asked the external evaluator to look at "the establishment and operation of the Shelter Cluster" in terms of the standard operating procedures established by the IASC. This section looks at these issues through the lens of four phases of the cluster's activation.

### ***2.1 Activation and Recruitment of the Cluster Team***

The evaluator asked all cluster personnel about their recruitment and activation as part of the cluster team. As is common on many Shelter/NFI Cluster Deployments, the recruitment of cluster personnel was done through the use of previously employed consultants from the global shelter cluster's roster, including those that had participated in the coordination training offered by the global cluster.

The time between the beginning of the recruitment and the team's deployment in Pakistan varied between two weeks and one month depending on the staff involved (existing IOM staff were naturally deployed quicker). The time spent in recruitment was variously attributed to the existence of other professional commitments or to IOM's administrative procedures. Although the evaluator noted a decrease in the time required for recruitment between 2010 and 2013, especially given the presence of many key staff in country. Certainly the external evaluation feels that the administrative procedures for recruitment of cluster staff should be reduced to the shortest possible time. The one cluster personnel that had to wait a full month before being deployed due to administrative procedures in 2010 is an example of where IOM could have been more reactive on recruitment of staff member.

The evaluator also noted that all four of the National Cluster Coordinators deployed by IOM to run the Shelter/NFI Cluster in Pakistan had previous experience as Hub Coordinators for the cluster in Pakistan either in this humanitarian response or the 2005 response to the South Asian Earthquake. The evaluator would like to underline this as a clear best practice in terms of staffing of the cluster, as the coordinators previous experience at the Provincial level ensured helped inform the National Cluster Coordinator's strategic and policy-making functions.

### ***2.2 Local Level Coordination Structures***

The Shelter/NFI Cluster's structure was quite complex in Pakistan, more so perhaps than any Shelter/NFI Cluster so far deployed to respond to a humanitarian crisis. Firstly the cluster was composed of three layers of coordination, a national cluster in Islamabad, Provincial Clusters in four of the country's provinces suffering from parallel humanitarian crises and a district-level local coordination mechanism to look at key operational issues for shelter programs.

The multitude of layers of coordination was not necessarily unique, having been successfully implemented in a number of other Shelter/NFI Cluster deployments, but this cluster's innovation was to contract local shelter agencies (either local, national or international NGOs) to run district-level coordination structures for the cluster. Here during the response to the 2011 floods, IOM signed contracts with local shelter agencies to provide one staff full time for district-level coordination and then included these staff members into their coordination team.



*“District Focal Points were part of our [cluster coordination] team, they were IOM-led Cluster Staff in all but contractual status.” Cluster Personnel*

This ability to extend the layers of coordination all the way down to the district-level was seen as useful and relevant by every stakeholder that the evaluator met in Pakistan. In fact, all the stakeholders interviewed by the external evaluation were able to present clear and concrete ways in which that district-level coordination supported their shelter programming.

*“The level of professional integrity demonstrated by the Shelter/NFI Cluster's top management has bled all the way down to the district level, resulting in surprising effective and coherent local level coordination.” INGO/IO Stakeholder*

*“The district level meetings allowed us to discuss key operational issues in the district that were slowing down our programmes; they were very useful on a day-to-day basis.” National/Local NGO Stakeholder*

It should be noted that a minority of stakeholders found some different messages at the district, provincial and national levels early in the emergency response, but all agreed that by 2012 the clusters were delivering a single coordinated message at all levels of coordination.

*“In the beginning of the 2010 emergency, there were some different messages being delivered at different levels of the cluster and we found it problematic. For example, they were proposing different materials and different standards for shelters. But as time passed, the standards proposed became the same. Most importantly, I think that the district-level clusters demonstrated to the national cluster the need to build in flexibility to technical guidelines to allow for different designs in different zones.” INGO/IO Stakeholder*

Also the district-level coordination structures were identified by stakeholders interviewed by the external evaluation as a platform for resisting politically-oriented pressure from some local authorities. Often shelter stakeholders noted that they received politically-oriented pressure to hire certain local residents in their teams or provide assistance to certain groups of beneficiaries. Using the joint platform of the district-level coordination structures supported by the Shelter/NFI Cluster, however, they were able to deflect this pressure and focus on the humanitarian imperatives that were supposed to be guiding their programs.

### **2.3 Regional Level Coordination Structures**

The scope of this evaluation does not look at the other regional coordination structures in Pakistan run by NRC and UNHCR, which were responding to parallel complex emergencies to the flooding being responded to by the IOM-led clusters. The evaluation does look at the national coordination structure's ability to coordinate with those other provincial clusters and found a strong consensus among key stakeholders that the IOM-led national cluster had great difficulty in coordinating with the Provincial Clusters not run by IOM.

*“There was a big disconnect among provincial level clusters and the national cluster. I think that's clear to all the partners.” Cluster Personnel*

*“In KP the emergency is very different from the emergency in Sindh. Here I've found a real lack of coordination between the Provincial and National Cluster. They don't seem to be talking to each other.” INGO/IO Stakeholder*

*“When it comes to having the KP/FATA Provincial Cluster share information with the national cluster, at some point you just hit a wall and there was no point in trying anymore.” INGO/IO Stakeholder*

It should be noted that this perceived lack of coordination was not referencing the smaller clusters in Pakistani Administered Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan that were active following the 2010 flood. The lack of coordination between the national and provincial clusters in KP/FATA and Balochistan, however, was recognized by all actors interviewed by the external evaluation. Different stakeholders identified different reasons for this lack of coordination.

*“[The Provincial Cluster Lead] is the problem; they simply will not coordinate with the national level.” Donor Agency Stakeholder*

*“I think having different organizations managing different provincial shelter clusters is an inherently ineffective system.” Cluster Personnel*

*“We are still very far from having country-level understanding that the cluster's interest is separate from the agency's interest. This misunderstanding results in coordination issues becoming political issues and makes it very difficult to ensure proper coordination between provinces.” Cluster Personnel*

The lack of communication between the provincial clusters and the national cluster started at strategic priorities all the way to basic information sharing on shelter and NFI programming being implemented in those areas. All stakeholders interviewed by the cluster (cluster personnel, UN agency representatives, INGO representatives and representatives of the provincial cluster lead agencies themselves) agreed that the provincial clusters not run by IOM were not good at sharing information with the national cluster.

*“We can't get information from [Provincial Cluster Lead]'s three clusters here at the national level. Frankly, I think it comes down to a lack of internal guidance that cluster coordination is a priority.” INGO/IO Stakeholder*

*“We are asked regularly to submit our 4W information to the [Provincial Cluster Lead], but we never get anything back from them. Literally nothing, no maps, no matrixes, nothing. We have no idea what they do with this information, but I assume they use it for their own purposes somehow.” INGO/IO Stakeholder*

The representatives of the Provincial Cluster Leads that were interviewed by the external evaluation (2 NRC staff and 1 UNHCR staff – see Annex A) acknowledged the perception among stakeholders of a lack of information sharing with the national cluster as a reality. They explained the issue as one of a very different culture of information management between their organizations and that of the IOM-led Shelter/NFI Cluster.

*“The 4W information held by [the Provincial Cluster Lead] is tied up in large databases filled with personally identifiable information of internally displaced persons that are rightfully kept quite secure. Untying the information relevant for coordination from the sensitive personally identifiable information is tricky.”*  
INGO/IO Stakeholder

Regardless of the reasons for the lack of communication between some provincial clusters managed by other organizations and the national cluster, the evaluator feels that stronger linkages between these structures would have clearly had a significant added value for humanitarian programmes in Pakistan. Stakeholders of the national level cluster mentioned significant efforts that were made to develop closer coordination at that level.

*“We brought the cluster coordinators together in Islamabad to have workshops and try and develop common approaches and standards. That happened two to three times during the time that I was there.”* Cluster Personnel

*“We actually made progress at one point in bridging the gap between our national cluster and the [Provincial Cluster Lead in KP/FATA]’s cluster. The Cluster Coordinator and I visited to try and ramp up the coordination for flooding issues in the area. We developed a good working relationship with the new Provincial Cluster Coordinator and he made a commitment to come to Islamabad every two weeks for the national meeting. But that was five weeks before the cluster was deactivated, so it was all for naught.”* Cluster Personnel

While coordination and information sharing between the Shelter/NFI Cluster’s provincial and national leads represents significant organisational, technical and logistical challenges, the external evaluator sees clear value in pursuing closer coordination between these structures in the future.

#### **2.4 Deactivation and Handover**

The cluster was handed-over once to UN Habitat in March of 2011 for a period of six months and then again in 2013 deactivated into the form of an IOM-led working group. The decision to change the role and mandate of the cluster system came first in 2011 from the Government of Pakistan and then in 2013 from the Humanitarian Coordinator. The evaluator asked various stakeholders about these handovers and their effect on the coordination in the shelter sector.

Generally, the hand-over to UN Habitat was viewed as quite abrupt by IOM’s cluster personnel, who felt that the government’s decision was not adequately discussed with the humanitarian community.

*“Deactivation was taken by the government, because they decided that the ‘emergency was over’ and as a result the cluster should be handed over to a development type of organisation. The cluster’s themselves didn’t have any say in that and we were forced to hand everything over in one week.”* Cluster Personnel

However, most of the cluster's partners that were interviewed by the external evaluation felt that the time was right to hand over the cluster to UN Habitat and appreciated the need to begin discussing more development-oriented housing concerns.

*"I think it was the right time for IOM to hand over the cluster, because the emergency was mostly over by then." National/Local NGO Stakeholder*

*"The decision should have been made earlier to deactivate the humanitarian cluster system. The clusters were artificially maintained by the UN when there were no longer emergency humanitarian needs." Donor Agency Stakeholder*

All of the stakeholders interviewed by the external evaluator saw value in some form of functioning sectoral coordination structure in between disasters, especially to ensure a high-level of preparedness for future humanitarian programming.

*"The problem is... clusters taper off between emergencies and then have to be rebuilt each time from scratch. There should be some sort of continuous coordination support in Pakistan. You could say this is the role of the government, but given their level of activity the United Nations should step up in this regard." National/Local NGO Stakeholder*

While most of the stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation appreciated the need for more development-focused approach to the cluster's work by March of 2011, most of them also compared the UN Habitat-led Shelter/NFI Cluster unfavourably to the IOM-led cluster.

*"The UN Habitat colleagues were playing more of a "leading" role, rather than a "facilitating" role, which led to a lot of disagreements with the partner agencies." INGO/IO Stakeholder*

*"With UN Habitat, decision making wasn't as participatory as when IOM ran the cluster. They made all their decisions among a 'big five' of actors in Islamabad and then sent out the results to the cluster partners." INGO/IO Stakeholder*

*"IOM's work was not taken up by UN Habitat. It was hard to find a UN Habitat person to have a discussion with us [Pakistani civil society]. They had the attitude that 'they know better' and there was no thought about reaching out to learn more about local construction methods and traditions." National/Local NGO Stakeholder*

The above perception of UN-Habitat's work as being less participatory probably stems from their inability to continue to support the same level of local coordination at the district levels as IOM had. In analysing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the UN-Habitat run cluster, many stakeholders identified a perceived difficulty for UN-Habitat to raise funds dedicated to cluster coordination. The external evaluator would like to underline this issue as an important one in terms of future handover of large-scale cluster deployments.

### 3. Services Provided by the Shelter/NFI Cluster

The Shelter/NFI Cluster in Pakistan provided a number of services to its partners, in line with IASC guidance on cluster coordination around the world<sup>v</sup>. In addition to the coordination meetings organized by the cluster, information management, technical guidance and advocacy and fundraising services were provided by the cluster to its partners in Pakistan.

#### 3.1 Coordination Meetings

Universally the stakeholders of the Shelter/NFI Cluster interviewed by the cluster praised the IOM-led cluster for the professionalism of their coordination meetings. Everyone described the meetings, whether held at the national, provincial or district level as useful to their work and professionally run.

*“The meetings were well run and most importantly very open to a variety of different voices and opinions.” INGO/IO Stakeholder*

*“The meetings were well managed and very informative for me as a Shelter Program Manager. They were especially helpful in terms of avoiding duplication between agencies.” INGO/IO Stakeholder*

While the stakeholders of the cluster mentioned the strong relationships they saw between the district focal points that ran the cluster’s district-level coordination mechanisms and their governmental counterparts, elsewhere stakeholders were not satisfied with the government’s involvement in the coordination of shelter and NFI programming. It should be underlined that the stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation placed the blame for this lack of involvement at the provincial and national levels squarely on the governmental agencies involved and not on the IOM-led Shelter/NFI Cluster.

*“At the district-level the government was very effectively involved in the Shelter Cluster meetings. However, I never saw the government taking ownership at the provincial or national levels. They are leading these forums on paper, but in reality they are barely participating in the process.” INGO/IO Stakeholder*

It should be noted that the governmental counterparts saw the situation quite differently, and felt that they had a strong involvement in the cluster’s work at all levels. Nevertheless, governmental stakeholders at the provincial levels often felt had a limited amount of leverage on the cluster’s decisions.

*“For the UC-Ranking exercise organised by the cluster, we were not involved in the drafting of the methodology for the information collection. I still don’t clearly understand how they collected their damage information and therefore, we had no choice but to decline their findings.” Government Stakeholder*

The external evaluator noted significant efforts by the IOM-led Shelter/NFI Cluster to involve their governmental stakeholders at the national and provincial level in their decision-making processes. Still, though, there was a clear lack of ‘ownership’ of the cluster’s work expressed at all

levels of government stakeholders interviewed by the cluster. Potential solutions to this issue are discussed below in section five of this report in the form of recommendations.

The evaluator also noted that all stakeholders, both international and national, felt the cluster did an excellent job ensuring that coordination meetings were in the appropriate language for their respective audiences. It was noted that provincial and district coordination meetings were in the appropriate local languages (Urdu or Sindhi), with translation into English provided if expatriate colleagues were present.

### **3.2 Information Management**

No other aspect of the cluster's work received as strong or as universal acclaim as the work the cluster did on information management (IM). In fact, many stakeholders found the IM work so useful, that they identified the cluster itself with its 4W (who, what, where and when) matrix.

*"The information management provided by the Shelter/NFI Cluster was excellent. We found literally everything that we were looking for." INGO/IO Stakeholder*

*"The Shelter Cluster consistently produces the best mapping of what's happening of all the clusters out there, and the information is quite quick in terms of their turn around often in only a few hours." Donor Agency Stakeholder*

*"The IM matrixes and tools developed by the Shelter/NFI Cluster are the gold standard of what's being used in Pakistan. Every cluster now uses the tools developed by the Shelter/NFI Cluster. We consider it the benchmark standard for information management in the country." INGO/IO Stakeholder*

Indeed, a number of stakeholders highlighted the cluster's ability to leverage their strong support among donor agencies in order to ensure full compliance with the submission of information to the cluster's 4W matrix as an important best practice.

*"In 2010 many organizations weren't giving their information on their shelter programs to the cluster. But now the cluster's IM includes even the smallest organisation's information. This is because the donors are requiring good coordination as a condition for their funding. The cluster has leveraged the support of donors to ensure excellent coordination and a bare minimum of duplication." INGO/IO Stakeholder*

More than simply talking about their appreciation for the work the Shelter/NFI Cluster did in information management, stakeholders interviewed by the cluster were able to explain how they used the information provided by the cluster to plan their programs. **Every single stakeholder interviewed by the cluster noted having used the cluster's IM products in preparing their proposals and planning their interventions.** In the external evaluator's experience, this is an incredibly strong indicator of the cluster's influence in avoiding duplication of humanitarian programs and a result perhaps one of the most extensive uses of IM seen in a Shelter/NFI Cluster deployment worldwide.

One of the highlights of the IM products produced by the cluster was the UC Ranking exercise, in which the cluster leveraged a variety of information sources to produce a list of the Union Councils most in need of shelter assistance by analysing the gap between the assessed need for shelter assistance and the amount of shelter programming committed to the district.

*“Our first reference when planning a new shelter program was to look at the cluster’s UC Ranking exercise. It was the best information out there on where the need was.” National/Local NGO Stakeholder*

A minority of stakeholders, however, felt that the UC Ranking exercise lost its relevance the further it got from the initial emergency response. Especially in 2013, some stakeholders began to feel that the UC Ranking exercise relied too much on information from the previous year and didn’t take into account affected communities’ own self-recovery.

*“By 2013, the UC Ranking no longer reflected the field reality... They should be updated at the least every six months in order to remain relevant.” INGO/IO Stakeholder*

The external evaluator’s own review of the UC Ranking exercises found in the archives of the Shelter/NFI Cluster show evidence of continued updating and improvements to the data on damage and needs. Indeed it seems as if new data and information collected by the cluster’s provincial teams and partner agencies was added to the UC Ranking data almost every month the cluster was activated.



### **3.4 Technical Guidance / Standards**

The Shelter/NFI Cluster produced a large variety of technical guidance during its more than three years of activation. From overall sectoral strategies, to most common issues in shelter construction, disaster risk reduction strategies and finally recommended designs and bills of quantity. Over the course of the cluster's three year activation, the cluster's recommendations began to coalesce around the construction of "one room shelters" that could serve as the centre of permanent constructions. Also the cluster's guidance emphasized the need to use locally-sourced materials and vernacular construction practices more and more over the course of its three-year activation.

By 2013, all of the stakeholders interviewed by the external evaluator appreciated the cluster's technical guidance. They found it both appropriate to the context in Pakistan and useful in their own shelter programs.

*"The designs [produced by the Shelter/NFI Cluster] helped us to think more about DRR in our shelter projects. Before this, we weren't really thinking about DRR issues in our projects. I found it quite useful." INGO/IO Stakeholder*

*"The Shelter cluster gave good technical advice, because they adopted what people already use in their own culture." Government Stakeholder*

*"The One Room Shelter book brought together a lot of good guidelines that are still used now in 2014. We see many local communities replicating those guidelines in their own home constructions." INGO/IO Stakeholder*

*"The guidance and advice provided by the cluster on technical issues was appropriate mainly because it adopted many local construction practices and materials into the designs." National/Local NGO Stakeholder*

*"The NGOs that used the Shelter/NFI Cluster's guidelines all wound up slightly adapting them to their own context, which I think is very good. It shows they were useful in a number of different contexts." INGO/IO Stakeholder*

*"The donors are not really experts in these shelter issues. With the technical guidance from the Shelter Cluster and their cost estimates, they are providing a lot of useful information for donors. It ensures that the discussions between implementers and donors have a solid basis." Donor Agency Stakeholder*

It should be noted here that most stakeholders interviewed by the external evaluation remember the technical guidance provided by the Shelter/NFI Cluster on early recovery shelter programs and not clearly the advice for emergency shelter programs and plastic sheeting. So the conclusions of this section mostly relate to the technical guidance for early recovery, transitional, one room shelter and permanent shelter programming.

The external evaluator notes that the extent to which local materials and vernacular construction practices were integrated into technical guidelines developed by the cluster is likely a best practice for cluster coordination worldwide. The involvement of local NGOs in the process of



establishing new shelter designs, in this case especially the Heritage Foundation through a DFID grant to the IOM One Room Shelter Program, is a practice that should be replicated across Shelter/NFI Clusters wherever possible.

While praise for the technical guidance produced towards the end of the cluster's activation was uniformly positive, some stakeholders noted that more could have been done to communicate and spread this technical guidance through local coordination mechanisms.

*"The One Room Shelter book (referring to a product of the IOM Program Team) was a good output, but these guidelines were not well circulated after the government stopped the clusters from working. Even some of the district level clusters were not familiar with the work of the cluster on one room shelters."*  
INGO/IO Stakeholder

It should be noted that most of the above the stakeholder is referring to a product funded by DFID of the IOM One Room Shelter Program, and not a product of the cluster itself. That being said the book was widely promoted by the cluster as a best practice in 2013, and was widely seen as the cluster's 'final summary' of their technical advice for shelter programs in Pakistan.

While the technical products produced towards the end of the cluster's activation were well received, the external evaluator found almost no shelter programs implemented in 2010, 2011 or 2012 that were primarily based on the cluster's guidance. Rather Shelter/NFI Cluster partners mostly developed their own designs with only scant references to individual elements of guidance provided by the cluster. In fact, most stakeholders interviewed by the cluster found the cluster's technical guidance simply came too late for their programs.

*"The cluster's designs came too late for our organization, but I think it was useful for some local NGOs that didn't have technical staff... We designed our one room shelter ourselves with support from technical specialists from our [head office]."*  
INGO/IO Stakeholder

*"We discussed these guidelines so many times, and the whole process of developing a consensus took so long. Then they had to be presented to the government before they were finally published in 2013."* INGO/IO Stakeholder

*"When we worked with different donors (other than IOM), we had different costings and objectives for our shelters. So we didn't use IOM's technical guidance very much."* National/Local NGO Stakeholder

Cluster personnel acknowledged to the external evaluator that much of the technical guidance came after the partner's shelter early recovery programs were well underway and certainly after proposals had been submitted and contracts with donor agencies signed, limiting the impact of the guidance provided. Cluster personnel interviewed by the external evaluation framed their role as a tool for exchanging experience between partners, rather than needing to provide technical support to shelter agencies that didn't have in-house capacity to produce their own designs.

*“Our approach for my time with the cluster was not to put out a ‘Shelter Cluster Approved’ design, but rather be a platform for experience sharing between the partners.” Cluster Personnel*

*“IOM [meaning the Shelter/NFI Cluster] should just create a shelter model and tell us it’s the right model. Otherwise it is very confusing.” National/Local NGO Stakeholder*

However, as the quote from a national/local NGO stakeholder above illustrates, many partners of the cluster were looking for more robust and concrete guidance from the cluster in terms of technical designs for shelter programs. Even those NGOs that had their own technical expertise and didn’t rely on the cluster’s technical experts, didn’t appear to the external evaluator to have used significant amount of technical guidance provided by the Shelter/NFI Cluster in their designs prior to 2013. Rather they spoke more of contributing to discussions in the Technical Working Groups (TWiGs), far more than they spoke of getting useful technical information out them.

Looking at the issue of technical guidance as a whole, the external evaluator does feel that the cluster could have done more to influence the types of constructions implemented in Pakistan in response to flooding between 2010 to 2012. The view of the donor agency stakeholder quoted below echoes the views of the evaluation:

*“The Shelter/NFI Cluster provided useful lists of do’s and don’ts [for shelter construction], but to be honest they didn’t drive the most important developments [in the shelter sector in Pakistan] over the past four years. They reported and summarised them, but they didn’t drive the process.” Donor Agency Stakeholder*

*“There were just too consultative and consensus seeking in coming up with technical guidelines. I would have liked them to just put an end to the discussions and push through a technical design.” INGO/IO Stakeholder*

The external evaluation recognizes the quality of the technical guidance produced by the cluster towards the end of its activation in 2013. Especially impressive was its best practice use of locally-sourced materials and vernacular construction methods. It is clear, however, that this advice was provided to partners too late to influence the majority of shelters built to respond to the 2010-2012 floods in Pakistan. While other forms of guidance were provided earlier, they weren’t complete or comprehensive enough to effectively shape the type of early recovery shelter programs implemented in Pakistan. The recommendations included in section five of this report will deal with suggested ways to address this issue.

### **3.5 Advocacy, Strategy and Fundraising**

Another service the cluster provided to its partners was advocacy support in order to raise funding for the humanitarian response to the Pakistan floods. Stakeholders at all levels praised the cluster’s efforts and recognized that the cluster played an important role in the large levels of funding that were available to respond to the 2010 floods.


*“The Shelter Cluster did a great job advocating for more funding to respond to the Pakistan floods. They created strong one-page visuals that really communicated a lot.” INGO/IO Stakeholder*

*“In the last decade most of [our donor agency]’s responses are conflict-related. In most of these countries it’s the politics that drive these responses. Without the advocacy provided by the Shelter Cluster, these floods could have been ignored by [our HQ].” Donor Agency Stakeholder*

While far less funding was raised to respond to subsequent floods in 2011 and 2012, none of the stakeholders placed that blame at the feet of the cluster. The external evaluator agrees that donor fatigue and large humanitarian crises elsewhere played the largest role in reducing the amount of funding available to subsequent floods.

One aspect of the advocacy role played by the cluster was as part of the Emergency Response Fund (ERF) funding process. There the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) asked the Shelter/NFI Cluster to play an important role in the review of proposals submitted to the ERF. During the cluster’s three-year activation, the cluster played an integral role in the solicitation and review of proposals for ERF Funding.

As outlined in the diagram below, the cluster both solicited proposals for ERF funding, based on criteria agreed on between the ERF and the clusters, as well as did an initial technical review of proposals submitted to the cluster to see which met the cluster’s guidelines.



It should be noted that following an external evaluation of the ERF funding mechanism in 2011<sup>vi</sup>, OCHA decided to no longer ask the cluster’s to vet the proposals submitted to the ERF, but simply provided technical advice on their contents. While the wording and flow of proposals between OCHA and the clusters has changed slightly, the overall role of the different parties remains essentially the same as the process outlined above.

This process for reviewing ERF proposals is by far the most intricate that the external evaluator has seen in a major cluster deployment. In the evaluator's experience, usually it is only the cluster personnel themselves involved in the review of proposals to multilateral donors that seek the cluster's technical advice. The involvement of the Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) of the cluster in the review of proposals seems to have paid dividends in spreading the understanding of the process among a large number of humanitarian actors and providing strong transparency to the cluster's and OCHA's funding decisions.

*"The Shelter/NFI Cluster is the best of all the clusters for reviewing proposals submitted to the ERF, because they have an independent team fully dedicated to cluster coordination and not double-hatting with their agency's own programming. This means they are seen as impartial, have more time to review proposals and have created a clear system with clear criteria." INGO/IO Stakeholder*

*"I think it was a beautiful process [for vetting ERF proposals] where everyone was participating, especially including local NGOs." INGO/IO Stakeholder*

Cluster personnel, however, did note that it took a tremendous amount of cluster resources to participate in the ERF process, often times a whole week of the cluster's time was devoted to sifting through and assessing the often more than 100 proposals received by the cluster for an ERF call for proposals. Despite this investment of time, most stakeholders interviewed by the cluster found the process worthwhile.

*"The ERF did take a lot of time and resources from the Shelter Cluster, but that's because they are open, engaged with partners and transparent in their selection. That's what makes this cluster different." Donor Agency Stakeholder*

Despite a significant effort to ensure the transparency of the process, many of the stakeholders interviewed by the external evaluation – notably those that were local NGOs or smaller INGOs – thought the process was opaque and not entirely fair. As might be expected, these comments came exclusively from stakeholders that were not represented in the cluster's SAG.

*"Organisations based in Islamabad have an advantage when it comes to accessing funding managed by the cluster. They are able to meet the cluster leadership face-to-face and establish a relationship." National/Local NGO Stakeholder*

*"The Shelter Cluster needs to improve the transparency of the ERF funding process. UN agencies and INGOs are getting too large share of the funding, even when they aren't able to effectively use the funding." National/Local NGO Stakeholder*

*"From my perspective, the organizations that participated more closely with the cluster, that had the personal linkages with the cluster, they had the advantage in securing ERF funding. They talked a lot about transparent criteria, but that was the reality from my perspective." INGO/IO Stakeholder*

While the external evaluator recognizes some of the concerns of the stakeholders that complained about the ERF funding mechanism, he still feels that the Shelter/NFI Cluster in

Pakistan went to great strides to ensure the transparency of their proposal vetting process. Indeed the involvement of the SAG in reviewing proposals submitted to the cluster should be considered a best practice in terms of future cluster involvement in the decision-making processes of multilateral donors.

Another issue that came up a lot among the stakeholders interviewed by the external evaluation was the perception that adequate feedback was not provided to agencies that submitted a proposal to the cluster for ERF funding. Indeed, not a single stakeholder interviewed by the external evaluation – except for those that were members of the SAG – was able to identify the reasons that their proposal was rejected for ERF funding. Most stakeholders said that they had received no explanation from the cluster for the rejection of their proposal, not even a pro-forma rejection letter, and didn't understand the cluster's reasoning in not recommending it to OCHA for funding.

When the external evaluator asked the actors involved in the process of vetting proposals for the ERF, they recognized that no clear feedback was provided to partners that submitted proposals, but that it was simply impractical to do so given the cluster's position as a coordinating body.

*"It was agreed that it was the responsibility of the cluster to send a response to partners for any proposals that they axed at their level. That wasn't the ERF's responsibility." INGO/IO Stakeholder*

*"If we were to send out the matrix [of criteria that determines which proposals are recommended to the ERF] there would be more questions from partners and emails would be sent copied to all of New York and Geneva. It would create more problems than it would solve." Cluster Personnel*

The external evaluator agrees that there were some risks to the relationships the cluster had with partners by being fully open about the reasons that certain proposals were recommended to the ERF and certain proposals were not. He feels, however, that there would have been a lot to gain from being fully open about the proposal selection process and sending out the matrix that the cluster and SAG had used to vet the proposals out to all applicants. In other words, the external evaluator would like to encourage the Shelter/NFI Cluster in Pakistan to continue to push the transparent and open process for reviewing proposals to its logical conclusion by sharing all the internal vetting documents used by the cluster with all of the cluster's partners.

## 4. Stakeholders' Key Messages for Future Clusters

As part of the interviews that the external evaluation conducted of stakeholders of the Shelter/NFI Cluster, the evaluator asked what advice stakeholders of this current cluster would have for future Shelter/NFI Clusters that might be deployed in Pakistan. The question was framed as an attempt to provide insight and lessons learned from the past three years on the coordination of humanitarian programs in Pakistan.

The evaluation received dozens of different responses to the question from a variety of stakeholders. Below, please find all the advice that at least two separate stakeholders provided grouped by the frequency that advice was given to the external evaluation.

### Importance of Creating a Strong Relationship with Government Agencies (9 Stakeholders)

You need a very close and active engagement with authorities and each key level of government. This includes providing them with information and supporting them in their response to the disaster. They can't feel that we are setting up a parallel structure to their own decision-making structure. That means reaching out to them before the meeting, explaining the agenda.	Cluster Personnel
You need to work very closely with NDMA, PDMA and District DMA, in order to ensure proper coordination.	IO/INGO Stakeholder
In future disaster responses, the government of Pakistan will be the actual coordinating lead in each sector. The clusters need to realise that they need to build the capacity of the government and not rely on the capacity of the international community to do the job of coordinating emergency humanitarian responses.	Donor Agency Stakeholder
Involve the government and advocate to them right from the beginning. Ensure they understand their facilitation role in a large-scale humanitarian response.	IO/INGO Stakeholder
In terms of the government on No Objection Certificates and ensuring humanitarian access to affected communities in Pakistan. The cluster should ensure that government actors better understand the NGOs processes and procedures.	IO/INGO Stakeholder
Make sure to keep the PDMA strongly in the loop. They can ensure a strong coordination between the government's response and the international donor-funded response.	Government Stakeholder
They should try and build the capacity of the government officials in order to make them better understand the humanitarian programming cycle and methodologies.	IO/INGO Stakeholder
We tried to co-locate with the PDMA in Sindh in 2011, and it didn't add much value to the response. But I still think it's an initiative that could be tried again. We could also try to provide some funding to the PDMA, which combined with the colocation could produce a humanitarian response more integrated with the government. Another idea is to begin to publish IM products jointly, in order to give them ownership of the information being produced by the cluster.	Cluster Personnel
The clusters should involve the government more in the production, dissemination and publication of information in order to make them true 'caretakers' of that information.	IO/INGO Stakeholder



**Importance of Face-time with Provincial Cluster Leads (4 Stakeholders)**

Need to invest facetime early on to creat relationships with the Provincial Cluster leads not run by IOM (or the national cluster agency).	Cluster Personnel
Invest in face-time with the other provincial cluster leads. Get to know each of their contexts and they will take national sectoral coordination more seriously.	IO/INGO Stakeholder
Ensure very early on that you meet with the other provincial clusters personally, in order to ensure that you establish a strong working relationship.	Cluster Personnel
Endeavour to draw in the complex emergency in KP/FATA to the national coordination structure for shelter programs. That cannot remain separate responses and HCR and IOM have to resolve their issues in that regard.	Donor Agency Stakeholder

**Need for Continuity between Cluster Activations (4 Stakeholders)**

Promote setting up "permanent clusters", which helps to ensure the creation of good technical guidance and lessons learned.	Cluster Personnel
Cluster's should continue in 'peacetime' and be active in providing training to government and civil society structures on DRR issues and disaster response.	Local/National NGO Stakeholder
Every cluster should also be functionnal in 'peacetime' and not have to set up their operations from scratch during each disaster.	Local/National NGO Stakeholder
The cluster should remain functional between natural disasters, where they can be effective at DRR and preparation activities in their sectors.	Local/National NGO Stakeholder

**Importance of Local Technical Expertise and Pilots of New Technical Approaches (4 Stakeholders)**

Prove your technical guidance through a pilot, that is very powerful in terms of advocate for shelter actors to take up your technical guidance.	Cluster Personnel
In 2010 the quality of the designs for shelters being built was extremely poor, with little attention to important details. The technical expertise available in the country must be utilised by the shelter agencies implenting programs in Pakistan. There are many local organisations that can bring this local expertise to shelter construction and design.	Local/National NGO Stakeholder
More work can be done to strengthen the technical guidance provided early in a cluster's deployment.	Cluster Personnel
The technical specifications of the shelter materials need to be revised based on the local context.	IO/INGO Stakeholder

**Build on Existing Tools and Experiences / Don't Re-Invent the Wheel (4 Stakeholders)**

One my useful contributions to the cluster in Paksitan was the compilation of key technical guidance and strategy documents used over three years. Please make sure and read this!	Cluster Personnel
Look back at what's been done before. They're a lot of tools created during the 2010-2013 humanitarian response that are useful and relevant to the context in Pakistan.	IO/INGO Stakeholder
It should be a standard process for those people coming into the country to have the opportunity to be briefed by former cluster coordinators. That would be crucial and could be done while their still at home waiting for the administrative hiring procedures to take their course.	Cluster Personnel
In the Pakistan context a cluster needs to build on what had been done before.	Donor Agency Stakeholder

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### Need to Produce Early Technical Guidance (3 Stakeholders)

Strengthen the early technical guidance provided by the cluster to ensure key standards are in place when major Early Recovery calls for proposal are issued.	Cluster Personnel
Be more proactive in coming up with technical guidance in local languages that affected populations can use during the emergency shelter phase.	Donor Agency Stakeholder
Widely circulate early shelter designs and guidance to make sure that stakeholders can use them in putting together their early recovery project proposals. Often the most important technical documents from past responses are often not available or not known to many actors.	IO/INGO Stakeholder

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### Importance of Local Levels of Coordination (3 Stakeholders)

Try to coordinate as close to the people as feasible and financially possible. The district level was the more important to us, and if you can go to village level would be ideal. The model of decentralised coordination can work.	Cluster Personnel
Operational district-level coordination is essential in the case of a large-scale disaster and sufficient resources need to be secured in order to establish it early on.	Cluster Personnel
There is a need to scale up the district-level coordination mechanisms as soon as possible after the disaster. This is one of the most useful cluster coordination mechanism from my perspective.	Cluster Personnel

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### Importance of Interactions with Local Civil Society Organisations (3 Stakeholders)

We should be actively engaging more and more with local NGOs. They are the partners that really have access to beneficiaries in need in Pakistan.	Cluster Personnel
Cluster coordinators should meet frequently with local NGOs to ensure a strong grasp of the operational context in which they're working.	Local/National NGO Stakeholder
Due to security concerns, the clusters are not able to reach many affected areas. So ensuring the involvement of local civil society in the cluster coordination process is key to providing the clusters' capability to coordinate the humanitarian response.	IO/INGO Stakeholder

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### Need for Monitoring Mechanism for Clusters (3 Stakeholders)

One of the deficiencies that I've seen in the cluster. There isn't a proper monitoring system to see if partners are actually following these standards and guidelines set forth by the cluster. There should be a monitoring committee to make sure the cluster's guidance is being followed.	IO/INGO Stakeholder
Make sure donors don't fund actions that aren't supported by the cluster. Even a formal "No Objection Certificate" system run by the cluster, in which donors would ask clusters to explicitly approve their proposals, would be good to way to end duplication among shelter actors.	IO/INGO Stakeholder
Do more independent analysis and critique of the shelter responses going on. Don't be such a neutral bystander in the process of defining technical standards.	Donor Agency Stakeholder

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### The Value of National Ownership or Experience in the Cluster (2 Stakeholders)

In 2010 the cluster was led by Arshad Rashid, if you can find a national with	Cluster Personnel
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good coordination skills that is ideal.

Ensuring that future cluster coordinators have extensive knowledge of Pakistan is crucial. IO/INGO Stakeholder

### **Importance of Information Management to the Cluster (2 Stakeholders)**

Collection and compilation and dissemination of information is really what makes a cluster a success. If we can't do that on time, then the rest of the coordination is useless. We will be perceived as a failure unless we can establish a good IM system and products. Cluster Personnel

The IM tools and systems established by the cluster in between 2010 and 2013 work and they add real value to the response. Be sure to use them from day one. Cluster Personnel

Much of the advice given by the stakeholders echoes the findings of the external evaluation, with a number items reflected above in the evaluation report including the need to produce early technical guidance during the cluster's first weeks of activation, the importance of local levels of coordination and the importance of information management to the cluster's work. What strikes the external evaluation most are the emphasis placed by stakeholders on the relationship with government agencies and how it will only become more important in future humanitarian responses. Also, the value of national leadership of the cluster's coordination mechanism as well as the need for continuity between cluster activations are points that the evaluation welcomes and takes under serious consideration.

## 5. Conclusions / Recommendations

In summary of the work done over a period of five weeks, the external evaluation has come to the following conclusions about the effectiveness and impact of the IOM-led Shelter/NFI Cluster in Pakistan between 2010 and 2013 and provided a number of recommendations about what should be capitalized upon or improved in future cluster activations.

### ***5.1 Conclusions on the Impact of Cluster Coordination***

The Shelter/NFI Cluster in Pakistan was widely regarded as a professional, competent and effective cluster among its stakeholders in Pakistan. Every stakeholder interviewed by the external evaluation described it either as the best or among the top two clusters working in Pakistan. Additionally, every actor interviewed by the evaluation saw the Shelter/NFI Cluster in Pakistan as being strongly independent from IOM's program teams. They emphasized that the cluster team's status as a neutral arbiter in discussions among cluster members as incredibly important to the coordination of shelter activities in Pakistan.

The Shelter/NFI Cluster in Pakistan created effective coordination mechanisms at the national, provincial and district levels that were incredibly useful in terms of creating a professional and coordinated humanitarian response in the sector. The meetings run by the cluster were always seen as informative by cluster stakeholders, who displayed strong levels of attendance for most of the cluster's three-year activation in Pakistan. The innovation of contracting local shelter actors to run district-level coordination structures in particular should be regarded as a best practice for coordinating responses over such large territorial areas.

The information management products produced by the cluster had a tremendous impact on the targeting of humanitarian aid and early recovery programs, with every actor interviewed by the cluster having identified them as the primary means with which they targeted their activities. The impact that the cluster has had in avoiding duplication of humanitarian aid in response to the floods in Pakistan between 2010 and 2013 has been considerable and very valuable to the overall humanitarian effort. Indeed information collected by the cluster has been used by a variety of other clusters in order to better target their own programs.

The technical guidance produced by the cluster has not had as much impact as it could have had. Few actors interviewed by the cluster had used the cluster's guidance as the primary source for the technical designs for the shelters they constructed. While individual best practices and improvements were well disseminated by the cluster, they did not truly lead the sector in identifying the most important shelter construction techniques appropriate to the response in Pakistan. That being said, the Shelter/NFI Cluster and its partner agencies have left behind an important body of technical guidance produced in 2012 and 2013 that will be important to future humanitarian shelter programs in Pakistan.

The work that the cluster did in terms of advocacy for funding to the flood response in Pakistan between 2010 and 2013 was also quite useful. All of the donor agencies remarked at how often they were able to use those documents in terms of getting their headquarters to commit more funds to the response. Also the cluster invested significant time and resources into an active participation with OCHA's ERF funding mechanism. The investment had a significant ancillary

benefit of improving the perception of the cluster's transparency vis-à-vis its partners in the country, although this was less true for shelter partners without a significant presence in the capitol.

## **5.2 Recommendations for Future Cluster Activations in Pakistan**

Based on the external evaluation's conclusions mentioned above, the evaluator has the following recommendations for future cluster activations in shelter and non-food items sector in Pakistan:

1. **Continue to invest in information management** and build off the tools developed for IM in this response. The strong value added of the IOM-led shelter cluster in providing useful and timely IM products to its stakeholders should serve as an impetus to continue to build and invest in this area.
2. The need to get good technical guidance out early was identified by a large number of stakeholders and is one of the key recommendations of this external evaluation. In order to accomplish this result, the evaluation has identified a number of potential strategies, many of which could be implemented in tandem to one another.

Firstly, the cluster should be able to **translate the global cluster's emergency shelter education and communication materials into local languages** more quickly. There is no reason that good communication materials that provide examples of what simple structures can be constructed with tarpaulin sheets, ropes and some salvaged materials can't be produced in local languages within the first two to three weeks. The cluster was not able to do that in Pakistan according to a number of stakeholders and it should become a standard practice for Shelter/NFI Clusters worldwide to promote more effective use of emergency shelter materials.

Secondly, the external evaluation believes that there are ways to produce designs and technical guidance for early recovery or transitional shelter programs more quickly on future shelter deployments. It's not that the Shelter/NFI Cluster in Pakistan didn't produce technical guidelines in its first few months of activation in 2010, it did produce some useful "dos and don'ts" for its partners. Most stakeholders interviewed by the evaluation, however, **expected more technical support from the cluster** and did not base their designs for early recovery shelter programs primarily on the shelter cluster's advice. This expectation was especially true, as only one or two shelter stakeholders in Pakistan noted having significant technical experience on their team for their response to the floods.

On potential way to get designs and technical guidance out earlier in future activations of the shelter cluster would be to have **two Technical Advisors deployed simultaneously** in the first few months of the cluster's activation. One advisor focused on emergency shelter programs and a second focused on early recovery / transitional shelter programs. This could ensure that recommended technical designs were produced by the cluster within the first three months of activation.

3. Despite the significant investment of time and resources, the initiative of the Shelter/NFI Cluster in Pakistan of **involving the Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) in the review of proposals submitted to the ERF is worth continuing**. While the process didn't guarantee

the transparency of the process to all applicants, it still provided a wide number of actors with a clear understanding of how proposals were recommended by the cluster for funding and improved the cluster's reputation for transparency and independence among the wider humanitarian community. In fact based on the results of the experiment in Pakistan, it might be worth trying to mainstream this as a best practice with the global cluster.

Additionally in this regard, when working to vet proposals for multilateral donor funding mechanisms, as was done with the Emergency Response Fund in Pakistan, the cluster should **share all of its spreadsheets, tables and matrixes that are used to screen proposals** with the entire membership of the Shelter/NFI Cluster. This will ensure complete transparency as to the funding decisions recommended by the Shelter/NFI Cluster, especially with smaller stakeholders with only limited presence in the capital.

4. By all accounts, the National Cluster Coordinators that ran the Shelter/NFI Cluster in Pakistan between 2010 and 2013 were well regarded by a wide variety of stakeholders. They were generally recognized as being independent of IOM's program departments and very knowledgeable about the challenges facing the shelter sector in Pakistan. The evaluation recognizes that the cluster coordinator's previous experience with shelter coordination at the provincial level played a key role in their success as national-level coordinators. So, **continuing to recruit national cluster coordinators with previous experience in shelter coordination in Pakistan** would be recommended. The practice of promoting qualified Pakistani nationals to such positions, as was the case with Mr. Arshad Rashid in 2010, would also be recommended, given his success at forging strong relationships with government counterparts early in the cluster's activation.
5. Promoting the early **activation of district-level coordination structures** in future disasters is a clear recommendation of this external evaluation, given their success in providing operational-level coordination and support to shelter agencies to resist the influence of political pressures on the humanitarian programming. Just the activation of district-level coordination structures, however, is not enough in the eye of the external evaluation. The contractual model under which the district-level coordination structures were financially supported by the cluster and enabled to focus on coordination work is an identified best practice for cluster coordination in Pakistan. This structure of contracted local shelter actors hiring dedicated district-level cluster coordinators provided a clear added-value to the response in Pakistan.
6. It remains important to work through the issues that have made coordination difficult **between the provincial Shelter/NFI Clusters in Balochistan and KP/FATA and the IOM-led national cluster**. There is a real need to improve the amount of information sharing and coordination going on between these layers of coordination, especially on technical guidelines and standards. If necessary, apply pressure through key donor agency stakeholders to encourage the proactivity of the other provincial clusters in coordinating their activities with the national cluster.
7. The Shelter/NFI Cluster in Pakistan briefly tried to **collocate with the Provincial Disaster Management Authority (PDMA)** in Sindh Province by having their Provincial Shelter/NFI

Cluster Coordinator work out of the PDMA's office. The experience was not seen as particularly beneficial by either the PDMA or the cluster personnel involved, but the external evaluation nevertheless feels that this is an initiative to be pursued. A combination of a consensus among stakeholders of the increasing need to involve government stakeholders in humanitarian decision-making and the increasing desire within the government to 'control' the work of humanitarian actors leads to a need to explore all avenues to better integrate the governmental actors into the work of the Shelter/NFI cluster. While such a setup might also be advantageous at the national level, the National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)'s office location within the Prime Minister's Office makes such a setup practically inconceivable.

8. Additionally, **joint publishing of key information management materials**, such as damage assessments, 4W and gap analyses, together with the NDMA could go a long way towards improving the integration of humanitarian efforts conducted by the government and the cluster's partners. In order for the government to agree to publish such documents jointly, they would have to be involved from the start in the designing of the methodology for collecting such data.
9. Continuing to have some type of **low-intensity coordination system for shelter and NFI programming in Pakistan between large humanitarian emergencies** seems to be something a large number of stakeholders were requesting (including governmental stakeholders) and would be something the external evaluation would recommend. The currently operating "Shelter and Non-Food Item Working Group" should continue to function with a skeleton group of cluster coordination team members, likely consisting only of national staff members, could continue to work on issues like maintaining databases of shelter programming, collecting reliable population, shelter construction and administrative boundary information for future IM needs. A technical advisor could continue to catalogue shelter construction techniques and perhaps provide guidance to development programming in the shelter sector by integrating disaster risk reduction techniques. Such a system would ensure that future clusters would be able to activate quickly and capitalize on the experience of the cluster from 2010 to 2013.

## Annex A – List of Stakeholders Interviewed

Cluster Personnel Interviewed by External Evaluation						
Name	Organisation <sup>vii</sup>	Title <sup>1</sup>	Email	Involved in the Response		
				2010-11	2011-12	2012-13
Badel Awan	Shelter/NFI Cluster	Information Management Assistant	<a href="mailto:bawan@iom.int">bawan@iom.int</a>		X	X
Muhammad Eidal	Shelter/NFI Cluster	District Focal Point	<a href="mailto:meidal@iom.int">meidal@iom.int</a>	X	X	
		Provincial Coordinator (North Sindh)				X
Mahwish Irfan	Shelter/NFI Cluster	GIS Analyst	<a href="mailto:mirfan@iom.int">mirfan@iom.int</a>		X	X
Sumera Izhar	Shelter/NFI Cluster	Technical Officer	<a href="mailto:sizhar@iom.int">sizhar@iom.int</a>			Since
Jim Kennedy	Shelter/NFI Cluster	Technical Advisor	<a href="mailto:jpk18269@hotmail.com">jpk18269@hotmail.com</a>	X		
Kashif Khan	Shelter/NFI Cluster	Information Management Officer	<a href="mailto:kkhan2@iom.int">kkhan2@iom.int</a>	X	X	X
Maria Moita	Shelter/NFI Cluster	Technical Advisor	<a href="mailto:mmoita@iom.int">mmoita@iom.int</a>	X		
		National Coordinator			X	X
Deeba Pervez	Shelter/NFI Cluster	Provincial Coordinator (Sindh)	<a href="mailto:dpervez@iom.int">dpervez@iom.int</a>	X	X	X
Manahil Qureshi	Shelter/NFI Cluster	Assessment Focal Point / IMO	<a href="mailto:mqureshi@iom.int">mqureshi@iom.int</a>		X	X
Arshad Rashid	Shelter/NFI Cluster	National Coordinator	<a href="mailto:rarashid@iom.int">rarashid@iom.int</a>	X		
Amina Saoudi	Shelter/NFI Cluster	Provincial Coordinator (Sindh)		X	X	
		National Coordinator				X
Edgar Scrase	Shelter/NFI Cluster	Information Management Officer	<a href="mailto:escrase@unhcr.org">escrase@unhcr.org</a>	X	X	
Katherine Smalley	Shelter/NFI Cluster	Deputy National Coordinator	<a href="mailto:ksmalley@iom.int">ksmalley@iom.int</a>			X
		National Coordination Focal Point				Since
Jan-Willem Wegdam	Shelter/NFI Cluster	Provincial Coordinator (Sindh)	<a href="mailto:wegdam@xs4all.nl">wegdam@xs4all.nl</a>	X		
		National Coordinator			X	

Cluster Partners Interviewed by External Evaluation						
Name	Organisation <sup>1</sup>	Title <sup>1</sup>	Email	Involved in the Response		
				2010-11	2011-12	2012-13
Iftikhar Ahmed	CRS	Senior Project Officer – Shelter	<a href="mailto:iftikhar.ahmed@crs.org">iftikhar.ahmed@crs.org</a>	X	X	X
Mahmood Ahmed	HelpAge International	Senior Operations & Emergency Manager	<a href="mailto:mahmood.ahmed@helpagesa.org">mahmood.ahmed@helpagesa.org</a>	X	X	X
Masood Ahmed	NRC	Shelter Coordinator – Balochistan Cluster Co-Lead	<a href="mailto:masood.ahmed@nrc.no">masood.ahmed@nrc.no</a>	X	X	X
Shaikh Tanveer Ahmed	Hands	Chief Executive	<a href="mailto:Tanveer.ahmed@hands.org.pk">Tanveer.ahmed@hands.org.pk</a>	X	X	X
Syed Junaid Akhlaq	NDMA / Government of Pakistan	Head of Operations Dept – Recovery	<a href="mailto:dir_rr@ndma.gov.pk">dir_rr@ndma.gov.pk</a>	X	X	
		Director				X
Ellahi Bakhsh Baloch	Strengthening Participatory Organization (SPO)	Regional Head (Sindh Province)	<a href="mailto:ellaheen@spopk.org">ellaheen@spopk.org</a>	X	X	X
Rafiq Bassan	Al-Mehran Rural Development Organization (AMRDO)	Chairman	<a href="mailto:info@amrdo.org">info@amrdo.org</a>	X	X	X
Abdul Jabbar Chhachhar	Al-Mehran Rural Development Organization (AMRDO)	Chief Executive Officer / Founder	<a href="mailto:jabbar@amrdo.org">jabbar@amrdo.org</a>	X	X	X
Safraz Lal Din	Secours Islamique	Program Manager	<a href="mailto:sarfraz.laldin@acted.org">sarfraz.laldin@acted.org</a>	X	X	
	ACTED	Director of Programs				X
Bella Evidente	UN-Habitat	Country Programme Manager a.i.	<a href="mailto:bella.evidente@unhabitat.org.pk">bella.evidente@unhabitat.org.pk</a>		X	X
Fatir Jardoan	Pakistan Rural Initiatives for Emergency Preparedness, Response and Development (PREPARED)	Program Manager	<a href="mailto:fjardoan@prepared.com.pk">fjardoan@prepared.com.pk</a>	X	X	X
Annette Hearn	OCHA	Deputy Head of Office	<a href="mailto:hearns@un.org">hearns@un.org</a>	X	X	X
Ali Gohar Khan	USAID/OFDA	Program Management Specialist			X	X

Nadeem Khan	NRC	Shelter Project Manager	<a href="mailto:nadeem.ilyas@nrc.no">nadeem.ilyas@nrc.no</a>	X	X	X
Muhammad Tariq Khan	CARE	Shelter Advisor	<a href="mailto:mtariqwws@gmail.com">mtariqwws@gmail.com</a>	X		
		Technical Advisor				X
Basharat Ullah Khan	IFRC	National Construction & Shelter Coordinator	<a href="mailto:basharat.khan@ifrc.org">basharat.khan@ifrc.org</a>	X	X	X
Adam Kalopsidiotis	Cordaid	Shelter Program Manager	<a href="mailto:adam.cordaid@gmail.com">adam.cordaid@gmail.com</a>	X		
Yasmeen Lari	Heritage Foundation	Founder / Chief Executive	<a href="mailto:yasmeen.lari@gmail.com">yasmeen.lari@gmail.com</a>		X	X
Aamir Bashir Malik	Concern Worldwide / RAPID Fund	Director, RAPID Fund	<a href="mailto:aamir.malik@concern.net">aamir.malik@concern.net</a>	X	X	X
Nadir Mansoor	Hands	Senior Manager Infrastructure Development & Shelter	<a href="mailto:nadir.mansoor@hands.org.pk">nadir.mansoor@hands.org.pk</a>	X	X	X
Magnus Wolfe Murray	DFID	Humanitarian Advisor	<a href="mailto:m-wolfemurray@dfid.gov.uk">m-wolfemurray@dfid.gov.uk</a>	X	X	X
Brig Sajid Naeem	NDMA / Government of Pakistan	Director	<a href="mailto:sicbs@ndma.gov.pk">sicbs@ndma.gov.pk</a>	X	X	
	National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM)	Senior Institutional and Capacity Building Specialist				
Lakshmi Noviera	OCHA / ERF	ERF Manager	<a href="mailto:noviera@un.org">noviera@un.org</a>	X	X	X
Akhlaque A. Qureshi	PDMA / Government of Sindh	Director (Operations)	<a href="mailto:dir.ops@pdma.gos.pk">dir.ops@pdma.gos.pk</a>	X		X
Seemi Saeed	UN-Habitat	Senior Architect	<a href="mailto:seemi.saeed@unhabitat.org.pk">seemi.saeed@unhabitat.org.pk</a>	X	X	X
Edgar Scrase	UNHCR	Information Management Officer	<a href="mailto:escrase@unhcr.org">escrase@unhcr.org</a>			X
Waseem Ahmed Solangi	Hands	Manager, Infrastructure Development Energy, WASH and Shelter Program	<a href="mailto:waseem.solangi@hands.org.pk">waseem.solangi@hands.org.pk</a>	X	X	X
Joseph Tritschler	USAID/OFDA	Senior Program Officer	<a href="mailto:jtritschler@usaid.gov">jtritschler@usaid.gov</a>		X	X
Muhammad	ACTED	Deputy Area Coordinator	<a href="mailto:muhammad.yousif@acted.org">muhammad.yousif@acted.org</a>	X	X	X



Yousif						
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## Annex B – Semi Structured Interviews of Cluster Personnel

### Personal Information

What was your role in the cluster?

- National Coordinator;  Provincial Coordinator;  District Coordinator;  National Information Manager;  Provincial Information Manager;  Technical Advisor;  Other

How long and during what time period(s) were you involved in the cluster?

- 2010 flood response;  2011 flood response;  2012 flood response  
\_\_\_\_\_ months in total

What was your previous experience with cluster coordination?

- Previously deployed by the Shelter Cluster;  Previously deployed by another cluster;  
 Experience as a cluster partner;  No experience with cluster coordination.

How long have you been working in the humanitarian field?

\_\_\_\_\_ years

### Recruitment and Deployment

How were you recruited?

- Existing pool of Shelter Cluster consultants (trained roster);  Existing IOM Pakistan staff member;  Existing IOM staff member outside of Pakistan;  Responded to public advertisement;  Other

How long was the recruitment period (from first contact to arrival in Pakistan/start of functions)?

\_\_\_\_\_ days

How clear were your responsibilities and the management lines within the cluster?

\_\_\_\_\_

How much support did you receive during your deployment? What was the strongest example of the support that you received and the area where you received the least support?

\_\_\_\_\_

How was the coordination between the different layers of coordination (national, provincial and district)? Were there ever times that they seemed to be providing conflicting messages / guidance?

\_\_\_\_\_

How did the different layers of coordination communicate and coordinate activities? How often did they communicate?

Frequency of communication \_\_\_\_\_

Was the fact that different layers of coordination were implemented by different agencies affect the quality of the coordination? How could it have been alleviated?

\_\_\_\_\_

**Service Provision**

Of all the services provided by the cluster (IM, technical guidance, forums for coordination), which ones do you feel were the most important and why? Was there one that you felt had little or no impact?

\_\_\_\_\_

**Info Management**

Which were the most useful and least useful IM products and why?

\_\_\_\_\_

At what level was IM data disaggregated to? Do you know why the level was chosen?

\_\_\_\_\_

What temporal information was included and why?

\_\_\_\_\_

In what ways did you observe shelter cluster partners' using IM products?

\_\_\_\_\_

What was the one IM product that you weren't able to do, but you wish you had?

\_\_\_\_\_

**Technical Guidance**

How was the technical guidance produced by the cluster developed?

\_\_\_\_\_

How closely was the technical guidance followed for:

- Emergency Shelter \_\_\_\_\_
- Transitional Shelter \_\_\_\_\_
- NFI Kits \_\_\_\_\_

Why was certain technical guidance not followed by cluster partners?

\_\_\_\_\_

How active were partners in the development of the technical guidance and why?

\_\_\_\_\_

**Advocacy / Strategic Guidance**

Did the cluster support the mobilization of more resources for the humanitarian needs in Pakistan? How?

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What was the most effective advocacy tool used?

---

What interactions did the cluster have with donor agencies?

---

In your opinion, is it the cluster's role to directly advocate for increased humanitarian funding or is it to provide its partners with tools to do their own advocacy?

---

How was the cluster involved in the distribution of pooled funds (CERF, Concern/OFDA Rapid, others)? What mechanisms were used to invite proposals from different humanitarian actors?

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### **Handover / Closeout**

How effective was the handover of the cluster? Do you feel coordination services were effectively continued after the cluster's deactivation?

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How was the decision made to deactivate the cluster? Do you agree with it, why / why not?

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### **Future Lessons**

If the Shelter Cluster were re-deployed in Pakistan to deal with a humanitarian disaster, what would be the one thing that you would change about the cluster's set up, management or services?

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## Annex C – Semi Structured Interviews of Cluster Partners

### Personal Information

How long and during what time period(s) were you involved in the humanitarian response in Pakistan?

2010 flood response;  2011 flood response;  2012 flood response  
\_\_\_\_\_ months in total involved with the humanitarian response between 2010-2013

In what way did you interact with the cluster (check as many as apply)?

National Cluster meetings;  Provincial Cluster meetings;  District Cluster Meetings;  
 TWiGs;  SAG;  IM products;  Other: \_\_\_\_\_

### Coordination within the Cluster

How was the coordination between the different layers of coordination (national, provincial and district)? Were there ever times that they seemed to be providing conflicting messages / guidance?

\_\_\_\_\_

In your opinion, was the fact that different layers of coordination were implemented by different agencies affect the quality of the coordination? How could it have been alleviated?

\_\_\_\_\_

### Service Provision

Of all the services provided by the cluster (IM, technical guidance, forums for coordination), which ones do you feel were the most important and why? Was there one that you felt had little or no impact?

\_\_\_\_\_

### Cluster Meetings

At what level did you attend cluster meetings?

National;  Provincial;  District;  SAG;  TWiG

How often did you attend these meetings?

Bi-weekly;  Monthly;  Only occasionally;

How effectively did you feel the meetings were run and how useful did you find them?

\_\_\_\_\_

Were cluster meetings provided in the appropriate language for your organization?

\_\_\_\_\_

Did your organization ever contribute a presentation to the meetings? Were you invited to?

\_\_\_\_\_

## Info Management

Which were the most useful and least useful IM products and why?

\_\_\_\_\_

How often did you use IM products from the shelter cluster?

- Just once a year (for proposals / reports);  A couple of times a year;  
 At least monthly;  At least weekly.

Were the IM products provided at a sufficient level of disaggregation of data (Province, District, UC, etc) to be useful to your organization?

\_\_\_\_\_

How did you use the IM information provided?

Selection of locations of intervention: \_\_\_\_\_

Selection of types of intervention: \_\_\_\_\_

Advocacy / fundraising efforts: \_\_\_\_\_

How did you access the IM materials? Were they easy enough to access?

- Cluster website;  Other website;  At cluster meetings;  other:

\_\_\_\_\_

Is there anything that you think was missing?

\_\_\_\_\_

## Technical Guidance

What pieces of technical guidance produced by the cluster can you remember?

\_\_\_\_\_

Did your organizations programming use these guidelines?

- Yes, but our humanitarian programming was already in line with these guidelines;  
 Yes, these guidelines shaped our humanitarian programming;  
 No, we were aware of these guidelines, but didn't follow them for these reasons:

\_\_\_\_\_

- No, we were un-aware of these guidelines.

How active was your organization in the development of these technical guidelines?

\_\_\_\_\_

Do you feel the guidelines were appropriate to the humanitarian shelter needs at the time?  
Why or why not?

\_\_\_\_\_

## Advocacy / Strategic Guidance

Did the cluster provide guidance on damage assessment criteria? How useful did you find this information?

\_\_\_\_\_

Did you use any of the cluster's material / information in your own advocacy / fundraising efforts?

\_\_\_\_\_

In your opinion, is it the cluster's role to directly advocate for increased humanitarian funding or is it to provide its partners with tools to do their own advocacy?

\_\_\_\_\_

Was the affected population in any way involved in the development of the sectoral strategy? Do you think their voices were heard?

\_\_\_\_\_

How was the cluster involved in the distribution of pooled funds (CERF, Concern/OFDA Rapid, others)? Did your organization participate, why or why not?

\_\_\_\_\_

### **Handover / Closeout**

How effective was the handover of the cluster? Do you feel coordination services were effectively continued after the cluster's deactivation?

\_\_\_\_\_

How was the decision made to deactivate the cluster? Do you agree with it, why / why not?

\_\_\_\_\_

### **Future Lessons**

If the Shelter Cluster were re-deployed in Pakistan to deal with a humanitarian disaster, what would be the one thing that you would change about the cluster's set up, management or services?

\_\_\_\_\_

## Annex D – Terms of Reference for the External Evaluation

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<sup>i</sup> IFRC Framework for Evaluation. IFRC Planning and Evaluation Department (PED) – IFRC Secretariat. 2011. [www.ifrc.org](http://www.ifrc.org)

<sup>ii</sup> In addition to the provincial shelter clusters listed here, small provincial clusters were active in Pakistani Administered Kashmir (PAK) and Gilgit-Baltistan, run by FOCUS and AKDN respectively. Given the long amount of time that has passed since their activation, more than three years in total, the evaluation was not able to look at their relationship with the national cluster.

<sup>iii</sup> The exceeds the target of 40 stakeholders interviewed set out in the evaluation's inception report.

<sup>iv</sup> Evaluating the Shelter Cluster: Overview and Tools. Global Shelter Cluster. Draft 14/04/2014. pg 6-7

<sup>v</sup> Handbook for RCs and HCs on Emergency Preparedness and Response. IASC. 2010.

<sup>vi</sup> Final Report – Evaluation of the Pakistan Emergency Response Fund. Andy Featherstone. November 2011.

<sup>vii</sup> The titles and organisations listed here are referring to the stakeholders' titles and organisations during their participation in flood response between 2010 and 2013 in Pakistan, and not their current organisations or titles.



Terms of Reference (TOR) for:

**IOM-led Shelter/NFIs Cluster Evaluation 2014**

**1. Summary**

- 1.1 Purpose:** To share key lessons and recommendations from the Pakistan Shelter/NFIs Cluster to the floods response from 2010 to 2013 for improving and informing future shelter cluster response, by evaluating the impact and effectiveness of the coordination services. To trial and review the shelter cluster evaluation toolkit
- 1.2 Audience:** Shelter coordination team members will use it to learn for future responses within Pakistan. Cluster partners, donors, and other humanitarian actors will use it for general information.
- 1.3 Commissioners:** The evaluation is being commissioned by the Global Shelter Cluster Accountability Working Group. The consultant will be hired by IMPACT Initiatives
- 1.4 Reports to:**  
*IMPACT Initiatives for contractual issues, logistics and security related matters*  
*Joseph Ashmore IOM Geneva as the Evaluation manager*  
*Amina Saoudi (IOM Pakistan) as outgoing shelter cluster coordinator, as focal point in country*
- 1.5 Duration:** 25 days
- 1.6 Timeframe:** from XXXX, 2014 to XXXXX, 2014
- 1.7 Location:** Home based with travel to Pakistan (around XX days).

**2. Background**

Extreme flooding has occurred in Pakistan three years in a row, each time hundreds of thousands of houses have collapsed, displacing millions and thwarting numerous development gains.

The monsoon of 2010 led to one of the largest human displacement and loss of housing in the history of modern humanitarian affairs. Over 1.5 million houses were damaged or destroyed and approximately 11 million individuals either lost their home or experienced some level of damage and loss. In 2011 the southern provinces of Pakistan, Sindh and Balochistan, suffered from new flood after an extraordinary monsoon rainfall, as a result 350,000 – 500,000 houses were completely destroyed and over 2.5m people were displaced. Recently, the unseasonal rain outbursts of 7<sup>th</sup> to 11<sup>th</sup> September 2012 destroyed a further 300,000 – 450,000 houses, displacing over 2million people – making extreme flooding in Pakistan almost a predictable annual event.

IOM has been leading the Shelter Cluster in Pakistan since 2005 Earthquake; the cluster system went through successive deactivations and reactivations in view of changing needs and situations. In the

aftermath of the 2010 floods in Pakistan, the cluster system was activated in August 2010 and continued till the end of March 2011; following which working groups were formed for dealing with early recovery activities; accordingly the clusters for natural disaster were activated in September 2011 and continued through 2012 and 2013. The cluster system has now been formally deactivated in December 2013.

From 2012 to 2013, IOM led the shelter cluster at national level and also led the provincial shelter cluster in Sindh. IOM as the Shelter cluster lead organization maintained working relationship with NDMA as the co-chair for the cluster at the national level and with PDMA as the co-chair at the provincial level.

The Temporary Settlement Support Unit (TSSU) was established under the Shelter Cluster in response to the 2011 monsoon floods to gather information on the locations of temporary settlements and the living conditions of populations displaced by the flooding. In the absence of a CCCM Cluster, TSSU undertakes CCCM-related assessment and capacity building activities.

IOM received funding from DFID, USAID/OFDA, DG ECHO and government of Japan for the work related to shelter cluster which included but was not limited to conduct field assessments, identify emergency shelter needs following floods or other disasters, develop response strategies, and organize appropriate assistance with the aid of its members, Pakistani national and local disaster management officials, and civil society groups.

The structure of the cluster coordination mechanisms is the following;

The Shelter/NFIs Cluster is operating on two levels;

- i. At National level – Co-Chair is NDMA
- ii. At Provincial Level
  - a. Sindh – IOM with PDMA as co-chair
  - b. KP/FATA – UNHCR with PDMA and FDMA as co-chairs<sup>1</sup>
  - c. Balochistan – NRC with PDMA as co-chairs.

The Shelter Cluster was activated in September 2011 to coordinate shelter response interventions following Sindh Floods 2011 and continued to coordinate activities relating to 2012 floods response at the national, provincial and district level. 274 organizations participated in the Shelter Cluster at various levels during 2012 – 2013.

In order to coordinate various activities relating to relief and recovery, a total of 260 meetings were held monthly/bimonthly in Islamabad and affected districts to review ongoing and planned activities in response to the 2011 and 2012 floods. Cluster meetings were co-chaired by government counterparts wherever possible to encourage local ownership and contribute towards sustained and productive partnerships amongst humanitarian community and government counterparts responding to relief and

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<sup>1</sup> UNHCR led KP/FATA Shelter Cluster includes complex crises and remains active at provincial level in the conflict context.

early recovery needs, mapping of outstanding gaps and needs and resource mobilization for 2011 and 2012 flood response in Pakistan.

### **3. Evaluation Objectives & Scope**

#### **Objectives**

The objectives of the evaluation are to

- 1) Document, review and analyse the experience of the IOM-led country Shelter Cluster team with respect to the establishment and operation of the Shelter Cluster, with a particular emphasis on standard operating procedures and lessons to be learnt for future operations;
- 2) Appraise the service provided by the shelter cluster team to shelter cluster participants (Government, UN agencies, NGOs both national and international) at national, provincial and sub-provincial level.
- 3) Review the national coordination model with specific reference to use of multiple agencies coordinating the response nationally, provincially, and at the district level.
- 4) Assess the impact of the shelter cluster in promoting a coordinated shelter response
- 5) Appraise and provide recommendations with regard to future emergency shelter cluster coordination activities at both national and provincial levels.
- 6) Review the shelter cluster evaluation toolkit (currently in draft)

#### **Scope**

The scope relates to:

- The national level coordination approach, with different agencies taking a lead in different provinces.
- Specific coordination arrangements in Sindh and Punjab

However, the specific coordination arrangements within KP, fata, Baluchistan, Kashmir and Gilgit / Baltistan are excluded

### **4. Evaluation Methodology**

The methodology should include;

- a. Desk Review
  - Review of available documented materials relating to the start-up, planning, implementation, and impact of the Shelter Cluster. Most of the materials can be found on [www.shelterpakistan.org](http://www.shelterpakistan.org).

- Review of the shelter cluster interim reports.

b. Data Collection and Stakeholders Analysis

- Interviews with Shelter/NFI Cluster member agencies (NGOs and INGOs)
- Interviews with NDMA as the co-chair for the National Shelter/NFI Cluster.
- Interviews with other UN agencies participating in Shelter Cluster.
- Interviews with provincial shelter cluster lead agencies and co-chairs.
- Interviews with PDMA and district authorities.
- Interviews with other cluster lead like education, WASH, Health, CCCM clusters, to analyze the inter-cluster coordination mechanism.
- NGOs/INGOs that worked under IOM-led Shelter Cluster as District Focal Points (DFPs).
- Interviews with key staff and consultants who have had a key role in coordination since 2010

c. Compilation of the Report (see DRAFT evaluation toolkit for template)

**5. Deliverables (or Output)**

- **Inception report** (see cluster evaluation toolkit for sample format)
- **Evaluation report** with key recommendations and supporting information.
- **Collated and systemized documentation** relating to cluster systems to support future activations. As annexes:
  - o Additional notes, summaries of interviews etc. as appropriate or supporting documentation.
  - o Summary of review activities undertaken including interviews, visits, documents reviewed etc.
- **Comments** on use and applicability of shelter cluster evaluation toolkit

**6. Proposed Timeline (or Schedule)**

The exercise will be implemented over a period of 25 days between \_\_\_\_\_ 2014 and \_\_\_\_\_ 2014.

**7. Evaluation Quality and Ethical Standards**

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of people and the communities of which they are members, and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate, reliable, and legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and applicable practices being used in similar type of evaluations globally and in native countries.

**8. Evaluation Team and reporting**

The evaluation will be carried out by an external independent consultant with support of an internal resource person that has been involved in operations.

- **External Independent Consultant:** leads the evaluation process, carry out the desk review, do the interviews (skype or phone), plan the trip to Pakistan in coordination with the resource person and the coordination team on the ground, lead the field visit, lead the interviews, write the draft review, finalize the review according to the comments received.
- **Internal Resource Person:** advise on the preparation of the trip, participate in the trip, participate in the interviews, give feedback and orientation on the people to be interviewed, give background to the issues raised by the interviewees, give comments to the draft review and any other actions that he and the external consultant might find useful for the review.

#### **9. Reporting:**

- The consultant will be contracted by IMPACT Initiatives under an ECHO shelter cluster grant for enhanced coordination. IMPACT Initiatives will be responsible for in country security arrangements
- The overall evaluation will be managed by the Global Shelter Cluster coordination focal point in IOM HQ.
- In country: Amina Saoudi (IOM Pakistan) as outgoing shelter cluster coordinator, as focal point in country

#### **10. Appendices**

Key reference documents will be provided.