


# The Philippines Shelter Cluster in response to Typhoon Haiyan / Yolanda



05 September 2016  
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Cover: Provinces map of the Visayas (© Volina).

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## Abbreviations and acronyms

BRE	Building Research Establishment
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DEC	Disasters Emergency Committee
DFID	Department for International Development
DSWD	Department of Social Welfare and Development
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HLP	Housing, Land and Property
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IEC	Information, Education, and Communication
IDP	Internally displaced person
IM	Information management
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies
MIRA	Multi-Cluster/Sector Integrated Rapid Assessment
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OPARR	Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery
PAGASA	Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration
QSAND	Quantifying Sustainability in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters
SAG	Strategic Advisory Group
SCT	Shelter Coordination Team
SSD	Shelter and Settlements Department
Sitrep	Situation report
TWIG	Technical working group
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNISDR	United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature

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Many of the recommendations in this review draw on comments and suggestions by informants but all errors and omissions are my own.

Sara Davidson

## Executive summary

Typhoon Haiyan, (Yolanda), reached Samar on 8 November 2013. It is believed to have been the most powerful typhoon ever to have made landfall and was the deadliest typhoon in the Philippines' recorded history. The typhoon was followed by a storm surge 7.5 metres high. Early warning and preparedness measures saved many lives but more than 7,000 people lost their lives. In Tacloban City and nearby towns, over 4,000 people died as a result of the storm surge alone.

The Philippines government and humanitarian agencies responded to many natural and man-made disasters in 2013, including an earthquake in October. On 9 November, the government requested international assistance. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) assessed the emergency as requiring a 'Level 3' response, the first time a sudden-onset natural disaster had been so designated.

Haiyan damaged or destroyed more than a million homes. IFRC, already leading the earthquake Shelter Cluster in Bohol, deployed a shelter coordination team for the second time in less than a month. Its Haiyan emergency appeal included 761,688 Swiss francs for coordination of the shelter response.

This evaluation was commissioned by IFRC to review the effectiveness of its shelter cluster coordination from November 2013 to November 2014. The evaluation included desk review, meetings in Manila and Tacloban, and interviews and written responses involving approximately 50 informants. Preliminary findings were shared by IFRC at a partner workshop in Manila in 2016 and a report draft reviewed by the evaluation manager and global focal points.

IFRC responded fast to typhoon warnings. It began deployment of focal points before the typhoon made landfall and transferred staff from the Bohol Cluster. By December 2013, it had 15 staff in Manila, where they were hosted by OCHA, and in three hubs in Cebu, Roxas and Tacloban. IOM provided coordination at sub-hubs in Guiuan and Ormoc. Over the thirteen months of the Haiyan deployment, approximately 60 persons were deployed by IFRC, IOM and UN-Habitat.

This was not enough. The L3 response required a larger coordination team than IFRC had ever deployed, a minimum of 30 persons in post for at least three months. Achieving and maintaining a team this size proved impossible, partly due to demand elsewhere but also because of organisational bottlenecks. Lack of global capacity in Geneva and institutional barriers to recruitment in the Philippines left the IFRC-led team with gaps. These gaps and a baffling absence of support staff and transport meant overload, inefficiency, stress and burn-out for many in the team. Haiyan hub coordinators achieved results despite IFRC protocols by hiring casual staff themselves. The Bohol team was left with almost no staff and relied on partners for much support.

In its seventh Shelter Cluster deployment in the Philippines IFRC was well-placed to build on links with the government. The team was welcomed by UN and government counterparts and Haiyan cluster and hub coordinators understood the importance of representation at different levels. However, the Cluster's lack of visibility between emergencies – again, due to institutional barriers - and early turnover in the role of cluster coordinator meant learning and re-learning context in a politically complex and highly scrutinised response.

Though the Philippines government had legislated for clusters, responsibility for disaster management and humanitarian coordination was not clear-cut. The government and international responders retained different perspectives on humanitarian assistance, recovery timelines and coordination. Co-leadership on shelter was complicated by the division of responsibility between different government departments and different local administrative levels. Senior operations managers were based in affected regions. This weakened the SAG whose meetings were in the capital. Without a deputy, it was hard for the coordinator in Manila to travel. The main hub moved to Tacloban in April 2014.

As in the Bopha response, there was criticism that OCHA coordination hubs were not closer to areas directly affected. Given the extent of damage - over 170 municipalities in 14 provinces were affected by Haiyan and infrastructure was badly damaged - the challenge was how to make best use of a relatively small number of skilled cluster staff and focal points in partner agencies. With no vehicles or drivers of their own, hub teams struggled to travel. With no interpreters on the team, it was harder for local agencies to participate fully in meetings or for specialist advisers to work in affected areas. Nevertheless, regional hub teams, supported by partners, were praised for holding Shelter Cluster meetings in affected areas though urban response in Tacloban City would have benefited from a deputy coordinator role. The cluster should consider, with its partners, whether and where hubs add value.

Shelter Cluster meetings were generally seen as effective and useful. Shelter Coordination Team members took legal, technical and cross-cutting expertise to and from coordination forums, TWIGs, agency and community meetings. They were well-supported by partners such as IOM, CRS and Save the Children. They developed IEC resources that have been adopted by government and partners and used in subsequent disasters in the Philippines.

The L3 response demanded and generated a huge amount of data not only for shelter partners but for central coordination of the response. Information management training for partners in one hub was replicated by OCHA but the Cluster's own lack of capacity was a constraint. To address this data collection was centralised. That was intended to reduce pressure on hubs but some coordinators felt that the consolidated data were shared too slowly for partners to use. Reshaping information management to capture information on recovery produced friction, stress and a two-month hiatus in data collection. All the same, partners said that 3W information remained one of the reasons they went to cluster meetings.

Strategy was informed by workshops in each region in January-February 2014 but not finalised. Reasons included lack of government commitment, the speed with which self-recovery had begun and the fact that strategy remained linked to a central plan formulated before assessment and consultation in very different regions. Recovery Shelter Guidelines, developed by technical coordinators, partners and the SAG, appear to have served as de facto cluster strategy on self-recovery.

The Shelter Cluster's *8 Build Back Safer Key Messages*, first developed in the Guiuan sub-hub, were tested with local and global cluster partners before adoption by government and non-government organisations. These messages, in local languages using clear graphics, are one of the cluster's success stories and a testimony to cooperation between IOM and IFRC. The *Key Messages* remain in use in the Philippines and have been adapted in deployments elsewhere. Nevertheless, as monitoring found, affected households required funds for shelter too if messages were to be used.

REACH drew on prior experience with the Cluster in the Philippines to recruit and train a large local assessment team. The difficulties of travel and communication made the shelter and WASH assessment challenging and REACH's achievement impressive. However, delay in starting due to other requests from the Shelter Cluster, including participation in the Multi-Cluster/Sector Integrated Rapid Assessment (MIRA) meant that the report came too late for planning by many partners. The Shelter Cluster and REACH needed to prioritise service to partners and involve them in deciding purpose, timing and presentation of assessments.

REACH was also asked to monitor shelter response in April and September 2014. Analyses reflected regional differences and concluded that the shelter sector had largely met the need for emergency shelter of those targeted in the Strategic Response Plan (300,000 households) but that recovery (500,000 households) in some of the worst affected regions had slowed, stopped or was unsafe in an under-funded response.

The Shelter Cluster recruited a large number of short-term advisers on cross-cutting issues. IFRC had experience of HLP from the Bopha response and its advisers led much inter-cluster work on No-Build Zones. Though initially constrained by redeployment of the first adviser, this work was viewed as skilled and successful.

IFRC deployed gender and diversity advisers for the first time. DSWD and partners, including Handicap International, provided inputs on diversity, disability and age which contributed to guidance on HLP and beneficiary selection. The experience of Philippines and Nepal suggests that shelter coordination team members would benefit from gender and diversity awareness before as well as during deployment.

Specialists also advised on a range of environmental issues, including the clearance and re-use of lumber and compliance with legislation on site selection, construction materials and building. A sustainability adviser worked with partners and universities to develop factsheets on construction materials. Pressure on the core team could have been lessened by asking SAG member agencies to host advisers.

The global focal point for advocacy provided remote support, including infographics and media monitoring before arriving in the Philippines in December. This meant the cluster had capacity at a time when other media advisers had left but none when media interest was at its highest. Nevertheless, the adviser received high praise from partners and counterparts. The Shelter Coordination Team was seen as successful in influencing government, HCT and partner policy on issues such as bunkhouses (collective centres), No-Build Zones and safer shelter.

The Cluster participated in accountability initiatives started by OCHA and could have strengthened accountability by adding feedback to affected communities to REACH's terms of reference. Evaluations of accountability in the overall response found that selective targeting was unpopular. This finding should inform global cluster learning and future deployments.

Following its formal closure of the emergency response phase in July 2014, the government began absorbing the work of the clusters. The Shelter Cluster became the Housing and Shelter Working Group and started early to handover to national and provincial government and to NGO Welthungerhilfe. The cluster invited partners to become focal points, trained a Deputy Technical Coordinator who was funded by CRS and based in DSWD's Region VIII office, and provided partners with electronic copies of technical and HLP resources.



Contingency planning was one of two areas with which partners expressed lack of satisfaction in cluster performance monitoring. However, the Cluster developed the shelter section of OCHA's contingency plan in Region VIII and its resources informed the shelter response to Typhoon Hagupit, coordinated by the government, in late 2014

The global cluster needs to clarify with the Philippines government what role it sees for IFRC in the coordination of shelter response. IFRC needs to consider whether, with present resources and funds, it has the capacity to coordinate in a future L3 response. In the meantime, a committed Shelter Coordination Team has, despite many bottlenecks, left behind numerous examples of shelter advice still in use.

## Recommendations

	<b>Cluster leadership</b>
R1	Clarify with the Philippines government what role it sees for IFRC in coordination of international shelter response in the future.
	<b>Cluster personnel</b>
R2	Develop global capacity to coordinate shelter responses likely to include large-scale, rapid-onset, serial and / or simultaneous events. Capacity is needed to develop surge and follow-on staffing, HR management, and reward strategy.
R3	Use end of mission reports and evaluations to develop simulations which test global and field coordination capacity in different scenarios.
R4	Clarify HR procedures in coordination teams, for example, security, working time, stress management, hiring and firing. Clarify how to support teams consistently when more than one shelter cluster is deployed in a single country.
R5	Ensure roles, terms and conditions and reporting lines are accurately described in contracts and terms of reference to minimise individual and institutional risk.
R6	Maintain shared overview of personnel needs in SSD and field by linking staffing plan organigram and coordination strategy.
R7	Simplify institutional procedures to enable recruitment of national shelter coordination staff during and between emergencies.
R8	Include deputy coordinators, administrators, logisticians, drivers and interpreters in expanded teams as per shelter coordination manual.
R9	Ensure end of mission debriefing by SSD for team members and advisors.
	<b>Supporting shelter service delivery</b>
R10	Consult cluster partners and national and local coordinating bodies on location / relocation of hubs and sub-hubs, bearing in mind logistical costs and benefits.
R11	Consult national and local coordinating bodies on the practical support, supplies, training and services they need from the Shelter Cluster to carry out their role.
R12	Simplify institutional procedures to enable provision of finance and transport to shelter coordination teams.
R13	Prioritise service to shelter cluster partners, hubs and capacity-building in IM (and see R6).

R14	Include use of Dropbox in all shelter coordination team training and briefing.
R15	Set up a webpage to ensure easy access to shelter DRR resources in technical index. Include date and author(s) in documents to ensure use of latest versions.
	<b>Strategy, policy and standards</b>
R16	In an extended cluster, ensure cluster and hubs each have a coordination strategy with linked staffing plan.
R17	Prioritise service to cluster shelter partners in assessment and monitoring. Consult partners, record decisions and clarify reporting line for assessment and monitoring team in order to agree report purpose and ownership.
R18	Draw on global and partner resources to agree research methodology and non-technical summary for assessment and monitoring reports.
R19	Include gender and diversity in training for all global and country level coordinators, information, assessment and technical managers.
R20	Ask SAG members to host cross-cutting advisers in order to deploy and utilise dedicated staff earlier.
	<b>Advocacy and communication</b>
R21	Deploy an advocacy and communication adviser within the first week of the disaster and be ready to replace him/her after four to six weeks as per end of mission recommendations.
	<b>Accountability to affected persons</b>
R22	Use findings of Haiyan accountability evaluations to support shared learning on shelter targeting and accountability to affected people in future responses.
	<b>Contingency planning</b>
R23	Record and share process of development and promotion of 8 Build Back Safer Key Messages for replication in future responses.

# 1 Introduction

## 1.1 Purpose, scope and clients

This evaluation was commissioned by the IFRC. Its purpose is to review the effectiveness of coordination by the IFRC-led Shelter Coordination Team during the response to Typhoon Haiyan / Yolanda<sup>1</sup> and to identify key lessons and recommendations to improve and inform future deployments.

The period covered by the evaluation is November 2013 to November 2014 when the Shelter Cluster was co-led by IFRC. This evaluation considers only IFRC's contribution to shelter coordination. Shelter outcomes are considered in an evaluation conducted by REACH on behalf of IFRC in 2016.

In addition to appraisal against the core cluster functions established by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the evaluation also considers leadership and personnel issues, in accordance with its terms of reference.

## 1.2 Humanitarian reform and the Transformative Agenda

A process of humanitarian reform was initiated by the UN's Emergency Relief Coordinator and the IASC in 2005. Reform aimed to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response through greater predictability, accountability, coordination and partnership.

Humanitarian reform is based on three 'pillars', intended to strengthen systemic weaknesses in humanitarian response.

- i. The cluster approach: addressing the need for 'adequate capacity and predictable leadership in all sectors of humanitarian response.
- ii. Humanitarian financing: addressing the need for 'adequate, timely and flexible financing' of humanitarian response, notably through the Central Emergency Response Fund.
- iii. Humanitarian Coordinator strengthening: addressing the need for 'effective leadership and coordination in emergencies' by the senior UN figure in country<sup>2</sup>

Humanitarian reform acknowledges that effective response depends on the quality of partnership between the UN agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and Red Cross/Red Crescent agencies that respond globally to emergencies. Commitment to partnership between these constituencies was endorsed through a set of principles developed in 2007.<sup>3</sup>

Of particular relevance to the present report is the cluster approach.

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<sup>1</sup> The Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) assigns memorable local names to tropical cyclones that enter its area of responsibility. Haiyan's local name was Yolanda

<sup>2</sup> OCHA, (2006), *Building a Stronger, More Predictable Humanitarian Response System*, [www.ochaonline.un.org](http://www.ochaonline.un.org)

<sup>3</sup> Global Humanitarian Partnership, (2007), *Principles of Partnership*, <http://www.icva.ch/doc00002628.doc>

International response to the Haiti earthquake and the Pakistan floods in 2010 was thought to have exposed weaknesses and inefficiencies in the humanitarian reform approach. In consequence, the IASC principals made further reforms. In December 2011, they agreed the 'Transformative Agenda'. Amongst changes, sudden-onset humanitarian crises requiring system-wide mobilization by humanitarian agencies would be termed Level 3 (L3) emergencies. Level 3 activation is expected to ensure a more effective response to the humanitarian needs of affected populations. Whether or not a disaster calls for Level 3 activation is based on five criteria:

- Scale of emergency
- Urgency
- Complexity
- Capacity (national)
- Reputational risk (national/international)

Typhoon Haiyan was the first sudden-onset natural disaster to have a Level 3 designation.

### 1.3 The Shelter Cluster

The cluster approach aims to address gaps and strengthen response in specific sectors of international humanitarian response. At global level, there are eleven clusters. Global lead agencies are responsible for setting standards and policy, building response capacity, and providing operational support to a country level cluster. At country level, the cluster approach is expected to ensure a coherent and effective sectoral response.

UNHCR normally leads the shelter cluster when a crisis is related to conflict that results in internal displacement. Where a crisis is related to natural disaster, IFRC usually leads or 'convenes' the shelter cluster. In 2013 the *Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent Humanitarian Assistance* recognised the Shelter Coordination Team as one IFRC's global and regional response mechanisms and surge tools.<sup>4</sup> In different countries or different phases of a response, other agencies such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), UN-Habitat and NGOs may also lead or co-lead the cluster.<sup>5</sup>

In the Philippines, the frequency of natural disaster and the country's level of vulnerability resulted in national legislation on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) including clusters at national, regional and provincial government level. In 2007, Philippines government circular NDCC 5 formally designated the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) the Shelter Cluster lead, with IFRC and UN-Habitat its international counterparts.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> IFRC, *Principles and Rules for Red Cross and Red Crescent Humanitarian Assistance*, (2013), page

<sup>5</sup> [www.sheltercluster.org](http://www.sheltercluster.org)

<sup>6</sup> Republic of the Philippines, National Disaster Coordinating Council, *Institutionalization of the Cluster Approach in the Philippines Disaster Management System*, NDCC Circular No. 5 2007, May 2007

## **2. Methodology**

### **2.1 Evaluation methodology**

- a) Desk review, including evaluations of the Haiyan response, Dropbox content supplied by OFRC in Geneva, contemporary media and the Shelter Cluster website
- b) Visit to Manila and Tacloban lasting twelve days
- c) Semi-structured interviews: face to face in Manila, Tacloban and Dulag; phone and Skype; written communication. These involved over 50 informants.
- d) Review of end of mission reports by 12 members of the Shelter Coordination Team
- e) Compilation and submission of draft report.

### **2.2 Constraints**

Discussions about the evaluation began in 2014 but the start date was postponed to the end of 2015. Owing to the passage of time, alternatives to evaluation were proposed but IFRC's preference was for a fuller review.

The passage of time presented a number of challenges. Most members of IFRC's Shelter Coordination Team and many partner representatives had left the Philippines by November 2014. Though the Haiyan shelter response was ongoing in 2016, programmes were in the process of closing and staff preparing to leave. Few of those involved in later programmes had experience of the emergency response. Informant details required revision in the course of the evaluation.

Following the Haiyan response, the Philippines government undertook a review of disaster legislation and no longer had a national Shelter Cluster. IFRC's counterparts in national government were unavailable but a meeting at DSWD in Manila and another at City Hall in Tacloban provided insights which helped illuminate the findings of document review and discussions with other informants.

A number of informants felt that their recollection of events which had taken place 2-3 years earlier was poor. Both national and international informants in the Philippines had by then responded to subsequent emergencies. In these circumstances, end of mission reports by members of the Shelter Coordination Team provided invaluable contemporary records.


### 3 Background and context

#### 3.1 Context of the emergency response

##### a) Typhoon Haiyan

Typhoon Haiyan made landfall in Guiuan on the south-east tip of Samar at 4.40 a.m. on Friday 8 November 2013. A Category 5 'super typhoon', it moved north-west through the Visayan Islands in the central Philippines. It made landfall again at Tolosa, south of Tacloban City, at Daanbantayan and Bantayan Island in northern Cebu, at Concepcion in Iloilo and Busuanga in Palawan. The storm path was 600 km wide. Haiyan is believed to be the most powerful typhoon ever to make landfall and the deadliest typhoon in the Philippines' recorded history.

Figure 1. Path of Typhoon Haiyan, 8 November 2013




Early warning and preparedness measures by national and local government, the Philippines Red Cross and others saved many lives. Approximately 800,000 people were evacuated. Nevertheless, 6,183 people died across the central Philippines and 1,061 people are missing. Nearly 29,000 people were injured.

The path and force of the typhoon were accurately forecast and publicised. However, preparation by local and national government agencies, was not equal to the strength of the typhoon.<sup>7</sup> There was limited understanding of the risk of storm surge or storm tide.<sup>8</sup> The typhoon created a wall of water up 7.5 meters high which flooded low-lying islands and the regional coastal areas of Samar and Leyte (see Figure 2).

The port city of Tacloban, capital of Leyte and Administrative Region VIII, and coastal areas less than 5 meters above sea level suffered greatest damage from the surge. Over 4,000 people, two-thirds of all who lost their lives, died as a result of the storm surge in Tacloban and the neighbouring towns of Palo and Tanuan. Those who died included many who had sought refuge in evacuation centres.

**Figure 2. Typhoon path and storm surge, Samar and Leyte**



<sup>7</sup> Corazón “Dinky” Solíman, Department for Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), quoted in Kate Hodal, Tacloban: a year after typhoon Haiyan, *The Guardian*, 20.10.14

<sup>8</sup> Olaf Neussner, (2014), *Assessment of Early Warning Efforts in Leyte for Typhoon Haiyan/Yolanda*, GIZ, page 7. A FAO report on land tenure and natural disaster in 2010 stated “Storm surges ... are another hazard facing the Philippines, but little information on storm surges is available. ADRC (2002) recorded two occurrences of storm surges in 1991 and 2000, which killed 10 people in Samar and Leyte Islands and left 5250 others homeless. No estimates on economic damages were reported.” Garibay et al, (2010)

## b) Emergency response

*The international system, like the government itself, is challenged by the continuous nature of crisis in the country, where there is little breathing room between disasters ...*<sup>9</sup>

The Philippines is one of the world's five most disaster-prone countries. It suffers, on average, 20 typhoons each year.<sup>10</sup> Haiyan was the 25<sup>th</sup> tropical storm to enter Philippines territory in 2013. By the time Haiyan made landfall the capacity and resources of the government and many humanitarian agencies had been depleted by response to conflict and displacement in Mindanao, to Typhoon Bopha and the Bohol earthquake in October 2013. On 9 November, the government requested international assistance. Two days later, it declared a state of national calamity.<sup>11</sup>

Haiyan affected 16 million people, over one-tenth of the population, in 44 provinces. It triggered the world's largest displacement in 2013 as it forced more people to flee their homes than in Africa, the Americas, Europe and Oceania combined.<sup>12</sup> It resulted in damage to 1.1 million homes of which 536,819 were completely destroyed.<sup>13</sup> Economic losses and damage totalled PHP 571.1 billion (USD 12.9 billion).

Using IASC's Level 3 criteria, the UN's Emergency Relief Coordinator rated Haiyan as follows:

**Table 1: Typhoon Haiyan L3 rating<sup>14</sup>**

L3 Criteria	Rating
Scale of emergency	<i>Very high / catastrophic</i>
Urgency	<i>Very high</i>
Complexity	<i>High</i>
Capacity (national)	<i>Medium</i>
Reputational risk	<i>High</i>

The L3 declaration on 12 November 2013 triggered a global response. Nearly 500 international personnel were deployed by OCHA to support assessment, implementation and coordination.

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<sup>9</sup> Jan Kellett and Katie Peters, (2014), *Dare to prepare: taking risk seriously, Compendium of background resources*, ODI, page 21

<sup>10</sup> UNISDR, (2015), *Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction GARI5 at a glance*

<sup>11</sup> OCHA, Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Situation Report No. 6, 12 November 2013

<sup>12</sup> Michelle Yonetani (2014), *Global Estimates 2014, People displaced by disasters, NRC, IDMC*, page 8

<sup>13</sup> Shelter Cluster, cited in OCHA Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan Situation Report No. 16, 22 November 2013

<sup>14</sup> OCHA, (undated), *Emergency Directors: Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines Analysis of the Classification of the Emergency*



The IASC launched an appeal for USD 301 million, later revised to USD 348 million, for immediate aid. This included a request for USD 46 million for emergency shelter assistance.

### 3.2 Shelter Cluster roll-out

Though the Philippines government had legislated for clusters at national and international level it had yet to implement the approach. This was acknowledged in an after-action review of the Bopha response in April 2013.<sup>15</sup> By November 2013, responsibility for humanitarian coordination was less clear-cut than either national legislation or international protocols implied.<sup>16</sup> Just as the typhoon had different names – Yolanda and Haiyan – the response was seen through different lenses. Evaluations of the overall response noted some of the contradictions in the Haiyan response and a context where national and international bodies had different perspectives.

- National government wanted to demonstrate its sovereignty and control of the response but international organisations to demonstrate their implementation of L3 protocols.
- Government and international agencies were subject to high levels of media scrutiny and feared for institutional reputations. As a result, many prioritized institutional rather than collective targets in their responses.
- Government and international agencies had different timelines for relief and recovery. Government wanted agencies to move into recovery as soon as possible: international agencies were mandated to provide humanitarian assistance as long as necessary.
- Government expected international agencies to work through national clusters. International agencies were working through IASC clusters on the assumption implicit in the L3 declaration that government structures had been overwhelmed. Each thought that the other was missing opportunities to engage.<sup>17</sup>

IFRC was officially confirmed as Shelter Cluster lead agency in the Haiyan response by the UN Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator on 9 November 2013. It was already leading the Bohol Shelter Cluster thus Haiyan required deployment of a Shelter Coordination Team for the second time in less than a month. IFRC's emergency appeal for CHF 72,323,259 included CHF 761,688 for its role in shelter coordination. The Haiyan response as a whole was the largest in a sudden-onset natural disaster since those in Haiti and Pakistan in 2010.<sup>18</sup> It affected more people than any previous disaster in the Philippines in which the Shelter Cluster has been activated (see Annex 2).

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<sup>15</sup> OCHA, *Report: After Action Review/Lessons Learned Workshops for Typhoon Bopha Response*, 14 June 2013

<sup>16</sup> Kellett and Peters, (2014), page 21

<sup>17</sup> Philip Dy and Tori Stephens, (2016), *Strengthening Coordination Among Philippine Government, Civil Society and International Actors*, Harvard Kennedy School Program on Crisis Leadership, pp 39-47

<sup>18</sup> OCHA, *Response To Typhoon Haiyan In The Philippines, Operational Peer Review 2014*, page 5

## 4 Findings

### 4.1 Activation and leadership

The Shelter Cluster's focal point in IFRC's Asia Pacific region had been in the Philippines since 18 October, supporting the new cluster in Bohol. He was redeployed to Manila and became the first Haiyan cluster coordinator.

On 7 November he took part in a meeting of the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) on preparedness and response. A global cluster focal point from UNHCR, on loan to the Bohol Shelter Cluster, reviewed prepositioned stock and later joined the UNDAC team in assessing needs in Iloilo (Region VI).

The first coordinators contributed to overall response planning and designed the cluster structure and staffing plan. The Shelter and Settlements Department (SSD) in Geneva began recruitment. OCHA invited the national cluster to set up office in a small room in its Makati premises. Co-location placed the Manila team close to the HCT and leadership of the international response, an arrangement which both valued throughout the long deployment.

However, the cluster's government lead agency, DSWD, was at Quezon City, at least an hour's drive away. DSWD was leading coordination by several clusters. It had many response and coordination responsibilities and did not specialise in shelter. The government called on additional departments to address different aspects of shelter response and recovery.<sup>19</sup>

- *The Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD needed to co-lead in all clusters so their capacity, already reduced with staff affected by the typhoon, was stretched over all the response sectors.*<sup>20</sup>

The first coordinators had worked in the Philippines in previous responses. This was an advantage, particularly with international humanitarian partners. However, the initial team could not stay long. This factor, coupled with the absence of a cluster presence *between* emergencies, a recommendation of reviews of the Washi and Bopha Shelter Clusters and an aim of IFRC, put the coordination team at a disadvantage.<sup>21</sup>

- *When you see this [person] you think ...that's the cluster ... It's not the numbers. It's what they can put on the table! They are experienced ... Coordination starts with good*

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<sup>19</sup> According to a Shelter Cluster donor briefing, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) was responsible for provision of shelter materials and construction of bunkhouses and DSWD for beneficiary selection. Other government partners included the National Housing Authority, Housing and Urban Development Coordination Council, Department for International and Local Government, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau and local government units (LGUs).

<sup>20</sup> DFID, *What works in addressing violence against women and girls? Lessons learned from Typhoon Haiyan: Workshop Report*, June 2015, DFID, page 5

<sup>21</sup> Sara Davidson, (2014), *The Philippines Shelter Cluster in response to Typhoon Bopha / Pablo* page 9; Camila Vega, (2012), *Review of the IFRC-led Shelter Cluster: Tropical Storm Washi*, April 2012, page 10

*relationships. You know the people in the organisation.*<sup>22</sup>

- *IFRC didn't have someone in the Philippine that had a relationship with the government. It was extremely difficult for IFRC to establish a relationship with an extremely busy government: - they already had their own partners.*<sup>23</sup>

The Philippines political landscape, legal scrutiny of disaster preparedness and media scrutiny of response, added to complexity.<sup>24</sup> Successive coordinators worked hard to build good relations with DSWD and other government departments in Manila and affected areas. The government respected technical advice and there was strong co-leadership in the hubs. However, Philippines disaster legislation came under review in late 2014, and at the time of the review shelter and NFI had been absorbed into other national clusters.

## Recommendations

	<b>Cluster leadership</b>
R1	Clarify with the Philippines government what role it sees for IFRC in coordination of international shelter response in the future.

## 4.2 Cluster personnel

### a) Capacity

Personnel already in country were followed by global focal points, consultants and staff of National Societies, IFRC and partner organisations. National Societies in Australia, Austria, Britain, Canada, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and USA, and IFRC, BRE, DFID, UN-Habitat, UNHCR and WWF deployed or seconded personnel. By December 2013, the cluster had 15 coordination staff in Manila and three regional hubs, with IOM coordinating at two sub-hubs.

The staffing plan included both the Bohol and Haiyan clusters as part of a Philippines Shelter Cluster. The plan was largely realistic in its estimate of core needs, with coordinator, information manager, technical coordinator and administrative support in each hub but Manila. It was also consistent with the expectations of a L3 response.<sup>25</sup>


<sup>22</sup> Semi-structured interview 09.03.16

<sup>23</sup> Semi-structured interview 09.05.15

<sup>24</sup> Kate Hodal, 'Tacloban mayor in power tussle with president following Haiyan disaster', 22 November 2013, *The Guardian*; Miguel Syjuco, 'In the Philippines, clouds of a different colour', 13 November, *Globe and Mail*, Toronto; Maria Paz Mendez Hodes, 'Haiyan and the other Philippines typhoon: The untold political scandal underpinning this tragedy', Friday 8 November 2013, *The Independent*

<sup>25</sup> Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Transformative Agenda Reference Document 2. Humanitarian System-Wide Emergency Activation: definition and procedures 13 April 2012, page 5 footnote

**Figure 3. Philippines Shelter Coordination Team: planned structure and capacity<sup>26</sup>**



In addition to the cluster in Bohol, the plan placed coordination teams in Busuanga, Guiuan, Roxas and Tacloban with coordinator and deputy in Manila and a team of roving advisers (see Annex 3). This would have required a minimum of 30 persons over the likely three months' duration of the L3 response if partners provided sub-hub coordinators.

Actual structure was different (see Figure 4). Busuanga did not become a coordination hub but Cebu did. IOM coordinated at Guiuan and Ormoc in Region VIII. The Bohol Shelter Cluster, intermittently part of Philippines Shelter Cluster documentation, was not included in terms of reference for the Haiyan deployment and lost most staff to the Haiyan cluster.

Core posts, particularly those in information management (IM), were hard to fill consistently. There were approximately 20 Shelter Clusters active in 2013-14, including five L3 emergencies in Syria, Central African Republic, South Sudan, Iraq and Yemen. Though IFRC does not work in conflict zones, it relied on a pool of staff likely to be in demand for other operational and coordination roles. In 2013, IFRC itself led clusters in Fiji, Philippines, Mozambique and Bangladesh.


The cluster succeeded in appointing a large number of specialist advisers for technical and cross-cutting roles who led production of significant resources (see Figure 5). Though shelter recovery started early and proved complex, the role of recovery adviser role fell to technical

<sup>26</sup> Shelter Cluster Philippines, Shelter Cluster Coordination Structure, 14 November 2013

coordinators.<sup>27</sup> Coordinators in Manila and Region VIII also noted the need for national shelter materials market mapping early in the response.<sup>28</sup> Oxfam conducted market mapping in Samar and in May 2014 IFRC advertised for an Emergency Market Mapping and Analysis Adviser though did not make an appointment.

- *For lack of a ‘recovery adviser’ who could collate and represent the views of the coordination team, many of whom had a relevant recovery experience, the cluster was two to three months late in providing coherent ‘shelter recovery’ advice.<sup>29</sup>*

**Figure 4. Haiyan Shelter Coordination Team  
Core roles December 2013**




<sup>27</sup> Semi-structured interview 04.05.16

<sup>28</sup> End of mission report 04.02.14

<sup>29</sup> End of mission report 22.05.14.

**Figure 5. Haiyan Shelter Coordination Team  
Roving advisers 2013-14**



During the thirteen months of the Haiyan deployment, approximately 60 persons were recruited or seconded to the team by IFRC, IOM and UN-Habitat. Of these, IFRC deployed almost 50. By comparison, the IFRC-led Shelter Coordination Team in Haiti had 56 national and international members in the field over ten months.

Steps taken to fill gaps in the Haiyan core team included redeployment from the Bohol cluster and from advisory roles (notably HLP), the doubling up of roles (for example technical and information manager), first-time deployments, and one-month contracts. Some staff in short-term roles were happiest (see next section). Most in the team found themselves overloaded:

- *I arrived in country believing that I was to take on the role of a hub technical coordinator, but once in country... I spent about a month covering as ... information manager ... overlapping with 3 weeks of also being technical coordinator.*<sup>30</sup>
- *I was lucky enough to cut my teeth and old and stupid enough to manage but ... I never felt so much out of my depth.*<sup>31</sup>

Administrative and logistics staff were almost impossible to recruit for largely institutional reasons. A three-month recruitment horizon and apparently unattractive salary levels at the

<sup>30</sup> End of mission report 12.03.14

<sup>31</sup> Semi-structured interview 16.02.16

Philippines Red Cross made local recruitment impossible.<sup>32</sup> Frustrated hub coordinators eventually hired a small number of Filipino staff, including a driver with a taxi. The Secretariat ruled this a breach of IFRC protocol and a source of risk but was baffled by corporate oblivion to the cluster's need for administrative and logistics support.<sup>33</sup> The staffing plan included no interpreters and without them it was harder for Filipino staff and agencies to participate fully in meetings or international advisers to discuss cross-cutting issues in affected areas.

- *In effect SCT members have to act as highly paid administrators ... at a time when there are a multitude of other demands placed upon them. This is the single most inefficient and archaic aspect of SCTs' working...*<sup>34</sup>
- *One of the biggest missed opportunities during my mission was the recruitment of national staff who could be trained up in admin and basic IM. This would have helped with the consistency of staffing, assured greater handover and built national capacity.*<sup>35</sup>
- *The cluster language was English. Locals feel they are at the back.*<sup>36</sup>

The cluster and IFRC-led hubs had no vehicles and IFRC security did not always permit use of public transport. Partners and the Philippines Red Cross had loaned vehicles during the Bopha response but there was little spare capacity following Haiyan.

- *When I consulted with the IFRC security advisor on the use of motorized tricycles, I was advised that these were "forbidden" but not provided with any other transport options. This posed an impossible situation, especially in Roxas and to some degree in Tacloban.*<sup>37</sup>
- *Human resources and fleet management were an ongoing concern, as were the overly restrictive policies outlined in the security framework.*<sup>38</sup>

The Haiti shelter cluster review of 2011 and the global evaluation of IFRC's shelter role in 2013 had recommended IFRC strengthen capacity at global level and review cluster recruitment and retention.<sup>39</sup> However, responsibility for human resource issues in the Haiyan (and Bohol) deployment fell largely to a single member of the Shelter and Settlements Department (SSD) in Geneva. Given the global demand for personnel, the level of international recruitment and the

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<sup>32</sup> Pedro Simoes, (2014), *Risk Management and Audit on Issues Related to the Shelter Cluster*, IFRC (Internal), page 3. Only the Philippines Red Cross was permitted to recruit local staff. In fact, the host National Society significantly raised local salaries for its Haiyan Task Force in the face of competition for volunteers and staff from other agencies [Semi-structured interview 08.13.16].

<sup>33</sup> Simoes, (2014), page 4

<sup>34</sup> End of mission report 04.02.14

<sup>35</sup> End of mission report 26.03.13

<sup>36</sup> Semi-structured interview 10.03.16

<sup>37</sup> Correspondence 20.04.16

<sup>38</sup> End of mission report 22.05.14

<sup>39</sup> Davidson, (2011), page 9; Peter Lawther and Sara Davidson, (2013), *Evaluation of the Shelter Role of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies*, page 31

quality of recruits was impressive. However, the limited capacity in Geneva and barriers to local recruitment were institutional bottlenecks to surge and follow-on capacity.<sup>40</sup>

- *Perhaps it's a matter of providing HR surge capacity at Geneva level to support all deployments and contract arrangements, or if there is a need for a boost to the roster for regular engagement.*<sup>41</sup>
- *The fact that in Geneva [global coordinator] is alone is a real bottle neck.*<sup>42</sup>

## **b) Staff management and support**

Travel and communications between Manila and the hubs were difficult, particularly at the start of the deployment. Even later, workloads in Manila, coupled with the lack of a deputy coordinator there, made this problematic.

- *We didn't get out enough even to the hubs. We were handcuffed by the SRP and all the additional processes. Ridiculous timetables ... meant that we were tied to our laptops.*<sup>43</sup>
- *There was no deputy coordinator. If you don't have one you can hardly travel.*<sup>44</sup>

Moving national coordination from Manila to Tacloban in 2014 brought support closer to the field though there was still a need for representation and government liaison in Manila. The coordination adviser started team retreats in December 2013. The fourth cluster coordinator continued these every 4-6 weeks. A weekly Skype meeting included the SSD.

Retreats brought together staff from IFRC-led hubs, the IOM-led hubs and the Bohol cluster. Programme issues and differences of opinion were frankly aired. Retreats helped strengthen relationships though some problems remained consistent: high workloads, turnover, regions with distinct dynamics, languages and shelter operations, and difficulties with information management.<sup>45</sup>

- *There was little opportunity for one-to-one mentoring with team members. This, in part, exacerbated a breakdown in trust between information managers and coordinators in the field.*<sup>46</sup>

Retreats were held at weekends so further reduced time off. Some coordinators ensured hub staff took time off but contracts were not always clear about leave entitlements or working hours. A culture of long hours, role ambiguity and gaps in staffing contributed to the burnout

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<sup>40</sup> GPPI's review of Transformative Agenda reviews included the Haiyan response and advised IASC members to simplify emergency hiring procedures or improve recruitment and training of national and local staff. See Susanna Krueger, Andras Derzsi-Horvath and Julia Steets, (2016), *IASC Transformative Agenda, A Review of Reviews and Their Follow-Up*, GPPI, 92014) page 46

<sup>41</sup> End of mission report 12.03.14

<sup>42</sup> Semi-structured interview 04.04.16

<sup>43</sup> Semi-structured interview 16.02.16

<sup>44</sup> Semi-structured interview 27.04.16

<sup>45</sup> End of mission report 22.05.14

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.



described by several informants. There were management visits but stress, its causes and the significance for health and corporate risk appears not have been recognised. As in Haiti, responsibility for security, line management, staff discipline and grievance was not always clear.

A number of team members, both new and experienced, found the Haiyan deployment a challenge they relished. Those with shorter contracts and / or good briefing and support were most positive.

- *Excellent mission. I very much enjoyed working with the team and in the Shelter Cluster context itself.*<sup>47</sup>
- *I had plenty of support going out there in terms of everything I had to have ready ... I don't think they could have done any better in that regard ... I'd go back in a heartbeat.*<sup>48</sup>

Nevertheless, many, among them the most experienced, found the deployment extremely demanding. This is evident in end of mission reports though some informants were reluctant to complain for fear of losing future work. The SSD did not debrief Shelter Coordination Team members though some had been able to speak to the cluster coordinator in Manila.

- *The scale, the geographical spread, the politics and other ... circumstances have probably made this one of the most difficult cluster coordination teams I have worked in.*<sup>49</sup>
- *We were just surrounded by people burning out left, right and centre.*<sup>50</sup>
- *We burned out a lot of people. There are probably a few information managers who won't work with us again.*<sup>51</sup>
- *The culture is and was that we are tough and so could not in any way say, 'Help I'm struggling.'*<sup>52</sup>

## Recommendations

	<b>Cluster personnel</b>
R2	Develop global capacity to coordinate shelter responses likely to include large-scale, rapid-onset, serial and / or simultaneous events. Capacity is needed for surge, follow-on staffing, HR management, and reward strategy.
R3	Use end of mission reports and evaluations to develop simulations which test global and field coordination capacity in different scenarios.
R4	Clarify HR procedures in coordination teams, for example, security, working time, stress management, hiring and firing. Clarify how to support teams consistently when more than one shelter cluster is deployed in a single country.

<sup>47</sup> End of mission report 26.03.13

<sup>48</sup> Semi-structured interview 12.05.16

<sup>49</sup> End of mission report 12.03.14

<sup>50</sup> Semi-structured interview 04.05.16

<sup>51</sup> Semi-structured interview 16.02.16

<sup>52</sup> Correspondence 12.05.16

R5	Ensure roles, terms and conditions and reporting lines are accurately described in contracts and terms of reference to minimise individual and institutional risk.
R6	Maintain shared overview of personnel needs in SSD and field by linking staffing plan organigram and coordination strategy.
R7	Simplify institutional procedures to enable recruitment of national shelter coordination staff during and between emergencies.
R8	Include deputy coordinators, administrators, logisticians, drivers and interpreters in expanded teams as per shelter coordination manual.
R9	Ensure end of mission debriefing by SSD for team members and advisors.

### 4.3 Supporting shelter service delivery

#### a) Cluster objective

The Haiyan cluster's draft strategies set out shelter delivery targets and indicators. Shelter Cluster partners would provide emergency shelter for 300,000 households and support 500,000 households in self-recovery.<sup>53</sup> In each case, 80 per cent of beneficiaries would be satisfied with assistance received from shelter partners. In addition, 20,000 people would be trained to repair and reconstruct shelter as a result of assistance by the Early Recovery and Shelter Clusters.

#### b) Partners

Shelter Cluster partners are not named in the draft strategy but the Haiyan Strategic Response Plan refers to participation by 27 partners plus the Philippines Red Cross, one of the largest shelter providers, and DSWD. Factsheets and the last draft of the framework refer to 75 cluster partners in the first half of 2014. In August 2014, 20-30 were sharing information with the cluster.<sup>54</sup>

Media coverage and the scale of need brought many government and non-government agencies to shelter and shelter cluster meetings for the first time. Coordinators explained cluster purpose, structure and expectations at early meetings but there was no Memorandum of Understanding with partners. Partner feedback on cluster performance was gauged through an online survey and shared with partners. In May 2014, the Tacloban coordinator reported to partners that advocacy had received 100% positive feedback. Other feedback had been mainly

<sup>53</sup> Shelter self-recovery is defined as the process of rebuilding or repairing houses by households using their own assets and labour or labour from the local informal building sector. The process is incremental, different for every household and likely to take several years. From Victoria Maynard, Elizabeth Parker and John Twigg, (2016?), *The effectiveness and efficiency of interventions supporting shelter self-recovery following humanitarian crises*, Humanitarian Evidence Programme, page 12


<sup>54</sup> *Minutes* Haiyan Shelter Cluster, Team Meeting, Tacloban, Friday 29<sup>th</sup> August

positive but areas for improvement were needs assessment and gap analysis, and contingency planning / preparedness for recurrent disasters.<sup>55</sup>

### c) Coordination hubs

The draft strategy assigned responsibility to IFRC for co-leadership at national level in Manila and regional level in Cebu, Roxas and Tacloban. IFRC continued to co-lead the Shelter Cluster in Bohol where the coordinator relied largely on partners to fill team roles. IOM coordinated shelter sub-hubs at Guiuan and Ormoc which reported to the Tacloban coordinator.

**Figure 5. Haiyan Shelter Cluster hubs**



As in the Bopha response, there was criticism that regional coordination hubs set up by OCHA were not closer to municipalities and barangays directly affected. Clusters had too to liaise with government co-leads and counterparts located elsewhere. However, the Strategic Response Plan noted that 171 municipalities in 14 provinces had been affected in the priority corridor. IFRC deployed and maintained one of the largest coordination teams. The challenge was not to mirror government structure but rather to make best use of a relatively small number of skilled international staff. Hub location might, in different circumstances, have been explored by DSWD, IFRC and the SAG once the response was under way, as it has been in other Shelter Cluster deployments.<sup>56</sup>

The Shelter Cluster set up additional hubs in Region VIII in 2014 and, despite its logistical constraints, was one of two praised by NGOs for holding some of its coordination meetings in

<sup>55</sup> *Minutes*, Typhoon Haiyan – Eastern Visayas Region VIII - Tacloban Coordination Hub, Shelter Cluster Meeting May 27, 2014

<sup>56</sup> End of mission report 04.02.14: and see Krueger et al, (2016), page 25

affected areas.<sup>57</sup> An evaluation for the UK's Disasters Emergency Committee and Canada's Humanitarian Coalition found that "All DEC/HC members reported attending coordination meetings. When asked which the most efficient cluster meeting was, nearly all cited the health and shelter clusters."<sup>58</sup>

#### **d) National hub**

The first cluster meeting in Manila took place on 13 November 2013 at the office of IOM. An average of seven partner organisations and networks attended the four meetings for which complete records are available. This small number was due partly to the fact that the cluster's role in Manila had more to do with representation: operational decisions were largely made by senior managers at hub level.

Participants at cluster meetings represented international NGOs, other clusters, and Red Cross and UN agencies familiar with the international cluster approach. Informants felt Shelter Cluster meetings were well-organised and useful for sharing information but that the knowledge and experience of locally-based partners could have been leveraged more by coordinators who understood the humanitarian system more than the Philippines.

- *They were one of the better organised clusters ... People who came were very friendly, very useful, very supportive.*<sup>59</sup>
- *My mistake ... was not following up with the key people who had lived there for years, who knew the Manila scene, who knew shelter inside out from Bopha ... I was just looking at the emergency response ...*<sup>60</sup>

DSWD neither attended nor co-chaired Shelter Cluster meetings in Manila but was consulted and kept up to date through bilateral discussions with coordinators and advisers, as were other relevant government departments. On the other hand, legal and technical expertise which coordinators and advisers brought to discussions appears to have been valued by government, HCT and partners, as evidenced by the success of advocacy. From April 2014 the shelter cluster moved most activity to Tacloban.

#### **e) Region VIII hub – Eastern Visayas**

The Eastern Visayas islands of Leyte, Samar and Biliran, suffered the greatest loss of life as a result of the typhoon. Approximately four million people were affected of whom almost 50 per cent were considered poor.<sup>61</sup> Almost half a million homes were damaged or destroyed.

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<sup>57</sup> Andy Featherstone, (2014), *Missed Again – making space for partnership in the Typhoon Haiyan response*, ActionAid, CAFOD, Christian Aid, Oxfam GB and Tearfund, page 21

<sup>58</sup> David Sanderson and Zenaida Delica Willison, (2014), *Philippines Typhoon Haiyan Response Review*, Disasters Emergencies Committee and Humanitarian Coalition, page 16

<sup>59</sup> Semi-structured interview 10.03.16 (1)

<sup>60</sup> Semi-structured interview 27.04.16

<sup>61</sup> "The poverty threshold (basic food and non-food needs) for a Filipino family of five stands at Php 7,890 per month – 175 USD" (NSCB 2012). ACAPs, *Secondary Data Review -January 2014 Philippines Typhoon Yolanda*, ACAPS

Preparedness was uneven and first responders were among those killed, injured or otherwise affected.<sup>62</sup> Longstanding political rivalries in Tacloban complicated an initial response perceived as slow. As elsewhere, however, government at multiple levels was mandated to lead coordination.

- *The mayor has a legal mandate to coordinate ... It's the mayor's responsibility ... He's elected. On the other hand we have the international cluster. And the cluster works with DSWD.*<sup>63</sup>
- *[The Shelter Coordination Team] definitely helped to coordinate ... we appreciate coordination but early on ... we had to make sure they coordinated with the city... We know the situation and the place and the needs [but] the Shelter Cluster was regional.*<sup>64</sup>

Shelter and CCCM clusters held a number of joint meetings in Tacloban at the start of the response and the first regional meeting took place on 15 November 2013. Overall demand and the complexity of the urban response and No-Build Zones meant that, with notable exceptions such as CRS, many cluster partners focused elsewhere.

Coordinators advocated with partners and worked on inter-cluster urban approaches. In June 2014 an additional coordination team was set up to cover Tacloban city and the coastal areas of Eastern Leyte where CRS, Medair, Samaritan's Purse, Save the Children and Spanish Red Cross became shelter focal points in different municipalities. ACTED, Cordaid, Food for the Hungry, Philippines Red Cross, Terre des Hommes and others also acted as focal point in Leyte and Samar.

A total of 74 agencies and clusters attended Shelter Cluster meetings at least once. An average of 20 agencies attended Region VIII meetings between November 2013 and September 2014. Technical outreach and coordination were particularly appreciated by evaluation informants. Meeting minutes from Ormoc indicate attendance by an average 16 partner organisations, with strong representation by local government. Meetings at Guiuan averaged 8 partners.

#### **f) Region VII hub – Central Visayas**

Region VII comprises Cebu, Bohol and Siquijor and smaller islands nearby. Almost 6 million people were affected by the typhoon, 30 per cent of whom were considered poor. Approximately 112,000 houses were damaged or destroyed.

The regional shelter coordination hub at Cebu City held its first meeting on 14 November 2013. Coordination by a provincial government task force was established in December 2013. Coordinators undertook lengthy bus journeys to liaise with government counterparts and build a working relationship. The cluster held coordination meetings at San Remigio in western Cebu, at Bogo City in north-eastern Cebu and on Bantayan Island.

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<sup>62</sup> Kriszia Lorrain Enriquez, Disaster Response Put to the Test: Lessons from Typhoon Yolanda, Asia Foundation, December 18, 2013 IOM reported that it had trained 35 DSWD staff but none could be traced at the start of the response.

<sup>63</sup> Semi-structured interview, 10.03.16

<sup>64</sup> Semi-structured interview, 17.03.16

- *“At the beginning, the meetings were held in Cebu City, about three hours’ drive from Bogo City where most of the shelter projects are located. The groups that were based here requested that the shelter Cluster meeting be held here. It was granted, hence, we were able to participate more.”*<sup>65</sup>

A total of 72 agencies, including LGUs, attended one or more meetings. On average, 14 agencies attended regional meetings between December 2013 and September 2014. Work by a TWIG on information management was followed by hub workshops for LGUs. The hub engaged a local coordination assistant who became deputy coordinator. A shelter strategy workshop involving 120 participants was held in January 2014 and became a model for other hubs.

In mid-2014 the Shelter Cluster set up a combined coordination team covering Regions VI and VII. ActionAid, Islamic Relief and CBM became local shelter focal points in North Cebu, Bantayan and the Camotes ahead of handover to DSWD in November.

### **g) Region VI hub – Western Visayas**

Region VI consists of the Islands of Panay, Guimaras and the province of Negros Occidental. Almost 4 million people were affected by Haiyan, 28 per cent of whom were poor. The typhoon damaged or destroyed almost half a million houses.<sup>66</sup>

The regional hub at Roxas, capital of Capiz Province, held its first meeting on 14 November 2013. A major challenge for the Shelter Coordination Team was liaison with departments of the national government which had offices at the regional centre in Iloilo City, 2-3 hours’ drive away. Team capacity expanded from one to three members by December. There was a gap before a smaller team came in January and from May 2014 the region was covered by a roving coordination team.

At the suggestion of Save the Children, a number of meetings were held in Estancia. This was one of the poorer municipalities and worst affected communities on the north-eastern coast of Iloilo. An oil spill had occurred as a result of the typhoon. Meetings at Estancia drew in a number of LGUs from neighbouring municipalities.

On average 12 agencies came to regional meetings in Roxas between December 2013 and October 2014, with a total of 64 agencies, cluster and LGUs attending at least once. Most partners were international, particularly at the start but information management also included smaller agencies working at municipal level. Work by the hub’s TWIG on beneficiary selection fed into the Shelter Prioritisation Tool which was seen as an example of good practice.<sup>67</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Cited in Featherstone, (2014), page 21

<sup>66</sup> ACAPs, *Secondary Data Review -January 2014 Philippines Typhoon Yolanda*, ACAPS page 83

<sup>67</sup> Michelle Yonetani, and Lorelle Yuen, (2014), *The Evolving Picture of Displacement in the Wake of Typhoon Haiyan An Evidence-based Overview*, DSWD, IOM and DMC, page 42

## **h) Strategic Advisory Group**

A national SAG was created in Manila by December 2013. Some meetings appear to have taken place at the offices of DSWD but no meeting minutes were available. SAG decisions are referred to in cluster minutes and end of mission reports. The national SAG considered and approved cluster products and messages, such as the Recovery Guidelines.

SAG Members were:

- CRS
- Habitat for Humanity
- IFRC
- IOM
- Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
- Philippines Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
- Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC)
- National Housing Authority (NHA)
- UN-Habitat

Partners sometimes delegated less senior managers to attend the national SAG because of operations in affected areas.

## **i) Technical Working Groups (TWIGS)**

Hubs were active in a large number of cluster and inter-cluster TWIGs, led by DSWD, IFRC, IOM and UN-Habitat. Few records are available but the outputs to which meetings contributed are posted on the cluster website (see Table 4). These outputs informed the cluster's work on technical and cross-cutting issues, advocacy and capacity-building.

Closer links with the Bohol earthquake cluster might have benefited Haiyan partners. A Region VIII cluster meeting in April 2014 asked for information on repairing masonry in addition to the 8 Build Back Safer Key Messages.<sup>68</sup> Masonry guidelines appear to have been developed by the Bohol cluster on behalf of both the Bohol and Haiyan Shelter Clusters.<sup>69</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> Typhoon Haiyan – Eastern Visayas Region - Tacloban Co-ordination Hub, Shelter Cluster Meeting minutes, April 14th, 2014

<sup>69</sup> Build Change, *You can keep your family safe in future earthquakes and typhoons*, Build Change and the Shelter Cluster (Bohol); Build Change, *Post-Disaster Reconnaissance Report Damage Assessment and Housing and Markets Survey 2013 Bohol Earthquake and Typhoon Yolanda*, Build Change, 31 January 2014, revised 5 February 2014

**Table 2. TWIGs and inter-cluster groups**

<b>TWIG / inter-cluster group</b>	<b>Chair</b>	<b>Contributed to:</b>
Beneficiary selection (Region VI)	DSWD,IFRC	Cluster Shelter Prioritisation Tool, April 2014
Coco lumber	Early Recovery + Livelihoods Cluster, Shelter Cluster	Coconut Lumber Technical Working Group (report), February 2014
Debt and loans in shelter	OCHA, Shelter Cluster	TWIG Minutes
Early recovery (Ormoc)	DSWD, IFRC	n/a
Emergency and temporary shelter	IFRC	Shelter specifications and Technical Guidelines (2013 and 2014)
Guiuan	IOM	8 Build Back Safer Key Messages
HLP	Protection Cluster, Shelter Cluster	Key HLP Principles For Shelter Partners –March 2014 HLP Principles related to Indigenous Peoples for Shelter Partners, March 2014
Information Management (Region VII)	n/a	IM workshop for LGUs
Manila	IFRC	TWIG Minutes
Reconstruction and recovery	DSWD, UN-Habitat	Recovery Shelter Guidelines, June and November 2014
Societal issues	DSWD, IFRC	Shelter Prioritisation Tool, April 2014
Tacloban	n/a	Typhoon Haiyan – Region 8 Supporting Self Recovery Shelter Repair Package Guidance 8 Build Back Safer Key Messages

**f) Information management**

Work in IM encountered many of the same challenges as in the Bopha response: discrepancies in different sets of government statistics; distribution by agencies which were not cluster partners; the difficulty of reporting planned and actual distribution; quantitative and qualitative differences in apparently identical packages of goods and services; the need to verify data provided. Some of the Haiyan cluster’s challenges were summed up in the report ‘Final Analysis of Shelter Recovery’ in October 2014:



- Volume of data generated by the large response
- Change of information needs in the move from emergency shelter to recovery
- Difficulty of measuring and attributing outcomes using IM
- Need for household data disaggregated by gender and age
- Need to align data collection with partners' own IM systems
- Absence of data on the use of cash<sup>70</sup>

Perhaps the greatest problem was lack of capacity. As noted above, the Region VII team provided LGU training to strengthen local capacity. OCHA built on this initiative and held a series of two-day workshops for government officers.

- *It was simple, using Excel in Cebu. Quite positive. We looked at how to empower municipality staff to better understand information management. Not high level, sky-rocketing training but grass-root training.*<sup>71</sup>
- *Building on the Shelter Cluster information management training carried out in Region VII in mid-February, OCHA is rolling out a series of two-day 'Humanitarian information management training' workshops across all affected regions through April-May, the objectives of which are to train government officers ... and explain how information feeds into humanitarian decision-making processes.*<sup>72</sup>

The cluster staffing plan had placed an information manager in every hub, with support from a roving IM coordinator. This would have required at least six IM managers over three months. IFRC actually deployed a total of twelve over the year.<sup>73</sup> Measures to increase IM staffing included remote support, shorter deployments and some doubling up of roles but not local recruitment.

A further measure was centralising IM, with partners uploading data directly to the database rather than through a hub. This meant data could be cleaned and standardised centrally. However, coordinators felt aggregate information was returned too slowly to the hubs where, for lack of space in Manila, some information managers working on centralised tasks were based. For their part, information managers were frustrated by requests for data they saw as difficult to collect and unlikely to be used. Workloads, uncertainty and, despite lack of capacity, redesign of information architecture produced stress, friction and a two-month hiatus in IM.

Informants voiced concerns about IM though many said that basic 3W information remained one of the reasons they went to cluster meetings and appreciated some of the challenges IM staff faced.

- *Coordination works here but at municipal level it's chaos. So this information [from the cluster] was good.*<sup>74</sup>
- *They did good work re IT and information management, that who-what-where. They kept*

<sup>70</sup> Shelter Cluster Philippines, *Final analysis of shelter recovery*, page 16, November 2014

<sup>71</sup> Semi-structured interview 04.04.16

<sup>72</sup> Shelter Cluster Philippines Haiyan Shelter Cluster, Workplan update, 1 April 2014

<sup>73</sup> Approximately the same number as in Haiti in 2010.

<sup>74</sup> Semi-structured interview 15.03.16

*reminding us to send information. Maybe they could reach out to others. Some agencies came late and did not report.*

- *All the people in IM worked like dogs to get data. I really admired their work ethic.*<sup>75</sup>

Mailchimp software was used to send out information though appears to have functioned in such a way that the coordinator could not always be certain where and one hub coordinator was unable to distribute information to partners for a month.<sup>76</sup>

Dropbox was an important source of cluster memory. It appears to have functioned better than in the Bopha response though some in the Shelter Coordination Team were not briefed on how to use it.

- *Lack of admin support also negatively impacted upon the vast amount of information and documents on the Shelter Cluster 'dropbox' and lack of knowledge management. As a short term [team member] I did not have the time or resources (or technology) to make this work in my favour/support my work.*<sup>77</sup>

At the time of the response, the SharePoint website was reported as lacking space and hard to navigate. At the time of the evaluation, it had greater capacity and was still in use. Haiyan Shelter Cluster documentation is extensive and a notable resource.<sup>78</sup> Irrespective of whether a Shelter Cluster is again deployed in the Philippines, it should be possible to maintain a single web page to help those responding and coordinating using the technical document index as source.

However, IEC messages on building back safer were developed after Typhoon Bopha in Mindanao, the earthquake in Bohol and Typhoon Haiyan.<sup>79</sup> All bear the Shelter Cluster logo. In a future disaster which should be used: the local or the latest? Guidance documents on the cluster website should bear a date, acknowledge the individuals and groups that created them and make clear when and where they can be used.

## **g) Handover**

Following its formal closure of the emergency response phase on 4 July 2014, the government began absorbing the work of the shelter cluster. The Social Services Cluster, coordinated by OPARR and led by DSWD, was responsible for emergency and temporary / transitional shelter. The resettlement cluster, also coordinated by OPARR and led by HUDCC coordinated urban development in resettlement areas and permanent houses. However, existing clusters continued as Humanitarian Working Groups.

The Shelter Cluster became the Housing and Shelter Working Group until October 2014 when responsibility for coordination was taken over by DSWD in Tacloban, the provincial government

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<sup>75</sup> Semi-structured interview 12.03.16

<sup>76</sup> End of mission report 28.08.16

<sup>77</sup> Correspondence 20.04.16

<sup>78</sup> SvN and rePlan (2015), *Humanitarian Coalition Philippines Typhoon Appeal – Part B: Literature Review*, Humanitarian Coalition

<sup>79</sup> *You can keep your family safe in future earthquakes and typhoons*, Build Change and the Shelter Cluster

in Cebu and Welthungerhilfe in Roxas.<sup>80</sup> Months ahead of IFRC's withdrawal, however, the shelter cluster began taking steps to enable a smooth handover. The coordinator invited NGOs and the Philippines Red Cross to become shelter focal points at municipal level and a number accepted. The aim was to have a shelter partner act as 'go between' so that DSWD need contact only one person when calling a meeting in a municipality.

The HSWG team trained a Deputy Technical Coordinator, funded by CRS and embedded in DSWD's Region VIII office for five months. The cluster handed over USB sticks containing key shelter resources to partners. At the time of the evaluation resources on the cluster website, including FAQs, 8 Build Back Safer Key Messages, Recovery Shelter Guidelines, HLP guidance and a comprehensive index of linked technical documentation. IFRC's role ended in late October 2014.

## Recommendations

	<b>Supporting shelter service delivery</b>
R10	Consult cluster partners and national and local coordinating bodies on location / relocation of hubs and sub-hubs, bearing in mind logistical costs and benefits.
R11	Consult national and local coordinating bodies on the practical support, supplies, training and services they need from the Shelter Cluster to carry out their role.
R12	Simplify institutional procedures to enable provision of finance and transport to shelter coordination teams.
R13	Prioritise service to shelter cluster partners, hubs and capacity-building in IM (and see R6).
R14	Include use of Dropbox in all shelter coordination team training and briefing.
R15	Set up a webpage to ensure easy access to shelter DRR resources in technical index. Include date and author(s) in documents to ensure use of latest versions.

## 4.4 Strategy

### a) Strategy and policy

The first two coordinators began developing shelter strategy at the start of the deployment, drawing on their previous experience in the Philippines. IASC's evaluation of the overall response notes that the Strategic Response Plan which included the Shelter Cluster's objectives was drawn up before deeper assessment. It notes the lack of time to consult in depth with national government, operational hubs or communities. "Instead, clusters were pressed into developing cluster plans in a week, based upon incomplete data, and the cluster plans became the basis upon which the Strategic Plan was constructed."<sup>81</sup>

<sup>80</sup> Shelter Cluster – Region 6, Meeting minutes, 2nd October 2014

<sup>81</sup> Hanley et al. (2014), page 62

The Shelter Cluster's draft Strategic Operational Framework was revised three times by mid-2014. It was informed by workshops in each region in January-February 2014 and by the draft strategy of the Early Recovery and Livelihoods Cluster. All the same, it was never finalised. Informants and end of mission reports suggested a number of reasons:

- The government did not commit to it.
- There was a perceived disconnect between planning in Manila and response in the hubs.
- Shelter self-recovery began much faster than foreseen.
- Shelter objectives were too rigidly linked to the overall Strategic Response Plan and indicators too prescriptive.
- The format was too general.

In Cebu, the coordinator set out regional Coordination Team goals. The Recovery Shelter Guidelines, developed by technical coordinators, partners and the SAG, seems to have served as shelter strategy in respect of Strategic Objective 2 and self-recovery.

## **b) Standards**

Technical Guidelines were developed in mid-December, based initially on the Pakistan Shelter Cluster strategy. They were revised in early 2014 to incorporate Haiyan-specific as well as global shelter advisories. The revised guidelines included specifications on shelter, NFIs, kits, construction materials and fixings for emergency and recovery shelter.

The Shelter Cluster supported the CCCM Cluster in advocating for bunkhouses (collective centres) to be constructed and provided in accordance with Sphere and WASH Cluster standards.

The Recovery Shelter Guidelines emphasized the rights-based approach and Do No Harm principles, drawing attention to global and Haiyan cluster standards and guidelines. Awareness of standards was also raised in 'clinics' by technical coordinators and cross-cutting advisers.

The guidelines were adopted by government and non-government organisations and have been used in subsequent responses, including the Nepal earthquake. Some informants felt that the 8 Build Back Safer Key Messages failed to reflect context but other partners understood that the Key Messages were not a blueprint but intended to be compatible with local building traditions and preferences.

- *... Indigenous communities in Palawan [Region IV-B] prefer keeping the old look of their houses, adding only features that would make them resilient. The houses are built based on the eight resilient messages set by the Shelter Cluster Organization.*<sup>82</sup>

The cluster's lack of mandate in respect of enforcing partner standards was a matter of concern for some informants. Households which received assistance, even of poor quality, were potentially disqualified from claiming financial or material assistance from government or elsewhere. On the other hand, the cluster took action to advocate with a partner when quality problems in Region VIII were brought to its attention.<sup>83</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> Archbishop Rolando Tria Tirona quoted in 1,813 'Haiyan' families get new homes for Christmas, *CBCP News* 28.Nov 2014

<sup>83</sup> Semi-structured interview 16.03.16

### c) Assessment

The Shelter Cluster staffing plan included an assessment coordinator. The role was not filled but global assessment partner REACH was already working with the Bohol Shelter Cluster when Haiyan made landfall.

REACH was asked to complete the Bohol Shelter Cluster assessment and undertake another on behalf of the new cluster. IFRC also asked REACH to undertake or contribute to three other assessments: shelter needs in Leyte, IDP shelter intentions in and around Tacloban, and the multi-cluster initial needs assessment (MIRA).

**Table 3. REACH shelter assessments, November 2013-January 2014**

REACH assessment	Area	Cluster	Outputs
1. Shelter needs	Leyte	Haiyan Shelter	Partner observations 14.11.13
2. Shelter needs	Bohol	Bohol Shelter	Final report 23.11.13
3. IDP shelter intentions and needs	Tacloban City and surrounding area	Haiyan CCCM and Shelter	Report 24.11.13
4. MIRA	Region IV-B, VI, VII and VIII	Haiyan Shelter and multi-cluster	Report 29.11.13
5. Shelter and WASH needs	Region IV-B, VI, and VIII	Haiyan Shelter and WASH	FAQs 20.12.13 Factsheet 27.12.13 Final report 15.01.14

The MIRA provided information for the Strategic Response Plan but informants thought it of less value for individual sectors.<sup>84</sup> Data collection for the combined shelter and WASH needs assessment took place from 28 November to 12 December 2013. Despite comparatively small local teams and a dual-sector focus, REACH covered a greater number of households across a larger area than previous assessments in the Philippines (see Annex 4).

The assessment covered nine provinces in Regions IV-B, VII and VIII and municipalities up to 200 kilometres from the typhoon path. Within each municipality, five barangays were selected at random. REACH sought to ensure equal representation of coastal and inland communities north and south of the typhoon track.

The scale of the emergency, the scope of the assessment and difficulties of travel and communication made the Haiyan Shelter and WASH assessment particularly challenging and REACH's achievement was impressive. It sent three international staff to the Philippines. It drew on experience in previous Shelter Cluster deployments and prior relationships with ACTED, LGUs, universities and partners to recruit a large local team. Team leaders in Roxas and Tacloban included two who had previously worked on shelter assessments in Mindanao and Bohol. Approximately 65 local enumerators were rapidly hired and trained in use of smartphones with Open Data Kit (ODK). The assessment comprised

<sup>84</sup> Semi-structured interview 01.04.14

- Collection of secondary data
- Household surveys
- Key informant interviews
- GIS and mapping

Initial findings were summarised in a Shelter Cluster Factsheet on 27 December. Feedback on a draft report was provided by the cluster information manager who arrived in country in late November. The report was finalised in mid-January.

The assessment by REACH was widely cited. The Shelter Cluster was praised for commissioning a sectoral assessment early on. ACAPs and IASC acknowledged the problem all sectors encountered in establishing an accurate picture of needs.<sup>85</sup> The shelter and WASH assessment was among many Shelter Cluster documents cited in a report for DSWD, IOM and IDMC on displacement after the typhoon.

- *“Other than shelter, which contracted out a monitoring process to REACH and which also considered areas of WASH, only in March-April did most clusters begin more detailed sector-wide assessments and baseline studies ...”*<sup>86</sup>
- *“The shelter assessments provide strong insight into the ... situation in dispersed displacement situations and provide some information on host family situations.”*<sup>87</sup>

Both the REACH and Shelter Coordination Teams regretted starting the assessment almost three weeks after the typhoon. This was slightly later than assessments that had followed the Bohol earthquake and Typhoon Bopha though in line with expectations following a MIRA (see Annex 4).<sup>88</sup>

- *[Next time] I would go immediately for a community level assessment – no UNDAC, no MIRA - which was shelter-oriented to quickly identify areas according to impact.*<sup>89</sup>
- *By the time the report was produced, it was two months after the typhoon, and many agencies had lost interest in the findings.*<sup>90</sup>

Some informants thought the assessment sample too large and the report too academic for partners whose programmes were already well underway by the time the assessment was finalised. Shelter and WASH findings were not cross-referenced.

For its part, REACH felt there had been insufficient engagement by the Shelter Coordination Team and partners when terms of reference were agreed hence lack of ownership of the

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<sup>85</sup> Teresa Hanley, Rusty Binas, Julian Murray and Baltz Tribunalo, (2014), *IASC Inter-agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Typhoon Haiyan Response*, OCHA, page 54

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Michelle Yonetani and Lorelle Yuen, (2014), *The Evolving Picture of Displacement in the Wake of Typhoon Haiyan*, DSWD, IDMC, IOM, SAS, page 17

<sup>88</sup> IASC, (2012), *Multi-Cluster/Sector Initial Rapid Assessment (MIRA)*, IASC, page 5

<sup>89</sup> Semi-structured interview 19.04.16

<sup>90</sup> End of mission report 26.03.13

findings. Turnover in Manila, hub start-up and the number of assessments had contributed to lack of time and communication. Some of these issues were addressed during monitoring.

- *In the future, I would push for very close collaboration in the design and analysis stages of the assessment to ensure the findings actually come in a form that helps to inform decisions.*<sup>91</sup>

There was a need for both REACH and IFRC to consider capacity when prioritising tasks and determining their scope. Finding time to discuss requirements and record decisions was difficult but the result, as both acknowledged, was more likely to be a product valued equally by local and global coordination partners. Some of these issues were addressed in monitoring.

### **c) Cross-cutting issues**

The Shelter Cluster recruited advisers on gender and diversity, HLP and different aspects of environment.

More than 30 million coconut trees had been damaged or destroyed by the typhoon, a devastating loss of agricultural livelihoods but a source of re-usable building material if recovered in good time. The Shelter Cluster initially led then supported the work of UNDP and ILO in the TWIG on use of coco lumber in construction. A debris adviser who had worked with the cluster in Haiti was deployed by the Australian Red Cross. With a colleague from the Early Recovery Cluster, he co-authored guidance relating to clearance, processing and re-use of lumber.

- *The cluster gave us all technical descriptions: coco lumber, eight key messages, it's very, very useful.*<sup>92</sup>
- *We use the eight messages from the Shelter Cluster and the study on coco lumber was very useful.*<sup>93</sup>

An environmental adviser who had also worked with the Cluster in Haiti joined the cluster for two months in December 2013. The Shelter and Environment Overview swiftly collate key topics, including recycling and legal requirements.<sup>94</sup> The Environmental Self-assessment and Action Checklist for Shelter Interventions was a tool to help agencies test compliance with legislation and codes on site selection, construction materials and building in affected areas. OCHA's report on environmental issues in the response cited Shelter Cluster concerns about the extraction of beach and river sand south of Tacloban for construction.<sup>95</sup>

A technical coordinator was seconded by the BRE Group. BRE, IFRC, UN-HABITAT, Habitat for Humanity, WWF US, Norwegian Refugee Council and others had developed the QSAND shelter sustainability tool. Typhoon Haiyan technical coordinator presented QSAND (Quantifying Sustainability in the Aftermath of Natural Disasters) to cluster partners and worked with

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<sup>91</sup> Correspondence 13.04.16

<sup>92</sup> Semi-structured interview 15.03.16 (1)

<sup>93</sup> Semi-structured interview 16.03.16

<sup>94</sup> Haiyan Shelter Cluster, *Shelter and Environment – An Overview, Typhoon Yolanda Response, Philippines*, 12 January 2014

<sup>95</sup> Åsa Granath, *Environmental Assessment. Final report and Recommendations*, OCHA, 18 June 2014

colleagues, partners and local universities to develop factsheets on different shelter construction materials.

Using the gender marker, OCHA reported that in the first three months of the response, 92% of funding received by partners in the Shelter Cluster, had gone for code 2a projects, that is, projects which identify and respond to the distinct needs of women, girls, boys and men. This was the highest of any cluster.<sup>96</sup> OCHA recommended deployment of gender advisers and, for the first time, the Shelter Cluster deployed a gender and diversity specialist. From early 2014 two advisers worked for 4-6 weeks in succession in regional hubs. They contributed to the development of beneficiary selection criteria, cited as an example of good practice.<sup>97</sup>

- *... Two clusters deployed so-called “gender and diversity experts.” This is an excellent practice that improves the way humanitarian aid is delivered.*<sup>98</sup>
- *I am especially proud of making a difference in the way that gender and diversity issues were mainstreamed in this response within the shelter sector.*<sup>99</sup>

Lessons learned from both the Philippines and Nepal shelter cluster included earlier and longer deployment of gender and diversity specialists.<sup>100</sup> Coordination teams needed training on gender before deployment in order to appreciate and make best use of specialist advice during the response.

DSWD and partners also provided inputs on diversity, disability and age. DSWD gave a presentation in Region VIII on indigenous groups and need for shelter in Samar, Leyte and Tacloban<sup>101</sup> and the cluster developed HLP principles for this group. Handicap International’s Inclusion Technical Unit in Capiz (Region VI) supported production of the cluster document ‘*Methodology Beneficiary Selection*’, part of its prioritisation tool. The Ageing and Disability Task Force (ADTF) which included HelpAge and its local partner COSE shared brochures with Shelter cluster partners.

Earlier deployment of specialists could have helped inform partner strategies and enabled cross-cutting issues to have been mainstreamed and budgeted earlier.

- *We failed to budget for ramps in our transitional shelter ... The Shelter Cluster said we should build for disabled people, but we had [already] budgeted.*<sup>102</sup>

Nevertheless, REACH’s second monitoring report for the Shelter Cluster found a “small, yet clear tendency” toward targeting of vulnerable households.

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<sup>96</sup> ICCG, *Philippines Periodic Monitoring Report*, Nov 2013 to Jan 2014, Inter-cluster Coordinating Group, page 23

<sup>97</sup> Yonetani and Yuen, (2014), page 42

<sup>98</sup> Marcy Hersh, (2014), *Philippines: New Approach to Emergency Response Fails Women and Girls*, Refugees International

<sup>99</sup> End of mission report 26.03.13

<sup>100</sup> Kathleen Walsh, *Gender and Diversity in the Shelter Cluster, Lessons Learned* (draft; internal)

<sup>101</sup> Typhoon Haiyan – Eastern Visayas Region - Tacloban Co-ordination Hub, Shelter Cluster Meeting Minutes, April 1st, 2014

<sup>102</sup> Semi-structured interview 16.03.16 (1)



- Overall, 41% of vulnerable households reported having received shelter assistance, compared to only 33% among non-vulnerable households.<sup>103</sup>

IFRC deployed HLP advisers on three occasions and also provided remote support to the cluster. IFRC had experience of HLP from the Bopha response and led much inter-cluster work on the human and land rights of displaced people in the Haiyan response. The Shelter Cluster’s role in HLP during the Haiyan response was viewed as skilled and successful.<sup>104</sup> IFRC later became one of two HLP focal points leading the global Protection Cluster’s work on HLP.

It is therefore unfortunate that lack of capacity saw specialist resources diverted to fill core roles. The first HLP adviser, though deployed early and in a first cluster post, was frequently redeployed in 2013-14 to fill temporary vacancies in the hubs and Manila. Her work was highly regarded but IFRC’s frequent redeployment less so.

- *She was in, she was out, her job description was never clear. She was meant to be the HLP adviser, but then she was managing the cluster.*<sup>105</sup>
- *The HLP adviser was doing this [work] virtually single-handedly. She couldn’t be in five places at once. If you’re going to do this you’ve got to do it seriously.*<sup>106</sup>
- *What ended up being one of the most complicated and politically sensitive issues post-Haiyan ended up falling on the shoulders of a single HLP adviser to the Shelter Cluster, who much of the time was also required to stand in as interim national Shelter Cluster coordinator in Manila.*<sup>107</sup>

## Recommendations

	<b>Strategy, policy and standards</b>
R16	In an extended cluster, ensure cluster and hubs each have a coordination strategy with linked staffing plan.
R17	Prioritise service to cluster shelter partners in assessment and monitoring. Consult partners, record decisions and clarify reporting line for assessment and monitoring team in order to agree report purpose and ownership.
R18	Draw on global and partner resources to agree research methodology and non-technical summary for assessment and monitoring reports.
R19	Include gender and diversity in training for all global and country level coordinators, information, assessment and technical managers.
R20	Ask SAG members to host cross-cutting advisers in order to deploy and utilise dedicated staff earlier.

<sup>103</sup> REACH, *Shelter Sector Response Monitoring, Typhoon Haiyan, Philippines, 2013 Final Report: Monitoring Assessment 2* September 2014, page 17

<sup>104</sup> Hanley et al. (2014), page 28

<sup>105</sup> Semi-structured interview 04.05.16

<sup>106</sup> Semi-structured interview 27.04.16

<sup>107</sup> Alice Thomas, *Typhoon Survivors Face Obstacles to Recovery*, March 28, 2014, RefugeesInternational, [www.refugeesinternational.org](http://www.refugeesinternational.org), page 6

## 4.5 Monitoring and reporting on implementation of Shelter Cluster strategy

REACH was asked to monitor shelter response in April and September 2014. Two rounds of monitoring included households in the government's priority zone of 50 kilometres. A sample of 3,000-4,000 households in municipalities in eight provinces in Regions VI, VII and VIII was selected. At the coordinator's request, REACH also compared the level of damage north and south of the typhoon track.

REACH again recruited and trained local enumerators. REACH and the Shelter Coordination Team were more successful in engaging partners though there remained some differing expectations in the Shelter Coordination Team. As with assessments, a written Terms of Reference or record of discussions and decisions in the field would aid all parties concerned in understanding scope and purpose.

- *What we found in Haiyan was that the baseline assessment and the monitoring ones were very difficult to compare.*<sup>108</sup>
- *... There was more support from the Shelter Coordination Team on both technical issues as well as logistical planning and contacting of partners to support data collection. While the scope was similar, the opportunity for planning ahead and on the ground support made the process much smoother.*<sup>109</sup>

REACH used global Shelter Cluster indicators and analysed the situation of vulnerable groups. The analyses reflected regional differences and concluded that the shelter sector had largely met the need for emergency shelter of those targeted in the Strategic Response Plan (300,000 households). However, recovery in some of the worst affected regions had slowed or even stopped. Only 38 per cent of households targeted had received shelter assistance eight months after the typhoon and approximately 75 per cent of shelter constructed or rebuilt was unsafe. The relatively small percentage of those who had received information about building back safer had been unable to use it.

Shelter Cluster partners, among them CRS, conducted regular monitoring of their own assistance, satisfaction levels and awareness of the 8 Build Back Safer Key Messages. CRS's MEAL team summarised findings in an easy to read 4-page format. The Shelter Cluster should consider whether a similar format would be useful for summarising and communicating cluster assessment and monitoring findings. Nevertheless, monitoring provided valuable information on the shelter response.

- *The Shelter cluster contracted a third party, REACH, to conduct periodic assessments which coincided to match the PMR cycle, and as a result the Shelter cluster was able to provide very solid data on the quality of construction and on the evolving character of shelter needs, even in the absence of a clear count of the scope of the needs.*<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> Semi-structured interview 16.02.16

<sup>109</sup> Correspondence 13.04.16

<sup>110</sup> Hanley et al., (2014), page 28

## 4.6 Advocacy and communication

As in the Bopha response, the Shelter Cluster strategy did not explicitly include advocacy. However, the staffing plan called for an advocacy and communication adviser. The global focal point for advocacy and communication had worked for the Cluster in Haiti and, with assistance from the American Red Cross, provided infographics and media monitoring before arriving in the Philippines for approximately three months on 1 December 2013.

This provided partners with expertise and experience at a time when many other media advisers had left though also meant the cluster had no specialist in country when media interest was at its highest.<sup>111</sup> The first adviser ensured use of Shelter Cluster branding, undertook reporting and produced a number of documents and web-based products for different audiences. Branding was very effective in maintaining the “firewall” between the Shelter Cluster and IFRC. Nevertheless, counterparts in the delegation found the Shelter Cluster knowledgeable and supportive. The first adviser left in late February 2014 and was later replaced by a communication and reporting adviser.

Web search finds numerous references to the Shelter Cluster in the Philippines press. The first adviser contributed to a cover feature in Christian Science Monitor and a story by Reuters.<sup>112 113</sup> The 8 Build Back Safer Key Messages developed by technical coordinators, TWIGs and local workshops were shared with affected populations in the Philippines through IEC materials. DSWD and partners added their own logos to materials they used. Similar messages were used in subsequent shelter cluster deployments in, for example, Burma and Fiji.<sup>114</sup>

### ***Shelter Cluster eight key messages posters update***<sup>115</sup>

**Achievements:** Eight build back safer key messages have been finalised and adopted. Shelter Cluster members are encouraged to add their logos at the bottom next to the Shelter Cluster and DSWD logos.

#### **Going forward:**

1. Next week, the key messages should be available in four local languages.
2. DSWD to use the key message for the radio show, distribution with their kits, and develop public outreach.
3. Communication with communities: Shelter Cluster is looking at bringing an expert on board and guide us on how to take the messages to the community.
4. All Shelter Cluster members are encouraged to use and disseminate these key messages with communities.

<sup>111</sup> End of mission report 27.02.14

<sup>112</sup> Thin Lei Win, With shelter funding shortfall, Haiyan survivors are building back worse, *Thomson Reuters Foundation News*, Tuesday, 14 January 2014 10:00 GMT

<sup>113</sup> Peter Ford, Typhoon Haiyan: Can Philippines build back better? *Christian Science Monitor* February 9, 2014

<sup>114</sup> Rakhine and Kachin/Shan Shelter NFI CCCM Cluster, (2015), *Build Back Safer Messages (Myanmar)*; IFRC, *Emergency appeal operation update IFRC, Fiji: Tropical Cyclone Winston, Operations update n° 2*: 5 August 2016

<sup>115</sup> Andrew Benham, Typhoon Haiyan – Eastern Visayas Region VIII - Tacloban Coordination Hub Shelter Cluster Meeting minutes, May 27, 2014

English language materials are easy to read. Shelter Cluster performance monitoring in the Philippines found 100 per cent partner satisfaction with advocacy. Cluster messages fed into advocacy and communication by partners and the Humanitarian Coordinator.<sup>116</sup> Experience in Haiyan also informed the global shelter cluster's advocacy strategy.<sup>117</sup> This defines the purpose of advocacy as "targeted communication with the goal to change a decision maker's opinions, attitudes, actions or lack of actions."<sup>118</sup> On this definition, the Shelter Cluster's "well-crafted messages"<sup>119</sup> on different topics, backed by evidence from REACH assessment and monitoring, were successful in influencing government, HCT and partner policy on bunkhouses, No-Build Zones and safer shelter.

- ... *the inter-agency response on shelter has several **key success stories**:*

*Advocacy on bunkhouses helped improve conditions for IDPs, particularly in terms of space allocation and WASH facilities.*

*Advocacy on the "unsafe" zone policy helped to clarify ambiguities and unblocked services to some highly vulnerable populations.*

*Key information tools were developed, to support best practices in construction and repairs by agencies and self-recovery efforts. With wide-reaching communication campaigns, these reached most affected populations - though results in the REACH survey of the safety of housing suggest there is significantly more to do to support their application.<sup>120</sup>*

Media coverage of bunkhouse standards contributed to positive change though some informants feared it also resulted in loss of face for the government. As in the Bopha response, cluster advocacy was less able to influence levels of shelter funding necessary for large scale recovery and resilience. Early Recovery and Shelter, identified in the Strategic Response Plan as the most critical needs, were also the most under-funded, receiving 29 per cent and 44 per cent of requested funding, respectively.<sup>121</sup>

The first adviser's end of mission report set out a number of recommendations. He emphasised the need to deploy an advocacy adviser within the first week of the disaster and noted a relative dearth of messages for shelter beneficiaries.<sup>122</sup> However, the cluster and partners were active in CwC and other accountability initiatives (see next section). Advocacy and communications for different audiences are listed in Annex 5. Job descriptions for those in the Haiyan Shelter Coordination Team did not reference Bohol where coordination continued separately but Factsheets and the Twitterfeed also covered the Bohol Cluster and the 'forgotten'<sup>123</sup> earthquake response.

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<sup>116</sup> Alison Kent, (2014), *In The Shadow of the Storm Getting recovery right one year after typhoon Haiyan*, Oxfam International

<sup>117</sup> Global shelter cluster advocacy strategy

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> Hanley et al., (2014), page x

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., (2014), page 28

<sup>121</sup> Inter-Cluster Coordination Group for the Humanitarian Country Team, *2014 Final Periodic Monitoring Report, Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda)*, OCHA

<sup>122</sup> End of mission report 27.02.14

<sup>123</sup> Shelter Cluster Twitterfeed, 6 February 2014

## Recommendation

	<b>Advocacy and communication</b>
R21	Deploy an advocacy and communication adviser within the first week of the disaster and be ready to replace him/her after four to six weeks as per end of mission recommendations.

### 4.7 Accountability to affected persons

*Accountability includes the willingness to listen to feedback and adjust programmes and strategies based on that feedback if necessary.*<sup>124</sup>

Accountability to affected people is emphasised in the Transformative Agenda and was named a cross-cutting issue in the Haiyan response. The Cluster did not make specific reference to accountability to affected people in its strategy or on its webpages though it contributed to accountability initiatives.

The Alliance of Sphere Advocates in the Philippines (ASAP) was already present. New accountability initiatives were started by OCHA and cluster partners. The cluster's messages on building back safer and HLP were developed and translated in collaboration with the Communicating with Communities (CwC) initiative. A number of long-established partners were members of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) and the Region VIII coordinator suggested they be asked by OCHA to present their work on accountability.<sup>125</sup>

DSWD and radio stations offered airtime for shelter partners. Shelter monitoring included questions on satisfaction and could have strengthened its accountability to affected people by adding a feedback loop to REACH's terms of reference.

Evaluations note more 'upward' than 'downward' accountability in the response. The reviews of *Pamati Kita* (Let's Listen Together) and *Tindog Kita* (Rise Together) also found that international assumptions about beneficiary selection and accountability to affected people were challenged by local culture. For example:

- Assistance created a debt of gratitude which was a disincentive to criticism.
- Face to face dialogue was preferred to telephone hotlines if an agency had no long-term presence in the community.
- Selective targeting by socio-economic status/vulnerability, geographical or livelihood group was extremely unpopular. It triggered divisiveness, a sense of shame amongst those excluded and a fear of resentment amongst those included.
- The most popular agency in Tacloban was the non-cluster Tzu Chi Foundation which provided unconditional cash via non-selective distribution

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<sup>124</sup> Global Shelter Cluster, Communications and Advocacy Strategy for the Global Shelter Cluster 2014-2017, March 2014

<sup>125</sup> End of mission report 04.02.14

- Use of accountability mechanisms did not necessarily lead to action or change by agencies.<sup>126</sup>

Similarly, IASC’s evaluation found that

- *Communities were generally unhappy with any type of targeting, arguing that they were all victims and therefore all needed assistance, and additionally that it was not traditional to exclude people in the community from assistance.*<sup>127</sup>

These findings are significant for beneficiary selection and accountability in future responses and should inform shelter cluster learning.

**Table 4. Accountability to affected people initiatives  
Typhoon Haiyan response**

Initiative	Lead	Activities include
ASAP	Lutheran World Relief	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Workshop in Region VII <sup>128</sup></li> <li>• Annual report on activities, including shelter and accountability</li> </ul>
Accountability to affected people (AAP) <sup>129</sup>	OCHA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TWIG meetings</li> <li>• Listening exercises</li> </ul>
CwC	OCHA, Philippines Information Agency, World Vision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• TWIG meetings</li> <li>• Feedback sessions</li> <li>• Common feedback form</li> <li>• Distribution of radios</li> <li>• Sharing partner activities</li> </ul>
<i>Pamati Kita</i>	Plan International, IOM, World Vision	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Joint accountability services, information campaign and hotline</li> </ul>
<i>Tindog Kita</i>	IOM	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Radio drama</li> <li>• Interactive talk show</li> <li>• Key message song</li> </ul>

## Recommendation

	<b>Accountability to affected persons</b>
R22	Use findings of Haiyan accountability evaluations to support shared learning on shelter targeting and accountability to affected people in future responses.

<sup>126</sup> See Jonathan Corpus Ong, Jaime Manuel Flores and Pamela Combinido, (2015), *Obliged to be grateful, How local communities experienced humanitarian actors in the Haiyan response, in the Haiyan response*, Plan International, IOM, World Vision, UKAid

<sup>127</sup> Hanley et al, (2014), page 38

<sup>128</sup> ASAP, *ASAP members’ accomplishments in promoting and applying the Sphere and other Q&A standards*, December 2013 to December 2014

<sup>129</sup> Later merged with CwC initiative

## 4.8 Contingency planning, preparedness and capacity-building

Contingency planning does not feature in the strategic framework and it was one of two areas with which partners expressed lack of satisfaction in cluster performance monitoring. However, the Shelter Cluster participated in the inter-agency disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction working group in Region VIII and developed the shelter section of OCHA's contingency plan in the region.

The cluster coordinator and technical coordinators discussed DRR one-to-one with mayors and shelter partners. The Shelter Cluster's 8 Build Back Safer Key Messages and the Recovery Guidelines were named as resources in the overall Region VIII contingency plan and are enduring DRR tools.<sup>130</sup> These and other documents were collated, given to partners as part of cluster handover, and informed the response to typhoon Hagupit in late 2014.

- *The most tangible example of DRR in practice in the response is the commitment to 'build back better,' which World Vision was promoting along with other members of the Shelter Cluster. The RTE received positive feedback on the usefulness of Build Back Better training which had begun in advance of the distribution of materials.*<sup>131</sup>
- *"The permanent shelters, built using 'build back safer' methods resisted the typhoon [Hagupit.] We will... shortly be ready to resume our construction projects."*<sup>132</sup>
- *None of the ADA/Caritas Austria/CRS supported shelters and toilets/septic tanks suffered any damage in the typhoon [Hagupit] and this has raised beneficiary confidence in the Build Back Safer construction techniques strictly monitored and enforced by CRS engineers and foremen.*<sup>133</sup>

However, the cluster's aim of embedding a shelter coordinator within IFRC's delegation in the Philippines to support shelter contingency and preparedness could not be realised owing to salary and institutional issues. Philippines disaster management law came under review after Haiyan and the work of the Shelter Cluster divided between other Philippines national clusters.

### Recommendation

	<b>Contingency planning</b>
R23	Record and share process of development and promotion of 8 Build Back Safer Key Messages for replication in future responses.

<sup>130</sup> UNOCHA, Contingency Plan, Region VIII, UNOCHA – July 2014

<sup>131</sup> Pauline Wilson, (2014), *Real-Time Evaluation of World Vision's Response to Typhoon Haiyan*, World Vision, page 15

<sup>132</sup> Handicap International, Typhoon Hagupit: "We Were Prepared...", ReliefWeb, 16 December 2014

<sup>133</sup> Caritas and Ikaw, *Transitional Shelter Palo*, [www.caritasresponse.org/shelter-tacloban](http://www.caritasresponse.org/shelter-tacloban)

## 5. Conclusions

The IFRC had skilled coordination staff in the Philippines before Haiyan made landfall. By transferring staff from the Bohol Shelter Cluster and deploying global and regional focal points, it was able to position experienced personnel in response planning.

Nevertheless, IFRC, like others, was unprepared for the scale and complexity - political and logistical - of the disaster that followed Haiyan. Both government and international partners were under pressure because of concurrent responses in the Philippines and elsewhere. In addition, lack of global capacity in Geneva and institutional barriers in the Philippines added to the challenges of surge and follow-on staffing at a time when coordinators and information managers were in great demand. Haiyan demanded a larger coordination team than IFRC had ever recruited. Despite the number of core staff and specialist advisors, recruitment gaps left the Haiyan team largely without administrative support and the Bohol team largely without staff. Like the SSD in Geneva, field teams were expected to do more with less.

Given its previous experience in smaller responses in the Philippines, IFRC was theoretically well-placed to build on its earlier relationship with government as it did with international partners in the HCT. The importance of doing so was well understood by successive coordinators in Manila and the hubs who did much to build or re-build relationships at different levels. However, IFRC's lack of visibility between emergencies and early turnover in the role of cluster coordinator had placed it, to some extent, on a similar footing to a new agency, learning context in a major response. Co-leadership of the cluster was not helped by the division of shelter between different government departments and the responsibility for coordination between different government levels.

In extraordinary circumstances, members of the Shelter Coordination Team did an extraordinary job. Members took legal, technical and cross-cutting expertise and experience to and from regional, provincial and national coordination forums, LGU and community meetings. They were well-supported by long-term shelter partners such as IOM, CRS and Save the Children. They developed high quality resources that have been adopted by DSWD and partners and used in subsequent disasters in the Philippines. Caught between what one informant termed 'the L3 circus' of the international response and another the 'poker game' of the national one, both in need of funds, the Shelter Cluster was expected and tempted to take on too much. However, the team's commitment to human rights and humanitarian values has left behind guidance on land and property, environment and safer shelter subsequently used in the Philippines and elsewhere.



## Annex 1 Timeline

2013	
15 May	IFRC Bopha Shelter Coordination Team ends mission in Philippines
September	Stand-off between army and Moro National Liberation Front in Zamboanga prompts 75,000 residents to flee.
15 October	Bohol earthquake. IFRC co-leads Shelter Cluster.
3 November	Typhoon Haiyan / Yolanda forms.
6 November	Haiyan enters Philippines area of responsibility.
7 November	Global shelter cluster focal point for Asia Pacific participates in HCT and cluster lead agency preparedness meeting. Becomes first Haiyan cluster coordinator.
8 November	Haiyan makes landfall and is followed by storm surges. Over 6,000 people are killed and 4 million left homeless.
9 November	IFRC is confirmed as Shelter Cluster co-lead agency by UN Resident / Humanitarian Coordinator.
?10 November	REACH team starts work as part of UNDAC-led MIRA assessment.
11 November	President Aquino declares state of national calamity and calls for international humanitarian assistance. UN CERF releases USD 25m.
12 November	Emergency Relief Coordinator activates Level 3 (L3) emergency response. IASC launches appeal for USD 301 million for Typhoon Haiyan Action Plan. This is later revised to USD 348 million. It includes a request for USD 46 million for emergency shelter assistance. IFRC launches emergency appeal for CHF 72,323,259 (about USD 78,600,372). This includes CHF 761,688 to support IFRC role in shelter coordination.
13 November	First shelter cluster meeting is held in Manila.
14 November	First shelter cluster meeting in Roxas, chaired by Save the Children.
15 November	First shelter cluster meetings in Cebu, chaired by IOM, and Tacloban, chaired by DSWD.
16 November	IOM and UNHCR start registering people fleeing affected areas at Cebu and Tacloban airports. Shelter Cluster HLP adviser arrives.
17 November	Shelter Cluster has total of eight 8 Shelter Coordination Team members in Bohol, Cebu; Manila, Roxas and Tacloban in Eastern Visayas. First shelter cluster meeting is held in Ormoc, chaired by CRS.
21 November	Shelter Cluster holds meeting with donors and heads of agencies in Manila, to present coordination arrangements, introduce draft shelter strategy, and advocate for shelter needs of affected population.
22 November	Data collection for MIRA ends. Shelter Cluster information manager arrives.

26 November	Shelter Coordination Team has 15 full-time staff.
28 November	HLP adviser becomes third cluster coordinator. Shelter and WASH needs assessment starts.
01 December	Shelter cluster communications and advocacy advisor arrives
10 December	12-month Strategic Response Plan is published with total budget of US\$ 788 million. Strategic Response Plan is designed to complement the government's RAY plan.
14 December	Fourth Shelter Cluster coordinator arrives.
16 December	Government's strategic plan to guide recovery and reconstruction published in 'Reconstruction Assistance for Yolanda' (RAY). Government announces creation of the Office of the Presidential Assistant for Rehabilitation and Recovery (OPARR).
<b>2014</b>	
15 January	Shelter and WASH needs report finalised.
January	Shelter and environment documents finalised.
March	HLP documents finalised.
April	Beneficiary selection documents finalised.
01 April	Shelter Coordination Team has 12/17 full-time staff.
04 April	Government declares humanitarian phase over and that coordination of further response will be under OPARR's structures rather than through humanitarian clusters. Shelter cluster formally becomes a sub-cluster of the Social Services Cluster, led by OPARR and coordinated by DSWD. Shelter Cluster renames itself the Humanitarian Shelter Working Group.
22 April	First monitoring report by REACH finalised.
June	8 Build Back Safer Key Messages finalised
31 August	In response to the Government announcement of the end of the humanitarian phase of the Haiyan response HCT closes the Strategic Response Plan. By the time of its closure, \$468 million had been received against the plan, making it 60.2% covered.  5,400 households (24,785 individuals) displaced by Haiyan are still living in tents, evacuation centres or bunkhouses. A further 95,000 households remain particularly vulnerable because of the poor quality of their shelter.  Overall, fewer than 50% of IDPs have a sustainable return or relocation site.
September	Second monitoring report by REACH finalised.
31 October	Final handover of Shelter Cluster.
November	Recovery Shelter Guidelines finalised
06 December	Typhoon Ruby / Hagupit makes landfall in Eastern Samar.
18 December	Haiyan Cluster coordinator leaves.

## Annex 2

**Table 5. IFRC-led Shelter Coordination Teams in Philippines 2006-2013**

Natural disaster	Date	Areas affected	Persons affected
Typhoon Haiyan / Yolanda	8-Nov-2013	Visayas, Mindoro, Palawan	16,106,870
Bohol earthquake	15-Oct-2013	Bohol	3,222,224
Typhoon Bopha / Pablo	4-Dec-2012	Mindanao, Visayas, Luzon	6,646,624
Typhoon Washi / Sendong)	16-Dec-2011	Northern Mindanao and Central Visayas	1,150,300
Typhoon Parma / Pepeng	29-Sep-2009	Eastern Visayas, Luzon	4,478,491
Typhoon Ketsana / Ondoy	24-Sep-2009	Luzon	4,901,763
Typhoon Durian / Reming	27-Sep-2006	Luzon, Visayas	3,842,406

## Annex 3

**Table 6. Haiyan Shelter Coordination Team  
Planned structure and capacity<sup>134</sup>**

<b>Manila hub</b>	<b>Roving support</b>	<b>Bohol hub</b>	<b>Busuanga hub</b>	<b>Guiuan hub</b>	<b>Roxas hub</b>	<b>Tacloban hub</b>
Cluster coordinator	Environment advisor	Hub coordinator	Region IV b coordinator	Hub coordinator	Region VI coordinator	Region VIII coordinator
Deputy coordinator	Information manager	Information manager	Information manager	Information manager	Information manager	Information manager
	Technical coordinator	Technical coordinator	Technical coordinator	Technical coordinator	Technical coordinator	Technical coordinator
	HLP advisor	Admin / IT / logistics *	Admin / IT / logistics *	Admin / IT / logistics *	Admin / IT / logistics *	Admin / IT / logistics *
	Assessment coordinator				Sub-hub coordinator **	Sub-hub coordinator **
	Comms. advisor					
	GIS / database					
	Beneficiary advisor					

\*To be locally recruited

\*\* To be recruited among cluster partners

<sup>134</sup> Shelter Cluster Coordination Structure, 14.11.13

## Annex 4

**Table 6. Shelter Cluster assessments by REACH in Philippines 2011-13**

Disaster	Date	Field assessment starts <sup>135</sup>	Persons affected	Households assessed
Typhoon Haiyan	08.11.13	26.11.13	16,106,870	6,483
Bohol earthquake	15.10.13	26.10.13	3,222,224	4,533
Typhoon Bopha	04.12.12	10.12.12	6,646,624	3,056
Typhoon Washi	16.12.11	20.01.12	1,150,300	3,945

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<sup>135</sup> Start of local enumerator training, usually two days long.

## Annex 5

**Table 7. Advocacy and communication by the Cluster**

Main audience	Advocacy / communication
<b>Affected people</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Technical guidelines</li> </ul>
<b>Donors</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Factsheets</li> <li>• PowerPoint presentations</li> <li>• Shelter Cluster brief</li> </ul>
<b>Government</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• HLP messages (No-Build Zones, bunkhouses, relocation, etc.)</li> <li>• 8 Build Back Safer Key Messages</li> <li>• One-year report</li> <li>• Photo book</li> <li>• Shelter Cluster brochure</li> <li>• Six-month report</li> <li>• Technical guidelines</li> </ul>
<b>Press/media</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Infographics</li> <li>• Key messages</li> <li>• Response to media requests</li> <li>• Contribution to stories</li> </ul>
<b>Other clusters / HCT</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Contribution to OCHA bulletins and sitreps</li> <li>• Reactive press lines</li> </ul>
<b>Shelter partners</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Factsheets</li> <li>• Infographics</li> <li>• 8 Build Back Safer Key Messages</li> <li>• Media monitoring report</li> <li>• One-year report</li> <li>• Photo book</li> <li>• Reactive press lines</li> <li>• Six-month report</li> <li>• Storify site</li> <li>• Technical guidelines</li> <li>• Twitter feed</li> </ul>

## Annex 6 Evaluation informants

Thibault Henry	ACTED	Country Representative
Denison Grellmann	ADRA Philippines	Country Director
Margaret Stansberry	American Red Cross	Country Representative
Kathleen Walsh	Australian Red Cross	Haiyan Shelter Cluster Gender and Diversity Adviser
Steve Barton	Australian Red Cross	Haiyan Shelter Cluster Hub Coordinator
Matthew Hewett *	Canadian Red Cross	Shelter Cluster Hub Information Manager
Neil Bauman	Canadian Red Cross and IFRC	Global Shelter Cluster Focal Point, Information Management; Haiyan Shelter Cluster Coordination Advisor
Macelinda (Mercy) Cepe	CECI-CONCERN Inc.	Project – Team Leader
Mariya Jopson Lagman	City of Tacloban	Executive Assistant IV, City Housing & Community Development Office
Joseph Curry	CRS	Country Representative
Honesto Pardes	DSWD	Engineer
Nuala Cowan	George Washington University	Haiyan Shelter Cluster Hub Information Manager
Emilio Teijeira	German Red Cross	Head of Office
Federico Carboni	German Red Cross	Programme Coordinator – Leyte
Sanjay Mukherjee	German Red Cross	Senior Shelter Delegate
Clay Westrope	Groundswell	REACH Global Assessment Specialist, U.S. Country Representative
Irantzu Serra Lasa	Habitat for Humanity International	Director, Housing and Human Settlements for Asia Pacific (former Haiyan FACT team shelter advisor, IFRC)
Charlito S. Ayco	Habitat for Humanity Philippines	Managing Director and CEO
Leonilo “Tots” Escilada	Habitat for Humanity Philippines	Regional Program Manager
Dave Hodgkins	Humanitarian Benchmark Consulting	Haiyan Shelter Cluster National Technical Coordinator
Emmanuel. C. Areño	ICODE	Executive Director

Faye Joy Pabiona	ICODE	DRRM Program Manager
Aleksandre 'Sasha' Mikadze	IFRC	Former Shelter Delegate, Philippines; Head of Office, Leyte
Anna Pont	IFRC	Haiyan Shelter Cluster Coordinator
Hajime Matsunaga	IFRC	Field Programme Coordinator, Philippines
Kate Marshall	IFRC	Communications Delegate, Philippines
Pablo Medina	IFRC	Senior Officer - Shelter Coordination, Shelter and Settlements
Patrick Elliott	IFRC	Haiyan Shelter Cluster Coordinator.
Victoria Stodart	IFRC	Haiyan Shelter Cluster Coordinator; HLP Adviser
Vincent Annoni	Impact Initiatives	REACH Global Coordinator
Arnaud de Coupigny	Independent Consultant	Haiyan Shelter Cluster Hub Coordinator
Birgitta Vaes	Independent Consultant	Bohol Shelter Cluster Coordinator; Haiyan Shelter Cluster Hub Coordinator
Emese Csete	Independent Consultant	Haiyan Shelter Cluster Information Manager
Helen Wood *	Independent Consultant	Haiyan Shelter Cluster Data Manager
James Shepherd-Barron	Independent Consultant	Haiyan Shelter Cluster Coordinator
Javier Cidón Martínez	Independent Consultant	Haiyan Shelter Cluster Hub Coordinator
Pablo du Roulet	Independent Consultant	Haiyan Shelter Cluster Hub Information Manager
Richard Luff *	Independent Consultant	Haiyan Shelter Cluster Hub Coordinator
Xavier Génot	Independent Consultant	Haiyan Shelter Hub and Cluster Coordinator
Wan S. Sophonpanich *	Independent Consultant	Haiyan Shelter Cluster Technical Coordinator
Maria Moita	IOM	Shelter and Settlements Program Manager; Regional Focal Point. Global Shelter Cluster in Asia/ Pacific
Leah Bugtay	Islamic Relief Worldwide – Philippines	MEAL Officer; Programme Coordinator
Heidi Cockram	Medair	Country Manager
Miriam Gomez	Medair	Shelter Advisor



Marc Bidder	OCHA	Head of Office, Philippines
Maria Agnes Palacio	OCHA	National Disaster Response Advisor, Philippines
Justin Morgan	Oxfam	Country Director
Adrian Tito Dampor	Philippines Red Cross	Dulag Shelter Officer
Clemente R. Japones Jr	Philippines Red Cross	Shelter Officer, Typhoon Haiyan Operation
John Rey Dollisin	Philippines Red Cross	Dulag Shelter Officer
Mark Mauro O. Victorio	Philippines Red Cross	Shelter and Settlements Sector Head, Typhoon Haiyan Operation
Resty Lou C. Talamayan	Philippines Red Cross	Operational Manager TS Haiyan (Yolanda) Operation
Jose "Boots" Rebuena	Plan International	Project manager, Tacloban reconstruction project
Gustavo Pablo Domato Palmerio *	Red Cross EU Office	Haiyan Shelter Cluster Hub Coordinator
Timo Lüge *	Social Media for Good	Haiyan Shelter Cluster Communications and Advocacy Advisor
Ana Montoya	Spanish Red Cross	Head of Delegation, Philippines
Christopher E. Rollo	UN-Habitat	Country Programme Manager
David O'Meara *	UNHCR	Global shelter cluster focal point
Ajab-Aram Richard. Macapagat	World Vision	Response Director, Typhoon Haiyan Response

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## Terms of reference

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

### Terms of reference for consultancy

#### Summary

**Purpose:** The Secretariat of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) seeks to review the effectiveness of the coordination services provided by the IFRC-led Shelter Coordination Team to the humanitarian response to typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines, to identify key lessons and recommendations to improve and inform future response.

**Audience:** The IFRC and in particular the Shelter & Settlements Department will use the review to identify lessons and provide recommendations to improve future deployments. Shelter coordination team members will use it to learn from the findings and improve practice. Cluster partners will use it as reference and in improving their shelter response as relevant. The Humanitarian Country Team will use it to inform the coordination arrangements for shelter response in the Philippines. Donors and other humanitarian actors will use it for general information. The report will be public and available at [sheltercluster.org](http://sheltercluster.org).

**Commissioners:** This review is being commissioned by IFRC as Global Shelter Cluster Lead for natural disasters and Shelter Cluster co-lead agency for the typhoon Haiyan response in the Philippines.

**Reports to:** Pablo Medina, IFRC Shelter and Settlements Department.

**Duration:** 35 working days, over a fifty day period.

**Timeframe:** from November 30, 2015 to January 18, 2016.

**Location:** Home based with travel to the Philippines (14 days). Dates for the field visit to be coordinated with the IFRC country office and the IFRC Shelter & Settlements department.

#### Purpose of Project and Background

The following are the Terms of Reference for a review of the Philippines Shelter Cluster in response to typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines.

Super Typhoon Haiyan (locally known as Yolanda) made its first landfall in the Philippines at 4:40 a.m. on 8 November, 2013 in Eastern Samar province. With maximum sustained winds of at least 235 km/h near the centre, and wind gusts at 275 km/h, the typhoon moved across the Visayas region and exited the Philippines towards the West Philippine Sea in early morning on 9 November. Haiyan was the strongest Typhoon to hit the Philippines in 2013, and one of the strongest in recorded history, and it caused massive devastation across the Visayas.

Typhoon Haiyan left behind widespread damage to shelters and infrastructure. It swept through the central Philippines, killing more than 6,000 people and displacing 4 million. The damage of the storm surge and flash flooding in Eastern Samar and Tacloban City was severe. Even some of what were considered strong buildings were significantly damaged. In some areas, flash floods reached the second floor of buildings and waves swept coastal homes away.

The National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) estimated that over 1 million houses were damaged, about half of which were totally destroyed.

The official cluster activation letter was sent out to the ERC on November 9, recognizing IFRC as the shelter cluster lead, in support of the government's overall leadership. This was in line with previous shelter clusters in response to natural disasters in the Philippines, including typhoon Durian in 2006, typhoons Ketsana and Parma in 2009, tropical storm Washi in 2011, typhoon Bopha in 2012, and the Bohol earthquake in 2013, only about two weeks before typhoon Haiyan made landfall. Therefore, the shelter cluster in the Philippines in response to typhoon Haiyan was convened by IFRC, in cooperation with the government lead, the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). As co-chair of the shelter cluster, IFRC deployed an inter-agency Shelter Coordination Team (SCT).

The members of the SCT contracted by IFRC were exclusively dedicated to the task of cluster coordination, independent of PRC and IFRC operations. Other members of the SCT who coordinated the cluster at the hub level had a dual responsibility in cluster coordination and their agency shelter program. The SCT worked closely with humanitarian shelter agencies and national and local authorities, providing technical advice, coordination and information management, assessment, strategic planning, advocacy, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and capacity building services to ensure the core cluster functions were met.

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## **Alignment to the IFRC's objectives and strategy** (IFRC's *Strategy 2020*)

This project aligns with strategic aim 2 of IFRC Strategy 2020, to save lives, protect livelihoods, and strengthen recovery from disasters and crisis. It will provide key lessons and recommendations to improve and inform future shelter response in the Philippines. Through improved shelter coordination, humanitarian agencies can strengthen the shelter response to disasters.

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## **Project objectives**

The objectives of the review are to:

- Appraise the service provided by IFRC as shelter cluster lead to shelter cluster partners – Government, UN agencies, Red Cross Red Crescent Movement, NGOs both national and international, and other actors.
- Review and analyse the experience of IFRC with respect to the establishment and operation of the Shelter Cluster, with a particular emphasis on lessons to be learnt for future operations.
- Provide recommendations with regard to IFRC's leadership of future shelter cluster coordination activities in the Philippines, for preparedness and emergency response and the resources required to perform such a role.
- Examine if there were aspects of IFRC's cluster leadership which potentially might have or actually did compromise the mandate and principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent.

In the framework of these objectives, the review will refer to the core cluster functions as per the IASC Reference Module for Cluster Coordination at Country Level (July 2015) as the main criteria to appraise the service provided by IFRC as shelter cluster lead:

- **Supporting service delivery:** coordination management; design, timeliness and implementation of the SCT, including factors and determinants which provided the SCT's strengths and weaknesses; linkage of IFRC's shelter coordination role with any coordination system set up by the national authorities; extent to which national actors (NGOs, affected population, civil society and private sector as relevant) were included in the coordination mechanism; relations with other sectors, the UN system, the Government and other coordination mechanisms as applicable; information management.
- **Informing strategic decision-making of the humanitarian response:** assessments and response gap analysis and how these fed into the appeal process; extent to which cross-cutting issues were included in the situation analysis and design of the shelter response.
- **Planning and strategy development:** strategic planning; technical coordination and application of standards; resource mobilization and appeals; accountability to affected populations; recovery guidance and involvement of the SCT in the transition from meeting emergency shelter needs to durable shelter solutions.

- **Advocacy:** communication and public information strategy and activities; identification of advocacy concerns and advocacy activities undertaken on behalf of cluster participants and the affected population.
- **Monitoring and evaluating:** reporting systems to monitor the implementation of the cluster strategy and corrective action when necessary; cluster performance monitoring.
- **Contingency planning/preparedness/capacity building:** national contingency plans identified and shared if available; extent to which response followed previously established contingency plans; development of cluster-based contingency plans when relevant; risk assessment and analysis carried out; readiness status enhanced; regular distribution of early warning reports; training; the feasibility and conditions required for IFRC to continue to lead the shelter cluster during the preparedness and relief periods in the Philippines.

In order to review and analyse the experience of IFRC with respect to the establishment and operation of the Shelter Cluster, the review will consider the following areas of inquiry:

- **Coordination Arrangements:** in-country coordination modalities; activation of the cluster process; staffing and rotation; access to equipment and supplies by and funding of the Shelter Coordination Team (SCT); understanding, support, and impact of IFRC's shelter coordination role within the in-country IFRC team and National Society, the Zone office and the secretariat in Geneva; value of linking and/or separating the SCT and the Red Cross relief operation; issues with regard to visibility for the International Federation and the Red Cross Red Crescent Movement; remote support; and design, implementation and timing of the exit/handover strategy.

## Desired outcomes

Through the conduct of a review of the Philippines Shelter Cluster in response to typhoon Haiyan, the following outcomes will be achieved:

1. IFRC (Philippines delegation, Asia-Pacific Zone Office and the Shelter and Settlements department) will identify lessons and act on recommendations to improve future deployments.
2. Shelter Coordination Team members and the Global Shelter Cluster Support Team will learn from the findings and apply them to revise tools and guidelines to improve shelter coordination policy and practice.
3. Philippines shelter cluster partners and government will use it as reference to improve their shelter response in future disasters as relevant.
4. The Humanitarian Country Team and other clusters in the Philippines will identify good practices and areas for improvement that may be relevant to their own coordination responsibilities.
5. Donors and other humanitarian actors will use it to inform planning and funding decisions for future shelter coordination and response in the Philippines.

## Consultancy outputs

1. An **inception note** (2-3 pages long) detailing the proposed methodology, data collection and reporting plans with draft data collection tools such as interview guides, a timeframe with firm dates for deliverables, and the travel and logistical arrangements for the evaluator.
2. **Debriefing / feedback to IFRC at all levels** – The evaluator will report its preliminary findings to the IFRC (in-country, zone, and Geneva), before leaving the country.

3. **Draft report** – A draft report, identifying key findings, conclusions, recommendations and lessons for future shelter coordination and response, will be submitted for review and feedback.
  4. **Final report** – Concise, written report in English (20-25 pages long) with key findings and recommendations and supporting information. The final report will contain a short executive summary and a main body of the report in the standard IFRC shelter coordination review template. Recommendations should be specific and feasible. This document should be of use for discussing the IFRC experiences of the cluster process internally and also with key donors and other stakeholders, and address the objectives and areas of inquiry outlined above (Project objectives).
  5. **Annexes** - Additional notes, summary of review activities undertaken including interview guide, list of stakeholders interviewed, questionnaire or survey if applicable, visits conducted with dates, list of documents reviewed, timeline that captures the milestones regarding the deployment of the SCT and shelter coordination and response, and any other supporting documentation as appropriate, as annexes to the report.
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## Method of delivery and reasons for selecting that method

The methodology will adhere to the IFRC Framework for Evaluation, with particular attention to the processes upholding the standards of how evaluations should be planned, managed, conducted, and utilized, and to the evaluation criteria endorsed by the IFRC Secretariat (relevance & appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, coverage, impact, coherence, sustainability & connectedness, and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Fundamental Principles, Code of Conduct, and IFRC’s Strategy 2020).

An **IFRC evaluation management team** will oversee the evaluation and, with the evaluator, to ensure that it upholds the IFRC Management Policy for Evaluation. The evaluation management team will consist of three people, one of which is from the Shelter & Settlements department, one from the Asia-Pacific Zone Office and one from the IFRC Country Office.

The **external evaluator** will provide an independent, objective perspective as well as technical expertise to the evaluation, and will be the primary author of the evaluation report. S/he should not have been involved or have a vested interest in the IFRC operation being evaluated, and will be hired in accordance with the IFRC procedure for the contracting of consultants, through a transparent recruitment process, based on their professional experience, competence, ethics and integrity for this evaluation. It is expected that the evaluator will be able to conduct a reliable and informed assessment of the shelter coordination in response to typhoon Bopha in the Philippines that has legitimacy and credibility with stakeholders.

**The specific evaluation methodology will be further detailed in the inception note in close consultation between the evaluator and the IFRC evaluation management team**, but will draw upon the following methods:

1. **Desktop review:** Review of available documented materials relating to the start-up, planning, implementation, and impact of the Philippines Shelter Cluster, relevant background documents and history, including prior IFRC Shelter Cluster evaluation reports, and any relevant sources of secondary data.
2. **Field visits/observations** to selected sites in the Philippines.
3. **Key informant interviews**, with key internal stakeholders within the IFRC Secretariat in Geneva, the Asia-Pacific Zone Office, the Country Office, and the deployed shelter cluster coordination team members, as well as with external stakeholders, including government officials, shelter cluster agencies, donors, OCHA, the Humanitarian Country Team, and others as relevant.

Other methods, such as a possible online survey or focus group discussions, will be detailed in an inception note to be developed by the consultant, as time and capacity allows.



An initial draft report will be prepared for a **review process**, which should occur within 1 week of submittal of the draft report to the evaluation management team, and will involve the following stakeholders in the following order:

1. **Days 1-2 of review process:** the evaluation management team to check content is in line with TOR and standards .
2. **Days 3-7 of review process:** stakeholders participating in the evaluation.

The review process will be followed to ensure stakeholder input while maintaining the integrity and independence of the report according to the following criteria:

- **Inaccuracy.** Inaccuracies are factual, supported with undisputable evidence, and therefore should be corrected in the evaluation report itself.
- **Clarifications.** A clarification is additional, explanatory information to what the evaluator provided in the report. It is the evaluators' decision whether to revise their report according to a clarification.
- **Difference of opinion.** A difference of opinion does not pertain to the findings (which are factual), but to the conclusions and/or recommendations. These may be expressed to the evaluator during the review process. It is the evaluator's decision whether to revise their report according to a difference of opinion.

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## **Support to be provided to the consultant**

The Senior Officer, Shelter Coordination, will brief the consultant and provide backstop support in dealing with any questions the consultant may have regarding the scope and content of the review as well as the information and background documentation required to gather data and analysis. The IFRC Country Office will provide the required administration and logistics support to organize the field visit and required interviews with stakeholders.

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## **Schedule for payment of fees**

The consultant will be paid the full amount upon satisfactory completion of the work in accordance with the terms of reference.

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## **Time Allocation, for budget purposes**

This assignment is for a maximum of 35 working days, during the period November 30, 2015 to January 18, 2016.

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## **Management of consultancy**

The consultancy shall be managed by the Senior Officer, Shelter Coordination. He will provide the required briefing to the consultant and have weekly monitoring discussions to assess progress. Other ad hoc communications with the consultant will be held as required.