**JOINT MONITORING MISSION REPORT**

**SHELTER CLUSTER NEPAL**

**February 5, 2016**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

Between November 16 and 21, DG ECHO and the Global Shelter Cluster (GSC) undertook a joint monitoring mission (JMM) to Nepal in order to assess the progress made in the implementation of the 2015 Enhanced Response Capacity grant to the Global Shelter Cluster. Through a review of existing documentation, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and field observation, the JMM team assessed the effectiveness of the Nepal Shelter Cluster in meeting the core cluster functions, evaluated the support provided by the GSC and identified potential areas where support from the GSC would have enhanced the performance of the Nepal Shelter Cluster. The main JMM findings and recommendations are as follows:

* Overall, progress in the implementation of the ERC grant is proceeding as expected. All indicators for the Specific Objective and Results are on track.
* As a result of the Global Shelter Cluster surge capacity system, the Nepal Shelter Cluster was able to very quickly expand its pre-earthquake capacity to meet the significant increase in shelter coordination demands following the 2015 April and May earthquakes.
* The decentralized coordination model through District Focal Points (DFPs) seconded by different cluster agencies ensured a link between national level and field level coordination. It also facilitated operational coordination at the district level. Having a coordination structure at the subnational level was also key in ensuring inclusivity, buy-in and ownership of the cluster by cluster agencies. The GSC could improve this model by **developing a quick training module and a briefing pack for sub-national or hub level focal points to better understand their role and the tools and support available** to carry it out effectively.
* While cash was a major feature of the response, the shelter cluster and sector were not prepared to either usefully get involved in multi-purpose cash grant discussions nor to provide the required technical advice to shelter cluster agencies in the use of cash-based approaches. The Global Shelter Cluster should **develop guidance on Cash and Shelter, including monitoring of shelter outcomes through cash-based interventions, and strengthen relationships with the existing cash community to ensure there is dedicated cash expertise in Shelter Coordination Teams** to engage and contribute to cash discussions at the country level and provide advice to partners on cash-based shelter programming.
* There was a wealth of technical guidance, Information, Education, and Communication (IEC) materials developed by the Nepal Shelter Cluster and used by humanitarian shelter agencies. However, it was not immediately apparent that these had translated into safer shelter practices by the affected population. The Global Shelter Cluster should **research which avenues are more effective in ensuring technical assistance and awareness raising activities translate into safer shelter and settlements**.
* It was widely recognized that the Nepal Shelter Cluster was instrumental in facilitating a more timely, more effective and better quality response. Shelter cluster partners, government counterparts, and other humanitarian stakeholders were generally satisfied and positive about the coordination services and the overall performance of the shelter cluster in Nepal. The JMM however noted some **areas for improvement** including a more systematic approach to capturing partners feedback through the use of the Cluster Performance Monitoring (CPM) tool; enhanced advocacy and articulation with GSC messaging, through dedicated communications and advocacy capacity in the SCT and perhaps a visit by the GSC Coordinator or Deputy Coordinator; the establishment of mechanisms to improve accountability to affected populations; some changes in the website; enhanced preparedness at the country level to develop IM and technical resources prior to disasters and facilitate surge capacity; and additional GSC global preparedness activities to be able to respond to larger and urban disasters, as the capacity of the GSC to respond came close to its limits.
* The GSC provided adequate support for the conduct of two coordinated assessments, an initial baseline assessment and a recovery monitoring assessment, with a final one scheduled on the first quarter of 2016. The JMM team agrees with an inclusive approach adopted by the Nepal Shelter Cluster in ensuring sufficient buy-in and engagement by the SCT and cluster partners, but believes **there is scope to improve the timing of the assessment process**, both in terms of the analysis (timing between end of data collection and sharing of the initial draft report) and feedback processes. In line with the recommendation above on cash, **an enhanced integration of cash and market mapping and analysis** components in shelter cluster assessments and improved engagement with the Cash Coordination Group in the design of coordinated cash and market assessments for multi-purpose cash grants is an area that requires further attention and capacity building by the GSC.

The JMM identified additional issues that were beyond the key areas of inquiry defined in the JMM ToR. These issues are listed and commented on at the end of the report.

**BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT**

A 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck central Nepal on April 25 between the capital, Kathmandu, and the city of Pokhara. On 12 May, a second earthquake measuring 7.3 magnitude hit 80 km to the east-northeast of Kathmandu. The devastation was widespread, with many buildings and infrastructure collapsed as a result of the earthquakes. Over 700,000 houses were damaged or destroyed. The Government of Nepal declared a state of emergency and appealed for humanitarian assistance internationally. All humanitarian clusters were activated to facilitate the coordination of the international humanitarian response.

The Nepal Shelter Cluster was first activated in 2008 in response to the Koshi floods. It has since remained active working on preparedness and contingency planning activities and coordinating the response to small and medium scale disasters that for the most part did not require the mobilization of international assistance.

The Nepal Cluster system is owned by the government with the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) as the overall lead agency for disaster response and preparedness, and other key line ministries identified for various cluster lead roles. The government lead agency for the shelter cluster in Nepal is the Ministry of Urban Development (MOUD) through its technical department, the Department of Urban Development and Building Construction (DUDBC). The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) together with the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS) are the shelter cluster lead agencies on behalf of the national and international humanitarian partners. Soon after the devastating earthquake of a magnitude of 7.8 on the Richter scale, IFRC deployed a Shelter Coordination Team (SCT) to work with the pre-established pre-earthquake shelter cluster team, the government and humanitarian shelter agencies in facilitating and coordinating the shelter response.

The Nepal Shelter Cluster has been supported by the Global Shelter Cluster through a range of activities including:

* Surge capacity: deployment of Global Focal Points for Information Management (Canadian Red Cross), for Technical Coordination (IOM), and for Coordination (IFRC), and Asia-Pacific Regional Focal Point (IFRC) as surge capacity to help start up and provide coordination, information management and technical support services to cluster agencies[[1]](#footnote-1).
* Shelter Coordination Team: identification, recruitment and overall human resource management of the Shelter Coordination Team members, other than the core capacity deployed from the GSC Support Team (GFPs and RFPs). There were a total of 44 SCT members throughout the response, most of them identified from the GSC shelter coordination roster.
* Internal communication tools: set-up and management of team dropbox and team skype.
* External communication tools: set-up and ongoing support to the [Nepal Shelter Cluster website](https://www.sheltercluster.org/response/nepal-earthquake-2015); email addresses (with sheltercluster.org domain); and maintenance and support to feeds on Twitter.
* Remote support on a variety of issues, including information management, environmental concerns, technical advice and coordination governance and management structures.
* Training: in-country and remote support in the organization and delivery of Participatory Approach for Safe Shelter Awareness training for cluster partners[[2]](#footnote-2).
* Tools and templates: provision of standard guidance, tools and templates to facilitate the implementation of cluster activities and delivery of core cluster functions. This includes standard Nepal Shelter Cluster word, excel and power point templates, brochure, strategy template, technical guidelines template, minutes templates, terms of reference, 3Ws, etc. Some of them were ‘ready to use’ and some had to be adapted to context by the SCT in consultation with cluster partners.
* Assessment and response monitoring: facilitation of shelter damage and needs assessment and response monitoring through the REACH partnership[[3]](#footnote-3).

The Global Shelter Cluster (GSC) is implementing its 2013-2017 strategy. ECHO has supported the implementation of this strategy through Enhanced Response Capacity grants in 2013-2014 and in 2015-2016[[4]](#footnote-4). Building on previous achievements and on the increased sustainability attained by the GSC, the 2015-2016 grant is meant to allow the shelter cluster collective to continue to work towards the fulfilment of the goal of the GSC Strategy 2013 – 2017. This grant – along with additional resources secured through GSC partners’ own contributions as well as through other donors – will allow the GSC to introduce a series of innovative approaches to address the challenges identified in previous years.

DG ECHO and the GSC undertook a joint monitoring mission (JMM) to Nepal in order to assess how the grant provided by ECHO to the GSC was supporting country-level shelter clusters. This report summarizes the main findings of the JMM.

**MAIN FINDINGS**

The main findings of the mission have been structured around the specific objective and expected results of the ERC funded action and their corresponding indicators of the logframe of the corresponding eSF. The specific objective contributes to achieving the **principal objective**: “*To more effectively meet the sheltering needs of populations affected by humanitarian crises, by strengthening the shelter response of humanitarian actors through leadership, coordination and accountability in the humanitarian shelter sector”.*

**1. Specific Objective: “*To strengthen the shelter response of humanitarian actors by improving the GSC surge capacity, preparedness, and advocacy*”.**

**a. Indicator 1**: ***Average number of hours in which a trained and experienced coordinator is deployed to newly activated shelter clusters.*** **Key questions**: **When did the cluster lead agency have a Shelter Cluster Coordinator in place to set-up the shelter cluster after the onset of the earthquake in Nepal? How many people and which roles did the Shelter Coordination Team have in place at what time during the response? How did the GSC surge capacity and support team contribute to having a functional team in place during the response?**

As a result of the Global Shelter Cluster surge capacity system, the Nepal Shelter Cluster was able to very quickly expand its pre-earthquake capacity to meet the significant increase in shelter coordination demands following the humanitarian response to the April and May earthquakes. Within 48 hours of the onset of the earthquake, there was a trained and experienced coordinator in place to take the lead while a longer term team was identified. The Global Focal Point for Information Management also arrived in country within two days to set up the shelter cluster information management system. Within the first week of the response, the Nepal Shelter Cluster had a fully functional team covering the three key functions of coordination, information management and technical advice[[5]](#footnote-5).

Overall, three Global Focal Points and one Roving Focal Point have deployed in support of the Nepal Shelter Cluster at different times during the response, from IFRC, Canadian Red Cross and IOM. In addition, a total of 25 team members were identified through the global roster, global-level agreements, or GSC network. In total throughout the response, there were 44[[6]](#footnote-6) Shelter Coordination Team members employed by the cluster lead agency on staff or consultancy contracts or through agreements with cluster partners for particular activities such as the Shelter Cluster assessments in partnership with REACH. Their roles included national coordination, regional hub coordination, operations support, technical coordination, information management, recovery advise, assessment and monitoring, private sector liaison, and gender and diversity advise.

While these numbers look impressive, the size of the team at any given point in time was not disproportionate to the coordination needs, and “*it was not perceived as a heavy structure because it was delivering, it was useful, and adequate to scale”[[7]](#footnote-7)*. These 44 SCT members include local and international personnel fully dedicated to the cluster coordination role, but they do not include the many staff of Shelter Cluster partners that volunteered their time to act as Shelter Cluster District Focal Points in the 14 priority districts. The dedication of these 14 District Focal Points ranged from 20% to 80% of their time, and their role was critical to facilitate coordination at the field level.

Early on in the response, a total of three regional hubs were established by the Humanitarian Coordinator in consultation with the HCT to cover the 14 districts that the government declared as priority: Western hub located in Gorkha, Eastern hub located in Sindhupalchok, and Central hub located in Kathmandu. In addition to these regional hub coordination mechanisms, each of the 14 priority district had a District Focal Point (DFP), a staff of one of the Shelter Cluster partner agencies who volunteered to act in that capacity in support of field level coordination. The appointment of DFPs followed a call for Expressions of Interest for cluster partners to assume such roles. While it was easy to identify for some districts, for others there were no agencies interested in assuming the role. The DFP model was key in ensuring a link between national level and field level coordination as well as to facilitate operational coordination at the district level. This ability to develop a coordination structure at the subnational level was also key in ensuring inclusivity, buy-in and ownership of the cluster by cluster agencies. This approach is partly a result of lessons learnt from the Shelter Cluster response to typhoon Haiyan, where a decentralized approach based on Municipal Focal Points was also utilized. The development of the DFP approach in Nepal shows that a decentralized coordination approach is getting institutionalized in the GSC coordination modalities at the country level.

The Shelter Coordination Team organized regular retreats (every two months) with the participation of DFPs, regional hub coordinators and national level SCT members to discuss and address ongoing challenges and ensure coherence between the national and field coordination structures. The subnational level coordination model would have benefitted from a briefing pack or quick training module for DFPs to better understand their role and the tools and support available to carry it out effectively.

As mentioned earlier, the Nepal Shelter Cluster was first activated in 2008 in response to the Koshi floods. It has since remained active working on preparedness and contingency planning activities and coordinating the response to small and medium scale disasters that for the most part did not require the mobilization of international assistance. The Nepal Shelter Cluster was coordinated by a national staff of the cluster lead agency prior to the earthquake. This national staff had a strong relationship and trust with the Government of Nepal lead agency built over the years. While he did not have the international experience in a cluster role to take on the national coordinator role in a disaster of this scale, he was not side-lined and he was kept in a key role as Deputy Coordinator and government liaison. The JMM noted this as good practice as it ensures continuity with the pre-disaster arrangements, capitalizes on existing relationships between the cluster lead agency and the government and facilitates transition and exit into the pre-earthquake system.

Cash was a major feature of the response. However, the shelter cluster and sector were not prepared to either usefully get involved in multi-purpose cash grant discussions nor to provide the required technical advice to shelter cluster agencies in the use of cash-based approaches. The Shelter Cluster can learn from this case for the future, including strategic rethinking of its role and added value. Food security, livelihoods and markets experts dominated cash programming and coordination, but were not equipped to address a predominantly shelter crisis. The shelter sector needs to generate its own evidence, learning and guidance and stronger working relationships with the existing cash community. Cash is consolidating rather than fragmenting, with clear rationale to consolidate sectors and to streamline disbursement mechanisms. The shelter cluster needs to catch up with this existing momentum and take a seat at the discussion tables to contribute to the formalizing policies and structures and ensure integration of Do No Harm principles. This should also include further consideration to the use of vouchers as a means of ensuring quality of materials, as the discussion seems polarized exclusively between in-kind and cash assistance. The deployment of a cash advisor fully embedded in the Shelter Coordination Team to engage in the Cash Coordination Group on behalf of the shelter sector and provide advice to shelter cluster agencies should become the norm in large scale disasters. As the current existing capacity in the shelter sector is limited in terms of expert human resources for such a role, the Global Shelter Cluster should explore avenues through which this capacity can be built.

The technical coordination role of the Nepal Shelter Cluster delivered quick and useful technical products, guidelines and IEC materials[[8]](#footnote-8). It was however noted that there were gaps at times during the response in being able to provide this service function at the required level. The JMM also noted that in spite of the technical assistance and resources provided by the cluster and the myriad of awareness raising and training programmes in place by cluster partners, these did not necessarily always translate into better rebuilding and self-recovery. The Global Shelter Cluster should explore which avenues are more effective in ensuring technical assistance translates into safer shelter and settlements.

The Nepal earthquake was a major shelter crisis, or at least it was perceived as such. The Nepal Shelter Cluster missed some opportunities for strategic communication, to educate a wider audience on shelter, settlement and housing recovery and risk reduction issues. To some extent, a visit by the GSC Deputy or Cluster Coordinators could have contributed to increased advocacy. Such presence early on in the response might also help facilitate some strategic decision making. The presence of a Global Focal Point for Communications and Advocacy or such a role within the SCT could also have contributed to enhance the impact of the Nepal Shelter Cluster, and ensured a better articulation of the Global Shelter Cluster advocacy with the national shelter cluster advocacy.

A positive aspect to highlight by the JMM was the relative stability of the position of the Nepal Shelter Cluster Coordinator, enhanced by the continuing presence of the Deputy Coordinator. The minimal rotation in the position of the national shelter cluster coordinator and the fact that there was no gap at any point during the response for that role was highlighted by the government lead agency. It ensured continuous engagement and trust building and allowed for a more effective delivery of the lead roles and responsibilities.

Subject to availability of resources, more could be done during preparedness to facilitate surge capacity when deployed in a future crisis. The development of technical resources, including IEC materials, information technology tools (for instance apps that can capitalize on the widespread adoption of mobile technology), and data preparedness outside of disasters can increase the potential for a quick uptake of tools, shelter technical guidance and information management for surge teams and cluster partners to assimilate.

There is recognition that with the exception of cash, the Global Shelter Cluster existing capacity proved adequate for this scale of natural disaster. However, while ready for the scope required in the Nepal earthquake, the GSC capacity came close to its limits. A large urban disaster would have likely exceeded the GSC capacity to cope with the scope and scale of shelter coordination demands required for such an event. The GSC should invest in global preparedness activities that result in increased capacity to respond to larger and different kind of disasters, including reaching out to strategic actors at the global and regional levels, such as the World Bank, JICA, or the Asian Development Bank.

**b. Indicator 2**: ***% of shelter cluster partners including the government counterpart that are satisfied with the coordination services provided*.** **Key questions**: **Are shelter cluster partners satisfied with how quickly the shelter cluster set up and provided shelter coordination services in response to the earthquake? Are they satisfied with the coordination process and cluster governance and management structure? Did the cluster facilitate a timely, effective, and quality response?**

The JMM team met with shelter cluster partners and government counterparts at national level and in one district, where there was both a regional hub and district level coordination capacity in place. Both the partners and the government counterparts were generally satisfied and positive about the coordination services and the overall performance of the shelter cluster in Nepal. This was also the case with other stakeholders that the JMM team met during the mission, such as the Humanitarian / Resident Coordinator, the Head of OCHA, donors and coordinators of other related clusters. The general agreement was that the shelter cluster was set-up quickly, that it managed to capitalize on the preparedness work undertaken previously, and that the coordination services and structures provided a timely, effective, and quality facilitation of the response. The satisfaction with the services provided by the cluster was also complemented by a general agreement that the shelter response had been quite positive, despite some remaining gaps (i.e. winterization coverage, cash expertise) .

It should be highlighted that there were very high expectations on the shelter cluster given the importance of shelter needs after the earthquakes. The GSC was able to deploy competent coordinators[[9]](#footnote-9) who effectively managed these high expectations. These coordinators, with global support, where also able to put in place an inclusive inter-agency coordination architecture which allowed contributions from shelter cluster partners. This was particularly remarkable for the district focal points who were seconded by cluster partners. The involvement of cluster partners in the coordination of the cluster increased their ownership of the process and made it more relevant to address their needs. Additionally, the willingness of cluster partners to contribute their own resources to the cluster indicate their appreciation of the services provided by the cluster. This involvement took place despite relatively limited dedicated funding for Shelter Cluster coordination at all levels (national, regional hub and district).

Partner satisfaction could have been measured more accurately had the Coordination Performance Monitoring Tool been implemented during the response. It is acknowledged that the shelter cluster coordinator and members of the coordination team actively sought feedback from cluster partners and introduced changes to address their concerns. One such example was the establishment of a Coordination Support Group following the establishment of a smaller and Nepali speaking Strategic Advisory Group upon request from the Government. However, the feedback process may have been better structured by using the Coordination Performance Monitoring Tool.

The cluster should also ideally find ways to go beyond measuring cluster partners’ satisfaction and establish mechanisms to improve accountability to affected population, or support agencies in doing so. Given the high needs and limited capacity, partners welcomed any support provided by the cluster. More guidance on the use of cash as a response mechanism would have been welcomed by partners. In addition, and while assessments were banned at the beginning of the response and an initial assessment was undertaken as soon as it was possible, an earlier release of the results of this initial assessment would have been useful. It is noted however that the assessment was adjusted and impacted by the second earthquake. Notwithstanding these areas for improvement, it was widely recognized that the Nepal Shelter Cluster was instrumental in facilitating a more timely, more effective and better quality response.

**2. Result 1: Global and regional shelter cluster capacity and resources are strengthened to provide responsive and flexible support to country level coordination mechanisms.**

**a. Indicator 1.1: harmonized basic coordination tools (Strategy, Factsheet, and Technical Guidelines and Standards) in place. Key questions: Are the key harmonized basic coordination tools in place in the Nepal Shelter Cluster?**

The Nepal Shelter Cluster had the key harmonized basic coordination tools in place. A strategy, factsheet, and technical guidelines and standards were in place, agreed with the government, and used by cluster partners. In addition, the Nepal Shelter Cluster also developed a number of key products that supported a coordinated response. Some of these key deliverables are mentioned in the timeline in Annex 1. They are all available at <https://www.sheltercluster.org/response/nepal-earthquake-2015>.

The JMM noted that further work is needed at the global level to provide guidance on using cash based interventions, including vouchers, to address shelter needs. It is important to capture the lessons learned in Nepal to inform this guidance. The response in Nepal included both in-kind and multi-purpose cash grants provided by different sectors. There is evidence that a large proportion of the multi-purpose cash grants intended to meet household needs other than shelter were actually used for shelter. This difference may have had an impact in the in-kind shelter distributions that were undertaken after the multi-purpose cash grants. The coordination of the cash assistance across the different clusters should also be analysed. The GSC should also provide advice on how to conduct post-distribution monitoring for cash interventions, a common methodology, and tools to analyse the monitoring undertaken by different stakeholders.

The Nepal shelter strategy emphasized the need to provide technical guidance to the affected population on the appropriate use of shelter materials and in building back safer. The cluster also developed Information, Education and Communication materials such as leaflets, posters, and training materials that were distributed and disseminated in Nepali and through different channels. These messages were delivered in flyers that were provided in most distributions of shelter materials, through short trainings, and other means. However, the GSC should further explore how this type of support could increase its effectiveness. Information materials should be provided as early as possible, ideally developed outside of disasters as a preparedness activity. They should be delivered in a more predictable way using an appropriate combination of different channels.

While sufficient guidance may have been in place, this may not necessarily have reached beneficiaries or it did not lead to a change in practices in the rebuilding process. It is recognized that a change in practices and behaviours takes a long time. It is not enough to distribute leaflets, these leaflets should be understood by beneficiaries, either through demonstrations or thorough explanations. Agencies need to accompany the learning process. Key messages, use of materials, and methodologies could be developed at global level and adapted at country level during the preparedness phase. This should include the development of effective IEC strategies, possibly with the support of an IEC specialist through the GSC. Some of the affected population start reconstruction very early on and should receive support on how to build back safer so that the cluster promotes and adds value to self-sheltering. The GSC should also consider more alternatives to deliver technical assistance support to affected population and to other stakeholders such as masons, carpenters, unskilled labour, and others.

**b. Indicator 1.2: assessment surge capacity deployed, enabling the organization of interagency assessments in order to feed into humanitarian funding milestones. Key questions: Were coordinated assessment conducted by the Nepal Shelter Cluster? How many? What did they feed into?**

The Nepal Shelter Cluster organized two coordinated assessments, an initial baseline assessment[[10]](#footnote-10) and a recovery monitoring assessment[[11]](#footnote-11). A third one focusing on recovery monitoring/evaluation is planned for the first term of 2016. Timelines for both assessment exercises already completed are attached in annex. The timelines also outline the objectives, methodology, stakeholder engagement and outputs of the assessments.

The first assessment was initially delayed by a decision of the Humanitarian Coordinator to prioritize initial response over the conduct of assessments, as well as by the second earthquake of May 12 which required a revision of the methodology and scope. Additionally, and based on previous experience, the Shelter Coordination Team wanted to ensure that the assessment and its findings and recommendations were truly accepted, owned and understood by cluster partners. Rather than an outsourced assessment to a third party that presents their findings, the Shelter Cluster believes for the assessment to have real value it must have the engagement of SCT members and cluster partners. Given the many demands on the SCT members and cluster partner personnel, this approach led to unfortunate delays in providing feedback and finalizing the report. There was a lot of discussion around the validity of the results in some places, limitations in the assessment and accuracy of the gap analysis.

Precisely to increase the engagement and ownership of the Shelter Cluster assessment process by SCT members and cluster partners, for the first time an assessment and monitoring officer from REACH was embedded in the SCT for a sustained period of time rather than for the assessment period itself. This contributed to a more inclusive process and ownership of the REACH assessment by Shelter Cluster SCT members and cluster partners. Where justified, this experience could be replicated in the future .

The JMM team agrees with an inclusive approach but believes there is scope to improve the timing of the process, both in terms of the analysis (timing between end of data collection and sharing of the initial draft report) and feedback processes.

Additional areas identified by the JMM for further consideration in improving future shelter cluster assessment activities included more clarity in the presentation of gap analysis and enhanced integration of cash and market mapping and analysis components in shelter cluster assessments. The need for improved engagement with the Cash Coordination Group in the design of coordinated cash and market assessments for multi-purpose cash grants is clearly an area that requires further attention and capacity building by the Global Shelter Cluster.

When the Humanitarian Coordinator put a halt to assessments at the beginning of the response, the Shelter Cluster devised an innovative approach coined as “Assist and Assess”[[12]](#footnote-12). It basically aimed at collecting assessment information as assistance was provided. While it was not really used by cluster partners, it was an interesting idea worth exploring further for future occasions.

**c. Indicator 1.3: Average % of time of the Surge Capacity spent on support to country-level clusters (whether in country or remotely). Was Surge Capacity deployed in support of the Nepal Shelter Cluster? How many people and for what period of time? In what capacity? Did their work contribute to a more effective Shelter Cluster in Nepal?**

This indicator applies to the global level as a means of tracking the overall Global Shelter Cluster surge capacity use of time. The GSC surge capacity specifically deployed in the Nepal Shelter Cluster is reflected in the indicator 1 of the Specific Objective above and reflected in the timeline in annex. Please refer to the section above for findings and issues related to the surge capacity.

**3. Result 2**: The preparedness and predictability of shelter coordination and responses is enhanced through an effective and well-functioning GSC.

**a. Indicator 2.1: % of SAG members that are satisfied with the transparency, accountability, and effectiveness of the GSC. N/A.**

This indicator does not really apply at the country level as it is measured at the global level. It should be noted however that 6 of the 11 SAG members (ACTED, IOM, UNHABITAT, Habitat for Humanity, Save the Children, and IFRC[[13]](#footnote-13)) have provided capacity to the coordination of the Shelter Cluster in Nepal. This can be considered an indicator of their ownership of the cluster and value for the effectiveness of the GSC. Some of the remaining SAG members were either non-operational such as InterAction or had limited involvement in the crisis due to the focus of the organization in conflict-related emergencies (UNHCR and NRC).

**b. Indicator 2.2: sheltercluster.org provides updated contact details and key documents related to the shelter response. Key questions: Does the Nepal Shelter Cluster page of the website provide sufficient information on the key elements of the shelter coordination and response in Nepal? Is it a useful resource for Shelter Cluster partners in Nepal? How many visitors and page views did the Nepal Shelter Cluster page in the website have in 2015?**

Sheltercluster.org provides contact details and key documents related to the shelter response. It is widely considered as a useful resource by cluster partners. From April 2015 to 20 November 2015, Nepal Earthquake 2015 response pages had 20,335 page views by 3,573 users who spent on average 3 minutes viewing pages. These numbers do not include visitors who might have gone directly to pages within the Nepal response page (as opposed to going via the response’s main page).

The list of pages within Nepal Earthquake 2015 Response with highest views (timeframe 25 April - 22 November 2015) include the following:

1. [Nepal Earthquake 2015](https://www.sheltercluster.org/response/nepal-earthquake-2015)  is the 2nd most visited page of the website with 20,131 views (after the website’s main homepage - 21,144 page views).
2. [Nepal Country Page](https://www.sheltercluster.org/asiapacific/nepal) is 9th on the list of most visited pages with 1,957 page views.
3. [Nepal Distribution Dashboard](https://www.sheltercluster.org/node/6537) is 13th with 1,658 page views
4. [Information Management page](http://sheltercluster.org/library/information-management-6) is 16th with 1,297 page views
5. [Nepal District Profiles](http://sheltercluster.org/library/district-profiles) is 21st with 843 page views.

Nepal has generated the most sessions within the selected timeframe - 12,948 (33 % of all sessions). Nepal Earthquake 2015 page was most visited on Wednesday, May 27, 2015, with 304 page views.  Average time spent on the page is 3 minutes 24 seconds. The top 5 countries from where most visits originated are Nepal, Switzerland, US, UK, and Ukraine.

The JMM noted that partners’ satisfaction with the website would have been measured more accurately using the Coordination Performance Monitoring Tool. The website could be improved by making it more user friendly and easier to navigate. This is particularly the case at sub-national and district level. It was also recommended that short summaries or descriptions of the documents were provided more consistently in the document description that the website provides. The Global Shelter Cluster has received recommendations from the Nepal Shelter Cluster on how to improve the website which will be addressed in the coming months.

**c. Indicator 2.3: % of Shelter Coordinators on the Global Coordination Workshop that classified the workshop as useful for their work at country level. Key questions: Did the participants in the 2015 Global Coordination Workshop from the Nepal Shelter Cluster Team consider it useful and relevant for their work in Nepal?**

This indicator is only applicable at the global level. Annex 7 provides a summary of the satisfaction survey of participants to the GSC coordination workshop. A total of 15 SCT members who had a role in the Nepal Shelter Cluster participated in the Global Shelter Coordination Workshop. The workshop allowed participants to learn from each other’s experiences, share challenges and contribute to capturing lessons learnt and good practices for improved shelter coordination in future responses.

**ADDITIONAL FINDINGS**

The JMM identified issues that were beyond the key areas of inquiry defined in the JMM ToR. The key issues that the JMM noticed in addition to the key areas of inquiry are the following:

**Engagement with other stakeholders**: the GSC should support country-level clusters in engaging more predictably with a wider range of stakeholders. The cluster in Nepal established links with the World Bank, the private sector, and other stakeholders. Of particular interest was the establishment of a Private Sector liaison position within the SCT, to better understand the response from the private sector, improve the gap analysis, and promote a higher quality response in future disasters in Nepal. However, more could be done in establishing links particularly during the preparedness phase and at global level. Some of the recommended stakeholders include: JICA which has excellent expertise in earthquake preparedness and engineering, the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC), the experts deployed during the Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), private sector, learning institutions and universities of disaster-prone countries and those recognized for a particular expertise in shelter-related areas.

**Debris and structurally unsafe building:** the management of debris and structurally unsafe buildings continues to be a challenge. Although it has been agreed that these issues are a responsibility of the Early Recovery cluster more could be done, particularly from the GSC to better address them as they are an important impediment for shelter.

**Articulation with PDNA**: The cluster contributed to the PDNA but it could have benefitted more from its expertise. In particular, there were members of the housing group of the PDNA that were very experienced and knowledgeable in traditional construction techniques in Nepal, and in earthquake engineering. They could have been incorporated into the cluster team even in an advisory role once the PDNA finished.

**Additional training needs**: the JMM noted the feedback received from some stakeholders welcoming the online training “More than Just a Roof” as a resource to provide an induction on shelter. The need to train affected population, masons, carpenters, and other stakeholders has also been highlighted in the report. Additional training needs have been identified for non-shelter actors, that is, responding agencies and institutions, national and international, that do not have an expertise in shelter. It would also be important to develop an induction package for district focal points capturing key issues related to the cluster and its functions, the role of the district focal points and the tools they should use, as well as particular tools that are used by the cluster in country.

**Construction tools**: the distribution of construction tools can help recovery by maximizing the resilience capacity of the affected population and the salvaging of materials and debris. The GSC should have better and clearer guidance on the tools that are adequate for different types of response. For instance, hammers that can remove nails are better for earthquake responses than mechanical hammers. The GSC could support preparedness by defining generic standard packages for rural and urban contexts that could later be adapted at national level.

**Opportunity for lesson learning**: as the Nepal Shelter Cluster approaches its exit from the earthquake response and transitions to its pre-earthquake activities, it is important to ensure that lessons are not lost as the team downscales. The Nepal Shelter Cluster should develop a plan to capture lessons and integrate the learning from this response into future shelter cluster operations in Nepal but also in other contexts, in coordination with and supported by the Global Shelter Cluster.

**Almost exclusive focus on household**: the Nepal Shelter Cluster could have put more emphasis and advocacy on settlements, missing an opportunity to include a settlement approach in the overall humanitarian response strategy. This links with an earlier point above with regards to missed opportunities for strategic advocacy and alignment between global and country-level shelter cluster advocacy.

**Link with health**: with the onset of winter, the shelter cluster winterization response can provide opportunities to measure the impact of shelter response in health outcomes. The Nepal Shelter Cluster in coordination with the Health Cluster could use this opportunity to demonstrate the links between the shelter and health sectors.

**Exit strategy**: the transition and exit strategy of the Nepal Shelter Cluster seems well thought through and can possibly inform future shelter cluster handovers in a more predictable manner. While it is too early to say whether it will work, the establishment of a recovery and reconstruction working group within the Shelter Cluster, which eventually takes on the responsibility for coordination of the recovery program, led by a consortium of agencies with specific strengths and capacities seems a good solution for future responses where the Government reconstruction coordination mechanism takes a long time to be established.

**ANNEX 1: TIMELINE OF THE NEPAL SHELTER CLUSTER**

**ANNEX 2: TIMELINE LIST OF ENTRIES**

**ANNEX 3: TIMELINE SOURCE DOCUMENT**

**ANNEX 4: LIST OF SCT PERSONNEL (NOT INCLUDING DFPs)**

**ANNEX 5: BASELINE ASSESSMENT SUMMARY DESCRIPTION AND TIMELINE**

**ANNEX 6: RESPONSE MONITORING SUMMARY DESCRIPTION AND TIMELINE**

**ANNEX 7: SATISFACTION SURVEY GSC COORDINATION WORKSHOP**

**ANNEX 8: TOR OF THE MISSION**

**ANNEX 9: FINAL JMM AGENDA - VISIT ITINERARY**

1. Deployment dates can be found in Annexes 1, 2, and 3, under Key Personnel. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. For additional information on this training, please go to <http://sheltercluster.org/library/passa-training> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Shelter and Settlements Vulnerability Assessment April/May – June 2015: <http://sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/shelter_needs_assessment_june_2015.pdf>

   Nepal Earthquake Recovery Monitoring Assessment November 2015: <http://sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/reach_npl_report_shelter_recovery_monitoring_assessment_nov2015.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. More information on these grants can be found at <https://www.sheltercluster.org/echo> [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The technical coordinator is a key role of the SCT. The Technical Coordinator supports the government and Shelter Cluster partners in developing coordinated, technical solutions for response plans and operations. Within the SCT, the technical coordinator guides shelter agencies in their development and implementation of shelter programming, in order to provide safe and resilient shelter solutions for beneficiaries. He/she normally also coordinates the Technical Working Groups (TWiGs), which are created on a needs-basis to address specific technical issues related to shelter programming. For further information on the role of the technical coordinator, please go to:

   <http://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/sct_technical_coordinator_final.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Of the 44 personnel that at some point during the response were a member of the SCT, a total of 13 were national staff and 31 were international staff/consultants, many of which were on mission for a limited period of time (one-two months). While the Nepal Shelter Cluster succeeded in maintaining some stability in the position of the Shelter Cluster Coordinator, that was not the case in other roles, and high staff rotation continues to be an issue of concern. For further information on the positions/roles of these 44 members of the SCT, please refer to Annex 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Jamie McGoldrick, Humanitarian and Resident Coordinator, Nepal. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. For a sample of outputs, please go to <http://sheltercluster.org/library/section-c-iec-materials> and <https://www.sheltercluster.org/working-group/technical-coordination> [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. All of the three cluster coordinators deployed had previous experience in a similar role in Pakistan, the Philippines, Nepal, and Vanuatu, and all of them had over 12 months of experience in various capacities in a Shelter Coordination Team. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. <http://sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/shelter_needs_assessment_june_2015.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. <http://sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/reach_npl_report_shelter_recovery_monitoring_assessment_nov2015.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. <https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/shelter_assist_and_assess_tool_wfp_-_translated.pdf> ; <https://www.sheltercluster.org/sites/default/files/docs/shelter_cluster_assist_and_assesss_tool_traslated.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. ACTED supported the Shelter Cluster needs assessment and monitoring exercises through REACH; IOM supported hub and district level coordination, as well as co-chaired the Recovery and Reconstruction Working Group and actively contributed towards the Technical WG; UNHABITAT co-chaired the Recovery and Reconstruction Working Group with IOM; Habitat for Humanity seconded a recovery coordinator to the SCT; Save the Children contributed through district level coordination and a financial contribution towards the shelter cluster REACH assessments; and IFRC was the Nepal Shelter Cluster lead agency contributing the bulk of the SCT capacity. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)