

Evaluation of the Mali Shelter Cluster 2013

External mid-term evaluation (pilot)

09 February 2014

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All errors and omissions are my own.

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Executive summary

This evaluation was a pilot exercise, undertaken on behalf of UNHCR. Its purpose was twofold: 1) to contribute to development of a common evaluation guide for the global Shelter Cluster, 2) to identify key lessons and recommendations for use by UNHCR in shelter coordination and response in Mali. This report focuses on the second purpose but the exercise also proved invaluable in informing development of the evaluation guide.

Intended scope was cluster coordination and shelter performance since December 2012 when the Shelter and NFI Cluster was activated. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee's core cluster functions and issues of leadership and personnel provided the evaluation framework. A single external evaluator conducted a desk review and semi-structured interviews. Meetings were held with key informants during a ten-day visit to Bamako in October 2013 but this was insufficient to evaluate shelter response hence the focus of the present evaluation remains cluster coordination.

Mali suffers from multiple natural hazards, including drought and flooding: food security and nutrition crises are frequent. Conflict in the north of the country in January 2012 resulted in human rights abuses, large-scale internal displacement and refugee flows. Humanitarian clusters were activated for the first time between March and May 2012 but shelter was not seen as a priority and was not among them. This was perhaps because use of camps and collective centres was minimal and host families, the 'silent NGO', and private landlords provided most shelter in the urban south. The Shelter Cluster was finally activated on 27 November 2012 and its first meeting took place on 7 December. By this time, there were already 199,000 internally displaced persons and a further risk of large-scale displacement following planned international military action in support of the Malian army.

UNHCR and IOM were designated cluster co-leads. Shared commitments were agreed through discussion and a written but unsigned terms of reference. Co-leadership at the start was strong, with support in Bamako from UNHCR's regional office and from IOM. Owing to lack of funds at IOM, all coordination team functions (coordination, information management and technical coordination) were being filled by April 2013 by UNHCR, with assistance from the global cluster focal points. UNHCR shelter coordination team members are, however, effectively 'double-hatted', covering operational gaps as well as leading the cluster. This is contrary to IASC guidance and contrasts with practice in other clusters in Mali.

Given the situation in Mali, HR processes need to factor in security when making appointments and provide support for national and international staff. The Malian Shelter Technical Adviser has remained in post since December 2012 but turnover in the post of coordinator, filled by international staff since activation, has made relationship-building with partners hard. Slow recruitment left the post empty after the departure of the first coordinator. UNHCR's Global Focal Point for shelter coordination, the regional shelter office in Dakar and the Mopti-based Shelter Technical Adviser all provided temporary support. However, a period of several weeks with no coordinator proved unavoidable. It resulted in a loss of service delivery and corporate memory and called into question the commitment of co-leads. The new coordinator appointed in June 2013 brought WASH Cluster experience and training. An early support visit from Geneva and more structured reporting would have eased the transition.

UNHCR has appointed French-speaking coordinators since cluster activation, ensuring participation by local as well as international agencies. There is no government co-chair but the Shelter Cluster has maintained strong links with the General Directorate of Civil Protection. Shelter Cluster meetings have been held monthly when a coordinator has been in post. Up to 35 UN, Red Cross, government and non-government agencies have attended meetings at least once. Meetings are held and minuted in French with clear action points. However, there is no up to date list of partners and no partnership agreement between lead agencies and partners to reinforce what each can expect of the other.

Successive coordinators and the first Technical Adviser have attempted to put formal cluster structures in place though the relatively small number of partners makes this difficult. A Strategic Advisory Group met informally for a few months. Working groups on NFI criteria and cash transfers started informally though the status of the latter, seen by its chair, Oxfam, as independent and 'cross-cutting', is unclear. The second Technical Adviser, based in Mopti, worked with UNHCR and cluster partners to develop specifications for reconstruction of *banco* (mud brick) housing, replacement of nomads' tents and a shelter repair kit. There appears to be no functioning shelter sub-cluster in Mopti though the Cluster is represented at inter-cluster meetings there. The status of the sub-cluster, SAG and technical working groups needs to be clarified and records of activities maintained.

Relatively few partners had shelter expertise and international cluster and agency staff could not access the north owing to lack of security. By the time the Shelter Cluster was activated, agencies had been at work for several months in the multi-sectoral urban response in the south. The response included mixed distributions and household NFI or cash grants by agencies not typically associated with the shelter and NFI sector. These factors complicated information management and added to challenges.

The draft terms of reference did not designate an information manager. The first Technical Adviser encouraged IOM to second a staff member who fulfilled the role until March 2013. IOM could not afford to replace him after he resigned and UNHCR staff subsequently provided support for shelter data analysis and introduced results-based management. This will aid the cluster in monitoring periodic shelter results. However, follow-up of requests for information to and from partners, has remained with the cluster coordinator, causing additional pressure.

The Mali Shelter Cluster has no dedicated website. By October 2013, information was being uploaded partly to the Mali pages of the global Shelter Cluster site and partly to OCHA Mali's Shelter Cluster page. Neither site is up to date or comprehensive nor is it not always easy to locate information. The first Technical Adviser set up a Dropbox, which could have been valuable in the face of future staff turnover. However, the Dropbox and many of the documents within it appeared to fall out of use shortly after his departure in December 2012. As a result, there is now no single record of cluster activities.

The interim coordinator drafted a strategy for the cluster in March-April 2013 using the Shelter Cluster toolkit template. The draft situates the shelter response within the overall response strategy of the Humanitarian Coordination Team. By October 2013, however, the document had yet to be validated. Feedback from partners on cluster performance, in the IASC's Cluster Performance Monitoring process, rated the cluster 'satisfactory' in a majority of areas. Aspects of performance on which it was rated less than satisfactory included needs analysis and identification of gaps, standard setting, monitoring and reporting, advocacy, and accountability.

The role of the Shelter Cluster in assessing shelter needs was hampered in part by the initial multi-sectoral approach and in part by lack of access to the north. However, the cluster was able to build on work by the Commission for Population Movements, an IOM-led working group of the Protection Cluster, and to share assessments by cluster partners. It commissioned a review of secondary data relevant to shelter in November 2012 and a needs assessment in the north in October 2013.

The cluster coordinator's job description and the Shelter Cluster draft strategy reference cross-cutting issues. The strategic framework included incorporation of age, disability, HIV/AIDS, gender, environment and human rights plus protection from mines and unexploded ordnance. Some of these issues are identified within vulnerability criteria used in the overall humanitarian response. However, the Mali Shelter Cluster could have made more use of resources on the global Cluster's website. Given concerns about overcrowding in the urban south and gender-based violence in the north, this was, perhaps, an opportunity lost.

Earlier emphasis on advocacy would have been appropriate in view of the low profile of shelter and the small number of partners in Mali with shelter experience. From April to August 2012, shelter was rarely mentioned in OCHA's SitReps though reference to refugee camps is frequent. However, the Global Focal Point for advocacy drafted an action plan, key messages and goals for the Mali Cluster in October 2013. The Factsheet developed in April, was also revised though at the time of writing, the updated version was not easy to find on cluster webpages.

Given the security situation and the low profile maintained by some agencies in Mali, the views of cluster partners should be sought before increased media attention is sought. Additional human resources, a MoU between UNHCR and IOM and commitment from the lead agencies are likely to be necessary if the plan is to be fulfilled and advocacy maintained.

There are no references to accountability to affected persons on either of the Mali Shelter Cluster web pages. The participation of a local NGO representing IDPs in some of the earlier meetings of the Shelter Cluster is an example of good practice and the Shelter Cluster could do more to draw on the experience of partners, at least one of which, World Vision, has complaints mechanisms in place. Goal 4 of the draft advocacy plan includes communication with the affected population and participation in a mass information campaign led by OCHA. Here too the views of cluster partners should be sought.

The Mali Shelter Cluster started in response to the need for contingency planning in the face of likely conflict and further displacement. Contingency planning was a topic at the first cluster meeting in December 2012, a focus of work by the first Technical Adviser and a component of the national contingency plan. UNHCR itself was seen as having acted fast in the floods of 2013, in part due to the work of the Cluster Coordinator. However, the Cluster did not by then appear to hold information on other partners' shelter or NFI stocks, apparently delaying, in the case of one agency, its delivery of NFI.

Capacity-building of partners is not referred to in the Mali Shelter Cluster strategy. Key documents by UNHCR and IFRC on urban response are posted on the Mali pages of the global website but are in English only. It may be appropriate to assess partner shelter capacity in urban settings and, subject to security, in the north where many returnees are eventually expected to return to dilapidated or damaged housing. This may be an opportunity to expand the number of agencies involved in shelter.

The Shelter Cluster in Mali has clearly faced considerable challenges. Nonetheless, it has established a platform on which to build. Despite – or because of – lack of access in the north and lack of ‘visibility’ of IDPs in the south, shelter has a role to play in mitigating displacement, in host family and rental support, in contingency planning and in planning return.

However, future commitment must be backed by an appraisal of what the lead agencies are able and willing to provide in terms of financial and human resources and in the support they can provide to staff in isolated roles. Both the global and local Shelter Cluster have amassed knowledge of great potential benefit to Mali if cluster leadership can be adequately resourced and sustained.

RECOMMENDATIONS

| | |
|----|---|
| | Cluster leadership |
| 1 | In conformity with IASC cluster guidance, draw up a Memorandum of Understanding setting out the roles and responsibilities of each of the co-lead agencies and the procedure to follow if lead agencies are unable to fulfil their role. Use this MoU in developing a template for the Shelter Cluster toolkit. |
| 2 | Communicate lead agency/agencies' roles to stakeholders to ensure clear and consistent messaging and accountability by cluster lead agencies. |
| 3 | Seek to renew relationship with government ministries. |
| | Cluster personnel |
| 4 | Strengthen UNHCR recruitment to prioritise consideration of security factors when appointing and supporting national and international staff. |
| 5 | In conformity with IASC cluster guidance and the practice of other clusters in Mali, appoint dedicated staff for cluster coordination and information management roles and avoid 'double-hatting.' |
| 6 | Deploy shelter coordination team members for a minimum period of six months and, subject to security considerations (see R4), seek to remove barriers to timely appointment and handovers. |
| 7 | Prioritise training and support for shelter coordination teams. Ensure a visit from Geneva or region within three months of a new coordinator appointment. |
| 8 | Review job descriptions and person specifications to ensure they conform to global cluster lead agencies' guidance on dual responsibility and reflect role in urban response. |
| | Supporting shelter service delivery |
| 9 | Establish and maintain a single, comprehensive Mali Shelter Cluster website. Review OCHA and GSC web pages to bring Mali information up to date. |
| 10 | Maintain an up to date list of cluster partners and contact details. |
| 11 | Confirm the status of the SAG or agree an alternative arrangement with partners. |
| 12 | Confirm the status of the Cash Transfer Working Group and the Mopti sub-cluster in the interests of service delivery and to ensure clear messaging and accountability. |
| 13 | Remind partners what services they can expect of the Shelter Cluster and what the Shelter Cluster expects of them through use of the IASC Minimum Commitments. |
| 14 | Establish a comprehensive database of cluster documentation and images, accessible to staff in Bamako, the region and Geneva, to maintain and enhance corporate memory. |

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|----|---|
| | Strategy, policy and standards |
| 15 | Review and finalise the Shelter Cluster strategy and issue a final version, incorporating cluster performance indicators, revised logical framework and urban shelter standards. |
| 16 | Involve SAG and/or cluster partners in process of strategy review and finalisation. |
| | Monitoring and reporting on implementation of Shelter Cluster strategy |
| 17 | Develop a Shelter Cluster action plan to facilitate monthly cluster monitoring, evaluation and reporting <i>to</i> Geneva and provision of feedback <i>from</i> Geneva. |
| 18 | Continue to use RBM approach to facilitate regular monitoring and evaluation of cluster partner results against targets. |
| | Advocacy and communication |
| 19 | Ensure latest Factsheet is visible on cluster webpages. |
| 20 | Given the security situation and low profile maintained by some agencies, seek the views of cluster partners before commitment to increased media advocacy and use of visual information. |
| 21 | Ensure ongoing global support, personnel and / or agreements are in place with UNHCR and IOM in Mali to implement the Shelter Cluster advocacy plan. |
| | Accountability to affected persons |
| 22 | Given the security situation and low profile maintained by some agencies, seek the views of cluster partners before commitment to large-scale communication with disaster-affected communities (part of the advocacy plan). |
| 23 | Ensure ongoing global support, personnel and / or agreements are in place with OCHA, UNHCR and IOM in Mali to implement goal of communication with disaster-affected communities. |
| | Contingency planning, preparedness and capacity-building |
| 24 | Continue to map shelter and NFI contingency stocks and capacity, and communicate information to partners and other stakeholders. |
| 25 | Ensure cluster has personnel capacity to respond to partner requests for information during urgent response (see R5). |
| 26 | Commission an assessment of shelter capacity. Depending on findings, commission training for Shelter Cluster partners and others to enhance shelter capacity in northern and southern Mali contexts. |
| 27 | Translate English language documentation on urban response, and post on Mali Shelter Cluster website. |

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Abbreviations and glossary

| | |
|--------------|--|
| AQIM | Al Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb |
| <i>banco</i> | Mud brick |
| CAP | Consolidated Appeal Process |
| CDAC | Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities |
| DDC | Direction du Développement et de la Coopération |
| DGPC | General Directorate of Civil Protection |
| DNAT | Direction National de l'Aménagement du Territoire |
| DNDS | Direction National du Développement Social |
| DNUH | Direction Nationale de l'Urbanisme et de l'Habitat |
| DTM | Displacement Tracking Matrix |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| ERC | Emergency Relief Coordinator |
| HAP | Humanitarian Accountability Partnership |
| HCT | Humanitarian Country Team |
| HDI | Human Development Index |
| HCUA | High Council for the Unity of Awazad |
| IASC | Inter-Agency Standing Committee |
| IDP | Internally displaced person |
| IMO | Information Management Officer |
| IOM | International Organisation for Migration |
| ICRC | International Committee of the Red Cross |
| IFRC | International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies |
| MdM | Médecins du Monde |
| MINUSMA | Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali |
| MNLA | Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad |
| MoU | Memorandum of Understanding |
| MUJWA | Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa |
| NFI | Non-food items |
| NGO | Non-governmental organisation |
| NRC | Norwegian Refugee Council |
| OCHA | UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs |
| RRWA | Regional Representation for West Africa |
| SAG | Strategic Advisory Group |
| ToR | Terms of Reference |
| TWIG | Technical working group |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNHCR | United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees |
| UNICEF | United Nations Children's Fund |
| UNSC | United Nations Security Council |
| UXO | Unexploded ordnance |
| WASH | Water, Sanitation and Hygiene |
| WFP | World Food Programme |

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose, scope and clients

The purpose of this pilot evaluation was twofold: 1) to contribute to the development of a common evaluation guide for the global Shelter Cluster, 2) to identify key lessons and recommendations for use by UNHCR in shelter coordination and shelter response in Mali. ¹

The scope of the evaluation was understood to be cluster coordination and shelter performance since December 2012. In addition to appraisal against the Inter-Agency Standing Committee's core cluster functions, two topics of interest to the Accountability Working Group namely leadership and personnel were also considered.

Lessons about the evaluation process are considered in this report and have already informed the draft evaluation guide (see footnotes). Lessons about the Mali deployment were shared with the Mali Shelter Cluster Coordinator in the field.

1.2 Humanitarian reform and the transformative agenda ²

The humanitarian reform process was initiated by the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in 2005 to improve the effectiveness of humanitarian response through greater predictability, accountability, coordination and partnership.

Humanitarian reform is based on three 'pillars', intended to address systemic weaknesses in response.

- i. The *cluster approach*: addressing the need for 'adequate capacity and predictable leadership in all sectors' of humanitarian response.
- ii. *Humanitarian financing*: addressing the need for 'adequate, timely and flexible financing' of humanitarian response, notably through the Central Emergency Response Fund.
- iii. *Humanitarian Coordinator strengthening*: addressing the need for 'effective leadership and coordination in emergencies' by the senior UN figure in country ³

Humanitarian reform acknowledges that effective response depends on the quality of *partnership* between the UN agencies, NGOs and Red Cross/Red Crescent agencies that respond globally to emergencies. Commitment to partnership between these constituencies was endorsed through a set of principles developed in 2007.⁴

¹ There were no specific terms of reference for the appraisal aspect which proceeded from a generic purpose drawn from the draft evaluation guide. (Email to commissioning agency dated 02/10/13)

² Suggested common text for draft evaluation guide – cf Fiji evaluation

³ OCHA, (2006), Building a Stronger, More Predictable Humanitarian Response System, www.ochaonline.un.org

⁴ Global Humanitarian Partnership, (2007), Principles of Partnership, <http://www.icva.ch/doc00002628.doc>

Of particular relevance to the present report is the cluster approach. However, the other ‘pillars’ - *Humanitarian Coordinator strengthening, humanitarian finance and partnership* - are interlinked drivers of effectiveness and quality.

International response to the Haiti earthquake and to the Pakistan floods in 2010 exposed a number of systemic weaknesses and inefficiencies. Because of these, the IASC Principals reviewed the approach to multilateral humanitarian response and made further adjustments. In December 2011, the IASC Principals agreed to a set of actions known as the *Transformative Agenda*, which aims to improve further leadership, coordination, and accountability of humanitarian interventions.⁵

1.3 The cluster approach

The cluster approach aims to address gaps and strengthen response in specific sectors of humanitarian response. At global level, there are eleven clusters. Global lead agencies are responsible for setting standards and policy, building response capacity, and providing operational support to a cluster deployed at country level. At country level, the cluster approach is expected to ensure a coherent and effective sectoral response.

1.4 The Shelter Cluster

The Shelter Cluster coordinates the work of organizations involved in the provision of shelter and NFI. At country level, UNHCR normally leads the cluster when a crisis is related to a conflict resulting in internal displacement. If the crisis is related to a natural disaster, IFRC usually leads the Shelter Cluster.⁶ However, in different countries and at different phases of a response, other agencies, including IOM, UN-Habitat and NGOs, may lead or co-lead.

More information on the Shelter Cluster and the names of global Shelter Cluster partners can be found here: www.sheltercluster.org

⁵ Cf Fiji evaluation – this topic informed draft evaluation guide

⁶ IFRC normally uses the term Shelter Cluster ‘convener.’

2. METHODOLOGY

2.1 Evaluation methodology

- a) Document review
- b) Visit to Mali lasting 10 days
- c) Interviews with approximately 27 informants
- d) Feedback to Shelter Cluster Coordinator in Bamako
- e) Compilation and submission of report.

2.2 Constraints

The evaluation was a pilot exercise, arranged at relatively short notice. It would have benefited from a terms of reference by the cluster co-leads and an inception report by the consultant. Both documents should have been shared with and involved the Cluster Coordinator, particularly in view of the logistics of the field visit in October 2013.⁷

Visa procedures delayed the start of the visit that then coincided with visits by the global Shelter Cluster focal points for advocacy and for assessment monitoring and evaluation. Field research thus added to the coordinator's already high workload.⁸ The visit also coincided with a major religious festival *Tabaski* (*Eid al-Adha* or Festival of Sacrifice). This is a one-day holiday in the UN calendar but a two-day holiday in other organisations and its precise date is determined by the position of the moon.⁹

It had been foreseen that the consultant would visit Mopti to speak to members of the Shelter sub-cluster there. However, the Cluster Coordinator pointed out that sub-cluster meetings were rare and that the small number of agencies attending them based in Bamako. This was borne out by desk research and it was decided to focus on informant meetings in the capital.

Most meetings in Bamako were conducted in English or in a mixture of French and English. In one case, a staff member of UNHCR interpreted between Tamasheq and French. However, a more in-depth evaluation in Mali would require fluent French and/or local language interpreters.¹⁰

⁷ See draft evaluation guide

⁸ Ditto

⁹ Ditto

¹⁰ Ditto

There was no evaluation manager but at least eight staff members of UNHCR in Geneva and Bamako were involved in helping to arrange the Mali field visit and their assistance was much appreciated. In addition, UNHCR in Bamako loaned drivers and office space throughout the field visit despite changes at their own office and the demands of operations. In addition to online security and diversity courses before the visit, approximately one day was required for security and administrative procedures in Bamako and this should be factored into future evaluation schedules.

3 BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

3.1 Context of the 2012-13 emergency response ¹¹

In mid-January 2012, separatist Tuaregs of the Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA), supported by Islamist groups, clashed with the Malian army in northern Mali. Grievances by the Tuareg population in the north dated from the colonial period. Corruption and the perceived failure of post-colonial governments to respond adequately to drought were among factors that deepened the political and ethnic divide between north and south. The fighting in 2012 resulted in large-scale internal displacement and refugee flows into neighbouring countries. (See Annex 1 for timeline.)

A military coup in March 2012 further threatened Mali's stability. Amid political uncertainty in the capital, separatists captured the three northern regions of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu, a vast, predominantly desert area which the MNLA proclaimed the independent state of "Azawad". Islamist groups then seized power from the secular MNLA, imposing strict Sharia law on the areas under their control. There followed summary executions, amputations, abuse of the rights of women and children, and destruction of the famous Sufi shrines in Timbuktu. These acts drew international condemnation.

The UN Security Council endorsed an international military response. After Islamist groups moved further south early in January 2013, French troops, supported by soldiers from Mali, ECOWAS and Chad and backed by the EU, UK and USA, recaptured Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. Islamist groups then resorted to guerrilla tactics, kidnapping and suicide attacks.

Mali's rapid collapse in 2012 apparently came as a surprise. Once a centre of learning and trade, Mali has experienced two decades of multi-party democracy and been seen as a West African success story. ¹² However, Mali is one of the world's poorest countries. In 2012, it ranked 182 out of 187 on the UNDP Human Development Index (HDI)¹³ and 141 out of 147 in the HDI's Gender Inequality Index. ¹⁴ More than half the country's population of 15.3 million subsist on less than US\$1.25 per day. Average life expectancy is 51 years. Approximately one in five children does not reach the age of five.

Mali is one of several countries across the Sahel that suffer recurrent and frequent food security and nutrition crises. Communities are exposed to multiple natural hazards linked to the dry tropical climate, and to extreme weather, particularly droughts, locust invasions and floods. In 2011, more than a million children in the Sahel region were at risk of severe malnourishment as inadequate rain, poor harvests and rising food prices left hundreds of thousands vulnerable and weak.¹⁵ Despite a good harvest in 2012, millions continue to suffer from food insecurity, malnutrition and lack of livelihoods. The conflict and the insecurity generated in northern Mali further increased humanitarian need while simultaneously making access to the affected population in the north more difficult. In 2012, approximately 4.6 million people in Mali were affected by food insecurity and more than 175,000 children at risk of Severe Acute Malnutrition.

¹¹ Source OCHA <http://www.unocha.org/ocha2012-13/mali>

¹² Thurston and Lebovich, (2013), page 3

¹³ Cited in Thurston and Lebovich, (2013), page 6

¹⁴ UNDP Gender Inequality Index 2012, <https://data.undp.org/dataset/Table-4-Gender-Inequality-Index/pq34-nwq7>

¹⁵ <http://glidenumber.net/glide/public/search/details.jsp?glide=19712&record=3&last=20>

3.2 Shelter Cluster activation

*We don't have camps ... You may have thirty in a house. But you don't see that misery ... It's a hidden crisis.*¹⁶

*There is at this stage no project specifically to do with shelter. On the other hand, there is multi-sectoral assistance to the most vulnerable IDPs (food, WASH, NFI, cash...).*¹⁷

Humanitarian clusters were activated for the first time in Mali in 2012. Four clusters - Food Security, Nutrition, Health, and Protection - were activated in March, Logistics, Emergency Telecoms and WASH in April, Education in May (see Annex 1 for timeline).

IOM had advocated for activation of the Shelter Cluster. According to the 2013 Global Appeal, IOM was involved in shelter reconstruction and repairs and UNHCR in NFI distribution. The response to advocacy appears to have been slow. The need for a Shelter and NFI Cluster is noted in OCHA's SitRep for 11 October 2012. By this time, approximately 199,000 persons had been internally displaced. Most families were living in rented accommodation or with a host family. In Bamako in September-October 2012, 62% of IDP households were renting houses and 29% living with a host family.¹⁸

The Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) requested Shelter Cluster activation on 29 October. His message to the ERC cited the likelihood of military intervention and probable worsening of the humanitarian situation. The displacement of more families from the north to Bamako, Mopti, Ségou and Sikasso would lead to deterioration of socio-economic conditions for IDPs and host families. Existing coordination capacity was unable to 'adequately address complex shelter and NFI needs.'¹⁹

The new cluster would be led by UNHCR with IOM as co-lead.²⁰ On 20 November, the ERC proposed activation of the Shelter Cluster on these terms. The cluster was activated on 27 November and its first meeting took place at UNHCR in Bamako on 7 December 2012, nine months after clusters had first been activated and almost a year after displacement had begun.

¹⁶ Unless otherwise indicated, quotes are taken from informant interviews, where necessary translated from French.

¹⁷ Compte rendu de la réunion du cluster abris du 7 décembre 2012, Version 21/12/ 2012

¹⁸ IOM, DTM November 2012, page 2

¹⁹ Message from HC / RC to Emergency Response Coordinator, 29 October 2012

²⁰ Ibid.

4 FINDINGS

4.1 Leadership

The Cluster System is struggling to find adequate leadership for a coordinated approach to assisting IDPs outside camps, whether in hosting or rental situations. A joint approach is necessary to respond to cross-cutting needs, yet it can be challenging – especially in field locations – to identify the most appropriate Cluster lead.²¹

A Cluster Coordinator is nothing if he doesn't have a strong cluster lead agency.

IASC advises that in the case of joint cluster leadership

Terms of reference or memoranda of understanding must [emphasis in original] be developed to ensure a common understanding of roles and responsibilities with the leadership arrangement within a specific context, as well as common accountabilities ... The terms of reference must be completed and understood in advance as taking on a shared leadership role will in most cases require actors to hire full- time staff.²²

In November 2013, UNHCR's Senior Regional Shelter Officer sought to agree cluster roles with UNHCR and IOM. A Dropbox includes draft terms of reference dated 7 December 2012. The document sets out purpose and tasks for the Mali Shelter Cluster. It affirms the role of UNHCR and IOM as co-lead agencies and notes that UNHCR has identified a Cluster Coordinator and IOM a Technical Coordinator.²³

By April 2013, however, all roles envisaged for the co-leads in the proposed organigram were being filled by UNHCR or REACH.²⁴ A report that month by the interim cluster coordinator, UNHCR's Global Focal Point for coordination, noted that cluster co-leadership had yet to be activated.²⁵

He and IOM counterparts discussed the issue and the lack of resources which prevented further funding by IOM of staff in Shelter Cluster roles. It is not known whether either agency approached the HCT or donors to seek funds for co-leadership as advised in IASC guidance.²⁶ In May 2013, UNHCR's Senior Regional Shelter Adviser recommended that UNHCR Senior Management engage with IOM to clarify its responsibility towards the cluster.²⁷

By January 2013, the existence of both the Dropbox and the terms of reference appear largely forgotten. The third coordinator and his IOM counterpart attempted to agree co-leadership roles in late 2013. The coordinator proposed a written terms of reference and his counterpart that

²¹ Anne Davies, (2012), *IDPs in Host Families and Host Communities: Assistance for hosting Arrangements*, Division of International Protection, Protection Operational Support, UNHCR, page 30

²² IASC, (2012), Cluster Coordination Module, page 19

²³ Cluster Abris et Non Vivres – Mali, Termes de référence, cluster Abris et Non Vivres, Mali, DRAFT 7th Décembre 2012

²⁴ Draft Cluster Structure versions 1 and 2, 5.12.12 and 10.12.12

²⁵ Ivan Vuarambon, Mission report Mali - March 25th / April 20th 2013, Global Shelter Cluster

²⁶ IASC, (2012), Cluster Coordination Module, page 19

²⁷ Charles Campbell, Notes on Mission to Mali, UNHCR Regional Representation for West Africa, Dakar, 25th April – 4th May 2013, page 2

UNHCR and IOM alternate the chair at cluster meetings. Discussions were not advanced nor agreement reached by October 2013.

In practice, co-leadership arrangements relied on a 'gentleman's agreement' easily forgotten with the turnover of UNHCR and IOM cluster staff. The global Shelter Cluster toolkit includes a MoU template on cluster handover. Judging from the experience in Mali, the toolkit would benefit from a model document on joint cluster leadership, in accordance with IASC guidance.

Early meetings of the Shelter Cluster included representatives from various government ministries including, on two occasions, the Direction Nationale de l'Urbanisme et de l'Habitat (DNUH). The late activation of the cluster, the change of government and of coordinator are likely to have made building the relationship harder. However, the energetic General Directorate of Civil Protection (DGPC) has been represented at most meetings of the Cluster and provides input to its work between them.

4.2 Cluster personnel

a) Capacity

The complexity of urban shelter response and of support to host communities is acknowledged in publications by UNHCR,²⁸ IFRC²⁹, UN-Habitat³⁰ and the IASC³¹ posted on the Mali pages of the global cluster website. IASC notes the need for partners to develop surge capacity and expertise in urban response. Such expertise is not made explicit in the person specifications of the Cluster Coordinator or first Technical Adviser though successive team members have brought experience from shelter operations, urban response and cluster coordination.

UNHCR has appointed French-speaking coordinators since cluster activation. The first had been Shelter Cluster Coordinator in Côte d'Ivoire and the Central African Republic. The interim coordinator was the newly appointed Global Focal Point for shelter coordination at UNHCR. The third had worked as construction expert with UNICEF in Guinea Bissau before becoming WASH Cluster Coordinator in Niger. The second Technical Adviser is a Malian civil engineer with considerable international experience in programmes by UNHCR and UNOPS.

Shelter coordination team

| SCT member | National/international | Agency | Started | Finished |
|-------------------------------|------------------------|--------|---------------|-------------------------|
| Cluster Coordinator (1) | International | UNHCR | December 2012 | March 2013 |
| Cluster Coordinator (interim) | International | UNHCR | March 2013 | April 2013 |
| Cluster Coordinator (3) | International | UNHCR | June 2013 | Continues ³² |

²⁸ Davies, (2012)

²⁹ Vitella and D'Urzo, (2012)

³⁰ Barcelo et al, (2011)

³¹ IASC, (2010), IASC Strategy: Meeting Humanitarian Challenges in Urban Areas, IASC

³² As at October 2013

| | | | | |
|-----------------------|---------------|-------|---------------|-------------------------|
| Technical adviser (1) | International | IOM | November 2012 | December 2012 |
| Technical adviser (2) | National | UNHCR | December 2012 | Continues ³³ |
| Information Manager | National | IOM | December 2012 | March 2013 |

The advantage of recruiting French speakers is evident in the participation by local NGOs in cluster meetings. However, international staff could not travel outside Bamako owing to the security situation. Within Bamako, there were security concerns, evident in the low profile maintained by some international partners. The security situation is believed to have contributed to turnover in the role of coordinator but it must be factored into recruitment for all cluster roles, national or international.

It is striking that neither UNHCR nor IOM was able to provide the Shelter Cluster with full-time personnel despite the size of Mali and the scale and complexity of a disaster that involved conflict, natural disaster and large-scale displacement. The IASC recommends that cluster coordinators are full-time in such emergencies.

'During the height of an emergency and in large protracted emergencies, when cluster coordination is a full-time job, Cluster Lead Agencies should appoint dedicated Cluster Coordinators i.e. individuals who can spend 100% of their time fulfilling their cluster coordination responsibilities and are accountable to the broader cluster membership.' ³⁴

IASC also recommends use of full-time coordination staff when a cluster is jointly led.³⁵ Both the first and interim Shelter Cluster coordinators were full-time. By October 2013, however, the third Cluster Coordinator and the Technical Adviser were 'double-hatted', providing support too for UNHCR's own operations.

In this respect, the Shelter Cluster appears to have differed from other clusters: the Food Security cluster had a full-time coordinator and information manager and thought this to be the case with most clusters. The WASH Cluster had a full-time coordinator and a full-time information manager from activation until at least December 2013. Contrary to IASC guidance the dual role is not reflected in the Mali Shelter Cluster coordinator's terms of reference.³⁶

The first Technical Adviser's terms of reference reflected responsibility for operations and cluster. He helped establish the new cluster and assisted with stock mapping, contingency planning and engaging shelter partners. He set up the cluster's Dropbox and encouraged IOM to release an information manager for the cluster. Although his terms of reference were for three months, he was available for only two weeks.³⁷ The second Technical Adviser was appointed by UNHCR. He was based in Mopti from December 2012.

³³ Ditto

³⁴ IASC, (2011), Framework on Cluster Coordination Costs and Functions in Humanitarian Emergencies at the Country Level

³⁵ IASC, (2012), Cluster Coordination Module, page 19

³⁶ Joint letter from Cluster Lead Agencies to their Directors/Representatives at Country Level, 20 October 2009 appended to IASC, (2012), Cluster Coordination Module. UNHCR is a signatory to the letter.

³⁷ IOM, Shelter Technical Adviser, Bamako, Mali, requisition, 21.11.2012

UNHCR also helped to fill the gap when IOM's Information Manager left in March 2013. The task of following up information requests, mapping contingency stocks and responding to partners' requests for information, however, remained with the Cluster Coordinator. A partner noted the overload that resulted:

They think they have a person in the cluster so that person will do everything.

b) Staff management and support

You have to manage the people – the Cluster Coordinator – if you're cluster lead agency. It's your reputation and that of your agency. It's your accountability. It's the image of your agency at global level.

The third coordinator was new to UNHCR and the Shelter Cluster and had not previously worked in Mali. Line management and support from UNHCR's representative in Mali, in accordance with UNHCR structure, was warmly appreciated. UNHCR also provides security and logistical support though the Cluster Coordinator is self-supporting in terms of administration.

The third coordinator did not have a handover or Shelter Cluster training. Four months into his six-months contract, the Mali Cluster had not received a monitoring visit from Geneva nor been asked for regular progress or monitoring reports though ad hoc support was frequent. At the time of the consultant's visit, support was being provided in the field by the Global Focal Points for advocacy and assessment. Global technical support was very welcome but sustainability could be assured through regular follow-up, using a standard written format. This would also contribute to corporate memory.

c) Turnover

Turnover of staff in the cluster coordination role was hard. It's easier and cheaper to have someone as a consultant rather than as regular staff. But it's better for us [partners] to have someone for a year.

There were three Cluster Coordinators within the six months from December 2012 to June 2013. Cluster partners who informed this report, while appreciating what each incumbent brought to the coordinator role, commented on the frequent turnover.

In his mission report, the interim coordinator (25 March to 20 April 2013) noted that failure to confirm his successor's appointment, thereby leaving a gap in cluster coordination, could 'weaken the role of UNHCR as cluster lead' in the context of return to the north and the exhaustion of financial reserves by IDPs and host families.³⁸

The gap was only partly filled by the work of the second Technical Adviser who moved temporarily to Bamako to coordinate the CAP process, and by the Senior Regional Shelter

³⁸ Ivan Vuarambon, Mission report Mali - March 25th / April 20th 2013, Global Shelter Cluster

Officer based in Dakar. The regional office also recommended action to fast-track the filling of a vacancy which was damaging the Shelter Cluster's reputation.³⁹

Since December 2012, UNHCR has provided the Shelter Cluster Coordinator with office space in Bamako. In the absence of a coordinator for 6-8 weeks, the cluster office was pressed into use by UNHCR personnel and by October 2013 was shared with three members of UNHCR staff.

4.3 Supporting shelter service delivery

a) Cluster objective

The main objective of the Mali Shelter Cluster, as stated in strategy and advocacy documents, is to enable the most vulnerable members of the affected community to benefit from appropriate shelter and thus reduce their risk of eviction, extortion and violence, to improve existing housing and to help returnees resettle in their home communities.

b) Cluster partners

There is no up to date list of cluster partners. The draft cluster strategy lists 20 members, IASC's August CPM exercise counts 19. OCHA counts 11 partners and the most recent Shelter Cluster Factsheet 8:

- ACTED
- ICRC (observer)
- INTERSOS
- IOM
- Mali Red Cross Society
- NRC
- UNHCR
- World Vision ⁴⁰

A far larger number of UN, government and local and international non-government agencies has actually attended cluster meetings at least once, however (see section on Main Cluster Meeting below). In March 2013, the Priority Action Plan listed the following as Shelter Cluster partners:

Shelter reconstruction and repairs: DGPC / government ministries, IOM, Mali Red Cross Society

Cash transfer: ACTED, CARE, CRS, DGPC, IOM, OXFAM, Mercy Corps

NFIs: ACTED, ALIMA, AVSF, CARE, CRS, INTERSOS, IOM, IRC, Mali Red Cross Society,

³⁹ Charles Campbell, Notes on Mission to Mali, UNHCR Regional Representation for West Africa, Dakar, 25th April – 4th May 2013

⁴⁰ Cluster Factsheet, (draft) October 2013

MDM-B, MDM-F, UNHCR, UNICEF, USAID

Shelter in the Mali context did not necessarily mean building emergency shelter or transitional shelter because the main shelter 'agencies' in the south of Mali were host families, the 'silent NGO'⁴¹ and private landlords. Though shelter was a high priority for IDPs and host families, food was a higher one. This is unsurprising in the context of Mali's ongoing food security and nutrition crisis but the need for a shelter and cluster response – overcrowding, abuse, unemployment in urban areas and damage to housing left behind in the north - was also identified.

By the time the Shelter Cluster started work at the end of 2012, agencies had already been at work for several months in the multi-sectoral response in the south. The response included household NFI or cash grants by agencies not typically associated with the shelter and NFI sector such as UNICEF and Médecins du Monde and relatively few partners at national or international level with shelter expertise. International cluster staff could not access the north owing to lack of security and were confined to what an informant described as the Bamako 'bubble.'

As in other Shelter Cluster deployments, there appears to have been no partnership agreement between lead agencies and cluster partners in Mali, for example, through use of the IASC's 'Minimum Commitments.'⁴² Such an agreement might have helped strengthen information management, for example (see below).

c) Cluster structure

In December 2012 the planned cluster structure comprised

- Main cluster meeting
- Strategic Advisory Group
- Working groups
- Regional focal points

Main cluster meeting Representatives of 35 agencies, government departments and clusters have attended monthly Shelter Cluster meetings at least once, according to the minutes (see Annex 3). Average attendance at the nine meetings from December 2012 to October 2013 was twelve organisations, falling slightly after the break in monthly meetings in April and May 2013. Participants included national and international NGOs and, at two meetings in early 2013, a local organisation representing IDPs.

Apart from the cluster leads, agencies attending most frequently are ACTED, NRC, the DGPC and OCHA. Approximately half the cluster's meetings have been held at UNHCR but others hosted by DGPC, IOM and NRC. They are organised and chaired by the Cluster Coordinator. Most informants thought cluster meetings useful for information exchange and the DGPC found partners and successive coordinators receptive and responsive.

Meetings are held and minuted in French with clear action points. The minutes of early meetings are stored only on the global Cluster's Mali webpage. Some agendas and minutes from June 2013 onwards are held on OCHA's Mali website but they are not easy to find.

⁴¹ Davies, (2012), page 11

⁴² IASC, (2012), *Cluster Coordination Module*, page 14

Strategic Advisory Group A SAG was created in January 2013 comprising most of the regular meeting participants and a government ministry.

- ACTED
- DGPC
- IOM
- Mali Red Cross Society
- Ministère de l'action humanitaire
- NRC
- UNHCR
- UNICEF

and the Cluster Coordinator

Meetings were apparently held but no minutes recorded.⁴³ In June 2013, the coordinator attempted to revive the SAG but by October 2013 it was still not functioning. Whether or not a separate group was viable in a cluster with a small number of active partners, a strategic function within a complex and changing environment seems imperative. The Mali cluster would benefit from discussion of alternative approaches, for example, an agenda item at main cluster meetings or a SAG meeting immediately before or after the main cluster meeting.

Working groups A working group on NFI targeting met twice in March 2013. Participants were:

- ACTED
- CRS
- DNDS
- Handicap International
- INTERSOS
- Mercy Corps
- NRC
- Protection Cluster / Help Age
- Protection Cluster / UNHCR

and the Cluster Coordinator

The group was chaired by ACTED and minutes of two meetings are posted on the cluster's local web pages. The group agreed the contents of a minimum household NFI kit and later decided to design a more comprehensive one to enable individual partners to add cluster-approved items. In August 2013, ACTED resigned as chair and the group questioned whether it should continue as a separate forum since participation was almost identical to that of the main cluster meeting.

Oxfam GB led a Cash Transfer Group, activated in January after a request by the ERC that the Shelter Cluster explore the possible use of cash transfers as an option in housing. Its members were

- ACTED

⁴³ Cluster Abris, Mali, Compte Rendu de la réunion ordinaire Mardi, 25 Juin 2013

- CARE
- CRS
- IOM
- Mercy Corps
- OXFAM ⁴⁴

The objective of the group was sharing of experience and coordination of 4W. No minutes were available. The June 2013 cluster meeting noted that few partners had attended meetings of the working group or completed its 4W matrix. Oxfam, a founder of CaLP, the Cash Learning Partnership, continued to share experience and learning with the Shelter Cluster but by October 2013 it was clear that *it* regarded the Cash Transfer Group as independent and multi-sectoral while the Shelter Cluster continued to see it as a Shelter Cluster TWIG.

Given the limited personnel resources of the shelter coordination team and the size of the cluster's active membership, there seems no reason why the Group should be linked to the Shelter Cluster alone. However, one partner noted the need for the Mali cluster's need for guidelines on cash and shelter, similar to those developed in the Haiti context, and for maintenance of 4W information.

In addition to NFI targeting and cash transfer, informal groups worked with the technical coordinator to develop shelter technical specifications and on the CAP revision in the first half of 2013.

Sub-clusters / technical support According to its draft terms of reference and organigram, IOM in cooperation with UNHCR planned to designate local focal points to represent the cluster and coordinate in the field at Mopti, Ségou and other centres in anticipation of IDP influxes. ⁴⁵ Though there is reference to a Mopti sub-cluster in some documentation, including the April 2013 Factsheet, the role of the second Technical Adviser, based in Mopti, appears to have had more to do with UNHCR and partner operations than with sub-cluster coordination.

The second Technical Adviser worked with UNHCR and cluster partners such as NRC to develop specifications for reconstruction of *banco* (mud brick) housing, replacement of nomads' tents and a shelter repair kit. He moved briefly to the Bamako office in June 2013 when there was no Cluster Coordinator to develop the CAP with a small group of partners.

A single shelter sub-cluster meeting in August 2013 is shown on the OCHA calendar but there are no Mopti sub-cluster minutes on either Shelter Cluster website. Until at least March 2013, meetings of the main cluster had representation from agencies working in Mopti (for example, INTERSOS and UNHCR) and the Shelter Cluster is represented at OCHA-led inter-cluster coordination meetings in Mopti.

In July 2013, inter-cluster meeting minutes from Mopti recorded the need to reactivate the Shelter Cluster there, with particular focus on cash transfer. ⁴⁶ According to OCHA, agencies then active in shelter and NFI in Mopti were:

⁴⁴ Cluster Abris, Mali, Cadre Stratégique, Version: 1.0, Date: 5 avril 2013

⁴⁵ Cluster Abris, Mali, Compte rendu, réunion technique sur la situation en matière d'abris, 16 janvier 2012

⁴⁶ OCHA, Compte rendu de la réunion de coordination humanitaire générale Mopti, Mercredi, 17 juillet 2013 ; OCHA, Sous bureau de Mopti: réunion de coordination, 10 juillet 2013

- CARE Mali
- Delta Survie
- IOM
- Mali Red Cross
- NRC
- SOS ATTITUDE
- Swiss Red Cross
- UNHCR ⁴⁷

By October 2013, the Cluster Coordinator and Technical Adviser thought the number far fewer. Partners who responded to IASC's cluster performance monitoring exercise in August 2013 rated the Shelter Cluster satisfactory in terms of providing a coordination platform but one commented:

The shelter sub-cluster has not been activated in the regions (Mopti) though needs in the field are huge. ⁴⁸

d) Information management

Cluster/Sector lead agencies shall allocate the necessary human and financial resources for IM. Each cluster shall appoint an IM focal point ... ⁴⁹

We realised there was an incredible amount of duplication. We really lacked the capacity within the cluster to really organise, to structure the distribution, to make sure that things were properly identified.

A dedicated person is needed. An information management officer is more important than a Cluster Coordinator.

We can't have visibility if we don't have information ... Everything is linked.

Globally, the Shelter Cluster has been a leader in information management, one of the core activities in any cluster. The Clusters' draft terms of reference did not designate an information manager but the first Technical Adviser encouraged IOM to allocate a staff member for the purpose. The cluster information manager attended Shelter Cluster meetings until his resignation in March 2013. The interim Coordinator noted the need for a "fully dedicated IMO for the cluster (OCHA is very demanding for cluster leads to produce consistent and qualitative information)." ⁵⁰ An additional challenge in the Mali context was mixed distributions, for example of food and non-food items. This made it hard to track separate elements. The aid sector in Mali was more accustomed to development than emergency programmes and the shelter coordination team required capacity to train and follow up requests with partners.

⁴⁷ OCHA, Mali - 3W Présence opérationnelle et programme : Qui fait, Quoi, Où (31 Juillet 2013)

⁴⁸ IASC, Suivi des performances du groupe sectoriel : version préliminaire du Rapport des performances en matière de coordination, Groupe sectoriel : Abris ; Pays : Mali ; Niveau : NA ; Achievé le : 21 août 2013

⁴⁹ IASC, (2008), Operational Guidance on Responsibilities of Cluster/Sector Leads & OCHA in Information Management

⁵⁰ Ivan Vuarambon, Mission report Mali - March 25th / April 20th 2013, Global Shelter Cluster

A role appears to have been envisaged for the Logistics Cluster which noted in January 2013 that UNHCR and IOM would be using it as a platform to coordinate NFI projects.⁵¹ An unwritten agreement was also made with OCHA to update the global Shelter Cluster's Mali webpage.

IOM did not have the financial resources to replace the information manager and UNHCR staff provided support to the cluster. In addition to maintaining continuity, the advantage of this arrangement was that it introduced results-based management that could strengthen periodic monitoring of progress against cluster targets otherwise expressed as cumulative totals. UNHCR information management staff attended meetings of the Shelter Cluster and in September 2013 presented this approach and a revised logical framework.

UNHCR's support was welcome. In the absence of a partnership agreement with Shelter Cluster partners, cluster experience in Mali and personnel capacity in the coordination team, it remained difficult, however, to elicit data from partners. The Mali Shelter Cluster was not unique in this respect but it was left to the Coordinator, in addition to his operational and coordination responsibilities, to follow up information requests.

Cluster minutes note the need for partner information on cash distribution and on contingency stocks after the August 2013 floods. Some cluster partners noted that they in turn did not always receive a timely response to requests for information to the cluster though OCHA felt its requests were answered promptly. Information management is an area where global support might have been expected. In late 2012, REACH contributed to the development of performance indicators for all clusters, used at the inter-cluster Information Management Working Group meeting. However, the Shelter Cluster was not represented at these meetings until late April 2013.

As noted above, the Mali Shelter Cluster has no website of its own. An unwritten agreement was made with OCHA to update the global Shelter Cluster's Mali webpage. By October 2013, information was held partly on the Mali pages of the global Shelter Cluster site and partly on the Shelter Cluster pages of OCHA Mali.^{52 53} Neither site is up to date or comprehensive. The sites do not mirror one another nor is it easy to locate information. OCHA's global website carries data about all Mali clusters except shelter.⁵⁴ In Mali, the OCHA website uses the same icon to represent the Shelter Cluster and inter-cluster activities.

The first Technical Adviser set up a Dropbox but this fell quickly out of use. As a result, there appears to be no single comprehensive archive anywhere of the Mali Shelter Cluster's activities.

⁵¹ WFP Mali, Special Operation SO 200534, Logistics Cluster & Emergency Telecommunication, Cluster Support to the Humanitarian Community In Mali, (1 January 2013 to 31 December 2013)

⁵² <https://www.sheltercluster.org/Africa/Mali/Pages/default.aspx>

⁵³ <https://mali.humanitarianresponse.info/fr/clusters/abri>

⁵⁴ OCHA https://clusters.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/cluster_configuration-mali-2012-1.pdf

4.4 Strategy, policy and standards

*The cluster has to produce a strategy as soon as possible ... it should be reviewed and adapted on a regular basis following the evolution of the situation.*⁵⁵

a) Strategy development

Perhaps because it began so late and at a time of great uncertainty in late 2012, the Mali Shelter Cluster did not immediately develop a strategy. However, the draft terms of reference sets out the tasks of the cluster and the Dropbox includes shelter options for different conflict scenarios.

The interim coordinator drafted a strategy for the cluster in March-April 2013. In accordance with the Shelter Cluster toolkit template, it considers

1. Context
2. Guiding principles and policies
3. Aims and objectives
4. Response strategy and operational priorities
5. Management, coordination and stakeholders
6. Technical guidance and standards
7. Advocacy and communication
8. Monitoring and evaluation of the strategy

Annexes set out shelter options, shelter technical specifications and cross-cutting issues. The draft identifies cluster partners and proposed cluster structure in Mali, and situates the shelter response within the overall response strategy of the HCT.

It is not clear to what extent partners or the affected population were involved in the drafting process, as minutes of SAG meetings are not recorded. An unendorsed first draft dated 5 April 2013 is posted on the global Shelter Cluster pages but on the local web pages, the link to Shelter Cluster strategy leads only to Annex 6.

The Shelter Cluster strategy references Sphere shelter standards but has less to say on accountability to the affected population. It notes that a local organisation of IDPs *Association de PDI*s had attended cluster meetings before March 2013. This represents good practice but the group did not attend later meetings (see Annex 3).

The draft strategy has little to say about advocacy and communication, and implies that this is largely the role of OCHA and the HCT. Both the shelter sector and the Shelter Cluster in Mali lacked visibility before and after cluster activation. Early emphasis on advocacy would have been appropriate in view of the low profile of shelter and the small number of partners with shelter experience.

The draft strategy was completed shortly before the break in cluster coordination. A proposal for a cluster action plan was put to the main cluster meeting in June 2013 but it was noted there that the strategy needed first be validated. Some feedback into strategy development was given

⁵⁵ Global Shelter Cluster, Strategic framework template

and amendments suggested at the meeting in July 2013 but it is not clear whether the draft strategy has subsequently been validated, revised or monitored.

Participants in the IASC cluster performance monitoring exercise rated the Shelter Cluster 'satisfactory' in relation to strategy but 'not at all satisfactory' in relation to standard setting. It is not clear which aspect participants referred to but, as noted in the section on working groups (above), there was a perceived lack of cash and shelter standards. The interim coordinator noted:

*Monitoring of shelter standards needs to be followed-up mainly with IDPs receiving cash grants. Some level of conditionality should be envisaged in such programming to ensure that minimal acceptable living conditions are met, like basic sanitation, minimal covered space, natural light and ventilation.*⁵⁶

In June 2013, an internal review by the Shelter and Settlements Section in Geneva noted the absence of urban shelter standards for Mali.⁵⁷

b) Needs assessment

The role of the Shelter Cluster in assessing shelter needs was hampered in part by the initial and ongoing multi-sectoral approach and in part by lack of access to the north. However, IOM leads the Protection Cluster sub-group, the Commission on Population Movements (CMP), which, since early 2012, has been collecting and analysing data on IDPs and their needs, priorities and intentions.⁵⁸ Members of the Commission included Shelter Cluster partners such as ACTED, CRS and NRC as well as IOM and UNHCR.

When the Shelter Cluster began work, REACH was commissioned to undertake a review of existing data of relevance to the shelter sector and a multi-sectoral needs assessment in Commune 5 in Bamako.^{59 60} Given the role of the CMP, the purpose of the second assessment is not clear and it is not shared on Shelter Cluster web pages. The larger review, though it lacks recommendations and photos, provides a useful basis for cluster strategy. The Global Focal Point for assessment, based at REACH, was again commissioned to assess shelter needs in the north in October 2014.

Partners such as INTERSOS and ACTED shared their own assessments with the cluster. These include quantitative, qualitative and/or visual information on shelter and the needs of host and tenant families. Use of photos, as in the report by INTERSOS and its local partner IMADEL in Mopti region, can contribute to needs assessment and advocacy but may be subject to security considerations (see section 4.6).⁶¹

⁵⁶ Ivan Vuarambon, Mission report Mali - March 25th / April 20th 2013, Global Shelter Cluster

⁵⁷ UNHCR, Issues related to Shelter Cluster Coordination (internal), June 26th

⁵⁸ IOM, (2013), Enquête Sur les Intentions de Retour des Déplacés Internes, février 2013

⁵⁹ REACH, (2012), Situation de l'abri au Mali : Revue des Données Secondaires, décembre 2012

⁶⁰ REACH, (2012), Dynamiques de Déplacement au Mali, Fiche d'information # 1, Commune 5, Bamako Décembre 2012

⁶¹ IMADEL and INTERSOS, Rapport Evaluation Rapide Habitat, 02 au 08 mars 2013

c) Cross-cutting issues

The cluster coordinator's job description references cross-cutting issues. In its Annex 3, the Shelter Cluster strategic framework promoted incorporation of the following cross cutting issues: age, disability, HIV/AIDS, gender, environment and human rights. In addition, it considered protection from mines and UXO a cross-cutting issue.

Some of these issues are partially identified within vulnerability criteria addressed in the overall humanitarian response. However, there is no evidence of other promotion or mainstreaming of cross-cutting issues by the Shelter Cluster on Mali web pages nor use of the few global Shelter Cluster documents in French on cross-cutting issues.

Given the Mali cluster's own concerns about overcrowding in the urban south, well-documented GBV in the north and the involvement in Mopti of Delta Survie,⁶² this is an area where the global and local Shelter Cluster could do more.

4.5 Monitoring and reporting on implementation of Shelter Cluster strategy

As noted above, the Shelter Cluster strategy was still in draft and the SAG not active at the time of this review. Partners were sometimes slow to provide information and there was no dedicated information manager to assist in following up requests. While communication with Geneva was frequent, there appears to have been no requirement for regular progress reports from the Shelter and Settlements Section at global level. The Dropbox contains a single draft SitRep dated 9 December 2012.

The Shelter Cluster participated in the IASC's Cluster Performance monitoring exercise in August 2013. This provided feedback from eight partners on cluster performance and was useful for the coordinator in providing a checklist on his role and responsibilities. The cluster was rated 'satisfactory' in a majority of areas. Areas rated less than satisfactory included needs analysis and the identification of gaps, standard setting, monitoring and reporting, advocacy, and accountability. Global support for advocacy and for needs analysis in the north followed this exercise. Local support for monitoring was provided by UNHCR staff who sought to help reshape information management and introduce RBM.

4.6 Advocacy and communication

*While camps bring their own set of problems, they also usually bring public awareness and visibility to IDPs ... In contrast, IDPs who do not live in camps are often out of the public eye ...*⁶³

*Shelter is ...not represented in the key message developed by OCHA for the HCT and as long as the UN leadership is not talking about the urgent need for adequate shelter funding, it will be difficult to get the attention of donors.*⁶⁴

⁶² NGO supported by MdM which provides surgery and shelter for women suffering obstetric fistula.

⁶³ Brookings-LSE Project on Internal Displacement, (2013), *Under the Radar: Internally Displaced Persons in Non-Camp Settings*, Brookings Institution

⁶⁴ Advocacy and Communications Priorities for the Mali Shelter Cluster (October 2013 draft)

As noted above, the draft Shelter Cluster strategy described the role of OCHA and the HCT in advocacy and saw the cluster's main advocacy channels as its Factsheet and website. However, from April to August 2012, shelter in Mali was rarely mentioned in OCHA's Situation Reports though reference to refugee camps in neighbouring countries was frequent. This may reflect the lack of awareness of shelter which had resulted in the cluster's belated activation. The Shelter Cluster Factsheet was developed in April and revised in October 2013 but the updated version is hard to find on the Mali Shelter Cluster's web pages.

Shelter and the needs of host families are mentioned more frequently from January 2013 by which time the Shelter Cluster had started work. Even so, of nineteen OCHA SitReps from January to August 2013, only seven mention the Shelter Cluster. The interim Cluster Coordinator highlighted the importance of advocacy in his April 2013 mission report because planning for repair and rebuilding in the north demanded a higher profile for the sector and a higher level of funding for partners. Lack of visibility in OCHA publications and the CAP was discussed at the Shelter Cluster meeting in June 2013.

The visit to Mali in late 2013 of the global advocacy focal point was welcomed. Working with the coordinator and public information staff of UNHCR and IOM, he drafted an action plan, key messages and four goals:

1. The shelter sector in Mali is adequately funded
2. At least four partners work on shelter and NFI activities in the north of Mali
3. Humanitarian access for shelter actors is improved in the north of Mali
4. All people who are eligible for shelter assistance receive timely and accurate information

The action plan requires information on shelter needs in the north (being collated by REACH), representation by the Shelter Cluster at OCHA public information meetings, at HCT press briefings and with the CDAC network. Additional human resources and/or a MoU with partners in UNHCR and IOM are likely to be necessary to fulfil the plan. Given the security situation and the low profile maintained by some international agencies working in Mali, the views of cluster partners should be sought before increased media attention is sought.

4.7 Accountability to affected persons

As noted above, the Shelter Cluster strategy references Sphere shelter standards but has less to say on accountability to the affected population. There are no references to accountability to affected persons on either of the Mali Shelter Cluster web pages.

The participation of a local NGO representing IDPs in some of the earlier meetings of the Shelter Cluster is an example of good practice but, the Shelter Cluster might have done more to highlight the experience of NGO partners. World Vision, to take one example, is a founder member of the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership and the Emergency Capacity Building Project and has complaints mechanisms in place in Mali.

Goal 4 of the draft advocacy plan includes communication with the affected population and recommends that the Shelter Cluster participate in the planning of a mass information campaign to be led by OCHA. This would contribute to transparency by providing information on eligibility for shelter and NFI assistance, if possible, linking the Mali Shelter Cluster with a regional

initiative by CDAC and OCHA. Given the security situation and the low profile maintained by some international agencies in Mali, however, the views of cluster partners should be sought.

4.8 Contingency planning, preparedness and capacity-building

a) Contingency planning and preparedness

We do not have a preparedness plan but, on the other hand, we have a sector and multi-sector response plan.⁶⁵

They are not clear about the NFI stocks partners have... so when the floods happened, they didn't have precise information on stock.

We said to the Shelter Cluster, 'This is what we have. Is it appropriate?' We waited for two weeks [for an answer]. We had 1500 kits ready to go.

When we had the floods in Bamako, UNHCR was the first to help. Trucks were out the first night. [Cluster Coordinator] made HCR work fast.

Mali had a multisectoral national contingency plan for 2011-2012, which included shelter and NFI. Shelter contingency planning was a topic at the first cluster meeting in December 2012 and a focus of work by the first Technical Adviser. It was an expected outcome of work by NRC and REACH to be completed in January 2013.

Heavy rains from 9-12 Aug 2013 caused flooding in Kidal and Ségou, destroying houses and fields. Around 11,300 people were affected.⁶⁶ On 28 August, torrential rains provoked flash floods in Bamako, killing 37 people. At least 20,000 people were displaced.⁶⁷ By October, 458,475 people had been affected by flooding and over 32,000 hectares of agricultural land destroyed.

The Shelter Cluster Coordinator shared information on needs from the DGPC (the government lead agency in case of flooding), and with partners at the main cluster meeting. UNHCR itself was seen as having acted fast in the floods, in part due to the work of the Shelter Cluster Coordinator. However, the Cluster did not by then hold information on other partners' shelter or NFI stocks and it was not until the end of September 2013 that they were asked to contribute to a mapping of stocks.

Partners who had participated in IASC Cluster Performance Monitoring (CPM) in August 2013 rated the Shelter Cluster 'satisfactory' in terms of contingency planning. Three informants to the present evaluation, however, felt that although the Shelter Cluster shared information well at meetings, it needed to be more proactive on preparedness. In mid-October, one partner was completing delivery of NFI kits for those affected by the August floods, having waited in vain for a response to queries to the Shelter Cluster and to the government.

⁶⁵ IASC, Suivi des performances du groupe sectoriel : version préliminaire du Rapport des performances en matière de coordination, Groupe sectoriel : Abris ; Pays : Mali ; Niveau : NA ; Achievé le : 21 août 2013

⁶⁶ OCHA, Mali: Complex Emergency Situation Report No. 39 (26 August 2013)

⁶⁷ OCHA, 2013 Rainy Season Overview, West and Central Africa, 11 September 2013

b) Capacity-building

Capacity-building of partners is not referred to in the Mali Shelter Cluster strategy nor in the minutes of meetings, though members shared experience and expertise on different aspects of response through presentations at main cluster meetings and in working groups. Key documents by UNHCR and IFRC on urban response are posted on the Mali pages of the global Shelter Cluster website but are in English only.

In these circumstances, it may be appropriate to assess partner capacity in urban settings and, subject to security, in the north where many returnees are eventually expected to return to dilapidated or damaged housing. This might also be an opportunity to expand the number of agencies involved in shelter.

5 CONCLUSIONS

The Shelter Cluster in Mali faced considerable challenges. It was activated at a time of insecurity in response to a heightened risk of further large-scale displacement. It was activated months after potential partners and other clusters had begun inter-sectoral work. Joint leadership proved difficult to maintain: commitment at the start had soon to contest with lack of funding in one lead agency and lack of full-time staff in the other.

Nonetheless the Mali shelter cluster has established a platform, respected by its government counterpart and by most of its partners, upon which UNHCR can build - if it wishes to. Despite – or because of – current lack of access in the north and lack of ‘visibility’ of IDPs in the south, shelter has a role to play in mitigating displacement, in host family and rental support, in contingency planning and in return.

However, commitment to the Mali Shelter Cluster must be backed by an honest appraisal of what lead agencies are able and willing to provide in terms of financial and human resources, and in the support they can provide to staff in isolated roles in Bamako and Mopti. Templates, toolkits and terms of reference require commitment and accountability if they are to be of use: the lead agencies, both members of the global SAG, need to do more to model coordination if they are to engage others in the work of the cluster.

Whichever agency or agencies lead the cluster, awareness is needed of the security environment within which the Mali cluster acts. This influences who the lead agency hires, the support it gives them, where it works and what it does. All the same, the global Shelter Cluster has amassed knowledge and a wealth of resources on shelter of great potential benefit to Mali if cluster leadership can be sustained.

Annex 1 Timeline ⁶⁸

| 2012 | |
|--------------|---|
| 17 January | Tuareg separatists and Islamic groups fight Malian army in north of country. There is large-scale IDP (81,463) and refugee (78,168) flows. |
| 08 March | UNHCR, OCHA, UNICEF and IOM have agreed to set up a Humanitarian Country Team |
| 12 March | WFP estimates over 107,000 IDPs |
| 21 March | Food Security, Health, Nutrition and Protection clusters activated |
| 22 March | President Touré overthrown in military coup. |
| 01 April | MNLA now in control of Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu |
| 15 April | Swiss national kidnapped in Timbuktu (released on 24 April) |
| 22 April | WFP estimates up to 130,000 IDPs, including 25,000 in Bamako. |
| 04 April | Ansar al Din and AQIM displace MNLA in parts of Timbuktu. |
| 05 April | MUJWA fighters abduct 7 Algerian diplomats in Gao (3 released on 5 July). |
| 06 April | MNLA declares northern Mali the independent state of Azawad, an area comprising 60% of Malian territory. |
| 13 April | Emergency Telecommunications, Logistics, WASH clusters activated |
| 30 April | Fighting in Bamako between supporters of deposed president and junta. |
| May | Mali Humanitarian Country Team becomes operational. |
| 02 May | Fighting in Bamako ends with defeat of president's supporters. |
| 05 May | 146,900 IDPs: Bamako 30,000; Mopti 9,100; North 107,000; Ségou 800. 97% live with host families and communities. |
| 18 May | ERC proposes activation of Education cluster |
| 19 June | 154,754 IDPs: Registered persons: Bamako 9,919; Kayes 210; Mopti 25,793; North 107,000; Ségou 8,400; Sikasso 3,505 |
| 19 June | Mali 2012 CAP issued. It aims to assist 5.06 million people affected by food and nutrition crisis and 2.2 million people affected by conflict. |
| 26 June | Donors have committed \$79.8m, 37% of total \$213,822,578 requirements. |
| 27 June | Islamist groups capture Gao from MNLA |
| 27 June | 158,857 IDPs: Registered persons: Bamako 9,919; Kayes 444; Mopti 29,589; North 107,000; Ségou 8,400; Sikasso 3,505 |
| 02 July | Ansar al Din destroy Muslim shrines in Timbuktu world heritage site. |
| 10 July | Donors have provided US\$ 88.5m, 41.6% of total requirements |
| 17 July | 174,003 IDPs |
| 19 July | Three European hostages kidnapped in 2011 in Algeria released in Mali. |
| 23 July | Donors have provided US\$ \$89m, 42.1% of total requirements |
| 27 August | Donors have provided \$97.5m, 46 per cent of total requirements. |
| 28 August | ERC visits Mali |
| 29 August | IDPs identify food, shelter, NFI, health and cash support as primary needs. Living conditions for IDPs are worsening because of rainy season. Host families too struggle to cope. |
| 01 September | MUJWA announces execution of Algerian diplomat. |

⁶⁸ Main sources: OCHA <http://www.unocha.org/ocha2012-13/mali> ; UNHCR http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full%20Report_648.pdf ; Thurston and Lebovich, (2013); BBC <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24787682> ; www.sheltercluster.org ; <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24787682>; OCHA Situation Reports; *Stratégie Protection Mali, En Situation de conflit armé*, Cluster Protection, Bamako, Décembre 2012

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|--------------|---|
| 11 September | Nearly 9,000 people reported homeless after floods in Ségou, Koulikoro, Sikasso, Kayes and Mopti. Five people dead; 2,824 houses collapsed. |
| 13 September | High Commissioner for Human Rights reports concern about human rights abuse in northern Mali to Human Rights Council. |
| 25 September | Donors have provided \$100.4m, 47% of total requirements. |
| 26 September | 118,795 IDPs |
| 11 October | An estimated 57% of IDPs are reported to be in need of shelter. HCT decides that a Shelter and NFI cluster is needed |
| 11 October | Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights raises concern about human rights abuse in northern Mali. |
| 21 October | Key basic needs identified by assessed IDPs in Mopti, Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal regions are food (90%), health (72%), shelter (57%), WASH (49%) |
| 27 October | UN Security Council adopts Resolution 2071 which mandates a plan for military intervention in northern Mali by ECOWAS and African Union |
| 24 October | Donors have provided \$103.8, 48% of total requirements. |
| 29 October | Mali Resident Coordinator asks ERC to activate Shelter and NFI Cluster to be led by UNHCR with IOM as co-lead |
| 1-2 November | Global Shelter Cluster meeting in Geneva |
| ? November | IOM deploys first Shelter Technical Adviser |
| 7 November | UNHCR sends an alert to its roster looking for a dedicated cluster coordinator |
| 11 November | ECOWAS heads of state approve military intervention plan |
| 13 November | African Union approves military intervention plan |
| 14 November | UNHCR Regional Shelter Officer deployed to Mali for a month. He starts discussing cluster issues with IOM and cluster partners |
| 20 November | MUJWA kidnaps French citizen in Diema, |
| 20 November | ERC proposes activation of Shelter and NFI Cluster |
| 21 November | French national kidnapped near Kayes. |
| 25 November | Arrival of the first Shelter Cluster coordinator in Mali |
| 27 November | Official activation date of the Shelter and NFI Cluster |
| 29 November | 198,558 IDPs |
| 29 November | Donors have provided \$127.7m, 60% of total requirements. |
| 07 December | 1 st meeting of Shelter Cluster held at UNHCR is attended by nine agencies. Cluster structure will include SAG, TWIGs and field based focal points. |
| ? December | First Shelter Technical Adviser leaves after approximately two weeks. |
| 20 December | UNSC adopts resolution 2085 authorizing deployment of international forces in Mali. EU deploys military training mission. |
| 2013 | |
| 08 January | Islamist advance into Mopti. Mali requests French military assistance. |
| 08 January | UNHCR has appointed second Technical Adviser Oxfam is leading reactivated Cash Transfer Group following request by ERC that the Shelter Cluster explore this option. A TWIG has been established to set out criteria for NFI distribution |
| 11 January | Operation Serval begins with French airstrikes |
| 16 January | French ground operations begin with support from ECOWAS, UK and USA |
| 16 January | 228,920 IDPs, including 8,700 displaced since 10 January |
| 16 January | Shelter Cluster TWIG meets at DGPC in Bamako to discuss local shelter focal points and shelter kits. Shelter Technical Adviser has been appointed. |
| 29 January | Mali 2013 CAP is launched. It requests US\$370m to assist 4.3m people. |

| | |
|-------------|---|
| 30 January | Gao, Timbuktu, Kidal by now recaptured by French and Malian forces |
| 31 January | IOM estimates 14,242 new IDPs in Ségou, Mopti and Bamako. |
| 05 February | CAP increased to US\$373.1m. Donors have provided \$7,613,821, 2% of total requirements. |
| 08 February | First suicide bombings in Malian history in Gao. |
| 13 February | Donors have provided \$10,021,526, 3% of total requirements (34.1% for Shelter Cluster needs). |
| 13 February | 20 % of <i>banco</i> shelters in north (3,272 structures) need repair or reconstruction. Shelter Cluster Technical Adviser has been assigned to Mopti to assess needs in north and support coordination of shelter activities. |
| 20 February | 260,665 IDPs |
| 20 February | Shelter Cluster Technical Adviser and NRC have developed shelter kit |
| 13 March | Donors have provided \$56m, 15% of requirements (40.6% of shelter and NFI needs) |
| 15 March | 270,765 IDPs |
| 15 March | TWIG meeting on NFI vulnerability and targeting criteria |
| 28 March | Shelter Cluster Coordinator leaves after 3.5 months. Interim coordinator from UNCR Shelter & Settlements Department takes over. |
| 31 March | Shelter Cluster Information Manager leaves after 3.5 months. Information management role taken on by UNHCR. |
| 27 March | In south, cases of IDP families unable to pay rent being evicted (Bamako, Mopti, Ségou) have been reported. Many host families live in overcrowded homes. NRC is conducting a study on living conditions of IDPs in host families or rented houses in Bamako and Ségou. In north, mud houses of displaced families need maintenance. Some have been looted. |
| 08 April | Interim Shelter Cluster Coordinator distributes draft strategy |
| 09 April | Interim Shelter Cluster Coordinator prepares draft cluster Factsheet |
| 10 April | The sub-cluster in Mopti estimates that 4,000 homes in north require major repairs. This includes 2,500 nomad tents that have been damaged. With an estimated \$540 to repair a home and \$240 to repair a nomad tent, the cost of the operation is \$2.3 million (excluding labour). |
| 10 April | CERF allocates \$16 million for life-saving projects. CAP donors have provided \$104.8 m, 25.6% of requirements. (35.5% of shelter/NFI needs) |
| 20 April | Interim Shelter Cluster Coordinator conducts internal evaluation and leaves. The Technical Adviser spends a month in Bamako, preparing the CAP until a new coordinator arrives in June. |
| 25 April | UNSC establishes MINUSMA with up to 11,400 military, up to 1,440 international police and civil component. MINUSMA will help to create secure environment for civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance. |
| 25 April | There are few humanitarian actors giving cash to help with housing costs (70 to 75% of IDPs are renters). There is no support for improvement of host family living conditions. |
| 30 April | 300,783 IDPs |
| 04 May | Suicide bombing in Gao region |
| 07 May | CAP donors have provided \$114m, 28% of total requirements (covering 32% of shelter and NFI needs) |
| 21 May | 301,027 IDPs |
| 18 June | Government of Mali, MNLA and HCUA sign ceasefire agreement |
| 21 June | 353,455 IDPs |
| 26 June | Shelter Cluster meets for the first time since March. SAG, TWIG and Cash |

| | |
|-------------|---|
| | Working Group require reactivation and/or support. |
| 15 July | AQIM confirms it has killed hostage in retaliation for French-led intervention |
| 16 July | CAP donors have provided \$142m, 30% of total requirements (covering 25% of shelter and NFI needs) |
| 19 July | Shelter needs and gaps: reconstruction in returnee areas in Mopti; rehabilitation of houses and tents for nomads to protect from rain; rehabilitation of shelters in north; support for rebuilding flood-damaged shelters in Kayes. |
| 25 July | 342,033 IDPS |
| 28 July | First round of presidential elections passes off peacefully. |
| 30 July | CAP donors have provided \$152m, 32% of total requirements (covering 25% of shelter and NFI needs) |
| 9-12 August | Heavy rains cause flooding in Ségou and Kidal. In Ségou, floods have affected 10,700 people, destroying numerous houses. |
| 26 August | CAP donors have provided \$168m, 35% of total requirements (covering 25% of shelter and NFI needs) |
| 26 August | The Government is establishing a cell to coordinate actions with NGOs, UN agencies and donors. Inter agency coordination groups are operating in Mopti and Gao. IASC cluster performance evaluation is ongoing. |
| July/August | Presidential election won by former Prime Minister Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, |
| 31 October | 283,726 IDPs. Most are in Bamako (67,250 persons), followed by Gao (47,562 persons). IOM estimates that 137,422 individuals have returned to Gao and Timbuktu regions since May 2013. |
| | As of October 31, 283,726 people have been identified as displaced in the country, representing a decrease from the peak of 333,622 reached in August and of 311 300 estimated in September. |
| 02 November | Two French journalists kidnapped in Kidal and killed by AQIM. |
| 04 November | CAP donors have provided \$222m, 46.6% of total requirements (covering 35% of shelter and NFI needs) |

Annex 2 Evaluation informants

| | | |
|------------------------|--|---|
| Etienne Pouret | ACTED | Chef de Projet |
| Saku Moussa | CARE | |
| Docteur Fanèké Dembélé | Direction Générale de la Protection | Médecin Commandant; Médecin Chef de la Protection Civile du Mali |
| Nanthilde Kamara | Food Security Cluster Mali / FAO-PAM * | Cluster Coordinator |
| Timo Lüge | Global Shelter Cluster | Global Focal Point for Communication and Advocacy |
| Vincent Annoni | Global Shelter Cluster / REACH | Global Focal Point for Assessment, Monitoring & Evaluation |
| Jules Amoti | ICRC | Coordinateur Sécurité Économique |
| Diaratou Bamba | ICRC | Assistant à la coordination Département Sécurité Économique |
| Codé Cisse | INTERSOS | Head of Mission |
| Joseph Ashmore | IOM | Global Focal Point for Coordination (first Shelter Technical Adviser, Mali) |
| Nuno Nunes | IOM | CCCM Global Cluster Coordinator |
| Hélène Bailly | IOM Mali | Coordinatrice projet |
| Juliane Quintero | IOM Mali | Public Information Officer |
| Nestor Girukwishaka | NRC | Shelter Program Manager |
| Anne-Céline Delinger | Nutrition Cluster, Mali / UNICEF * | Information Manager, |
| Noel P. Tsekouras | OCHA-ROCWA | Deputy Head of Office |
| Badjougué Dembélé | Oxfam GB Mali | Coordinateur Sécurité Alimentaire et Moyen d'Existence en Urgence (for Cash Transfer Working Group) |
| Jean Ruberintwari | Shelter Cluster Mali / UNHCR | Shelter Cluster Coordinator |
| Ambiré Dolo | Shelter Cluster Mali/ UNHCR | Conseiller technique abris |

| | | |
|---|----------------------------------|---|
| Ivan Vuarambon | UNHCR | Global Focal Point for Coordination (Interim Shelter Cluster Coordinator, Mali) |
| Miguel Urquia | UNHCR | Senior Emergency Shelter Coordinator - Shelter and Settlement Section |
| Sébastien Apatita | UNHCR Mali | Senior Field Coordinator |
| Etienne Rusamira | UNHCR Mali | Information Management Officer |
| James Léon-Dufour | UNHCR Mali | Information Management Officer |
| Yehia Ag Souleymane and UNHCR-assisted IDPs | UNHCR Mali | Associé de la Protection Sociale |
| Charles Campbell | UNHCR RRWA Dakar, Senegal | Senior Regional Shelter Officer |
| Katherine Echeverri | USAID / OFDA | Program Officer |
| Kakou Arsene Batcho | WASH Cluster, Mali / UNICEF * | Cluster Coordinator |
| Marie-Françoise I. Sitnam | World Vision International | Protection & Advisor IDP Response Coordinator |

* Denotes email exchange only

Annex 3 Agency representation at Shelter Cluster meetings 06/12/12 to 25/09/13

| 06/12/12 | 08/01/13 | 16/01/13 | 20/02/13 | 28/03/13 | 26/06/13 | 24/07/13 | 29/08/13 | 25/09/13 |
|----------------|-----------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------------------|--------------------|----------|--------------|--------------|-------------------|
| ACTED | ACTED | ACTED | ACTED | ACTED | ACTED | | | ACTED |
| | | | | | | | | ADRA |
| | | | | | ARAW | ARAW | ARAW | |
| | Association de PDIs | | Association de PDIs | | | | | |
| | Canadian Embassy | | Canadian Embassy | | | | | |
| CARE | CARE | | | | | | | |
| CRS | CRS | | CRS | | | | CRS | |
| | | | | DDC | | | | |
| DGPC | DGPC | DGPC | DGPC | | DGPC | DGPC | | DGPC |
| | | DNAT | DNAT | | | | | |
| | | DNUH | DNUH | | | | | |
| | | | | DNDS | | | | |
| | | | | | DNHH | | | |
| | | | | | | ICRC | | |
| | IFRC | IFRC | | | | | | |
| | | | | IMADEL | | | | IMADEL |
| REACH | | | | | | | | |
| | INTERSOS Mopti | | INTERSOS | INTERSOS | INTERSOS | | | |
| IOM | IOM | | IOM | IOM | IOM | IOM | IOM | IOM |
| | IRC | | | IRC | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | Islamic Relief |
| Mali Red Cross | | Mali Red Cross | | | | | | Mali Red Cross |
| | | | | Mercy Corps | | | | |
| | Ministère de l'Action Humanitaire | | Ministère de l'Action Humanitaire | | | | | |
| NRC | NRC | NRC | NRC | NRC | NRC | | NRC | |
| | OCHA | OCHA | OCHA | | OCHA | OCHA | | OCHA |
| | Oxfam GB | | Oxfam GB | | Oxfam GB | | Oxfam GB | |
| | Protection Cluster | | | Protection Cluster | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | Save the Children |
| | | | SOS Attitude | | | | | |
| UNHCR | UNHCR | UNHCR | UNHCR Mopti | UNHCR | UNHCR | UNHCR | UNHCR | |
| UNICEF | UNICEF | UNICEF | UNICEF | UNICEF | | | | |
| | | | USAID | USAID | USAID | USAID | | |
| WASH Cluster | WASH Cluster | | WASH Cluster | | | | | |
| | WFP | | | | | | | |
| | World Vision | | World Vision | | | World Vision | World Vision | |
| 10 | 20 | 10 | 19 | 13 | 11 | 8 | 7 | 9 |

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