



Pakistan Flood Response 2007

Review of the Shelter Working Group

INTERNAL



Executive Summary

The response of the humanitarian community to the Pakistan floods of June 2007 has been a very mixed affair, characterised by poor availability of funding, restricted access to affected areas and limited will from government counterparts to coordinate with the cluster system. Given these significant external constraints, it has proved difficult to judge the performance of the Emergency Shelter Working Group (ESWG) independently from the shortcomings of the wider cluster system used to respond to the Pakistan Floods¹.

Nonetheless, this review, undertaken at the three month mark after the floods, has sought to identify those issues that require improvement and has produced ten key recommendations for IFRC in its future role as 'convener of the ESWG', which are listed below. Other recommendations are contained within the body of the review report to follow.

This review acknowledges the hard work and commitment made by those that set up and ran the ESWG and notes that there were a number of distinct successes in a difficult working environment.

Key Recommendations

1. The UN system should be encouraged to adhere to the agreed IASC procedures for future roll out of the cluster approach. It was not clear whether or not the Government of Pakistan had agreed to a cluster approach for the flood response. This suggests that neither the humanitarian country team nor the Government was adequately consulted by the RC office and that agreed IASC procedures were subsequently not followed. This needs correction for future emergency response.

2. Clarify the role of the ESWG in the formulation and editing of the flash appeal. If the ESWG is to support the formation of the flash appeal in future cluster-led responses, it must be assured an executive role in the final submission for the shelter component. If this cannot be agreed, then ESWG should assume a more neutral role in future flash appeals, or withdraw from the process altogether.

¹ Refer to DFID Evaluation and IASC RTE.

3. Deploy human resources for a shelter cluster secretariat within 3 days. Given the speed of decision making for emergency shelter programming and national sensitivities concerning international humanitarian activity in an area with security concerns, the arrival of the coordinator nine days after the emergency proved too late to influence the design and implementation of the rapid joint assessment which failed to reliably establish shelter needs on the ground. Efforts were made to for others to assume a leadership role in the interim period, although some confusion remained. Similarly, the arrival of the technical advisor to the working group later still in mid-July meant that much of the excellent technical support literature produced remained unused and was too late to influence the actions of those shelter actors with resources from the outset including the Government of Pakistan. This raises a difficult issue concerning how far IFRC should rely upon contracting independent consultants for first wave, time-sensitive deployments.

4. Review the triggers within IFRC to support the cluster secretariat with dedicated IM staff. The chronic lack of available quality baseline data for shelter need meant meaningful gap analysis remained elusive. This detail was not overlooked by donors. Whilst the commodity tracking made available through the cluster proved useful to some members of the humanitarian community and to the government for planning their ongoing relief distributions, it could not be combined with a credible estimate of baseline need and hence did not significantly impact upon the decision-making of operational agencies in the field to meet identified gaps. Whilst this can be partially attributed to a lack of IM capacity and field coordination support from OCHA, the joint assessment and a lack of available disaggregated distribution data from the Government of Pakistan, the shelter working group suffered from a lack of its own dedicated IM support and information gathering capacity at hub and field level to provide sector-specific analysis.

5. Institutionalise country-level support from other shelter agencies to second personnel to the working group secretariat at the onset of future cluster responses. Staff to support technical advice, information management and field level coordination as part of the working group secretariat should be proactively sought from participating shelter agencies either at the onset of a future cluster approach or, preferably, prior to an emergency as part of IFRC disaster management programming in Pakistan. A technical advisor was seconded to the cluster from Care International, together with a hub coordinator from Islamic relief, although these arrangements were too late to significantly influence the decisions of shelter agencies already on the ground.

6. Where access and cluster funds are limited, explore alternative shelter cluster assessment options using agencies and individuals on the ground to better describe shelter needs and a gap analysis. The rapid joint assessment based upon helicopter flyovers and discussions at the district level was too large, too general and too late to be a

useful planning tool for shelter. It was further overly reliant upon damage and displacement levels as a proxy for shelter need and did not meaningfully account for underlying poverty levels and self-help recovery capacity. An alternative assessment approach that aims to cover less ground with more depth and a smaller group of experienced nationals might well have produced a more useful baseline for shelter need.

7. The working group coordinator should keep in regular contact with IFRC delegation and the national society during deployment. There was a perception among some staff in both IFRC and PRCS that expensive consultants were being used to '*specify bamboo and plastic tarpaulins*'. Whilst this is an understandable concern given the wider failings of the cluster system in this response, many were unaware of the wider advocacy role and political processes that the cluster lead role supports. Closer and sustained communication is required between an incoming cluster lead, the IFRC delegation and PRCS management to ensure that expectations on both sides are managed properly. This amounts to little in the way of additional workload and need not compromise the neutrality of the cluster lead vis-a-vis the cluster members.

8. Use the PFIC flood response website as point of departure for design of future shelter cluster websites. The shelter cluster website, designed and maintained by the NGO IASCI, was well designed, easy to use and provided a structured support tool to the cluster for shelter strategy, technical data, contacts and advocacy messages and 3W. The limited data available for commodity tracking and gap analysis was also made available together with a record of the process of decision making, which promoted transparency. IFRC should promote this format for future shelter coordination, whether or not the facility is managed by OCHA or IFRC.

9. Where the shelter working group is deemed to have a weak voice, advocacy should explore other channels. The advocacy channels of the shelter working group might have been reviewed in light of the fact that leverage with NDMA was very weak. Established agencies, including PRCS and UNHCR, had much better stronger influence with both central government counterparts as well as with officials at the field level. These channels might have been more effectively exploited as a vehicle for transferring advocacy messages emerging from the shelter working group concerning standard and gaps in government assistance.

10. IFRC should promote the need for a minimum hub/field level coordination to support residual shelter relief operations as part of the handover from ESWG to Early Recovery coordination. While the number of operational agencies involved in residual shelter relief is small, the early recovery cluster is both under-funded and almost entirely focused upon planning for the reconstruction phase and is not in a position to provide necessary field coordination and monitoring of residual shelter activities. Coordination for

these activities is now effectively reduced to updating the distribution spreadsheet to be shared with the government, yet evidence of overlapping assistance from the field trip as part of this review in Sindh province clearly indicates the need for a small cluster team of national staff based in field hubs to feed such information back to UN-Habitat. The emerging profile of residual shelter vulnerability might also have been better described as families return home in large numbers revealing the true gaps in assistance for emergency shelter. Given the absence of a capacity within UN-Habitat, IFRC promote the continued need for a minimum of field level coordination and commodity tracking after the closure of the ESWG when required.

Contents

Abbreviations	7
1 Introduction	8
1.1 Review methodology	8
1.2 Chronology of key events.....	8
2 Shelter Strategy	11
3 Coordination.....	14
4 Advocacy	16
5 Resource Mobilization.....	17
6 Assessment of shelter needs and gap analysis	19
7 Information management.....	23
8 Technical Advice.....	24
9 Exit & Handover	28
10 RC/RC support to the cluster.....	29
Author	35
Appendices	35
I Review Informants.....	35
II Cluster Meeting Attendance	35
III Terms of Reference for the ESWG Review	35
IV Event timeline for the emergency shelter cluster	35
V Document References.....	35
VI Semi-structured interview used for Review.....	35
VII Emergency shelter distributions (early August 2007)	35
VIII Consultant travel and use of time.....	35
IX Suggested revisions to the Terms of Reference for an ESWG Coordinator.....	35

Abbreviations

ACTED - Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development
CCCM – Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster
CERF – Central Emergency Response Fund
CRS – Catholic Relief Services
DDMA – District Disaster Management Authority
DM – Disaster Management
ESWG – Emergency Shelter Working Group
FACT – Field Assessment and Coordination Team
GIS – Geographic Information System
GoP – Government of Pakistan
IFRC – International Federation of the Red Cross
INGO – International Non-Governmental Organisation
IASC – Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IASCI – International Agency for Source Country Information
LNGO – Local Non-Governmental Organisation
M&E – Monitoring and Evaluation
NDMA – National Disaster Management Authority
NFI – Non-Food item
OCHA – Organisation for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PRCS – Pakistan Red Crescent Society
PDMA – Provincial Disaster Management Authority
RC – United Nations Resident Coordinator
RC/RC – Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement
RTE – Real Time Evaluation
SAG – Strategic Advisory Group
TOR – Terms of Reference
TWG – Technical Working Group
UC – Union Council
UNCT – United Nations Country Team
UNDAC - The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UN-H – United Nations Conference on Human Settlements
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
VCA – Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
WB – World Bank

1 Introduction

This review seeks to describe how the Emergency Shelter Working Group (ESWG) coordination mechanism has added value to the humanitarian response for the floods that occurred in Pakistan in June 2007 and to recommend improvements for the future. The review has focused upon several discrete areas including; the development of shelter strategy (chapter 2), coordination between shelter stakeholders (chapter 3), advocacy with government (chapter 4), resource mobilization for shelter activities (Chapter 5) the assessment of shelter needs (chapter 6), information management (chapter 7), the scope and quality of technical advice (chapter 8) and exit and handover (chapter 9). Finally, the RC/RC role in supporting the ESWG for the flood response is discussed in chapter 10. The full terms of reference for the assessment are contained in appendix III.

1.1 Review methodology

The opinions and experience of a wide range of participants and stakeholders in the ESWG were collected using a semi-structured interview questionnaire (appendix VI). Interviews were conducted with representatives from international and national NGOs, government officials and UN agency staff. Staff from IFRC headquarters in Geneva and the delegation in Islamabad have also been consulted, as well as senior representatives from the Pakistan Red Crescent Society at national, provincial and field offices. Finally, a field visit was made to PRCS shelter distribution sites in Larkana district where it was possible to consult with flood victims in three villages. Interviews were conducted by phone and email where it was not possible to arrange a meeting in person. A list of the key informants to this review is provided in appendix I.

The review took place over a three week period from 20th September to 10th October, including an 11 day field trip to Pakistan. A travel record of the review mission can be found in appendix VIII.

1.2 Chronology of key events

Before discussing the performance of the shelter cluster, it is worth briefly reviewing some key milestones in the coordination process from the onset of the floods to the closure of the Emergency Shelter Working Group. For a more detailed evaluation of the cluster process as a whole refer to the recently published IASC Real Time Evaluation. Figure 1 below describes some of the key milestones.

Figure 1 Coordination Milestones

Date	Milestone
24th June	UN DMT meet to discuss floods
27th June	Floods reach disaster scale
	GoP announces emergency in the two affected provinces
	decision was reportedly made internally to implement clusters by RC office
2nd July	Clusters officially rolled out by IASC CT and OCHA NY
3 rd July	IFRC Geneva asks UN-H staff in-country to chair the new ESWG
	IFRC FACT team arrive in Pakistan
4th July	UNDAC Team arrive in Pakistan
	IFRC preliminary appeal launched
5th July	ESWG coordinator (JBS) arrives in Pakistan
9th July	Joint Rapid Assessment Started
14th July	Joint Rapid Assessment ends
15th July	ESWG Technical Advisor (KC) arrives in Pakistan
	UN Flash Appeal sent to OCHA in NY and revised downwards
17 th July	Revised IFRC Appeal issued
18th July	Revised UN Flash Appeal issued
23rd July	UN Flash Appeal Revised (31% funded)
25th July	IFRC FACT team leaves Pakistan
30th July	ESWG Strategy Published (draft A)
1st August	Follow-on ESWG Cluster Lead (JR) arrives for handover period
15th August	ESWG Cluster Lead (JSB) hands over to JR
17th August	ESWG Technical Advisor (KC) leaves Pakistan
	WB & ADB conducted Damage and loss assessment
31st August	ESWG Cluster Lead (JR) hands over to UN-H and ESWG closed

By the 27th June, it became clear that the extent of the floods in Sindh and Baluchistan provinces had reached disaster proportions. The Government, however, did not declare an international emergency and placed the new National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) in charge of organizing a relief effort. IFRC were contacted by a representative of the UN RC's office, and informed that the activation of four clusters was proposed including shelter. IFRC agreed that this was an appropriately modest approach, and advised the IFRC representative at the humanitarian country team meeting to support this proposal. A day

later, however, the IASC CT and OCHA formally announced that the full complement of clusters would be used to coordinate the international response in support of the government. It was not clear how this decision had been made and who had been involved, but it was certainly clear that the IASC guidelines for rollout of the cluster approach had not been followed. The Government appeared only lukewarm to the idea of a cluster approach and later reports indicate that they had only agreed to four clusters for WASH, early recovery, health and emergency shelter. The UNDAC team arrived in the midst of this confusion and was not granted free access to the affected areas which further delayed an assessment of need.

In the meantime, an ESWG was then subsequently formed and UN-Habitat Pakistan was asked by IFRC to convene the meetings whilst a dedicated coordinator could be found. Agencies already on the ground prior to the floods began distributions of non-food items, including tents and plastic sheeting, using stockpiled material. The Government announced its intention to distribute up to 90,000 tents through its Emergency Relief Cell as well as providing cash grants of 250 USD to each family with a destroyed house upon their return home.

The first shelter ESWG coordinator for IFRC arrived on the 5th July². By this time, other cluster heads had already met and had jointly decided to undertake a rapid joint assessment. The assessment was hampered by delays due to the many parties involved and was not able to access all affected areas. Partial damage data from the assessment, however, did emerge in time to be combined with shelter commodity tracking data and this gap analysis formed the basis for the flash appeal. A draft shelter strategy was produced in consultation with the Islamabad ESWG in time for the appeal based upon a shelter kit and tools. The ESWG technical advisor then led the development of more detailed options for non-tent shelter support³.

The original flash appeal was for 88M USD, which was later reduced to 38M USD of which 12M USD was funded (33%). In the meantime IFRC had run its own flash appeal, raising 8.8M USD (52%). The lower than expected response to both flash appeals meant that very few shelter agencies were significantly involved in shelter activities after July, and participation in the ESCG dropped off sharply from this point. From here on the ESCG focused upon maintaining the shelter commodity tracking function and advocating with government for shelter-related early recovery programmes and residual gaps in emergency shelter relief. IFRC handed over the coordination of residual emergency shelter activities to UN-Habitat on 31st August 2007.

² The first Cluster coordinator was James Shepherd-Barron, who handed over to Jyri Rantanen

³ The Technical Advisor was Kate Crawford who was seconded to the cluster by Care International

2 Shelter Strategy

The shelter strategy developed by the working group was a well-worked document based upon the majority view of working group participants in Islamabad produced in time to inform the Flash Appeal. It described the need for non-tented shelter assistance as well as shelter 'software' programming, such as training and disaster risk reduction, which could be funded as part of an emergency response but would benefit later phases of recovery. This was by now a familiar model of assistance in Pakistan following the earthquake two years previously, but the need for its reiteration remained given the large number of new personnel in the working group without prior experience of shelter relief in Pakistan. The bill of quantities for a generic shelter provided a useful platform for budgeting and the performance indicators provided a tool for alignment of overall levels of assistance between agencies. The document also proved useful for donors to use in subsequent discussions with shelter agencies about their programme proposals.

Figure 2 IFRC/PRCS shelter kits



It is not clear, however, to what extent the detail of the published strategy was accepted by shelter agencies and individuals whose centre of gravity lay outside Islamabad or by those agencies with their own resources already on the ground at the start of the cluster process. Actors involved in shelter, including NRC, Concern and UNHCR, were all providing differing types of shelter assistance, understood as 'emergency shelter', 'transitional shelter' and 'shelter NFIs' interchangeably. While the use of relief stockpiles inevitably meant initial distributions were not standardized, subsequent efforts were not made to align or account for these differences within the cluster strategy as the response moved forward. This may reflect

a disconnect between Islamabad and the field, and between the shelter activities of the CCCM cluster and the ESWG.

Shelter vulnerability and equity of support to vulnerable groups were overviewed in the strategy, however, beneficiary selection criteria remained ambiguous particularly concerning how to account for underlying poverty and whether the receipt of government assistance would impact upon eligibility for shelter assistance from working group participants. The field visit conducted as part of this review in September 2007 noted that between 20-40% of returned families had received cash from the government, although this was likely to be under-reported given the mobility of families between displacement sites who may have already collected grants. In a relief environment where the ESWG played only a minor role in the emergency and transitional shelter response, these issues perhaps should have been addressed more concretely.

The ESCG, however, was beset with a more fundamental problem, as it was effectively split into two groups in terms of need for support: shelter agencies with their own resources and those without. Those agencies with resources reportedly needed timely assistance with shelter standards, field level assessment and real time monitoring to improve quality assurance and to harmonise beneficiary selection criteria. Agencies without resources needed baseline data and a suitable framework from which to appeal for resources from the flash appeal. The subsequent decision taken by the coordinator to focus upon resource mobilization requirements for under-funded NGOs dominated the activity of the ESCG, perhaps at the expense of other essential functions required to support operational agencies. This dichotomy of needs within the working group meant that it was impossible to satisfy all participating agencies with the limited time and staff in the cluster secretariat and raises some important questions about how IFRC should position itself in relation to the UN coordination framework, NGOs and government in the future, particularly where funds and access is limited and government support for a high profile international humanitarian coordination mechanism is weak.

Notwithstanding these comments, it is important to note that only a few shelter agencies had technical advisors on the ground and prepared to meaningfully contribute to the development of a shelter strategy in cluster meetings. This was due, in part, to the lack of funds and the lack of access to affected areas for international staff. Participating shelter agencies within the ESWG must bear the bulk of responsibility for any shortcomings of the shelter strategy.


Recommendations

- ***The UN system should be encouraged to adhere to the agreed IASC procedures for future roll out of the cluster approach.*** It was not clear whether or not the Government of Pakistan had agreed to a cluster approach for the flood response. This suggests that neither the humanitarian country team nor the Government was adequately consulted by the RC office and that agreed IASC procedures were subsequently not followed. This needs correction for future emergency response.
- ***Deploy a ESWG coordinator within three days.*** Given the speed of decision making for emergency shelter programming and the precipitous position of the coordination mechanism from the outset, the arrival of the coordinator nine days after the emergency proved too late to influence the design and implementation of the rapid joint assessment and the activities of shelter agencies already on the ground. Interim measures were put in place for others to lead the ESWG whilst a IFRC coordinator was found although, in this case, key strategic advice concerning assessment and draft strategy went lacking.
- ***Develop clearer beneficiary selection criteria in the shelter strategy.*** The shelter strategy needed clearer discussion of beneficiary selection criteria. This bears consequence for assessment method, monitoring and evaluation and the development of a performance management system for the ESWG.

3 Coordination

The main working group coordination meetings were run out of Islamabad. Meetings ran from the 4th July (led by UN-Habitat, then by IFRC from the 10th July to 16th August. Figure 3 below illustrates attendance at the IFRC meetings.

Figure 3 Attendance at Working Group Meetings



A strategic advisory panel (SAG) and a technical working group (TWG) were set up quickly in Islamabad to develop working group strategy. ESWG ‘hubs’ in Larkana and Quetta were established shortly after, led by two NGOs (one national, one international) to provide field level coordination and feed information to the central working group in Islamabad. The coordinator also made regular trips to Quetta to support provincial coordination and one later trip to Karachi and Larkana.

Many agencies expressed their gratitude to the ESWG for making the best of a difficult situation. Having ‘someone who understood the system’ who was focused upon shelter was appreciated by many agencies who recognized the need to harmonise assistance among a multitude of actors and of the need to maintain a capacity to identify and assist the most vulnerable flood affected groups in a systematic and sustained manner.

Attendance at the main working group meetings, as well as SAG and TWG panel meetings, however, was inconsistent and it further proved difficult to directly involve field-based staff in discussions, which may have led to less buy-in from decision makers. While it was not possible to visit Quetta as part of the review, several agencies reported that meetings in this location did allow for improved information sharing between implementing agencies, although it was judged as too far from the affected areas in Baluchistan province to provide useful monitoring data and was further not sustained beyond August 2007. Hub coordination in Larkana was reported as largely ineffectual, partly because a lack of capacity and partly because of the reluctance of the Sindh provincial government to coordinate with NGOs.

The IFRC FACT team, UNHCR and other major agencies involved in assessing shelter needs, did attend ESWG meetings and shared information, but this was not sustained, and the cluster as a group suffered as a consequence. There are of course inevitable pressing demands on time for any emergency assessment team, but there needs to be greater buy in and commitment from the major shelter actors, including IFRC, to support the ESWG as an entity in order to be effective in the future. Comments that *'results of cluster coordination have not been useful'* may well be true in this case, but the responsibility for this outcome lie with ESWG participants as much as with the secretariat. *'Collective responsibility'* must be better promoted in future.

A concerted effort was made to support inter-cluster coordination at the heads of clusters meetings, building upon lessons learnt from the earthquake response, but lack of funds to coordinate with, the separation of the clusters lead offices and the influence of lead agency priorities upon other cluster leads meant that decision making to promote inter-sector synergies was hampered.

There were also reports that NDMA felt they were not kept up to data on a regular basis with ESWG activities. This was despite the availability of shelter coordination information on the PFIC website (see appendix V). The fact that NDMA and the PDMA's were largely unwilling to share information and coordinate with the clusters was probably the greater reason for the problems in coordination with government, but also indicates the need for regular physical copies of data and strategies to be supplied to NDMA⁴.

Recommendations

- ***In such cases where security and access is poor and government is strong, humanitarian coordination mechanisms need a low-key branding whilst***

⁴ It should be noted that whilst every attempt was made to meet and interview with NDMA staff, it was only possible to interview the NDMA liaison officer within UNDP. Thus, the views of NDMA represented in this review are not fully represented.

providing for a quiet diplomacy behind the scenes, ensuring those who are already operational are filtered by the ESWG to be served first. The working group might then look for 'niches to add value'.

- ***Institutionalise country-level support from other shelter agencies to second personnel to the working group secretariat at the onset of future cluster responses.*** Staff from other agencies, including Care international and Islamic Relief, were identified to take leading roles in developing technical advice and hub coordination in Quetta. In future, however, staff might be found earlier from participating shelter agencies either at the onset of a future cluster approach or, preferably, prior to an emergency as part of IFRC disaster management programming in Pakistan. Agreeing secondment arrangements with agencies for the ESWG secretariat, at the national, regional or global level, will further promote buy-in and joint ownership of coordination, which is essential to the success of any cluster initiative.
- ***Field/hub coordination staff was needed to support a bottom-up approach to working group leadership.*** Coordination in the capital was overall judged to be good but it was too far from field activity in the provinces. Value could have been added by focusing more effort and resources to increase the 'upward information flow' from the districts rather than a top down approach from Islamabad.
- ***Consider supporting the co-location of future cluster lead offices to promote better information sharing and promote firewalls between lead agencies.*** It is critically important to promote inter-sectoral decision making. Although this is primarily an OCHA-role they should be supported to sustain interaction between cluster coordinators. The positive feedback from co-locating cluster offices in Yogyakarta is evidence that such an approach can yield more efficient and holistic planning.
- ***Provide government authorities with regular updates with physical copies of coordination documents.***

4 Advocacy

The ESWG had limited leverage over certain issues concerning shelter policy with NDMA, due in part to the confusion over appropriate humanitarian coordination structures and the limited resources available to cluster.

NDMA is a new institution in Pakistan and led by a personality with a more traditional military management style than other previous relief authorities. *'Relief hardware and not software'* was required to buy a seat at the decision-making table with the government. A cursory review of the 'funding dependent' column for shelter relief from the commodity tracking sheet in early August illustrates the lack of concrete resources available and underlines its weak advocacy position with the government (refer to Appendix VII). Given the current wider political and security problems in Western Pakistan, the vocal remonstrations about the 'humanitarian imperative' and access through cluster/working group channels was viewed as ineffectual and even counter productive by some of those interviewed, and demanded an alternative approach to both implementation and advocacy.

The ESWG did respond to these challenges by encouraging LNGOs and others to speak independently to Government and the press to promote best practice and identified gaps, although achieved only limited results. Larger actors with established channels, such as PRCS and UNHCR, might have been engaged more directly to discuss differences in standards of assistance, gaps in distributions, and differences in beneficiary targeting which may have had greater impact.

There were some successes with shelter advocacy, however, particularly in highlighting the need for Government to support early recovery programming. The non-tent shelter model, construction training and disaster risk reduction programming and the promotion of community-based decision making may well have influenced the early recovery framework and principles published by NDMA in September 2007.

Recommendation

- ***Where the ESCG is deemed to have a weak voice, advocacy should explore other channels.*** Established agencies with a pre-disaster field presence, including PRCS and UNHCR, had stronger influence with both central government counterparts as well as with officials at the field level. These channels might have been more effectively exploited as vehicles for transferring advocacy messages emerging from the ESWG.

5 Resource Mobilization

Resource mobilization through clusters has been fraught with problems in nearly all emergency responses where the cluster approach has been used. In the case of the flood response, it has proved a particularly sensitive issue for IFRC, in terms of demands upon resources for coordination, maintaining neutrality and a credible leadership role. The IASC Real Time Evaluation report for the flood response deals with wider structural issues

concerning resource mobilization, so comments here relate specifically to the shelter components of the CERF and the Flash Appeal.

Large amounts of time and effort were committed by both the ESWG coordinator and participating agencies to develop the flash appeal. Restrictions were placed on agencies approaching donors bilaterally and a substantial amount of work went into aligning proposals and developing funding criteria. The coordinator was reportedly thorough and consistent in his efforts to compile all proposals into an appeal document, but the process for developing the final appeal was far from transparent. Several shelter agencies that were asked to participate in the original flash appeal had their proposals moved from the ESWG to Early Recovery for the final appeal submission to OCHA in New York, with no explanation why this was done. The delay in the flash appeal also led some INGOs to bypass the ESWG altogether and negotiate directly with NDMA and donors. Donors had explicitly mentioned that the flash appeal would only fund activities for the first three months of the response, which effectively meant most 'early recovery' programmes were not fundable. This caused considerable resentment among participating agencies and damaged the credibility of IFRC as ESWG convener.

There was also lack of clarity among the cluster about how shelter agencies proposals were reviewed for the final flash appeal submission. It was the Strategic Advisory Group within the ESWG that evaluated the capacity of shelter agency and then edited proposals. This is the best way of undertaking such an exercise, as it spreads the decision making within nominated members of the ESWG and places the coordinator as a facilitation rather than a decision maker, leaving the RC/RC movement in a more neutral role. This, however, needs further clarification with ESWG participants and OCHA.

A number of national NGOs were also unhappy with the way they had been involved in the flash appeal. Several agencies complained they had been used to provide field data and add local credibility to the appeal, but were then either dropped completely or used as contractors rather than partners to deliver shelter programmes for international agencies, once limited resources were made available.

There was also a perception among many INGOs that available funds went to the UN first via the CERF at the expense of non-UN proposals within the flash appeal. Replenishing UN stockpiles with CERF funds was thought by several NGOs to encourage supply-led approaches and limits funding opportunities for smaller non-UN agencies. Whilst there is a strong counter argument to support the use of CERF to fund UN agencies on the ground with relief stocks during the initial response phase, the mechanisms of appropriating CERF funds needs to be made much clearer to those outside the UN if there is to support for clusters from non-UN actors in the future.

IFRC in Geneva has also expressed its concerns about the leadership role to determine who receives financial resources through appeals and who bearing the responsibility for such decisions. The emerging financial reforms within the UN in Pakistan and elsewhere may well place IFRC in a difficult position in the future, particularly in relation to whether pooled funding from the UN via humanitarian donors can be handed over to an ESWG for onward distribution. This also bears implication for the role and responsibility of donors and needs further discussion at global and country levels.

Recommendations

- ***Clarify the role of the ESWG in the formulation and editing of the flash appeal.***
If the ESWG is to support the formation of the flash appeal in future cluster-led responses, it must be assured an executive role in the final submission for the shelter component. If this cannot be agreed, then ESWG should assume a more neutral role in future flash appeals, or withdraw from the process altogether.
- ***Clarify the role of the Strategic Advisory Group within the ESWG in determining the shelter component of a flash appeal.***
- ***Preparing for a flash appeal is a full time job for a coordinator at the start of an emergency response.*** *The knock on impact of an ESWG involvement in a flash appeal will mean other ESWG support functions will require additional surge staff (see later recommendation on staff secondments).*

6 Assessment of shelter needs and gap analysis

'The Government never wanted the international community to play a part in determining humanitarian needs'

Initial efforts by ESWG to describe shelter needs were diverted by the rapid joint assessment, planning for which was started several days before the arrival of the coordinator. The joint assessment was beset by problems from the outset. The government was wary of international actors participating in the definition of the scale of need and it was not clear if there were shared goals for the assessment. There were also criticisms made concerning assessment method, which used helicopter flyovers and discussions with officials at the district level without adequately corroborated field cross checks at the village level. Admittedly, access was severely restricted in Baluchistan province which was estimated to represent about 80% of needs but the resultant assessment report was too general to be

useful as a detailed planning tool for shelter delivery (eg at the level of the village or union council) and too late to inform the flash appeal.

The assessment was further overly reliant upon housing damage and population displacement levels as a proxy indicator for shelter need and did not explicitly account for underlying poverty and autonomous recovery capacity. The IASC Real Time Evaluation points to other omissions in the assessment methodology including a lack of focus on quantifying priority needs of the disabled, the elderly and the landless and those with partially damaged housing that was unsafe for occupation. While a multi-stakeholder joint assessment did produce buy-in and some commonly agreed priorities, it reportedly relied heavily on inexperienced international staff with little knowledge of the area or of relevant assessment methods, which led to poor quality and inflated estimates of need.

The 50% downward revision for shelter needs conducted by IFRC and PRCS in August 2007 for its own program and based upon a household level survey, may well have been caused in part by supply-side constraints, although the field visit conducted as part of this review would suggest that needs had also dropped considerably suggesting an underestimation of self-help recovery capacity and the impact of government assistance. While it remains unclear how much this downward revision was driven by a reduction in needs and how much due to supply factors, the impact of self-help and government support clearly significantly reduced shelter vulnerability. This is important because while there is little doubt that an already impoverished community could always make good use of shelter kits for recovery purposes, for example, housing livestock and extending existing emergency shelter, there were other pressing transitional and recovery needs emerging rapidly during early August 2007 which have been largely unfunded and which were arguably as important, if not more important than shelter kit distributions. The differences in estimated need between the UN joint assessment in late-July 2007 and the second IFRC shelter assessment in August 2007 are illustrative of the need for major shelter agencies to review the emergency shelter assessment criteria for future flood response.

The final assessment report indicated emergency shelter needs for 350,000 to 400,000 people. This figure, however, did not appear to account for the significant planned shelter inputs from GoP, which included 15 M USD of cash grants for 60,000 families and 50,000 tents, together amounted to up to 27M USD of assistance. Whilst there were justified concerns about the efficacy of the government's cash and tent distributions programme, and a clear need for shelter support beyond tents, the significant inputs from the government might have been accounted for in a more meaningful manner in the assessment.

Figure 4 Shelter for a temporarily displaced family in Larkana District



The gap analysis that was undertaken by the ESWG, disaggregated to the level of union council, was based upon partial damage data from individual agency field reports, the joint assessment and the shelter commodity data from ESWG participants. This was useful to NDMA, who had little or no information management support, but the lack of detailed field assessment data from agencies or from the joint assessment to cross check needs against damage meant the document effectively remained as a commodity tracking report rather than a gap analysis.

Had there been the opportunity, an alternative approach to shelter needs assessment might have been used to complement the initial multi-sectoral needs assessment. Such an assessment might have used established local actors from ESWG agencies already on the ground in numbers, such as staff from PRCS and UNHCR, to conduct interviews with union council or village heads to estimate damage and displacement levels and then use a house-to-house 'rapid count' assessment in a select number of target villages to verify reported damage. This data could then have been combined with adjustments for the capacity for self-help and the likely impact of underlying poverty based upon qualitative field observations. Overall shelter need and a gap analysis based upon government plans as well as ESWG participants might then have been more reliably extrapolated upwards from these 'snap shots' from target villages for the purposes of the flash appeal, and refined over time as more

reliable data became available from areas not surveyed in detail during the initial phase. This may have also have afforded an opportunity to better describe area-specific beneficiary selection criteria and options for shelter assistance with standards in better time to impact upon shelter agencies already on the ground.

The ESWG role in assessment is also not clear. Some have expressed views that the ESWG is not a vehicle for assessment and that this is primary role of the government, NGO shelter agencies and the UN and that the direct involvement of the ESWG in such activities would reduce its focus on its core task of providing coordination. This ESWG was not in a position to fund dedicated assessments of this type but the question remains for the future that where government and the UN are not willing or do not have the capacity to undertake adequate shelter assessment, should it fall to the ESWG to meet the shortfall in quality information? Certainly the efficacy the shelter response and the credibility of this ESWG was significantly reduced without it.

Recommendations

- ***Ensure a common goal with the government for any needs assessment, and ensure that better field cross-checks are used to temper estimates of aggregated need used for a flash appeal.***
- ***Include first phase shelter needs assessment and survey methodologies in the training curricula for shelter cluster coordinators at the global level.***
- ***Faced with limited access and time for assessments in the future, the ESWG should explore the potential to support assessment on a much smaller scale to compliment and corroborate the findings of larger joint assessments. This would involve going 'deep and narrow' into a limited number of target villages and displacement sites to better establish the nature of shelter vulnerability. There is also a need to better harness independent shelter agency assessments to feed into cluster and overall needs assessment.***
- ***Promote closer information sharing between FACT team assessment for IFRC and the assessment of baseline needs data for the ESWG.***
- ***Underlying poverty and self-help capacity are key elements of an initial needs assessment for shelter.***

7 Information management

Most of those interviewed were impressed with the information management services provided by the ESWG. The shared website, created and maintained by the NGO IASCI, was well designed, easy to use and provided a structured support tool to the cluster for shelter strategy, technical data, contacts and advocacy messages. The limited data available for commodity tracking and gap analysis was also made available together with a record of the process of decision making, which promoted transparency and neutrality.

The ESWG group-email was also well received. The email group was started early enlisting a wide membership in the process. The 'Who, What, Where?' (3W) matrices were successfully moved out to the provincial hubs to update and maintain. UN-Habitat, when asked to do so by the ESWG, provided GIS and mapping facilities in the absence of any facility from OCHA. CD copies of the website were regularly sent to the cluster hub offices in Quetta and Larkana, although it was not ascertained whether or not this approach allowed those without regular access to the internet adequate access to cluster information and a part in decision-making. This was noted as a challenge in other cluster-led responses.

Despite these excellent information resources, the ESWG needed greater human resources to undertake analysis and interrogation of shelter data and to chase field data to improve the gap analysis. This might have been provided by a dedicated staff member within the ESWG secretariat although there was resistance from PRCS to allow further secondments to the cluster secretariat.

All clusters, as well as the ESWG, were severely restricted without an effective centralized information management system. It remains unclear why OCHA did not deploy a greater capacity to support information management once a decision had been made to implement the cluster approach, or why their resources were not used to contract IASCI to provide information management and mapping support beyond the joint assessment phase given the need for a credible knowledge base. The proposal included an interesting strategy of using a combination of using non-government and government actors to obtain field information on a 'double-blind' basis, which has been tried and tested elsewhere in the world. This may well have provided an excellent platform for both institutional development and an entry point for the cluster/working group machinery to collaborate more effectively with NDMA.

Recommendations

- ***Review the triggers to support ESWG secretariat with dedicated IM staff. The chronic lack of available quality baseline data for shelter need meant meaningful gap***

analysis remained elusive. This detail was not overlooked by donors. Whilst the commodity tracking made available through the cluster proved useful to some members of the humanitarian community and to the government for planning their ongoing relief distributions, it could not be combined with a credible estimate of baseline need and hence did not significantly impact upon the decision-making of operational agencies in the field to meet identified gaps. Whilst this can be partially attributed to a lack of IM capacity and field coordination support from OCHA, the ESWG suffered from a lack of its own dedicated IM support and information gathering capacity at hub and field level to provide sector-specific analysis. There are plans for staff from IFRC and UNHCR logistics departments to be deployed with shelter clusters to support to information management, particularly commodity tracking.

- ***Use PFIC flood response website as point of departure for design of future ESWG websites.***
- ***A small monitoring team was needed at field hubs to provide ‘ground truthing’ for initial assessments, independent monitoring during shelter delivery and impact analysis.*** *The ESWG coordinator asked for these resources, but were not provided. In the future, the delegation and the national society should consider seconding national staff to support these roles for limit periods in the future.*

8 Technical Advice

At the request of the coordinator, a technical advisor was seconded to the ESWG by Care International. She arrives in mid-July for one month and was placed in the UN-Habitat office to promote coordination between ESWG members and early recovery actors.

Technical advice focussed upon developing alternatives to tented shelter provision for emergency shelter response and drew upon observations made during field trips and consultation with shelter agencies. A number of key documents and presentations illustrating a range of context-specific shelter support options were then posted on the website and presented to the ESWG participants. Specifications of available local materials on informal markets, such as bamboo and ‘*chitai*’ matting, as well standard items such as plastic sheeting were also developed.

These efforts were deemed useful by several agencies that used the advice and guidance to adjust their programmes. The use of annotated photos to convey messages was particularly effective. The lack of suitably qualified technical staff attending meetings, however, stymied progress and many operational agencies were not able to use this material as it was developed too late. Some agencies also felt that the model of bamboo structure, plastic and

reed matting was overly-prescriptive and did not take into account local contextual variations and differing building typologies. Several agencies also highlighted the need for an in-depth market analysis of the quality and availability of local construction materials, such as bamboo and 'chitai' reed matting, to assist them with procurement rather than simply a specification.

Later advice from the technical advisor included a discussion paper on options for shelter programme delivery which included cash, vouchers, and in-kind assistance and a description and cost analysis of a permanent adobe house model to situate emergency or transitional assistance within a wider reconstruction process. The lack of funding for early recovery actors, however, meant that there were few agencies in a position to capitalize on the guidance for recovery and reconstruction programming.

The field visit undertaken as part of this review also indicated that shelter needs of those temporarily displaced and those who had returned to their villages appeared to vary, with implications for emergency shelter assistance. Whilst plastic sheeting may well have proved useful to displaced families living at the edge of roads at the start of the emergency, there was little evidence that plastic was being used for shelter by those who had returned home. Self-built shade structures had been constructed with salvaged wood and locally available grasses for day use, whilst government tents and partially-damaged houses were used for sleeping, with families often sharing accommodation. All families appeared to be living in some kind of shelter in the villages visited.

Figure 5 Government tents and self-built shelters



When asked what they needed the most, most families indicated shelter, food and water in that order, although 'shelter' in this case was understood to mean 'resources for permanent housing', including labour and bricks. The lack of salvage material from destroyed housing also reduced the efficacy of the shelter kit for transitional shelter purposes, as most adobe construction had returned to mud.

Figure 6 *Salvage material from adobe houses was very limited*



This raises some important question, even after two months, concerning what shelter assistance is most needed for returnees following a flood. There was a clear need for disaster management and risk reduction, including advice on site planning and house construction as well as advice and resources to build community facilities such as dykes. These elements were as important as shelter material distributions for emergency/transitional shelter support, yet this type of shelter assistance went lacking.

Figure 7 Buildings that survived the floods



It is noted, however, that this review was not able to visit affected areas in Baluchistan, which may well have painted a different picture of shelter needs to that described above. In this respect, UNHCR's decision to supply a limited package of plastic sheeting and bamboo structure only in Baluchistan province may well have been appropriate, although these observations do highlight the need to better account for regional differences in shelter assistance and point to difference among major shelter providers concerning published shelter strategy.

Recommendations

- ***Deploy the technical advisor at the start of a cluster response.*** *The arrival of the technical advisor later still in mid-July meant that much of the excellent technical support literature produced remained unused and was too late to influence the actions of those shelter actors with resources from the outset, including NRC, Concern and UNHCR, as well as the Government of Pakistan.*
- ***The capacity for self-help might have been better quantified, particularly relating to the needs of the temporarily displaced and returnees.***

- ***Consider undertaking a market analysis of local materials to be used for emergency shelter assistance.***

9 Exit & Handover

At the end of August 2007, the ESWG closed and formally handed over all residual shelter relief coordination and advocacy tasks to UN-Habitat. Relations between the ESWG and UN-Habitat were managed well from the start of the emergency, building upon strong personal working relationship developed between the coordinators during the earthquake response the previous year. The decision to locate the technical advisor in the UN-Habitat offices, the GIS and mapping support provided by UN-Habitat to the ESWG and the common position reached over the shelter strategy all reflect good working synergies.

At the time of the review, however, UN-Habitat had little or no funds to provide the coordination and monitoring needed for residual shelter relief. While the number of operational shelter agencies involved in residual shelter relief operations is few, there was evidence of substantial overlaps in assistance. This was noted in Larkana district during the field visit between JADE, the government and PRCS shelter distributions. This indicates the need to maintain basic information sharing at the field level whilst residual relief activities are ongoing.

In the absence of a capacity within UN-Habitat, IFRC might have promoted more strongly the need for continued field coordination after the closure of the ESWG. The emerging profile of residual shelter vulnerability as families return home in large numbers could have been better described to reveal the true gaps in assistance for basic shelter and then used to advocate with government and others to fill these gaps. The resource requirement for coordination activities for these residual activities may not have stretched to beyond 2 or 3 national officers for two months reporting either to OCHA or to UN-Habitat.

It is ironic that despite the governments initial opposition to cluster coordination, the need for some form of sustained, thematically grouped coordination in the recovery phase is now strong, particularly to develop the disaster management capacity of NDMA through partnerships with the UN and NGO sector. PRCS has a key role to play in working with NDMA for disaster preparedness and response including for shelter activities.

Recommendations

- ***IFRC should promote the need for a minimum hub/field level monitoring, coordination and advocacy for residual shelter relief operations in Early Recovery after the ESWG is closed.***
- ***Non-UN leadership of hub coordination is to be encouraged, but a minimum of training and/or personnel may be needed to support coordination of residual shelter relief activities.***
- ***Other more established agencies, such as UNHCR and PRCS, might have been in stronger positions to maintain hub coordination, monitoring and advocacy.***
- ***Advocate for PRCS to become an active member of NDMA and the PDMAs***

10 RC/RC support to the cluster

Despite the fact that IFRC shelter staff had played a key role in supporting the first shelter cluster in Pakistan after the earthquake led by IOM, the flood response was the first time senior management in the delegation and in the national society had been directly involved in supporting the leadership of an ESWG.

After the roll out of the clusters by the IASC CT, IFRC in Geneva stepped in to assist the delegation and the national society to explain the cluster approach in more detail and to prepare the ground for the ESWG leadership role. These efforts were appreciated by staff in Islamabad. IFRC Geneva also canvassed the opinion of several major shelter actors in Pakistan to understand the need for coordination to provide an informed brief for the incoming ESWG coordinator.

During the first week of the response, however, there was some confusion over this new role. Although UN-Habitat had been asked by IFRC Geneva to initiate and convene the ESWG ahead of the arrival of a coordinator, there was confusion over the participation and role of IFRC. This perhaps reflects a lack of communication from UN-Habitat and had caused some initial resentment towards IFRC among some participating shelter agencies, although this ground was later recovered. If ESWG leadership is to be shared in the future, then communication of roles and responsibilities must be consistent and clear to all concerned.

There was also a perception among some staff in both IFRC and PRCS in Pakistan that expensive consultants '*were being used to specify bamboo and plastic tarpaulins*'. Dedicated assistance from the ESWG coordinator was also expected to develop the IFRC/PRCS shelter

programme by some of those interviewed, but was thought to be withheld. Senior PRCS staff were also surprised on one occasion to see the ESWG coordinator at meetings with government and representing IFRC when they had not been informed. While such events are perhaps to be expected in an emergency response, closer and sustained communication is required between an incoming ESWG coordinator, IFRC and PRCS staff to ensure that expectations on both sides are managed properly.

On the one hand, renewed efforts are needed by IFRC Geneva to raise awareness among all RC/RC actors of the less visible benefits of effective ESWG coordination, particularly for the promotion of basic standards of assistance for those with limited experience in shelter who are present in all natural disaster responses; the need for regular, sustained, harmonised planning data to be made available for everyone; the ability to influence government shelter relief activity (the value of which in this case was which at least twice the value of the contributions of the international humanitarian community) and the creation of coordinated exit strategies for emergency phase actors, such as RC/RC. Whilst this cluster-led emergency was viewed by some as achieving few tangible benefits, much useful work went on behind the scenes that was not been fully appreciated.

On the other hand, greater efforts are also required from an incoming ESWG coordinator to liaise with the delegation and the national society. A pre-assignment briefing upon arrival in country with PRCS as well as the delegation is necessary to discuss protocols for contact with government and to explain the terms of reference for the cluster and relationship to PRCS programmes. Brief, but regular updates on ESWG progress with respect to RC/RC role throughout the assignment and an end of mission briefing with both PRCS and IFRC country team would also have been appreciated. This amounts to little in the way of additional workload and need not compromise the neutrality of the cluster lead vis-a-vis ESWG participants.

It is further interesting to note that many in IFRC and PRCS saw the first cluster lead as an 'outsider' despite his prior work with IFRC in previous disaster responses in a similar role. This would suggest that future consultants who assume the ESWG coordinator role need to take time to assure the delegation and the national societies of their familiarity with RC/RC working methodologies and code of conduct to gain their confidence. It is also the case, however, that external consultants often bring with them greater knowledge and experience of the workings of other organisations in the shelter cluster and can be in a stronger position than those with only RC/RC experience to coordinate an ESWG. The *'identity'* of the ESWG coordinator, in this case, needs further clarification with the delegation and the national society.


IFRC and the national society might also look to build shelter capacity in other areas, particularly in disaster management programming. If needs assessment, monitoring and preparedness for shelter relief and recovery can be mainstreamed into the disaster management training at all levels of the delegation and the national society, RC/RC can be better prepared to support future ESWGs, as well as its own programming, at the same time.

Emergency shelter needs following floods were different to those following the earthquake in Pakistan. Primarily, the need for disaster management and risk reduction and the need to tackle underlying poverty rose more quickly to compete with needs for shelter kits than for other recent natural disasters in the region. Given that risk reduction and disaster management are core areas of RC/RC focus in Pakistan, their inclusion in shelter relief programming ought to be a possibility in future shelter responses.

At a more practical level, there is a need to re-evaluate the costs and benefits of both stockpiling and distributing tents as opposed to other non-tented emergency shelter materials. PRCS had stockpiled tents as part of emergency preparedness in 2006, and had decided that as this stock should be rotated, it would be better to distribute 9000 tents in response to shelter needs for the floods. The shelter approach here was certainly supply driven. The cost of the distribution of 9000 canvas tents made in response to the floods might be estimated to be in region of 2.7 million USD, without accounting for stock piling and distribution costs. Although there will always be a need for some tent stockpiles, the extent of tent stocks available to the government of Pakistan may mean it is worth re-examining RC/RC shelter stockpiles in-country as part of its wider role in disaster management and preparedness for emergency shelter. Stockpiling of shelter requires functional and in-depth mapping of local culture, acceptability, climate and environmental hazards as well as logistic issues. Shelter stockpiling is currently being discussed within IFRC in Geneva, both to develop a global strategy and reserve and to country stocks.

When comparing the efficacy of the wider cluster systems in Pakistan, first for the earthquake in 2005 and for the flood response in 2007, it is clear that lessons from previous evaluations have not been learnt. Particularly, the need to adapt coordination to the scale of the disaster, the strength of government and implication of conflict and poor security in affected areas. The flood response indicates that agencies with established government relations have proven more effective at leveraging both humanitarian space and action compared with newer, higher profile 'democratic' systems that were perceived as confrontational, redundant and self-serving by government. This deserves some further thought with respect to RC/RC future role as convenor of the ESWG. Figure eight below illustrates the full range of services that an ESWG can provide and where these services lie within a political landscape.

Figure 8 The range of ESWG/Cluster services



Activities at the centre of the chart, such as 'strategy development', 'technical advice', 'gap analysis' and 'information management' are relatively non-controversial for RC/RC and are the core needs of ESWG participants in all disaster responses. Elements at the extremities of the diagram, including 'fund raising' at one end of the scale and 'monitoring', 'evaluation', 'quality assurance' and 'policy compliance' at the other, are more controversial elements. There are degrees of need for these latter activities in most shelter relief efforts, but the potential for these activities to cause conflict with RC/RC principles is also much higher. The RC/RC 'comfort zone' for support the shelter cluster would appear to be in the middle zone (marked in red).

There is also continued misunderstanding over coordination terminology. The term 'working group' is used only in terms of reference while most use the term 'cluster' in the field. The fact that other 'groups' exist within the cluster such as technical working group and strategic advisory group' is also confusing to many.

Despite the failings of this particular cluster approach, all bar one of those interviewed did not think that IFRC's role as 'convener of the ESWG' compromised neutrality and impartiality of the RC/RC movement overall. Some concerns were voiced about the position of the ESWG as a counterpart to the government and as a 'collaborator' with the military. The reality was that in this response, PRCS was a more effective counterpart than the ESWG, yet was able to maintain its independence. Indeed, it is clear that senior management of PRCS would like to become closer allies and even decision makers within the nascent NDMA, particularly regarding disaster management and relief delivery. This would seem to suggest that the management of public perceptions of neutrality with government is as important as managing independence for implementation. This applies equally to an ESWG as it does to an RC national society or a delegation, and comes down to sound judgement, effective leadership and adherence to the red cross code of conduct.

Recommendations

- ***Ensure all senior staff in a Delegation, as well as the head of delegation, are able to make an informed decision about whether or not a cluster system should be used to coordinate humanitarian relief.*** The absence of the head of delegation at the start of the emergency led to some confusion over leadership of shelter coordination. All senior staff in the delegation should therefore be in a position to make an informed decision within the IASC country team meetings to discuss and decide upon appropriate coordination mechanisms if required, and lead coordination meetings until a coordinator is found. These issues need to be benchmarked with existing IFRC tools such as the SoPs for FACT and ERU rapid deployment.
- ***Clarify agency/coordinator role in cluster coordination.*** Recent cluster-led responses to natural disaster indicate that IFRC at the global and country-level is 'leading the way' in allowing for devolved field level decision-making by cluster/working group coordinators. In fact, stronger involvement may be required in the future from IFRC Geneva to support both the delegation and the IASC country team to decide whether IFRC should act as convener of the ESWG, and to set the terms of reference. Once a ESWG coordinator, has been deployed, however, IFRC Geneva should return to a support role.
- ***Given that the current ESWG coordinator ToRs and the IASC guidance note are wide in scope, the IASC country team, supported by IFRC, should canvass opinion of shelter agencies prior to the deployment of a cluster lead to determine a refined picture of agency coordination needs.*** Appendix IX additionally contains some suggestions for revisions to the generic ToRs for an ESWG coordinator.
- ***Mainstream assessment capacity for shelter in the disaster management activities of IFRC and the national society.***
- ***Clarify or simplify coordination terminology for 'cluster' and 'working group', and define the coordinator's role in each of these.***
- ***Re-evaluate RC/RC shelter stockpile strategy in-country***
- ***The cluster lead should keep in regular contact with the IFRC country team and the national society during deployment.***

- **More qualified personnel from within IFRC are needed to be on call to respond to the need for first wave time sensitive deployments to lead an ESWG.** *The use of consultant rosters is only effective if people remain on call.*
- **Develop better tools to measure the performance of ESWG coordination.** *Performance management systems are currently under review within IFRC. ESWG performance should consider developing standard tools to measure the impact of cluster coordination in the field as well as satisfaction of ESWG participants. Tools for measuring the economic impact of emergency shelter programmes are also required to support a review of shelter stockpiling strategy and the efficacy of emergency assistance. Th*

Author

Pete Manfield is an architect and independent consultant. He was previously the early recovery coordinator for UN HC/RC in 2006/7 for the Java earthquake, Indonesia and the shelter policy advisor to the first emergency shelter cluster in Islamabad Pakistan for DFID/IOM in 2005. He has worked over the past 12 years on programmes and policy development with several NGOs, UN agencies and the peacekeeping forces.


Appendices

- I Review Informants**
- II Cluster Meeting Attendance**
- III Terms of Reference for the ESWG Review**
- IV Event timeline for the emergency shelter cluster**
- V Document and Online References**
- VI Semi-structured interview used for Review**
- VII Emergency shelter distributions (early August 2007)**
- VIII Consultant travel and use of time**
- IX Suggested revisions to the Terms of Reference for an ESWG Coordinator**

Appendix I - Evaluation Informants

date	informants	organisatio	Location	Position	email	notes	organisation type
19th Sept	Kate Crawford	IFRC (Care)	UK	Technical advisor	catherine.crawford@ucl.ac.uk	phone interview	ESC secretariat staff
20th Sept	James Shepherd-Barron	IFRC	UK	Shelter cluster coordinator	jamshepbarron@yahoo.com	phone interview	ESC secretariat staff
21st Sept	Graham Saunders	IFRC	Switzerland	Head shelter dept	graham.saunders@ifrc.org	phone interview	IFRC GVA
26th Sept	Stephen Loyst	IFRC	Islamabad	Head of Flood Operations	stephen.loyst@ifrc.org	interview	IFRC ISB
27th Sept	John Sampson	IOM	Islamabad	Emergency officer	jsampson@iom.int	interview	ESC member
27th Sept	Izora Mutya Maskun	IOM	Islamabad	Associate professional officer	imaskun@iom.int	interview	ESC member
27th Sept	Anna Pont	UN-Habitat	Islamabad	Human Settlements officer	apont@unhabitatpk.org	interview	UN
27th Sept	Azmat Ulla	IFRC	Islamabad	Head of Delagation	azmat.ulla@ifrc.org	interview	IFRC ISB
28th Sept	Ros Young	OCHA	Islamabad	Head of Office	young5@un.org	interview	UN
28th Sept	Udaya Regmi	IFRC	Islamabad	Deputy Head of Delagation	udaya.regmi@ifrc.org	interview	IFRC ISB
28th Sept	Namik Heydarov	NRC	Islamabad	Country Director	pk.pd@nrcafpk.org	phone interview	ESC member
28th Sept	Dorothy Blane	Concern	Islamabad	Country Director	dorothy.blane@concern.net	phone interview	ESC member
28th Sept	Yannick Deville	Acted	Islamabad	Emergency officer	yannick.deville@acted.org	phone interview	ESC member
29th Sept	Rick Bauer	Oxfam GB	UK	Head of shelter	RBauer@Oxfam.org.uk	phone interview	ESC member
29th Sept	Nadir	BRSP	Quetta	Country Director	nadir.gul@brsp.org.pk	interview	ESC member
29th Sept	Wolfgang Gressmann	IASCI	Islamabad	Director	wolfgang.gressmann@iasci.info	interview	Info management to Clusters
29th Sept	Muhammad Ilyas Khan	PRCS	Islamabad	Director of Operations	mikhan471@hotmail.com	interview	ESC member
30th Sept	Ros Young	OCHA	Islamabad	Head of office	young5@un.org	interview	UN
30th Sept	John Cosgrave	NOREPS	Islamabad	Evaluation Team Leader	johncosgrave@gmail.com	interview	Evaluator
30th Sept	Turid Laegreid	NCG	Islamabad	Political Scientist	turid.laegreid@ncg.no	interview	Evaluator
1st oct	Namik Heydarov	NRC	Islamabad	Country Director	pk.pd@nrcafpk.org	phone interview	CCCM/ESC
2nd oct	Ben Pickering	DFID	UK	Response Officer	b-pickering@dfid.gov.uk	phone interview	Donor
2nd oct	Kanweer Waseem	PRCS	Karachi	Provincial Secretary	prcsindh@cyber.net.pk	interview	ESC member
3rd oct	Rebecca Barber	NRC	Larkana	Project Coordinator	rbarber@nrcafpk.org	interview	ESC member
3rd oct	Rizwan Ali	NRC	Larkana	Emergency officer	arizwan@nrcafpk.org	interview	ESC member
4th oct	Killian Kleinschmidt	UNHCR	Islamabad	Assistant Representative	kleinsch@unhcr.org	interview	CCCM
4th oct	Felix de Vries	Danish RC	Islamabad	Construction Engineer	felixdevries@gmail.com	interview	ESC member
4th oct	Cormac Rooney	IFRC	Islamabad	Construction Coordinator		interview	ESC member
4th oct	Tariq Ali Chandio	PCRS	Larkana	Shelter project officer		interview	ESC member
5th oct	Rumana Kabir	UNHCR	UK	Rapid Assesment Team	rumanakabir2003@yahoo.co.uk	email	UNDAC
5th oct	Aslam Denarzai	Islamic Relief	Quetta	Programme Director	areamanager.blm@irp.org.pk	phone interview	ESC member
5th oct	Charlie	IFRC	Islamabad	Logistics Coordinator		interview	ESC member
5th oct	Uzman Qazi	UNDP	Islamabad	Programme Officer	uzman.qazi@undp.org	interview	Early Recovery Cluster
5th oct	Kamran Shariff	NDMA	Islamabad	National disaster Response Adv	kamran.shariff@undp.org	interview	Govt of Pakistan
8th oct	Craig Williams	OCHA	Bangkok	Regional Information Manager	williamscv@un.org	phone interview	UN info management
8th oct	Anissa Toscano	UNDAC	UK	Team Member	anissatoscano@hotmail.com	email	Donor
8th oct	Linda Stops	IFRC	Geneva			(had no comments)	IFRC GVA
8th oct	Mark Werdmuller	IFRC	Geneva	Shelter Delegate		phone interview	IFRC GVA
8th oct	Hakan Koray	IFRC	Geneva	Relief Officer		phone interview	IFRC GVA
10th oct	Jyri Ratanen	IFRC	Kuala Lumpur	Follow-on shelter cluster coordinator		phone interview	ESC secretariat staff
8th Nov	Ian Heigh	IFRC	Geneva	Logistics Coordinator		email	IFRC GVA

Appendix II - attendance at cluster meetings in Islamabad



Appendix III
Terms of Reference for:
A Review of the Pakistan Floods Response 2007
Shelter Working Group

Background to the Pakistan Floods Shelter Working Group Review

Under the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding between IFRC and UN OCHA,

“subject to available resources, constitutional limits, and the rules and regulations of the Federation, the Federation will assume a coordination role for emergency shelter in specific emergency operations within an agreed coordination system”.

The combined effects of storms beginning 23 June 2007 and Cyclone Yemyin on 26 June 2007 claimed approximately 300 lives across Pakistan. Baluchistan was severely hit by flooding and the effects of the cyclone with 1.5 million affected including 250,000 people made homeless and a further 300,000 displaced. Sindh suffered flooding and storm damage while North West Frontier Province was hit by flash floods on 30 June.

A total of 15 out of 29 districts across the Baluchistan were initially affected while five districts in Sindh were also affected. Infrastructure was severely undermined with roads and bridges damaged or destroyed and telecommunications out in many areas.

The government of Pakistan launched a national appeal for assistance and while it did not request international aid, it indicated it would welcome international support.

The IASC Country Team in Pakistan met on 2nd July 2007 and agreed to “reinstate the clusters in dealing with the aftermath of the cyclone and flooding in two provinces in the country – Balochistan and Sindh”.¹ The International Federation agreed to convene the shelter cluster.

With UN Habitat and IOM operational in Pakistan in support of the ongoing earthquake recovery activities, IFRC requested that UN Habitat chair the initial shelter working group meetings until the IFRC-appointed shelter coordinator arrived in country. Given the common settlement-related issues, the Shelter and Camp Coordination Camp Management clusters agreed to hold joint or overlapping meetings in Islamabad as appropriate. At the outset of the response, the IFRC formally requested UN Habitat to take on the role of focal agency for return and resettlement within the Shelter Working Group, which UN Habitat agreed to do.

Initial mapping services were provided by UN Habitat, and Information Management services on behalf of the clusters was provided by the NGO IASCI. A Shelter Working Group technical advisor was deployed by Care International at the request of IFRC and co-funded by IFRC and Care International.

With the increasing focus of the Government and hence the supporting Shelter Working Group on the return and resettlement process in addition to supporting the ongoing provision of emergency shelter, the International Federation formally handed over the coordination of the Shelter Working Group to UN Habitat on 31st August 2007.

¹ 2nd July 2007 Letter from Jan Vandemoortele, UN Resident Coordinator to Sir John Holmes, ERC, UN New York

Objective of the Pakistan Shelter Working Group (SWG) Review

The objectives of the SWG review are to:

1. appraise the service provided by the International Federation as shelter cluster coordinator to shelter cluster participants – Government, UN agencies, Red Cross Red Crescent Movement (Pakistan Red Crescent, IFRC, ICRC as appropriate), NGOs both national and international, and other actors;
2. appraise the service provided by the shelter cluster as a whole to meeting the needs of the households affected by the disaster;
3. review and analyse the experience of the International Federation with respect to the establishment and operation of the SWG, with a particular emphasis on lessons to be learnt for future operations;
4. provide recommendations with regard to the International Federation's leadership of future emergency shelter cluster coordination activities at both national and global levels.
5. examine if there were aspects of the Federation's cluster leadership which potentially might have or actually did compromise the mandate and principles of the Red Cross/Red Crescent.

Scope of the Review

The review will encompass, but not be limited to, the following areas:

- The activation of the cluster process and the extent of involvement and influence of the Federation, as an IASC member, in the decision-making process;
- the understanding and support of the Federation's shelter coordination role within the in country delegation, the region and Geneva;
- the impact of the SWG on the Federation Delegation and the Pakistan Red Crescent Society;
- the design and implementation of the SWG, including factors and determinants which provided the SWG's strengths and weaknesses;
- the value of linking and/or separating the SWG and the Red Cross relief operation;
- the design and implementation of the exit/handover strategy;
- relations with other clusters, the UN system and the Government;
- the staffing of the SWG and the support provided from the Secretariat;
- the equipping and funding of the SWG;
- the involvement of the SWG in the transition from meeting emergency shelter needs to permanent housing and resettlement;
- issues with regard to visibility for the International Federation and the Red Cross.

Methodology

The methodology employed by the reviewer/s in gathering and assessing information should include:

- A field visit to Islamabad;
- Review of available documented materials relating to the start-up, planning, implementation, and impact of the SWG (reference to the SWG Google/email group and website);
- Interviews with key internal stakeholders within the Secretariat in Geneva, (by phone) with Delegation in Islamabad, and the Pakistan Red Crescent;

- Interviews with other key stakeholders, in particular Government officials were possible;
- Interviews with UN OCHA and the UN RC's office;
- Interviews with shelter agencies participating in the SWG, and in particular UN Habitat and IOM;
- If feasible, interviews with beneficiaries (beneficiary perceptions regarding the extent to which the shelter response and the cluster approach is fulfilling their needs, and their satisfaction with their involvement in planning processes).

Note: A suggested list of interviewees will be provided separately.

Proposed Timeline

The exercise will be implemented over a period from 14 days between 17th September and 15th October, the start date subject to agreement with the Delegation in Islamabad.

Outputs

1. Concise, written document with key recommendations and supporting information. This document should be of use for discussing the IFRC experiences of the cluster process internally and also with key donors and other stakeholders.
2. Additional notes, summaries of interviews etc. as appropriate, or supporting documentation.
3. Summary of review activities undertaken, including interviews, visits, documents reviewed etc.

Key reference documents provided:

1. IFRC-UN OCHA Shelter MoU
2. IFRC Shelter Working Group Coordination Team ToRs
3. Lessons Learned – prepared by initial IFRC Shelter Cluster Coordinator James Shepherd Barron
4. Handover note IFRC-UN Habitat 31st August
5. All documents (meeting minutes, strategy documents etc.) from the MSWG website.

Appendix IV – Event timeline for the emergency shelter cluster

Date	Milestone
24th June	UN DMT meet to discuss floods
27th June	Floods reach disaster scale
	GoP announces emergency in the two affected provinces
	decision was reportedly made internally to implement clusters by RC office
2nd July	Clusters rolled out by IASC CT
	IFRC FACT team arrive in Pakistan
4th July	UNDAC Team arrive in Pakistan
5th July	ESC Cluster Lead (JBS) arrives in Pakistan
9th July	Joint Rapid Assessment Started
14th July	Joint Rapid Assessment ends
15th July	ESC Technical Advisor (KC) arrives in Pakistan
	UN Flash Appeal sent to OCHA in NY and revised downwards
18th July	Revised UN Flash Appeal Issued
23rd July	UN Flash Appeal Revised (31% funded)
25th July	IFRC FACT team leaves Pakistan
30th July	ESC Strategy Published (draft A)
1st August	replacement ESC Cluster Lead (JR) arrives for handover period
15th August	ESC Cluster Lead (JSB) hands over to JR
17th August	ESC Technical Advisor (KC) leaves Pakistan
	WB & ADB conducted Damage and loss assessment
31st August	ESC Cluster Lead (JR) hands over to UN-H and ESC closed

Appendix V - Document References

Real time Evaluation of the Pakistan Flood Response September, 2007 (IASC)

Mozambique Shelter Working Group Review, 2007 (IFRC)

Evaluation of the Pakistan Flood Response, October 2007 (DFID)

Joint Rapid Assessment Report, July 2007 (IASCI)

www.pfic.webexone.com

Strategic Operating Framework of the Shelter Working Group, 30th July 2007 (IFRC)

Appendix VI - Semi Structured Interview

(each section to correlate roughly to a chapter)

A Cluster Services

1 Info Management

- was information concerning humanitarian shelter need provided at a suitable resolution to enable effective decision-making for shelter programmes (graphic and numeric)?
- Was information made available/transferred effectively using available media (web/googlegroup/maps/databases)
- Was adequate information provided about the activities of others in the shelter cluster?
- Was adequate information provided about the activities of others outside the shelter cluster (other clusters, Govt, private sector?)

2 Technical Advice

Did the cluster provide adequate information for:

- Environmental concerns
- Construction techniques
- material procurement
- quality assurance
- protection

3 Resource Mobilization

Did the cluster effectively support the raising of funds to meet identified gaps?

- CERF
- FLASH
- Pooled funds

4 Strategy Development

Did the cluster adequately:

- support the selection of suitable settlement options
- The development of suitable programme management options (self help, direct implementation, working through partners)
- support the development of appropriate damage assessment criteria
- support the development of consensus beneficiary selection criteria

- advocate for required shelter and shelter-related activities that were beyond the resources and scope of the shelter cluster

4 M&E (to Govt and RC)

- Were the activities of clusters members sufficiently monitored?
- Did monitoring allow for real time improvement of projects by cluster agencies

B Process

- did the cluster involve all those concerned in decision making? (Govt & participants)?
- Was information managed in suitable languages?
- Was the cluster approach clear to participants?
- Did cluster lead act neutrally and impartially?
- Was the cluster closed effectively?
- Were beneficiaries involved/consulted?
- Were beneficiaries aware of the cluster process and working methods of the shelter cluster?
- Was RC/RC adequately aware/involved/supporting shelter cluster?
- Was the cluster managed effectively?

C Performance of the Shelter Cluster

- Were needs met?
- If not, why not?

D Performance of IFRC (GVA/ISB) in creating an effective shelter cluster

- Successes
- Failures (especially those relating to Mandate)

Appendix VII - Emergency shelter distributions (early August 2007)

SHELTER CLUSTER

Floods Response
Pakistan

EMERGENCY SHELTER DISTRIBUTIONS

BALUCHISTAN

	Organization	Districts	Emergency Shelter Distribution (by family)		
			At 30 July	In Pipeline	Intended ¹
1	Mercy Corps	Jaffarabad, Jhal Magsi, Lasbela, Bolan, Nasirabad			11,000
2	NRC	Jhal Magsi, Khuzdar			2,500
3	Save the Children UK	Kharan	400		4,600
4	Oxfam	Kech (Turbat)	1,555	2,445	
5	HAI	Khuzdar, Jhal Magsi	200		1,800
6	ARC	Kharan, Nushki	900		7,600
7	Acted	Washuk, Kharan		1,000	5,300
8	Premiere Urgence	Jhal Magsi			1,800
9	Care International	Turbat, Nasirabad, Bolan	750		1,200
10	CRS				5,000
11	Taraqee Foundaion				3,000
12	SPO	Turbat, Jjaffarabad, bolan	1,400		24,000
13	BRSP	Bolan, Khuzdar			4,000
14	UNHCR	Khuzdar	1,158		7,000
15	Islamic Relief	Jaffarabad, Washuk, Chagai, Kharan	2,000		
16	Save the Children US	Kharan			1,200
17	CONCERN		350		
18	Church World Service		820		
19	Muslim Aid	Gwadar	100		
	TOTAL		9,633	3,445	80,000

SINDH

	Organization	Districts	Emergency Shelter Distribution (by family)		
			At 30 July	In Pipeline	Intended
1	NRC	Shahdadkot, Naal, Kamber			2,800
2	Oxfam	Shahdadkot, Dadu	640	1,000	
3	Care Int'l	Shahdadkot	250		
	TOTAL		890	1,000	2,800

COMBINED TOTAL

	Organization	Districts	Emergency Shelter Distribution (by family)		
			At 30 July	In Pipeline	Intended
	Sub-Total NGO Community		10,523	4,445	82,800
	Sub-Total IFRC & PRCS		9,160	18,000	-
	Sub-Total GOP-NDMA²		64,123	35,877	-
	TOTAL		83,806	58,322	82,800

¹ Would be procured if funds allowed

² PRCS distribution data is included in the GOP figures

Appendix VIII - Consultant travel and use of time

19th Sept assignment preparation
20th Sept phone interviews with informants (from Jakarta)
21st Sept phone interviews with informants (from Jakarta)
22nd Sept
23rd Sept
24th Sept phone interviews with informants (from Jakarta)
25th Sept travel to Islamabad
26th Sept interviews in Islamabad
27th Sept interviews in Islamabad
28th Sept interviews in Islamabad
29th Sept interviews in Islamabad
30th Sept interviews in Islamabad
1st Oct travel to karachi
2nd Oct interviews in Karachi, travel to Larkana District
3rd Oct field visit to shelter distribution sites in larkana district
4th Oct travel to Islamabad and interviews with informants
5th Oct interviews in Islamabad
6th Oct (travel to Jakarta)
7th Oct
8th Oct phone interviews with informants (from Jakarta)
9th Oct report write up
10th Oct report write up and interviews
11th Oct report write up

Appendix IX – Suggestions for Generic Terms of Reference for the Shelter Working Group Coordinator

SHELTER WORKING GROUP COORDINATOR PAKISTAN FLOOD RESPONSE TERMS OF REFERENCE

Background

The combined effects of storms beginning 23 June and Cyclone Yemyin on 26 June have claimed approximately 300 lives across Pakistan. Baluchistan has been severely hit by flooding and the effects of the cyclone with 1.5 million affected including 250,000 people made homeless and a further 300,000 displaced. Sindh has suffered flooding and storm damage while North West Frontier Province was hit by flash floods on 30 June.

A total of 15 out of 29 districts across the Baluchistan have been affected while five districts in Sindh have been affected. Infrastructure has been severely undermined with roads and bridges damaged or destroyed and telecommunications out in many areas since 26 June.

The government of Pakistan is launching a national appeal for assistance and while it is not requesting international aid this stage, it says it would welcome international support.

The IASC Country Team in Pakistan met on 2nd July 2007 and agreed to "reinstate the clusters in dealing with the aftermath of the cyclone and flooding in two provinces in the country – Balochistan and Sindh".¹ The International Federation has agreed to convene the shelter cluster.

Objective

The key objective of the Shelter Coordinator of the Shelter Working Group (SWG) will be to contribute towards the effective provision of emergency shelter assistance to the affected population through the timely and efficient coordination of the SWG.

Scope of services

Specifically, the Shelter Coordinator will be responsible for facilitating and guiding the SWG to do the following:

Identification of key partners

- Identify key humanitarian partners for emergency shelter response, respecting their respective mandates and programme priorities;
- Identify other key partners, including national and provincial authorities,

Coordination of programme implementation

- Ensure appropriate coordination with all humanitarian partners (including UN agencies, national and international NGOs, the Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement, IOM and other international organizations), as well as with national authorities and local structures; ensuring operational already on the ground are served first

¹ 2nd July 2007 Letter from Jan Vandemoortele, UN Resident Coordinator to Sir John Holmes, ERC, UN New York

- Ensure the establishment/maintenance of appropriate sectoral coordination mechanisms, including working groups at the national and, if necessary, local level;
- Promote the integration of the IASC's agreed priority cross-cutting issues, namely human rights, HIV/AIDS, age, gender and environment, utilising participatory and community based approaches
- Secure commitments from participants in responding to needs and filling gaps, ensuring an appropriate distribution of responsibilities, with clearly defined focal points for specific issues where necessary; including support with hub coordination and field monitoring where appropriate
- Promote/encourage participants to work collectively, ensuring the complementarity of the various stakeholders' actions;
- Promote emergency response actions while at the same time considering the need for early recovery planning as well as prevention and risk reduction concerns;
- Ensure effective links with other sector working groups;
- Represent emergency shelter needs in discussions with the UN Resident Coordinator, appropriate Governmental representations, donors and other key agencies on prioritization, resource mobilization and advocacy; ensuring that existing coordination mechanisms between government and RC/RC are accounted for
- Act as focal point for inquiries on emergency shelter response plans and operations.

Planning and strategy development

- Promote timely needs assessment and sector specific analysis, using appropriate methods and ground truthing ensuring beneficiary participation including adequate attention given to the needs and challenges by gender and of vulnerable groups;
- Identification of gaps in coverage taking into consideration the activities of both government and non-government actors;
- Developing/updating agreed response strategies and action plans ensuring that these are adequately reflected in overall emergency response strategies.
- Utilising lessons learned from past activities and beneficiary feedback to revise strategies and action plans accordingly;
- Developing the transition from emergency shelter to longer-term shelter recovery programming, in close consultation with UN Habitat as the focal agency for early recovery, and the handover of the coordination role to other agencies, ensuring that coordination for residual shelter needs is provided as required.

Deleted: Needs

Deleted: ,

Information management

- Development of simple, user-friendly emergency shelter assistance reporting formats in consultation with the local authorities, providers of shelter assistance and other key stakeholders; these reporting formats should include provision for gender desegregation of data and reporting on more vulnerable groups, they should also be complementary to the information collection and reporting systems of other sector working groups;
- Promotion of and training on the use of these reporting tools among shelter assistance providers and other stakeholders;
- Gathering and collation of data on emergency shelter needs and assistance being provided in a timely and efficient manner, including feedback and/or issues raised by the affected population;
- Identification and reporting of any gaps in emergency shelter assistance to the SWG;
- Development and implementation of methods to share this information, as well as broader information on shelter needs and solutions which the SWG wants to develop and/or share, with all concerned stakeholders and the affected population; this

information may need to be made available in the local language, as well as English, to the maximum extent possible;

- Coordination with other clusters to ensure complementarity and cross-sectoral analysis of information on the disaster response.

Application of standards

- Ensure that the shelter response is guided - to the extent possible - by relevant policy guidelines and technical standards, allowing for regional variations in support, as well as relevant commitments that the Government has undertaken under international human rights law.

Monitoring and reporting

- Ensure adequate monitoring mechanisms are in place to review the impact of the sector coordination and progress against implementation plans [NB this has potentially onerous staff requirements];
- Ensure adequate reporting and effective information sharing, with support from the UN Resident Coordinator or other UN OCHA – appointed overall cluster coordinators.

Advocacy and resource mobilization

- Identify core advocacy concerns, including resource requirements, and contribute to key messages on broader advocacy initiatives choosing appropriate channels;
- Advocate for donors to fund participants to carry out priority activities in the sector concerned, while at the same time encouraging participants to mobilize resources for their activities through their usual channels [NB explicit guidance with regard to leading the shelter component of the flash appeal may be required].

Training and capacity building of national authorities and civil society

- Promote and support training of humanitarian personnel and capacity building of humanitarian partners, particularly where coordination of residual shelter activities are to be continued after the closure of the shelter working group;
- Support efforts to strengthen the capacity of the national authorities and civil society.

Other

- The Shelter Working Group Coordinator will advise IFRC on the approach to and resources required to provide the required coordination services to the Shelter Working Group participants. This will comprise discussion with the Head of Delegation or his/her designated representative, and the Head of Shelter, IFRC Geneva.
- The Shelter Working Group Coordinator will oversee the activities of other members of the IFRC Shelter Working Group Coordination Team as and when they are deployed.
- The Shelter Working Group Coordinator is responsible for overseeing any local staff engaged in support of the IFRC Shelter Working Group Coordination Team; any such engagement and the development of appropriate job descriptions is to be undertaken in consultation and agreement with the IFRC Delegation, although any salaries and associated costs are to be covered by the IFRC Shelter Working Group Coordination Team unless agreed otherwise.
- Any other tasks that may be required (within reason) to achieve the objective of this assignment.
- Provision of adequate handover, including the provision of brief guidance notes and counter-parting where possible.

- Preparation of a short summary report at the conclusion of the assignment on lessons learned.

Guiding Principles

The Shelter Coordinator will, at all times when carrying out this assignment, ensure that he/she adheres to the conditions of the International Federation commitments² to undertaking a leading role in emergency shelter in natural disasters, namely:

1. the Federation shall at all times adhere to the Fundamental Principles of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, its policies, procedures as well as those of the Movement, relevant to international disaster response (including the Seville Agreement);
2. the Principle of Independence will be upheld in respect of extra funding required to exercise this lead role;
3. the Federation will not accept accountability obligations beyond those defined in its Constitution and own policies; and
4. the responsibilities of such leadership will be clearly defined, leaving no room for "open ended" or unlimited obligations.

Reporting

The Shelter Coordinator will report directly to the Head, Shelter Department, International Federation, Geneva.

The Shelter Coordinator will liaise closely with the UN Resident Coordinator, national authorities and sector working groups carrying out coordination functions in others sectors/areas.

The Shelter Coordinator will ensure that the IFRC Head of Delegation and the national society are regularly kept informed on the functioning of the Shelter Coordination Team and issues that have or may potentially have an impact on IFRC resources or identity.

Deleted: is

The IFRC Head of Delegation is the primary authority on issues regarding security and safety. The Shelter Coordinator will function as other Federation representatives in this regard and will comply with all security and safety guidelines. The Shelter Coordinator will be the primary liaison with the Head of Delegation on all security, safety and travel issues for the Shelter Coordination Team.

² IFRC-UNOCHA Memorandum of Understanding, signed September 19th 2006.