



Private Sector Coordination Pilot Study



Shelter Cluster Nepal
ShelterCluster.org
Coordinating Humanitarian Shelter

Private Sector Coordination Pilot Study Report

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Acknowledgements

This report provides an overview of the Nepalese private sector and civil society's emergency response and engagement in the aftermath of the twin Nepal Earthquakes of April 25 and May 12, 2015. It was written by Ameena Shrestha, with data collection and reporting assistance from Shelter Cluster Nepal Private Sector Coordination team members Nikita Rajbhandari and Mukesh Khadka.

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List of Acronyms

4W	Who, What, Where, and When Mapping
CCI	Chamber of Commerce and Industry
CDO	Chief District Officer
CGI	Corrugated Galvanized Iron
COO	Chief Operating Officer
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
DDRC	District Disaster relief Committees
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
FNCCI	Federation of Nepalese Chamber of Commerce and Industry
GoN	Government of Nepal
HDRVG	Himalayan Disaster Relief Volunteer Group
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IM	Information Management
INGO	International Non-Government Organization
LDO	Local Development Officer
NFI	Non-Food Items
NGO	Non-Government Organization
NSET-Nepal	National Society for Earthquake Technology, Nepal
PM Relief Fund	Prime Minister's Relief Fund
SC Nepal	Shelter Cluster Nepal

TLC	Temporary Learning Center
TWG	Technical Working Group
VDC	Village Development Committee

Executive Summary



Photo Courtesy: Arniko Piya

Significant mobilization and participation in relief and recovery efforts by the Nepalese private sector was observed in the aftermath of April 25 and May 12 earthquakes. 4W mapping of the sector's response not only enables better understanding of the equity in coverage and gaps, but also lends voice to the stakeholders representing communities most adversely impacted by the disaster.

This pilot study aimed to assess (i) the sector's contribution in emergency relief distribution and recovery, and (ii) the interest level of the responders in integrating in Shelter Cluster or comparable coordination platform.

Secondary data was collected on assistance provided by the private sector and civil society responders to assess the sector's contribution in emergency relief distribution and recovery.

Responders were asked open ended questions on the utility of a coordination platform in order to assess the interest level in coordination.

More than 500 confirmed responders were contacted. Response rate was 27%, with only 134 reporting the details of relief and recovery activities.

Majority of the private sector response was undertaken as informal collaboration among for-profit businesses, volunteer groups, national organizations and local NGOs.

Private sector response is not cluster specific, with organizations and individuals providing assistance in shelter, food, NFIs, services, community buildings, and trainings.

Qualitative analysis of response from open ended questions pointed to some common trends among private sector responders. Majority of for-profit businesses participated in relief activities through the existing CSR missions. 90% of 96 district and municipal level CCIs reported either donating funds to the Prime Minister Relief Fund or distributing relief materials.

Ad hoc volunteer groups participated in extensive relief distribution, and could mobilize again with the availability of information regarding needs and gaps in reconstruction.

National organizations such as local NGOs, family trusts, foundations, and volunteer associations were currently focusing on transitional shelters, conducting livelihood training, providing TLCs and psycho-social counseling services.

Many responders reported plans for participating in reconstruction and recovery of private homes, schools and health centers. These efforts were significantly delayed due to the fuel crisis and its effects on the market supply and operational logistics.

Responders operating primarily from urban areas in Kathmandu valley reported referring

Key Findings

189,000	HH reached with Tarps/ Tents
18,000	HH reached with T-Shelters
15,000	HH reached with CGIs
218,000	HH reached with NFIs
157,000	HH reached with Food
552	Schools and Health Posts

to the SC Nepal's website for gaps and coverage data and technical guidelines, and also attending cluster meetings.

Majority found the available information helpful in the planning and decision making process, but two primary areas of improvement were suggested. First, a coordination platform should adopt both Nepali and English as the primary medium of communication to effectively engage private sector and civil society contingency. Second, it should provide increased opportunities for collaboration and communication of contextually relevant information among the private sector, civil society, and the INGOs stakeholders.

There was also a general lack of confidence with the GoN's ability to lead in matters of disaster preparedness and response. But, there was also a strong sense that the state should be the ultimate actor in leading such

response in future disasters, with the caveat that the state's policies and operations are timely and rational.

Some responders were open to leading coordination among their immediate network, but were unwilling to lead a national level coordination platform. They envisioned

a national level platform with initially shared resources with the GoN and the INGOs for its establishment, with the expectation of it becoming self-sustainable within a reasonable period of time. These observations were also confirmed through the findings of the Private Sector Debriefing Workshop conducted in November, 2015 (see Annex 3).

Summary Findings: Private Sector & Civil Society Debriefing Workshop

Nepal Earthquake 2015: Best Practices & Lessons Learned

- Essential need for private sector contingency in disaster preparedness and pre-disaster management.
- Central information management system needs to be established.
- Crisis management protocol where by civil sectors operate in conjunction with GoN and international agencies.
- Linkage between preparedness, and recovery and reconstruction.
- Advocacy from private sector coalition to the GoN.

Benefits to Private Sector and Civil Society in Coordinating with Humanitarian Sector

- Consolidated platform for coordination, advocacy, capacity building, and communication.
- Technical knowledge transmission and learning.
- Linkage to humanitarian sector Information Management, Monitoring and Reporting.
- Communication and advocacy linkage with the GoN.
- Effective inter-cluster linkages.
- Opportunities for Preparedness and DRR capacity building.

Recommendations

Effective integration of the private sector and civil society responders in the national and local level coordination mechanism calls for a paradigm shift that considers this contingency a critical and central stakeholder, rather than

a peripheral actor. It should be a multi-sectoral effort with collaboration among the GoN, the INGOs, and the private sector and civil society contingency.

Key Messages for Integration

- Overtly bureaucratized coordination operations should be avoided. Private sector and civil society response is seen as inherently spontaneous action with deep meaning for responders, and considerations should be made to avoid inhibiting the organic nature of response.
- Capacity building in coordination, reporting and information management is essential to ensure buy-in by the private sector and civil society stakeholders.
- Identification and capacity strengthening of already established volunteer networks, communication platforms, and information management systems within the private sector and civil society contingency is crucial to ensure sustainability of coordination.
- Coordination interlinkages in preparedness, DRR, post disaster response, and recovery and reconstruction activities are integral to private sector and civil society stakeholders' conceptualization of a coordination platform.
- Strategic inter cluster linkages, specifically with Shelter, WASH, Education, and Livelihood, is crucial to supporting coordination for private sector stakeholders.
- Perceived inadequacy and difference in styles of communication between private sector stakeholders and international agencies needs to be addressed.

Conceptualizing a Private Sector and Civil Society Integration

It is recommended that a private sector and civil society coordination platform should be integrated into an already existing disaster

response and recovery coordination platform. Three potential points of integration are described:

▪ National Level

1. Coordination

- Creating a Coordination Support Group (CSG) advisors drawn from the pool of private sector and civil society stakeholders to advocate on behalf of the contingency with the GoN and the INGO stakeholders.
- Vertical coordination with Private Sector and Civil Society Focal Point.

2. Technical Coordination

i. Private Sector and Civil Society Platform – Institutionalization under Technical Coordination.

- Private Sector Focal Point - Creating a distinct Focal Point to liaise specifically with private sector and civil society stakeholders, CSG advisors, and inter-cluster linkages.
- Private Sector and Civil Society Working Group - Consisting of stakeholders from businesses, FNCCI, CCIs, NGOs, NRNA, family trusts and foundations, etc. coordinated by Focal Point. Focal point acts as a liaison between private sector WG and other TWGs.

ii. Communication and Outreach – Institutionalization under Technical Coordination.

- Communication and Outreach Officer/s - Installing a communication and outreach officer with experience in outreach to multiple segments of Nepalese society.
- Integration of strategy and tools to address the perceived communication gaps between private sector contingency and international agencies.
- Communication and information platform accessible and relevant to non-humanitarian sector stakeholders can include integration of social media and technology providers drawn from the pool of Nepalese private sector.
- Coordination and linkage between private sector stakeholders and NSET/IFRC/IASC for DRR and Preparedness, and inter-cluster activities.

3. Information Management (IM) and Reporting

- Private Sector IM Officer - Responsible for assisting in private sector and civil society IM, Monitoring and Reporting, and establishing reporting mechanism and devising simple reporting tools for private sector responders.
- Devising a real time reporting mechanism and reporting tools to allow for the unencumbered flow of data.

▪ District Level

- Private Sector and Civil Society liaison drawn from the pool of responders operating in the districts, liaising concurrently with hub coordinators and district focal points.

▪ VDC/ Community Level Partners

- District and municipal level CCIs, NGOs, Community co-operatives, volunteer groups, corporate CSR and affiliated institutions.

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I. Introduction



Photo Courtesy: Arniko Piya

Immediately after the April 25, 2015 Nepal Earthquake, Nepalese private sector, civil society, and their network of global well-wishers within the country and internationally responded by conducting emergency relief and fundraising efforts.

Despite the mortal terror as the ground underneath their feet constantly shook with thousands of aftershocks, these volunteer responders pulled victims' bodies from the rubbles of destroyed buildings, salvaged priceless artifacts from the ruins of historical monuments in Kathmandu valley, set up emergency camps, distributed relief supplies, and raised funds both domestically and internationally to finance their efforts.

Although the threat of an impending earthquake was a common knowledge in the

Nepalese consciousness, the majority of the responders had no prior plans or practice in preparedness, allegedly because of the lack of institutional and political will for it. Most of these efforts were spontaneous and organic in nature, with the responders first organizing assistance closer to their locality. Their scope expanded as information became more available, but was contingent upon accessible financial and material resources.

One exception to this was Bibeksheel Nepali, a grassroots political party with a mass appeal to activists youth, which reported running practice drills for earthquake preparedness weeks prior to the April 25 Earthquake. Within the first hour, it was able to mobilize its volunteer contingency and set up emergency camps on the grounds of a Kathmandu

hospital, and eventually expanded its relief response to other districts.

The widespread usage of mobile phones and net-based communication platforms (although intermittent) facilitated these efforts. Both national telecom providers and international providers, like Skype and Viber, offered charge free calling services within the first few days of the April 25 Earthquake. Equipped with mobile phones and net-based communication platforms, these energetic youth and local business owners continued to find information, procure emergency relief materials, and coordinate transportation lines and delivery systems to the urban and rural areas in the impacted districts. Even as the GoN, well-established INGOs, and NGOs set down their system, these efforts became an important facet of the evolving post-disaster relief net that formed over the country.

A few national and international media outlets and blog sites noticed this ongoing phenomenon and reported colorful stories on the mass mobilization by the Nepalese private sector and civil society¹. However, the obvious absence of a coordinating mechanism and the ad hoc nature of relief efforts created missed opportunities for crucial data and information sharing among the civil society responders, the GoN, and the INGOs. It caused inefficient distribution of relief resources, resulting in duplication of efforts in many cases, and valuable opportunities were lost for

efficacious harnessing of local financial and volunteer resources. There are no concrete estimates of the number of victims reached or resources expended, but a conservative estimate puts the relief resources at millions of U.S. dollars. In many cases, these groups ended up being the first post-disaster responders.

With over 800,000 houses and 5,000 schools destroyed or damaged in the aftermath of the twin Nepal Earthquakes, a successful integration of the Nepalese private sector and civil society in Nepal's recovery and reconstruction efforts could potentially bridge the information, financial, and labor resource gaps not covered by the state and the international institutions². Also, a presence of trained local volunteer groups, that could effectively mobilize in short notice, could mitigate the devastating impact of future disasters while the state and international institutions mobilize for larger scale efforts.

Thus this pilot study was undertaken with the aims to assess the private sector and civil society's (i) contribution in emergency relief distribution, and (ii) the contingency's interest level in integrating Shelter Cluster or comparable coordination platform.

Limitations

This report provides a general overview of the post-disaster relief activities and opinions of the Nepalese private sector and civil society in

¹ For more information, see <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/05/150510073044740.html>; <http://www.newsweek.com/2015/05/15/bringing-bodies-kathmandu-328803.html>;

<http://blog.onestopportal.org/2015/05/junkiris-of-nepal.html>

² For more information, see <http://www.unocha.org/nepal> for reports

the aftermath of the twin Nepal Earthquakes, and is meant for a broader, rather than a specific, understanding of the topic.

Ability to adapt and demonstrate flexibility according to the needs and constraints of the participants has been the primary strength of this pilot study. Adjusting the initially designed methods and scope of the study to reflect the capacity of the respondent ensured response that would otherwise have been unattainable.

However, strategic time and opportunity for reporting pertinent information was lost due to the retroactive data collection. Also, verifying the accuracy of the reported distribution data was not feasible for the scope of this study, and there are valid concerns regarding the integrity of the data. Data was accepted from the sources in good faith, and left unreported when in doubt. Open-ended conversations with the interlinked groups of responders, however, confirmed to the veracity of the reporting, at least in terms of the volume of relief distribution.

Over 25% of the reported data lacked distribution information at the VDC and ward

level. Hence the analysis was conducted at the district level. Although it successfully provides a snapshot of general operational trends of the responders and assistance reached to the beneficiaries, it does not provide comprehensive information for gaps and coverage analysis.

In addition, it follows the SC Nepal reporting specification and employs a standard baseline measure of households reached, and does not calculate monetized measure of assistance provided. The findings and analyses are heavily weighted towards assistance provided in shelter for the same reason.

Further studies on the sources of funding, market supply chain, and communication channels specific to the private sector and civil society's operations would greatly expand the understanding of this sector's potential in disaster preparedness and response.

Structure

This report is structured in the following manner: Part I is the introduction, Part II describes the methods, Part III reports and analyses the findings, Part IV is the conclusion, and Part V provides recommendations.

II. Methods



Photo Courtesy: Arniko Piya

Contextual understanding of the private sector response and civil society in the aftermath of twin earthquakes anticipated this response to be a collaborative effort, with overlap of responders representing both for-profit and non-for-profit organizations and ad hoc volunteer groups.

In order to collect the data from the largest segment of the private sector and civil society responders, an inclusive working definition of *“[A] national or international individual or organization working in private sector, as well as in not-for-profit mission, excluding current Shelter Cluster Nepal partner agencies within*

the humanitarian aid framework, responding to the Nepal Earthquake 2015 relief and recovery” was adopted to identify so called private sector and civil society responders.

Referencing the working definition, secondary data was collected from for-profit companies and the affiliated institutions such as chamber of commerce and industries, not-for-profit organizations, such as family trusts, business foundations, local NGOs, national and international volunteer groups, and individual efforts.

Multiple methods of secondary data collection were initially adopted, viz.,

disseminating reporting template and survey questionnaires, telephone and email survey, extensive networking with social influencers, one on one meetings, field visits, and social media.

One-on-one meetings were found to be the most successful method for generating response, whereas online surveys were found to be the least successful. Thus, one-on-one meetings as well as telephone and email surveys were exclusively adopted as the primary methods for secondary data collection.

Reported data was accepted as provided in multiple formats to overcome the low response rate. Reporting template was adopted from the Shelter Cluster Nepal Reporting Template with additional categorical inclusion in types of assistance and assistance description. Seven types of assistance are listed with subcategories (See

Annex 1: Reporting Template). Crosschecking between Shelter Cluster Nepal and private sector database, as well as internal crosschecking within the private sector response data ensured the least possibility of data duplication.

Responders were asked open ended questions on the utility of a coordination platform for private sector. Open ended questions permitted engaged conversation, allowing responders to ask questions and provide opportunities for in-depth reflection.

The scope of this study was initially limited to assessing the private sector contribution in the three districts of Kathmandu Valley, and Gorkha. After the cursory analysis of reported data and survey, emergency relief activities undertaken in all 14 priority districts, and remaining affected districts, were utilized for analysis in order to fully capture the breadth of the private sector response.

I. Findings

A. Emergency Relief Response



Photo Courtesy: Arniko Piya

Qualitative analysis of information reported through open ended questions points to some common motivational factors and operational trends among the private sector and civil society responders.

In terms of reported motives behind voluntary mobilization, first and foremost, the April 25 earthquake was the first experience in a disaster of this scope and magnitude for the majority of Nepalese people in this generation. It brought the death and destruction into the proverbial backyard, and provided the emotional impetus for mass scale mobilization.

Second, the impact presented an opportunity for many in Nepalese civil society, especially the educated youth, to practice their burgeoning understanding of civic responsibility. There was an overwhelming perception among the local population that the state apparatus was severely unprepared and under-equipped to deal with a disaster of this magnitude in the first few days after the earthquake. Although many expressed desires of wanting to effectively participate in the Nepalese political processes, decades of civil war and political instability had managed to create a sense of disillusionment that thwarted their interest until this tragedy. It spurred a spontaneous creation of an intricate

network of personal and business networks into a force for rescue and relief.

Third, the existing dense and deep network of interpersonal relationships between the urban and rural population in Nepal (through familial ties, and interconnected circles of friends and professional colleagues) ensured the effective communication of the situation and the needs in the impacted areas. The internal migration of people from remote areas to urban areas for education and employment opportunities in the last few decades provided an information pipeline that connected remote households, communities, and villages with personal contact in urban areas.

Fourth, the international migration of Nepalese people for education and employment opportunities in the last few decades provided the platform for international fundraising opportunities that financed the national relief efforts.

And finally, the technologically savvy youth population was able to successfully harness the power of social media to communicate and share information and resources for relief and fundraising efforts.

Operationally, it was evident during the data collection process that the emergency relief response was an informal collaborative effort, with an overlap of responders representing for-profit businesses, non-profit organizations, and ad hoc volunteer groups. As such, outlining a distinct sectoral contribution to emergency relief response was problematic. The majority of for-profit businesses participated in relief activities

through the existing CSR missions. In addition to the FNCCI, about 90% of 96 district and municipal level CCIs reported either donating funds to the PM Relief Fund or distributing relief materials to impacted districts. National level trade and industry associations also conducted relief distributions.

CCIs from the eastern and the central regions reported distributing relief supplies in shelter, food, and NFIs items either through respective CDOs or through personnel mobilization. CCIs from western remote regions donated directly to the PM Fund.


Ad hoc volunteer groups participated in extensive relief distribution, but the majority reported no plans for reconstruction and recovery. This could change with the availability of information regarding needs and gaps in reconstruction, where this same contingency may mobilize again. Reported funding sources for ad hoc groups are personal funding, and national and international crowdsourcing, which may be replicated on an annual basis to fund portions of the long term recovery.

National organizations such as the local NGOs, family trusts, foundations, and volunteer associations reported the completion of emergency relief activities by mid-June, 2015. Majority were currently focusing on building transitional shelters, conducting livelihood training activities, and providing TLCs and psycho-social counselling services. Many responders reported plans for participating in reconstruction and recovery of private homes, schools and health centers. These efforts were significantly delayed due to the fuel crisis and its effects on the market supply and operational logistics.

i. Private Sector and Civil Society Survey and Reporting

Out of more than 500 confirmed responders that were contacted for survey and reporting, only 134 reported the details of activities (See Annex 2: List of Responders)³. Among the 134 data received, 62 were collaborative efforts among individuals, for-profit companies and their CSR arms, and ad hoc volunteer groups. 10 were business affiliated institutions, such

district and municipal level CCIs. NGOs and Trusts accounted for 41 of the reported data, and religious organizations accounted for 12. In addition, 4 Lions and Rotary Clubs, 3 school and university alumni groups, and 1 ex-British Gurkha Soldiers group, and 1 political party reported their data.



There were three main reasons identified for the low response rate: First, retroactive data collection was not optimum when there was a reported absence of accurate record keeping. Even a cursory operational analysis of the emergency response illustrates the ad hoc nature of activities undertaken by a contingency with no formal training in disaster

relief. Accurate record keeping was low on the priority list. This trend was more common with ad hoc volunteer groups.

Second, even when there were formal records available, responders were hesitant to share, mainly because of the perceived cost in time and resources. This was further exacerbated

³ List of Responders do not include FNCCI and HDRVG. Both data were included in the SC Nepal humanitarian agencies database.

by the geopolitical conflict in Nepal resulting in fuel crisis. It was a common trend observed among the local NGOs and for-profit businesses.

Third, many responders reported a fear of persecution by the state authorities for

multiple reasons, although the emergency relief and response activities undertaken by such responders appear to be significant. This trend was mainly observed among some volunteer groups and evangelical Christian networks.

ii. Sources of Funding

Reported sources of funding were personal contributions, door-to-door collection, international fundraising (through crowdfunding platforms such as *indiegogo* and *crowdrise*), CSR funds, employee contributions, organizational membership donations, and national and international donors contributing directly to the responders. Similar to the sectoral overlap of responders, their sources of funding were also diverse, with each responder adopting multiple means of fundraising.

Even a cursory browsing of crowdfunding platforms showed hundreds of individual and organizational appeals for Nepal Earthquake relief adding to millions of USD, and many had frequent updates on their relief activities. Tracking the appeals for their assistance data was a daunting task, but some resulted in successful reporting of data. For instance, Shikshya Foundation Nepal received over USD 600,000 in funds through the crowdsourcing


effort of its brand ambassador, Prabal Gurung, a renowned Nepali fashion designer based in New York.

NRNA, an umbrella organization of Nepalese expatriates with chapters in over 70 countries, raised over USD 400,000 through direct contributions from its members. This included temporary shelter, food, and NFI assistance in 13 districts. Furthermore, it has pledged USD 3.5 million to rebuild 1,000 permanent homes damaged by the earthquake. Himani Trust, eponymously named after the former crown-princess of Nepal Himani Rajya Laxmi Devi Shah, reported funding a majority of its relief activities through personal contributions by the name-bearer. Reported funding for FNCCI and CCIs came through personal contributions by their members, as well as non-member individuals and families from their districts and municipalities. In addition, they reported receiving direct in-kind donation of temporary shelters, food and NFIs.

iii. Post-disaster Relief Distribution


Even with a significantly low response rate, more than 189,000 households were reached with some type of assistance in temporary shelter, and more than 218,000 households were reached with some type assistance in NFIs (Fig. 2).

Households reached with tarpaulin and tent distribution by the private sector accounts for 20.9% of overall reported tarpaulin distribution (Fig. 3), when accounted for FNCCI, and HDRVG⁴.



⁴ Data from both these sources are included in the Shelter Cluster Nepal's humanitarian agencies database. <http://global-shelter-cluster.github.io/nepal-eq-2015/>

FIG. 3 - PROPORTION OF HOUSEHOLD REACHED WITH TARP DISTRIBUTION
BY HUMANITARIAN AGENCIES AND PRIVATE SECTOR



a. Temporary Shelter

A closer look at the distribution data and the qualitative inquiries suggest that the majority of the responders did not (or were not able to) follow the recommended guidelines for procurement and distribution of tarpaulin. Most were not aware of the specifications, or

even if they were, the market supply and the cost of tarpaulin/ tent dictated their choices.

Standard tarpaulin, heavy duty plastic sheeting, and canvas and other fabric tents were included in the data as tarpaulin distribution. Similarly, the sizes also varied

with some households receiving 9'X11' tarpaulin, and other households receiving 15'X18' canvas tents.


Many reported procuring the temporary shelter items locally in Kathmandu when available, or from the suppliers in the industrial cities in eastern Nepal that were not affected by the earthquake. The range of cost also varied depending upon the individual suppliers, with some maintaining the pre-earthquake price or providing tarpaulin at cost with no profit margin, while others reportedly sourced at more than 40% of pre-earthquake prices.

One responder reported manufacturing tents for distribution through their CSR arm to supplement the inadequate market supply. Sherpa Adventure Gear, an international outfitter based in Nepal, produced a limited supply of tents by repurposing stocked waterproof fabric normally used to create clothing items. In house conceptualization of design and the utilization of an available labor

pool for production (patterning and sewing), not only ensured a quick turnout but also provided opportunities for income generation to local crafters.

Some responders also reported importing temporary shelter items from across the border in India, and Thailand. However, the ability to import relief supplies from international sources were severely curtailed by the GoN emergency policy that mandated affiliation with registered NGO in order to get a tax-free status at border customs. Anecdotal stories of relief materials being stuck in the Nepal-India border for weeks abound (because of their inability or unwillingness to pay the 15% import tax).

Organizations such as the Lions and Rotary Clubs reported receiving packages of relief materials for distribution that included two tarpaulins per household, and funds through their international affiliates in South Asia, North America and some in Europe.





CGI distribution reached less than 16,000 households, with Sindhupalchok and Nuwakot receiving the highest (Figs. 4 & 5). Similar to tarpaulin/tent distribution, the responders did not (or were not able to) follow the recommended guidelines for procurement and distribution of CGIs. The specifications and number of sheets per bundle varied, with some households receiving two bundles each consisting of 8 sheets, and others receiving one bundle of 12 sheets per household.

Two reasons may explain the lower distribution rate of CGI compared to tarpaulin. First, the logistical challenge of transporting CGI and the costs associated with it may be considered significantly higher by the private sector, with no obligatory mandate to provide assistance. Second, most of the responders shifted their focus from emergency relief distribution to building transitional shelters

earlier in the emergency phase, thus, repurposing the CGI distribution.

More than 18,000 transitional shelters were either completed or ongoing in all 14 priority districts and 4 of the affected districts (Figs. 4, 5 & 6). Although this is not a high percentage of overall reported damage in shelter, it is close to 10% of the recommended 200,000 households to be reached with winterization plan that is currently being undertaken by the humanitarian agencies. Close to another 9,000 were being planned in the priority districts, but the logistical challenges due to the fuel crisis had created uncertainty with the undertaking. A comparative analysis of transitional shelters built by humanitarian agencies and private sector and civil society was not feasible since the SC Nepal does not collect data for fully built transitional shelters.






CGI dome and A-frame bamboo designs appeared more prevalent among the types of transitional shelter. In addition to the request by the beneficiaries, the most common rationale behind building CGI dome shelters was the design simplicity, time and cost effectiveness, and the opportunity for material upscaling for permanent rebuilding.

Aashraya Nepal, a shelter relief volunteer group founded by the graduates of Institute of Engineering, Pulchowk Campus in the aftermath of 2015 Nepal Earthquake, created a CGI dome shelter design concept that had been adopted to complete 2,300 shelters (Pic. 1 & 2). It is primarily funded through individual donations and in collaboration with other private sector and civil society responders⁵.

Technically oriented youth volunteer groups such as Aashraya Nepal were the critical responders during the early phases of the emergency relief response, and continue to be influential advocates for the effective reconstruction.

Similarly, PortalBikes, a social entrepreneurship organization founded by two American expatriates specializing in income generating bicycles, was also one of the more prolific distributors of complete CGI PortalShelter kits. Costing approximately USD 110 in materials (excluding the transportation cost), and estimated to comfortably house a family of five, these do-it-yourself kits were used by more than 137 organizations and individuals.

⁵ For more information, see Aashraya Nepal's social media site:
<https://www.facebook.com/reliefshelter/>



Pic. 1 - Aashraya Nepal CGI Dome Shelter, Photo Courtesy: Shikshya Foundation Nepal

These providers also included some international humanitarian agencies⁶. In addition, PortalBikes directly built more than 500 shelters funded through individual donations. One of the more interesting aspects of these shelter kits, with the video of their assembly instruction available for free online, is the successful adaptation of simple do-it-yourself technique within the Nepalese context.

A-frame bamboo transitional shelter, although not as prolific as the CGI dome shelters, has gained recognition among the

private sector and civil society responders (Pic. 3 & 4). This could be due to the name recognition associated with one of its more prolific builders. Chaudhary Foundation, the CSR arm of the Chaudhary Group of Industries, has been one of the most visible providers for this type of transitional shelter. A portion of its USD 2.5 million in earthquake funds has reportedly been utilized to complete more than 1,100 of these shelters in 10 of the 14 priority districts. CF have plans to build 9,000 more although the fuel crisis has reportedly created uncertainty with the availability of construction materials and transportation.

⁶ Many responders, including PortalBikes, referred to their personal or business online platform for detailed information regarding their activities to


accommodate for time:
<http://www.portalbikes.org/shelters/#shelters-buildyourown>



Pic. 2 – CGI Dome Shelter; Photo Courtesy: Shikshya Foundation Nepal

The expected life of these shelters was 2 years, and the average cost is approximately USD 550. According to the COO Merina Ranjit, the 2 years living in a transitional shelter could potentially provide enough time and opportunity for the beneficiaries to recover until they were able to amass enough resources for permanent rebuilding. There were 6 criteria of prioritization tools adopted, when feasible, to identify the most vulnerable

population. Once the site and the beneficiaries were identified, a written agreement between the homeowner and the CF was executed in order to detail and clarify the responsibilities of the stakeholders. This practice, according to Ranjit, allowed an owner-driven effort, and prevented misunderstanding and potential beneficiary dependency.



Pic. 3 – A-Frame Bamboo Transitional Shelter; Photo Courtesy: Chaudhary Foundation




Pic. 4 – A-Frame Bamboo Transitional Shelter completed; Photo Courtesy: Chaudhary Foundation

b. Distribution by Districts


Assistance was reported in 27 districts, including all 14 priority districts and 13 affected districts (Fig. 7 & 8). The highest number of households were reached with tarpaulin distribution in Kavrepalanchok district. Sindhupalchok and Nuwakot were the second and the third highest districts with households to be reached with tarp distribution (Fig. 7). The proximity and the accessibility of Kavrepalanchok and Nuwakot to responders could potentially explain the high distribution rates in these districts, whereas Sindhupalchok could be primarily due to the perceived need and coverage gaps reported after the May 12 earthquake.

It is interesting to note that Nepal Earthquake Recovery Monitoring Assessment, a separate assessment conducted by Shelter Cluster Nepal, reported less than 1% respondents choosing private sector as a source of assistance in Kathmandu. However, it is evident from Fig. 3 that more than 45.3% of overall tarpaulin distribution in Kathmandu was conducted by the private sector. This could point to poor messaging by private sector responders due to a lack of resources that was available to humanitarian agencies



Almost negligible volume of activities were reported in 13 affected districts (Fig. 8). This trend could hold true for all affected districts except for Lamjung and Solukhumbu. Conversations with responders point to

substantial private sector responses in these two districts, mostly by travel, tour, and hotel industries and their network of international well-wishers.



c. Food

More than 155,000 households were reached with some assistance in food in all 14 priority districts, with Sindhupalchok having the highest number of assisted households (Fig. 2 & 9). Dhading and Gorkha received the second and the third highest distribution. This could potentially be explained by the rush of responders reaching these two districts in the weeks between the twin earthquakes when the country was flooded with news about

landslides and stranded residents with reportedly no access to food. A very small volume of food distribution was reported in the affected districts, with the exception of Lamjung, in which more than 3,000 households were reached (Fig. 10).

A surprising consistency was observed among the diverse responders regarding the types of food distributed. Food assistance packages normally consisted of rice, dal (lentils), chiura


(beaten rice), cooking oil, salt, spice kits, sugar, tea, and packaged food items such as noodles and biscuits. A range of matrices were employed, but 5 Kgs. of rice per week per household consisting of an average of 5 members appears to be the most commonly adopted matrix.


Interestingly, the conversations on food distribution generated the most number of anecdotes that were poignantly humorous. Stories about duplicated efforts abounded. But tales of responders trekking for two days up the mountain trail in remotes areas carrying sacks of rice on their back only to be offered a meal with better tasting rice and local rooster was the tale most recounted with much relish. To some extent, stories like these encapsulate, in a nutshell, the entirety of this emergency relief response phenomenon by the Nepalese private sector and civil society. It

is the story of altruism, generosity, and difficult work, mixed with hard doses of reality because of occasionally missed communication and lack of coordination.




Photo Courtesy: Arniko Piya





d. NFIs




More than 218,000 households were reached with some type of assistance in NFIs (Fig. 2) Blankets and health and sanitation supplies accounted for the majority of distributed NFIs (Fig. 11). Over 62,000 households received blankets in all 14 of the priority districts. Open-ended conversations pointed to significantly higher number of completed and ongoing NFI distribution for winterization, especially blankets and health and sanitation supplies, in priority districts.

Non-prescription medicine, bandages, water purifying tablets, hand sanitizers, toothpaste, toothbrush, soaps, female hygiene kits,

sanitized gloves, and other medical supplies for health care practitioners were some of the commonly distributed health and sanitation supplies. These items were procured locally when available, or through international collection and transported to Nepal as cargo or personal luggage.

Lighting materials consisted mostly of battery powered torchlights, candles, and in one reported case, installation of solar panels providing both lighting and charging station⁷. Education kits mostly consisted of school backpacks filled with stationary supplies, and on some cases, school uniforms.

e. Community Buildings



⁷ Reported as Karma Flights/ AAR. For more information on solar lighting, please see <http://ran.org.np/light-of-hope-saurapani-gorkha/>

16 health posts, both completed and ongoing, were reported in 6 priority districts of Dhading, Dolakha, Kabhrepalanchok, Nuwakot, Okhaldhunga, and Sindhupalchok. These efforts were directed towards the rebuilding of existing health posts that were damaged during the twin earthquakes. Many of the private sector and civil society responders during the emergency relief phase were currently undertaking these rebuilding projects. For instance, Shikshya Foundation Nepal were supporting the rebuilding of Community Eye Centers in Dolakha and Sindhupalchok in collaboration with Tilganga Institute of Ophthalmology.

Similarly, assistance to 536 schools (completed, ongoing and planned) was

reported in 13 priority districts and 2 affected districts (Fig. 12). Assistance in school rebuilding ranged from providing construction materials such as CGIs to complete rebuilding.

Open-ended conversations pointed to a significantly large number of private sector and civil society responders planning to direct their efforts in school reconstruction. Chaudhary Foundation already had an ongoing effort of rebuilding 100 primary schools. District level Rotary and Lion Clubs also had school reconstruction planning underway. Many reported facing bureaucratic challenges, both on the national and local level, and mismatched community expectations in their efforts.

f. Services and Trainings

Over 7,000 households were reached with some type of assistance in services such as arts, sports and music recreational camps, health camps, temporary learning centers, childcare camps, psycho-social counseling, and volunteer debris clearing and reconstruction efforts (Fig. 2). Negligible training workshops were reported. However, open-ended conversations suggested a significantly higher number of households and

individuals were reached in both services and trainings. Some of the undertakings included trainings of carpenters in historical renovation and artifact reclamation, and livelihood trainings for victims in handicraft manufacturing, garment making, etc. Lack of time and resources in keeping accurate reports during the data collection process could potentially explain disparity in quantitative data reporting.

B. Information Sharing and Coordination

Those responders operating primarily from the urban areas in Kathmandu valley reported referring to SC Nepal and other cluster platforms for gaps and coverage in data and technical guidelines, and also attending cluster meetings. Although the majority found the available information helpful in the planning and decision making process, two primary areas of improvement were suggested.

First, most of the cluster meetings were conducted in English, which put many national responders at a perceived disadvantage in both understanding and communicating the topics of discussion. Thus, a dual linguistic platform should be adopted. Second, most of the available information were geared towards international humanitarian agencies, and thus contextually less relevant to the private sector and civil society concerns. Many echoed that the cluster meetings were primarily dominated by the INGO responders, and there was an obvious lack of platform to not only communicate and address the issues relevant to their operations, but also to provide feedback and share their local contextual knowledge.

Majority of the responders also recommended increased collaboration and coordination among diverse sectors, both national and international, for the optimum utilization of resources and local know-hows. Although there was an expressed interest in increased coordination with SC Nepal or a comparable platform for information sharing,

capacity building and advocacy, the conceptualization of coordination also meant an inherent interlinkages among DRR and preparedness capacity building, post-disaster response coordination, and recovery and reconstruction coordination. As one responder commented, “we represent all clusters in one, since our response is not cluster specific. We are mostly volunteers, who also has other work commitments. So who has the time or the manpower to attend tens of cluster meetings every week, and report the data according to the tens of cluster-specific guidelines?” And this sentiment was a common refrain among the majority of the responders.

In addition, some responders also expressed dissatisfaction with their lack of ability to positively influence the INGO stakeholders and create a meaningful collaboration during the emergency relief phase. There was a perception among some of the civil society responders that their technical expertise and contextual knowledge were outright dismissed without providing a better alternative solution in a timely fashion. This dynamic was mainly attributed to the overtly “bureaucratized” INGO sector that was perceived to be inept at reacting to the changing realities on the ground, and also to the perceived “hubris” and “know-it-all” attitude embodied by some in the INGO sector.

There was also a general misgiving and lack of confidence regarding the GoN’s ability to lead

in matters of disaster preparedness and response. But, there was also a strong sense that the state should be the ultimate actor in leading such response in future disasters, with the caveat that the state's policies and operations are timely and rational.

Open-ended conversation also illustrated that the members of this contingency were open to leading coordination among their immediate network, but were unwilling to lead a national level coordination platform.

This was mainly attributed to the lack of technical expertise, available time and financial resources. However, some stakeholders envisioned a national level platform with initially shared resources with the GoN and the INGOs for its establishment, with the expectation of it becoming self-sustainable within a reasonable period of time. These observations were also confirmed through the findings of the Private Sector Debriefing Workshop conducted in November (see Annex 3).

IV. Conclusion

This pilot study was undertaken with the objectives of assessing the Nepalese private sector and civil society's contributions in the post disaster relief response in the aftermath of twin Nepal Earthquakes, and the sector's interest level in coordinating with SC Nepal or comparable platform.

Secondary data was collected of the distribution activities and extensive qualitative data was gathered through open-ended questions. Over 500 confirmed responders were contacted. Data response rate was under 27%, with only 134 reporting their activities.

Over 189, 000 households were reached with assistance in tarpaulin/tent distribution in 14 priority districts, and 13 affected districts. Over 15,000 and 18,000 households were reached with assistance in CGI and transitional shelters respectively. Over 157,000 households were reached with assistance in food and over 218,000 households were reached with assistance in NFIs.

Even with a low response rate, these findings suggested that private sector and civil society responders were significant contributors to the humanitarian relief in the aftermath of the twin Nepal Earthquakes. They represent the community of beneficiaries and responders that are most directly impacted by disaster

and its aftermath, whether through the loss of life, shelter and/or livelihood, and are important stakeholders in the relief and recovery response. Integration of the private sector and civil society in humanitarian relief and recovery effort can, thus, add value by fostering ownership and sustainability, expanding opportunities for funding and financial contributions, and providing opportunities for collaboration.

However, effective integration of the private sector and civil society responders in the national and local level coordination mechanism calls for a paradigm shift that considers this contingency a critical and central stakeholder, rather than a peripheral actor.

Identifying the key stakeholders, and strengthening their existing capacity in disaster preparedness and response will take a strong and sustained commitment. It entails conceptualizing a coordination platform that takes into account the constraints of the private sector and civil society actors in terms of time and resources, and devising operational mechanisms that eases, rather than increases, the burden of coordination. It necessitates a multi-sectoral effort with collaboration among the GoN, INGOs, and private sector and civil society contingency.

V. Recommendations

An effective integration of the private sector and civil society into the disaster response coordination platform needs to be a multi-sectoral approach, with operational mechanisms that facilitates coordination by accommodating the constraints of this contingency. Some key considerations for integration are:

- Overtly bureaucratized coordination operations should be avoided. Private sector and civil society response is seen as inherently spontaneous action with deep meaning for responders. Although integration for standardization of response is essential, considerations should be made to avoid inhibiting the organic nature of response.
- Capacity building in coordination, reporting and information management is essential to ensure buy-in by private sector stakeholders.
- Identification and capacity strengthening of already established volunteer networks, communication platforms, and information management systems within the private sector and civil society contingency is crucial to ensure sustainability of coordination.
- Coordination interlinkages in preparedness, DRR, post disaster response, and recovery and reconstruction activities are integral to private sector and civil society stakeholders' conceptualization of a coordination platform.
- Strategic inter cluster linkages, specifically with Shelter, WASH, Education, and Livelihood, is crucial to supporting coordination for private sector stakeholders.

- Perceived inadequacy and difference in styles of communication between private sector stakeholders and international agencies needs to be addressed.

Private Sector and Civil Society Integration

It is recommended that a private sector and civil society coordination platform be integrated into an already existing disaster response and recovery coordination platform (for instance, Housing Recovery and Reconstruction Platform). This provides opportunities in trans-epistemic knowledge sharing and communication, while allowing for the optimum utilization of available resources. Devising the long-term self-sustainability of such platform could be part of its agenda.

Three points of integration are recommended. These are meant as broad topical ideas of potential steps in integration and the specifics need to be further analyzed.

1. Coordination - Creating a vertical integration of private sector and civil society coordination within the national organizational structure.
2. Information Management - Establishing integration of private sector and civil society data into the existing information management system.
3. Communication and Outreach - Designing a communication and outreach platform accessible and relevant to non-humanitarian sector stakeholders.

National Coordination Structure

- **National level**

- 1. **Coordination Support Group (CSG)**

- Creating a Coordination Support Group (CSG) advisors drawn from the pool of private sector and civil society stakeholders to advocate on behalf of the contingency with the GoN and the INGO stakeholders.
 - Vertical coordination with the Private Sector and Civil Society Focal Point.

- 2. **Technical Coordination**

- i. Private Sector and Civil Society Platform – Institutionalization under Technical Coordination.
 - Private Sector and Civil Society Focal Point – A Focal Point to liaise specifically with the private sector and civil society stakeholders, CSG advisors, and inter-cluster linkages.
 - Private Sector and Civil Society Working Group - Consisting of stakeholders from business, FNCCI, CCIs, NGOs, NRNA, Family Trusts and Foundations, etc. coordinated by Focal Point. Focal point acts as a liaison between private sector WG and other TWGs.
 - ii. Communication and Outreach – Institutionalization under Technical Coordination.
 - Communication and Outreach Officer/s - Installing a communication and outreach officer with experience in outreach to multiple segments of Nepalese society.
 - Integration of strategy and tools to address the perceived communication gaps between private sector contingency and international agencies.
 - Communication and information platform accessible and relevant to non-humanitarian sector stakeholders can include integration of social media and technology providers drawn from the pool of Nepalese private sector.
 - Coordination and linkage between private sector stakeholders and NSET/IFRC/IASC for DRR and Preparedness, and inter cluster activities.

- 3. **Information Management (IM) and Reporting**

- Private Sector and Civil Society IM Officer/s - Responsible for assisting in private sector IM, Monitoring and Reporting, and establishing reporting mechanism and devising simple reporting tools for private sector responders.
 - Devising a real time reporting mechanism and reporting tools to allow for the unencumbered flow of data.

- **District level**

- Private Sector and Civil Society Officer liaising concurrently with hub coordinators and district focal points.

- **VDC/ Community Level Partners**

- District and municipal level CCIs, NGOs, community co-operatives, volunteer groups, corporate CSR and affiliated institutions.

REPORTING TEMPLATE

Assistance Type	Assistance Description
1. Temporary shelter	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Tarpaulin/ Tent ii. CGI iii. Fixings (nylon rope, nails, tie wire, etc.) iv. Construction Materials (plumbing pipes, cement, gravel, brick, iron re-bars, wire nettings, sacks, etc. excluding CGIs and Fixings) v. Cash (cash/ in kind transfer for temporary shelter such as rent subsidy, sponsorship, hosting, etc.) vi. Tool Kits vii. Transitional shelter
2. Permanent Home	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Not specified
3. NFIs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Health & sanitation supplies (non-prescription medicines, bandages, splints, masks, gloves, water purifying tablets, sanitary pads, tampons, etc.) ii. Debris clearing supplies (gloves, masks, equipment, etc.) iii. Clothes/ rubber boots/ shoes/ sandals iv. Blankets v. Sleeping mats vi. Containers (jerry cans, buckets) vii. Kitchen sets (pots, pans, crockery, and cutlery) viii. Lighting (solar lights, candles, lamps, etc.) ix. Mosquito nets xii. Education kits xiii. Others
4. Food	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Not specified
5. Community building	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Health posts/ clinics ii. Schools and community shelters iii. Historical landmarks, temples, stupas, etc.
6. Services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Art/sports/music/recreational camps ii. Health camps/ Education camps/childcare camps iii. Psychological and social counselling iv. Construction/ debris clearing volunteer v. Others
7. Training_other	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> i. Not specified

LIST OF RESPONDERS⁸

1. Aashraya Nepal
2. ABARI
3. Act4Quake.org
4. Adventure Mountain Biking Academy
5. Association of Dalit Woman's Advancement of Nepal (ADWAN)
6. Amir Poudel
7. APIEN/ HISSAN
8. Art of Living
9. Association of St. Mary's Alumnae Nepal (ASMAN)
10. Azimut Nepal
11. Bahar Kumar
12. Bank of Kathmandu Limited
13. BESS (BPKIHS Ex-Student Society)
14. Bethel Baptist Church
15. Bibeksheel Nepali
16. Bijaya Tuladhar
17. Baptist Medical and Dental Mission International (BMDMI)
18. Chamber of Commerce (Dhulikhel)
19. Chamber of Commerce (Itahari)
20. Chamber of Commerce (Kailali)
21. Chamber of Commerce (Khotang)
22. Chamber of Commerce (Lamjung)
23. Chamber of Commerce (Mahottari)
24. Chamber of Commerce (Myagdi)
25. Chamber of Commerce (Ratnanagar)
26. Chamber of Commerce (Sunsari)
27. Chamber of Commerce (Udayapur)
28. Chandon Shakya
29. Change Fusion Nepal
30. Chariot Track Community Development Society (CTCDS)
31. Chaudhary Foundation
32. Cheej Kumar Shrestha
33. Community Grace
34. Children and Youth First
35. Dhurmus and Suntali Actors Group

⁸ There are overlaps in many emergency relief response groups. Certain groups are represented with names of the individuals as per the request, and in certain cases, the full names has not been provided.

36. Donation for Nepal
37. Doris
38. Dream Temple
39. Edushala
40. Federation of Business and Professional Women
41. Friends Of Nepal
42. Godavari Alumni Association
43. Global Peace Foundation
44. Grassroots Movement in Nepal (GMIN)
45. Golchha Organization
46. Grand Asian Journeys
47. Green Life Nepal
48. Grisham Koran Maharjan
49. Gyaneshwor Church
50. Help Nepal Network
51. Helping Hands
52. Himalayan Climate Initiative
53. Himani Trust
54. Hool Traders
55. Hope Camp
56. House of Hope
57. Impact Nepal
58. iTeen
59. Jamal Malik
60. Jason Woon
61. Karma Flights
62. Karma Flights/ AAR
63. Kathmandu and United Gorkha Ex-Soldierman Club
64. Kathmandu-Nepal Brahmakumari Society
65. Kavre Earthquake Relief
66. Kriayt Social Business
67. Kumari Bank
68. Lakasa
69. LINC2Nepal
70. Lions Club International
71. Lions Club Kathmandu
72. Melamchi and Indrawati Stone Pvt. Ltd./ Maa Chandeswori Agristone Pvt. Ltd.
73. Micah Network
74. Mirmire Youth Society
75. Mountain Child
76. Namlo Nepal International

77. Nepal Association of Tour & Travel Agents (NATTA)
78. Neerajan P. Rajbhandary
79. Nepal Development Society
80. Nepal Rises
81. Nepal Youth Foundation
82. New Ark Jagaran Manch
83. NIC ASIA Bank
84. NIMS Mission
85. Niti Foundation
86. Nepal Jesuit Social Institute (NJSI)
87. Non-Resident Nepalese Association
88. Nyano Sansar/ Nepal Share
89. Om Aama Samuha
90. Om Shrestha
91. P. S. Yonzon
92. Paul Hennis
93. Paulas
94. Phurba Lama
95. Portal Shelters
96. PRAN
97. Quake Relief Group
98. Quest Pharma
99. Rajan Acharya
100. Rasuwa EQ Relief Fund
101. Right4Children
102. Rose Foundation
103. Rotary Clubs of Nepal and Bhutan
104. Rotary Club Tripureswor
105. Rupesh Man Shrestha
106. Sabah Nepal
107. Sachit Shrestha
108. Sangsangai/ Ujjyalo Foundation
109. Sano Chano
110. Sano Paila
111. Shadab Khan
112. Shanti Nepal
113. Share Nepal
114. Sharmila Basnet
115. Sherpa Adventure Gear
116. Shikshya Foundation
117. Shyam Khatri

118. Sky Foundation
119. Speedway Foundation
120. Spreading Smile
121. Susan/ Ali/ Sanjay
122. Sushil Shrestha
123. Swadesh Gurung
124. Swayambhu R. Tuladhar
125. The Image Park
126. Tilganga Foundation
127. Together We Stand, Hand in Hand
128. Trip Himalaya
129. Ujjyalo Foundation
130. Volunteer for Change Nepal
131. We Aid Nepal
132. We Will Rise Foundation
133. Yala Rotary
134. Yogdaan Foundation



**PRIVATE SECTOR DEBRIEFING WORKSHOP
NEPAL EARTHQUAKE 2015: BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED
SHELTER CLUSTER NEPAL PRIVATE SECTOR COORDINATION**

**Tuesday, 24th November 2015
10:00 a.m. -2:30 p.m.
Bagaicha Restro, Jawalakhel, Lalitpur, Nepal**

List of participants:

Krishna S. Khaitu, CTCDS
Rajesh Bhoydo, CTCDS
Ram Sundar Bhello, CTCDS
Amir Livi, CTCDS
Suman Shakya, CE Services
Salouna Sthapit, CE Services
Sweta Amatya, CE Services
Kamal Babu Pariyar, ADWAN
Pralhad Karki, REDR India
Rajan Pandit, Nepal Youth Foundation
Timothy Rai, Himalayan Climate Initiative
Bigyan Khanal, Namlo International
Riswo R. Gorkhali, Nepal Youth Foundation
Nirman Ojha, ABARI
Govinda Narayan, Bibeksheel Nepali Party
Dikshya Ayer, AYON
Merina Ranjit, Chaudhary Foundation
Sumnima Dewan, Chaudhary Foundation
Anusa Thapa, Bibeksheel Nepali Party
Saurav Chand, Impact Nepal

Narayani Gaha, AYON
Dikshya Singh, Help Nepal Network
Manju Hamal, BPW
Ananta Raj Bajracharya, Lumanti Support
Group For Shelter
Pradip Khatiwada, NVP
Asha Shree Rajbhandari, CE Services
Lijeena Shakya, CE Services
Mangala Karanjit, BPW Nepal
Deepa Rai, Nepal Rises

Facilitator:

Ameena Shrestha, Private Sector
Coordinator, SC Nepal

Support:

Nikita Rajbhandari, SC Nepal
Mukesh Khadka, SC Nepal
Deepika Bhardwaj, SC Nepal
Imtiaz Ali, SC Nepal
Sarita Maurya, SC Nepal

Agenda:

- Introduction
- Presentation on the preliminary findings from private sector pilot study
- Topic 1 Discussion - Emergency Response: Identifying Challenges
 - Identifying common themes
 - Discussion on top themes identified
 - Discussion on issue areas:

- i. Urban/Rural
 - ii. NGOs/ For-profit/ Not-for-profit
- Coordination with GoN/ Humanitarian Sector
 - i. Incentives
 - ii. Challenges
- Best practices and Lessons Learned
- Topic 2 Discussion - Recovery and Reconstruction
 - i. Moving Forward: Identifying themes
- AOB

Meeting notes, actions and decisions:

A brief introduction about the Shelter Cluster Coordination Architecture was given by Sanjeev Hada, followed by the preliminary findings of Private Sector Coordination Pilot Study shared by Ameena Shrestha.

After the presentation the participants were divided into groups to discuss the various topics enlisted in the agenda.

Topic 1 Discussion – Emergency Response: Identifying Challenges

Under this session, stakeholders scrutinized the challenges encountered during prompt response post-earthquake 2015. Challenges confronted as discussed laid down the following points (in the order of importance):

- Lack of preparedness.
- Weak government directives.
- Technical knowledge deficiency.
- Lack of coordination among stakeholders.
- Information management inadequacy as well as information gap.
- Inadequate/ absent record keeping and tracking of the rapid actions.
- Market supply chain issues.
- Logistic/ Accessibility issues.
- Misleading information on damage assessment.
- Social exclusion and caste separation in camps.

Action points: Hurdles pinpointed were tackled as and when occurred in ad hoc manner, yet specific resolutions were demanded by stakeholders with the coordination of Shelter Cluster or comparable coordination platform. Further discussions on how the challenges were resolved during the crisis period.

Best Practices and Lessons Learned:

Further critical examination upon the issues faced led to best practices and lessons learned outlined by the private sector stakeholders. Variant points summarized were:

- Essential need of private sector contingency in disaster preparedness and pre-disaster management.
- A central information management system/center needs to be established.
- Crisis management protocol whereby hospitals, NGOs, preparedness agencies like Nepal Red Cross Society/ IFRC and the GoN work in conjunction.
- Preparedness should be part of recovery and reconstruction.
- Constant pressure from public as a collective body towards the GoN.
- Propose a protocol and take self-initiative rather than blaming game.
- Need assessment to avoid duplication and relief redundancy.
- Preventing increased level of beneficiary dependency should be a priority, hence community as a partner rather than beneficiaries model, with written contractual agreements with beneficiaries outlining their level of involvement.
- Transitional shelters ought to be terrain specific.
- Upscaling and salvaging of available resources.
- Trainings and capacity building: local masons, home owners, etc.
- Grass root level to macro level monitoring

Action points: Stakeholders envision a coalition of private sector contingency advocating the outlined best practices and lessons learned to GoN. Further discussion on the protocols essential.

Topic 2 Discussion - Recovery and Reconstruction Moving Forward: Identifying themes

In this session, stakeholders briefly touched on the process of recovery and reconstruction. Core ideas discussed revolved on the need for inclusive recovery and reconstruction plan, capacity building, and the GoN's role in leading and supporting the process.

- Recovery and reconstruction should be a holistic process, with much emphasis on means and methods of livelihood recovery/development along with shelter.
- Recovery is a long term process yet allocation of phase-wise time frame is essential.
- Youth involvement, and utilization of available capacity.
- Need identification is of paramount importance.
- Tax free market initiatives by the GoN for competitive advantage for fostering livelihood development inclusive for recovery and reconstruction.

- Willing banking sector for organizing mobile booth and coordination with the GoN.
- Independent assessment of Nepal Building Codes, Reassurance on the part of the GoN regarding the building guidelines.
- Civic responsibility in following GoN directives and mandates in recovery and reconstruction (e.g.: building regardless of the building codes)
- Building code is not complete on the part of the GoN, especially concerning urban reconstruction.
- Promotion and inclusion of cost-effective transitional shelters as the GoN proposed shelters are highly expensive to build.

Action points: Future workshops or partners forum shall be proposed to discuss recovery and reconstruction for interested private sector actors.

AOB

Participants were handed out survey to assess the usefulness of the workshop. All participants, except one, responded positively to the value of the workshop.

Action points: Bi-weekly to monthly discussion forum on specialized topics as identified is crucial.

Action points: Coordination and collaboration platform to showcase initiatives and discuss challenges and solution.