

The Somali Shelter / NFI Cluster

Reviews of coordination and response

Combined report

April 2015

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Abbreviations and acronyms

4W	Who-what-where-when information
ACF	Action Contre la Faim
ALNAP	Active Learning Network on Accountability and Performance
ASAL	Arid Semi-Arid Land (NGO)
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
ARC	American Refugee Committee
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Process
CGI	Corrugated galvanised iron
CRC	Cluster Review Committee
DFI	Development Frontiers International
DRC	Danish Refugee Council
GenCap	Gender Capacity Standby Project
FTE	Full-time equivalent
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HINNA	Haweenka Horseedka Nabadda & Nolosha (NGO)
HLP	Housing, Land and Property
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IDP	Internally displaced person
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
MRRR	Ministry of Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (Somaliland)
NFI	Non-food items
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NORCAP	Norwegian Standby Capacity Programme
NRC	Norwegian Refugee Council
OCHA	UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ORDO	Onkod Relief and Development Organisation
SAG	Strategic Advisory Group
SCC	Somali Community Concern
SSI	Semi-structured interview
SSS	Shelter and Settlements Section (UNHCR Geneva)
SSWC	Save Somali Women and Children
SSWG	Sustainable Shelter Working Group
TI	Transparency International
TWIG	Technical working group
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UNSOM	United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia
WASH	Water, sanitation and hygiene

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Many of the recommendations in the coordination review draw on suggestions by Shelter Cluster partners and other informants but all errors and omissions are my own.

Sara Davidson

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Clay Westrope

Executive summary

This report was commissioned by UNHCR's Shelter and Settlements Section (SSS). It combines the findings of two separate evaluations undertaken in Somalia in the latter half of 2014:

- 1) Shelter response
- 2) Shelter cluster coordination

An external consultant was contracted to undertake the review of coordination. REACH, a global cluster partner, undertook the evaluation of shelter response. The aim of the combined report is to identify lessons, good practice and recommendations, and to contribute to the global shelter cluster's evaluation guide.

The review of coordination covered the period from August 2006 when the Shelter Cluster first began work in Somalia until September 2014. The response review considered emergency shelter response at Mogadishu, transitional shelter at Bosaso, and permanent shelter at Galkayo.

Evaluation methods comprised document review, inception reports, field visits, key informant interviews, household surveys involving over 2,300 households (response only), and community discussions (response only).

Both evaluation teams encountered constraints. Little documentation on the cluster's lengthy deployment was available in Geneva. Most documents used in the coordination review were sourced via web search throughout the evaluation and requests to individual informants. Logistical and security considerations required revision of the original coordination review work plan. Security considerations restricted access by UNHCR's external consultant, a UK national, and REACH's evaluation manager, a US national, to Mogadishu. National and international staff of REACH therefore undertook enumerator training in Mogadishu, Bosaso and Galkayo. Shelter Cluster partners came to Mogadishu airport for meetings with the coordination evaluator.

Somalia was one of four countries in which clusters were piloted, a year after the humanitarian reform process of 2005. By 2006, civil war in Somalia had been underway for at least fifteen years. Up to 400,000 people had been internally displaced: thousands had fled the capital, Mogadishu, to escape fighting between the Islamic Courts Union and US-backed Ethiopian troops; thousands more were made homeless that year by floods.

Large parts of Somalia, particularly the south-central region, remained off-limits to humanitarian agencies. As in other cluster pilot countries, the failure of humanitarian assistance had been marked. Humanitarian aid in Somalia was seen as compromised by links to humanitarian intervention and the interests of global and regional powers. By 2006 the UN considered that the situation of IDPs had fallen far below the most basic of standards in refugee camps.

UNHCR is the Shelter Cluster's co-lead at global level. In Somalia, UNHCR and UN-Habitat jointly led the Shelter Cluster, a then innovative arrangement which capitalised on the agencies' expertise in emergency and permanent shelter and their many years' experience in Somalia. The Shelter Cluster's earliest focus was the

accessible areas of northern Puntland and Hargeisa. In Puntland and Somaliland the Shelter Cluster benefited from the input of its first partners, DRC, NRC, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, and UNICEF. Bosaso, in particular, was seen as an early model of what clusters could achieve.

A real-time evaluation by UNHCR in 2007 recommended that the agency increase cluster staffing. Recommendations to all clusters in IASC's 2007 evaluation of the new cluster approach emphasised the need for lead agencies to institutionalise their commitment and recruit dedicated staff with coordination and information management skills. These recommendations chimed with UNHCR's stated policy on cluster mainstreaming. Nevertheless, and despite a direct appeal in 2008 from Somalia's Humanitarian Coordinator, UNHCR did not appoint a dedicated Shelter Cluster coordinator until 2010.

Since then, successive coordinators, based in UNHCR's Somalia country office in Nairobi, have established the Shelter Cluster at national and regional level, building good relationships with cluster partners, UNHCR colleagues and other clusters. The appointment of full-time staff has been accompanied by an increase in the number and diversity of active partners. In 2006, the Somalia Shelter Cluster had 5 international partners, in 2012 10 partners, both local and international. In 2014, the cluster contact list numbered approximately 80 NGOs, Red Cross and UN agencies of which approximately 20 were considered active partners.

Partners have increasingly contributed to coordination. Before the appointment of a dedicated cluster coordinator, programme staff of UNHCR or UN-Habitat chaired coordination meetings in Somaliland, Puntland, Galkayo and Mogadishu. The first full-time Shelter Cluster coordinator appointed a local NGO, DFI, to act as focal point at Gedo in southern Somalia. His successor has worked with national and international partners to second Somali-speaking staff to ten regional hubs. By 2014 regional staff of ARC, DFI, DRC, NRC, UN-Habitat and UNHCR were acting as part-time regional cluster coordinators.

In order to enhance regional capacity, the cluster secretariat, working with the Protection Cluster, organised residential workshops for regional coordinators in Garowe and Hargeisa in 2013 and 2014. This is good practice. Nevertheless, the Somalia Shelter Cluster is likely to need more staff if it is consistently to support a larger number of regional hubs which operate with part-time coordinators in difficult and demanding circumstances. An internal review of the cluster's regionalisation is recommended, in line with a proposal by the global focal point for coordination.

The first dedicated coordinator was assisted by one full-time support officer in Nairobi and another in Mogadishu: the latter, appointed in 2012, is now the longest-serving member of the Shelter Cluster's Somalia staff. By late 2014 the secretariat had the equivalent of four full-time staff. However, staff in support roles are employed on short-term contracts or as unpaid interns and this has led to frequent gaps and turnover.

Partners appreciate the role of cluster staff in supporting service delivery through coordination meetings, the SAG, the Cluster Review Committee and the Sustainable Shelter Solutions Working Group (SSWG). They see the secretariat as highly innovative, committed and hard working. The cluster coordinator frequently visits Mogadishu but there remains a perception that major decisions are made solely in Nairobi at meetings where relevant Somali government and Somali-based NGO representatives cannot be present. A deputy coordinator role would go some way to addressing this perception as well as providing support for regional hubs. Holding

alternate quarterly or SSWG meetings in Mogadishu would also help raise the profile and status of the Shelter Cluster in Somalia.

Successive coordinators and support staff have struggled to maintain and rationalise website information. The plethora of websites and the difficulties of managing them are systemic issues. Nevertheless, www.sheltercluster.org should be the Somalia Shelter Cluster's main website. The appointment in 2014 of the cluster's first information manager is an opportunity to prioritise website maintenance and improvement.

The 2012 Strategic Operational Framework reflects the need for flexibility and for the options of emergency shelter, transitional shelter and durable solutions throughout Somalia. The cluster has tried to harmonise approaches rather than set standards which, experience has shown, are unlikely to be met. This is due in part to the huge programme area, the range of climates, lack of access and varying levels of government support. In addition, chronic under-funding and the summary eviction of IDPs by private and government landlords can put partners in an invidious position, forced to choose between the quantity and quality of shelter and settlement provision.

REACH's findings indicate that shelter – whether emergency, transitional or permanent - by cluster partners has been of better quality than previously supplied and better quality than that supplied by non-partners. It has met with high levels of beneficiary satisfaction. It leaves a majority feeling safer - at least inside individual shelters. However, settlement design, communal latrines and market areas have also contributed to feelings of insecurity outside individual shelters and this requires work with the Protection and WASH clusters. The use of contractor-driven approaches in large-scale response or to promote integration between displaced and host communities has left IDPs less well equipped to maintain, repair or extend shelter or to gain livelihood skills.

The mix of shelter options remains valid but a revised framework and contingency plan are overdue. By late 2014 the cluster had, with assistance from REACH, developed a shelter monitoring and evaluation framework and indicators. This, together with the follow-up of strategic topics addressed by the SSWG, will assist the cluster in revising strategy and bringing it up to date.

Revised strategy should specifically reference Sphere and other issues, standards and indicators that the cluster wishes to highlight. GenCap was active in Somalia from 2007 and the cluster strategy emphasises the need for consultation with women. Early monitoring found that security and protection from violence, including gender-based violence, were shelter beneficiaries' biggest concerns. This finding has informed the continuing use of CGI in transitional shelters and the inclusion of lockable doors in CGI shelters and *buuls*. Successive coordinators have hired female cluster support officers in both Nairobi and Mogadishu. In 2012, the Nairobi Cluster Support Officer and partner agency Save Somali Women and Children developed a standard "Women's Dignity Kit."

Some cluster assessment and monitoring has disaggregated data by gender, for example, the transitional shelter assessment at Bosaso in 2011. In 2014, however, the cluster's settlement infrastructure mapping reports from Bosaso and other locations did not disaggregate data by gender or age and REACH too found it hard to recruit female enumerators. The cluster should do more to promote consistent attention to the full range of IASC cross-cutting issues. They should be explicitly included in the Strategic Operational Framework, coordination workshops and joint

exercises. Global cluster tools and showcasing work by individual partners can assist. Accountability to affected people could be similarly highlighted and feedback 'loops' to groups surveyed added to the current assessment and settlement mapping exercises.

Informants were uniformly appreciative of the Somalia Shelter Cluster's role in developing and promoting mobile phone technology. In 2013 the Shelter Cluster began working on this with the Nairobi-based firm *mFieldwork* which in turn has built on experience from NRC in Somalia. A pilot project has addressed joint information management, assessment, monitoring and settlement mapping. Some partners have used the cluster's digital platform for their own assessments. The Shelter Cluster has also reached out to other clusters, including the Protection Cluster, to involve and assist them in joint assessments. The technology is seen as simple and quick to use by relatively small teams. This work has potential in other contexts and would repay evaluation by the global shelter cluster to test costs, benefits and sustainability, particularly among local NGOs.

Regular reporting from Nairobi and more frequent management visits and follow-up from Geneva would help the SSS understand the Somalia cluster's complex working environment and the security issues that daily confront partners and the secretariat. It would also contribute to learning by UNHCR and the global cluster. The small secretariat would benefit from global support for local and international advocacy because any humanitarian achievements in Somalia are dwarfed by the massive unmet need. In October 2014, the funding gap was greatest in the shelter and NFI sector where less than 7 per cent of CAP needs were met and less than half those in need of shelter and NFI assisted by cluster partners. Informants cited advocacy with donors and local government as areas in which the cluster could do more. Independently of the cluster, some of its partners have sought to draw attention to funding needs as famine again threatens Somalia.

The Shelter Cluster's achievements in Somalia have been made despite frequent staffing gaps and turnover in the small secretariat and despite the constant search by successive coordinators for funding. UNHCR's present country representative is supportive of the Shelter Cluster, as evidenced by funds for staffing and for information management initiatives. However, the pattern of funding since deployment has been inconsistent with the predictable leadership and appropriate staffing levels UNHCR promised for its new coordination mandate. UNHCR needs to consolidate the secretariat's impressive achievements since 2010 and conduct a budget review to ensure appropriate staffing and ring-fenced resources for the cluster and its activities.

Recommendations

Shelter response

	Mogadishu shelter response (emergency shelter)
S1	Involve all clusters, particularly WASH and Protection, in needs assessment to improve emergency shelter planning and access to services and facilities in IDP settlements.
S2	Ensure that the quality of shelter materials meets cluster requirements and advocate for shelter providers, both in and out of the cluster, to use cluster specifications.
S3	Establish a more detailed information management system to enable tracking of assistance by shelter and other sectors at household level.
S4	Include households which have <i>not</i> received assistance in future evaluations of emergency shelter in order to compare outcomes.
	Bosaso shelter response (transitional shelter)
S5	Explore alternatives to CGI for use in transitional shelter because it has limited availability and provides little ventilation.
S6	Include IDP households in construction and provide them with training on shelter maintenance to ensure they can expand and repair their own shelter safely and effectively. Continue to promote owner-driven approaches.
S7	Involve all clusters, particularly WASH and Protection, in needs assessment to improve emergency shelter planning and access to services and facilities in IDP settlements. Concentrate markets outside residential areas to ensure safety and security of shelter occupants.
S8	Include households which have <i>not</i> received assistance in future evaluations of transitional shelter in order to compare outcomes.
	Galkayo shelter response (permanent shelter)
S9	Include livelihood training and opportunities as an integral part of shelter response in permanent settlements.
S10	Include IDP households in planning and construction and provide them with training on shelter maintenance to ensure they can expand and repair their own shelter safely and effectively and/or gain a livelihood skill.
S11	When planning permanent settlements, allow room for expansion and construction of infrastructure such as schools or hospitals.
S12	Involve all clusters, particularly WASH and Protection, in needs assessment to improve emergency shelter planning and access to services and facilities in IDP settlements. Safety and security measures to be considered include the construction of police stations and plot fencing in order to improve perceptions of security in settlements
S13	Include households which have settled informally in permanent settlements in future evaluations in order to compare outcomes.
S14	Include protection from seismic events and flooding events in future evaluations of permanent shelter.

Coordination

	Cluster leadership
C1	In accordance with IASC cluster guidance, draw up a memorandum of understanding between cluster co-lead agencies to clarify roles and accountability.
C2	Brief new UNHCR regional and country staff in Geneva on Shelter Cluster lead agency role. Continue to update UNHCR regional and country staff during SSS visits to Somalia.
C3	Develop budget strategy for cluster lead role in Somalia to enable predictable leadership, appropriate staff numbers, and ring-fenced resources for activities.
	Cluster personnel
C4	Review staffing requirements to ensure the Somalia Shelter Cluster has appropriate levels of staffing.
C5	Subject to review of decentralisation (see C9), consider appointment of a deputy coordinator to support regional clusters.
C6	Institute monthly progress reporting to the SSS in Geneva.
C7	Institute six-monthly management visits by the SSS to Nairobi and Mogadishu.
	Supporting shelter delivery
C8	Consider holding alternate national cluster and SSWG meetings in Mogadishu and Nairobi.
C9	Involve the SAG in monitoring decentralisation and reviewing generic terms of reference for coordinators.
C10	Ensure CRC decisions are circulated to regional clusters and invite individual agencies to request more information from the secretariat if necessary.
C11	In line with the commitment to digital information, complete the current website makeover with assistance, if necessary, from the global focal point for information management, and consider use of a Dropbox for internal record-keeping.
C12	Use the main website calendar for all meetings, including those of the SSWG and regional cluster. Continue to populate regional pages to include all meeting records.
	Strategy, policy and standards
C13	With SAG partners, revise and update the Strategic Operational Framework and Shelter Cluster terms of reference.
C14	Post standards recommended on main cluster website. Promote common understanding of all IASC cross-cutting issues via website, by showcasing the work of cluster partners, and in joint exercises.

C15	Consider real-time evaluation of digital platform to assess costs, benefits, continuity and complementarity, and potential to contribute to accountability to affected people (and see C21).
C16	Include standards and all IASC cross-cutting issues in revised Strategic Operational Framework and coordination training.
	Monitoring and reporting on implementation of Shelter Cluster strategy
C17	Take part in cluster performance monitoring at national and regional level.
	Advocacy and communication
C18	Provide global support for advocacy, including development of Factsheets and infographics, and a simple leaflet about the Shelter Cluster in English and Somali.
c19	Consider an advocacy TWIG to raise and maintain awareness of shelter funding needs.
	Accountability to affected persons
C20	Include accountability to affected population in revised Strategic Operational Framework and in coordination training. Showcase good practice by partners.
C21	Communicate the findings of joint assessments, monitoring and evaluation to the communities that contributed to them (and see C15).
	Contingency planning, preparedness and capacity-building
C22	Finalise shelter and NFI contingency plan and share with partners and on website.
C23	Feed regional capacity-building requests into quarterly and/or SSWG meetings.

1 Introduction

1.1 Evaluation purpose, scope and clients

These evaluations were commissioned by the Shelter and Settlements Department of UNHCR in Geneva. Evaluation of coordination was intended to review the effectiveness of coordination services provided by UNHCR as lead agency of the Somalia Shelter and NFI Cluster and to identify key lessons and recommendations to improve cluster coordination in the future. Evaluation of shelter response was intended to review achievements and challenges in meeting emergency, transitional and long term shelter needs of the affected population and making recommendations on future shelter response.

The evaluations would also contribute to trial and review of the global Shelter Cluster's Evaluation guidelines. Development of the guidelines is a project of the global shelter cluster's Accountability Working Group. The project is funded by ECHO and led by UNHCR.¹

The review of coordination covered the period from August 2006 when the Shelter Cluster was first deployed in Somalia until September 2014. In addition to appraisal against the core cluster functions established by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), the evaluation also considered leadership and personnel issues.

The shelter response evaluation considered the three phases of the Shelter Cluster strategy at sample locations: emergency shelter at Mogadishu, transitional shelter at Bosaso, and permanent shelter at Galkayo.

¹ The AWG members are ACTED, CARE, IFRC, NRC, Shelter Center, UNHABITAT, UNHCR

2 Methodology

2.1 Evaluation methodology

a. Personnel

The evaluations were managed for UNHCR by successive global focal points for coordination in Geneva. UNHCR had originally intended to contract a two-person external team to undertake a joint evaluation of coordination and response. However, contracting procedures made this impossible and two 'teams' were deployed.

An external consultant was contracted to undertake the review of coordination. She was assisted by staff of NRC during field visits in Bosaso and Hargeisa and by the Shelter Cluster's Support Officer in Mogadishu.

REACH, a global cluster partner which has provided the Somalia Shelter Cluster with assessment capacity since June 2012, was commissioned to undertake the evaluation of shelter response. One of its international evaluation managers, supported by two international staff of REACH in Somalia, was dedicated to the evaluation. REACH provided five assessment and GIS staff to design and manage quantitative data collection and analysis for each of the three field locations. Cluster partners seconded or recruited thirty enumerators at each location.

b. Document review

The external consultant collated background documentation on the Somalia situation, partner programmes and the Shelter Cluster in Somalia since 2007 for the evaluation of coordination.

c. Inception report

Each team submitted an inception report, including work plans and schedules, to the evaluation manager and shared these with the Shelter Cluster Coordinator in Nairobi.

d. Field visits

Field visits were agreed in cooperation with the cluster coordinator. The choice for both teams was influenced by security and logistical considerations and the aim to ensure that the evaluations considered the range of emergency, transitional and permanent shelter and NFI delivered by Shelter Cluster partners.

The teams independently visited Mogadishu and Bosaso. The external consultant also visited Hargeisa. REACH had evaluated permanent shelter in Galkayo in June 2014 and its findings there formed part of the present evaluation.

e. Interviews on coordination with approximately fifty key informants

Views on coordination were sought primarily through semi-structured interviews (SSIs) and group discussions in Nairobi, Bosaso, Hargeisa and Mogadishu, and by phone and Skype discussion. Key informants included approximately fifty staff of international and national cluster partner and stakeholder agencies, government bodies in Hargeisa and Mogadishu, and past and present cluster staff.

f. Response surveys involving over 2,300 households

REACH teams conducted household surveys, key informant interviews, and community discussions in Mogadishu, Galkayo and Bosaso. Household surveys involved a total of 2,341 households, averaging 780 at each location. Data were collected using mobile data collection technology, analysed, compared with existing data and plotted onto maps. Workshops were conducted with field actors in Nairobi and Mogadishu to review the initial findings of the response evaluation.

g. Draft report and case studies

Drafts of the report on coordination were shared with the Evaluation Manager and cluster coordinator for comment and feedback. A final version was prepared in December 2013 and the cluster evaluation guide modified.

REACH combined quantitative, narrative and mapping data in three case studies on shelter at Bosaso, Galkayo and Mogadishu. They shared drafts with the Evaluation Manager, Somalia Shelter Cluster Coordinator, partners in Nairobi and the external consultant. The final version of each case was posted on the REACH website. Edited versions are included in the body of this report and full texts in the annexes.

2.2 Constraints

a. Access

Security considerations restricted access by UNHCR's external consultant, a UK national, and REACH's evaluation manager, a US national, to Mogadishu. In the case of REACH, a national staff member was able to undertake enumerator training with partners in Mogadishu. International and national REACH staff members conducted training in Bosaso and Galkayo. For the coordination evaluation, Shelter Cluster partners came to Mogadishu airport for meetings.

Logistical considerations required changes to the coordination work plan. The revised plan permitted one and a half days for meetings and site visits in each of Bosaso and Hargeisa and half a day in Mogadishu. An online questionnaire proved impracticable but its questions formed the basis of semi-structured interviews.

b. Documentation

Little documentation on the cluster's lengthy deployment was available in Geneva and most documents were sourced via web search and through requests to individual informants. Website maintenance and document management are the subject of recommendations in the coordination report.

3 Background and context

3.1 Context of the humanitarian response in Somalia

a) Background²

Somalia was created with UN assistance in 1960. Its creation followed the merger of the former British protectorate and Italian colony that had divided most of the territory of the Somalis during the imperial land grabs of the 19th Century. The new republic's relationship with its neighbours was soured when Britain bequeathed border territories in the south to Kenya and the west to Ethiopia. The white 'star of unity' on the Somali national flag points to these countries and also to the former French colony, present day Djibouti, which collectively represent the territory of a 'Greater Somalia' (see map, below).

In 1970, General Siad Barre seized power in a coup. A new Supreme Ruling Council developed close relations with the USSR. Despite achievements that included the establishment of a Somali orthography, advancement in education, and management of the 1974 famine, at that time the worst in living memory, the Barre regime is most often remembered for its military failure, cruelty and corruption.

Military defeat in the western Ogaden region in 1978 resulted in thousands of refugees fleeing Ethiopia for Somalia. Barre had forced the dissolution of political parties, ostensibly to reduce the influence of the clans they represented which traditionally governed day to day life. He detained and tortured clan leaders but increasingly relied on and favoured his own family and clan.³ Five thousand people were killed when Hargeisa, capital of British Somaliland and home to a powerful opposition clan, was razed in 1988. A million people were displaced before Barre was forced into exile in January 1991.

Barre had many opponents but they shared no agenda other than his overthrow. Years of clan warfare followed. Former British Somaliland declared unilateral independence in 1991, Puntland sought autonomy in 1998.

² Main sources for this section: BBC; James Fergusson (2013), *The World's Most Dangerous Place*, Black Swan; Mary Harper, (2012), *Getting Somalia Wrong?* Zed Books; IDMC (2010), *Displacement and worsening humanitarian situation as a result of ongoing violence and conflict, A profile of the internal displacement situation*; Ioan Lewis, (2008), *Understanding Somalia and Somaliland*, Hurst; UNDSS briefing 10.10.14; UNHCR (various)

³ Human rights Watch, September 1992, *Indivisible Human Rights*, page 22

Table 1 Military intervention in Somalia 1992-2011⁴

1992 - UN troops arrive to monitor ceasefire after fighting that follows fall of President Siad Barre. A US-led task force delivers aid as part of Operation Restore Hope.

1993 – 24 Pakistani, 1 Malaysian and 18 US soldiers are killed in an incident made famous by the film ‘Black Hawk Down.’

1995 - UN troops withdraw, leaving warlords to fight on. UN casualties number 150.

2006 - Ethiopia sends troops to defend Somalia interim government.

2007 - African AMISOM peacekeeping force is deployed.

2011 - Kenya enters Somalia in pursuit of al-Shabaab militia.

By 2006 when the humanitarian clusters were activated, thousands had fled Mogadishu to escape fighting between the relatively popular government of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) and US-backed Ethiopian forces. In 2007 UNHCR reported that

Assessments by the United Nations and non-governmental organizations indicate that assistance in all sectors is far below international humanitarian standards. The hardest-hit regions are in south and central Somalia and south “Puntland”. Meanwhile, living conditions in internally displaced persons (IDP) settlements fall below even the basic standards of refugee camps: access to safe places in IDP settlements often requires paying landlords; clean water and latrines are hard to come by; and health facilities and treatment are subject to shortage of staff and medicines.⁵


Defeat of the ICU saw moderates flee to Eritrea and militants to Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab fought back, regaining control of most of southern Somalia by late 2008. In May 2009 Islamist insurgents launched an attack on Mogadishu, prompting President Ahmad to appeal for help from abroad. Al-Shabaab consolidated its position as the most powerful insurgent group by driving its main rival out of the southern port city of Kismayo in October 2009. It encountered a series of offensives by government and African peacekeepers and a Kenyan army incursion in 2011. Thousands fled fighting and famine in the south.

Al-Shabaab withdrew from Mogadishu in August 2011 and lost its last urban stronghold, Kismayo, in October 2012. Somalia's first formal parliament in over twenty years was sworn in at Mogadishu airport, marking an end to eight years of transitional government.

⁴ BBC www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094632

⁵ UNHCR, (2007), Response Plan Somalia 2008-10

Half a million people died in the famines of 1992 and 2010-12. By October 2014, more than a million Somalis were refugees in neighbouring countries and 1.1 million remained internally displaced.⁶ Approximately 893,000 IDPs were living in south-central Somalia. This included an estimated 369,000 in settlements in and around Mogadishu, 129,000 in Puntland and 84,000 in Somaliland.



2011: Famine is declared in two regions of southern Somalia. Across the country, four million people need urgent assistance - including three million in the south. Credit: OCHA

Peace is not yet assured. Decades of fighting have contributed to a protracted situation in which Somalis have few resources to cope with the natural disasters to which their country is prone (see Annex 2) and recurrent displacement. The environment for Somalis and for those delivering humanitarian assistance remains dangerous. In February 2014, suicide bombers in Mogadishu targeted a convoy in which UNHCR's representative and members of her staff were travelling. In the month of October 2014, OCHA reported that eleven violent incidents against humanitarian personnel and assets had been recorded across nine regions. These incidents resulted in the death of two humanitarian workers, one case of attempted rape, another of injury, and two arrests.⁷

Somalia is widely termed a 'failed' or 'fragile' state. It is second only to South Sudan in the 'Failed States Index' and 175/175 in Transparency International's Corruption

⁶ OCHA, 24 November 2014, Humanitarian Bulletin Somalia October 2014

⁷ Ibid.

Perceptions Index.⁸ Development indicators in Somalia are among the worst in the world.⁹

Population	10.5 million
Poverty rate	73%
Population under 30	70%
Youth unemployment	67%
School-age children in school	42%
Adult literacy	31.8%
HDI rank	165 (2010)

Somalia is also seen as a country that has been failed. Observers point to the legacy of colonialism and the Cold War, the effects of the ‘War on Terror’ and the politics of oil. Some say that structural adjustment helped start a decline in food production that increased dependency on imported grain and food aid.¹⁰ Others contrast the relative stability of Somaliland with the volatility and violence of South-Central Somalia, where those who have sought to aid Somalia are seen as yoking humanitarian assistance to humanitarian intervention, promoting global and regional interests but reducing humanitarian space.^{11 12} UNDP reported in 2014:

While Somalia’s humanitarian situation has slowly stabilized since the devastating famine that killed 260,000 people three years ago, it is still extremely fragile. Half of the population has experienced abject poverty. More than one million people remain displaced in often appalling conditions and more than one million people are refugees in the region. One serious or a series of shocks – such as failed rains, increased insecurity or reduced access – and Somalia could slip easily back into a deep crisis.¹³

By late 2014, donor fatigue, lack of access and the competing demands of more recent crises were seen as leaving the Somalia humanitarian response under-funded. In October 2014, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon warned that famine again threatened the lives of 3 million people. In the same month, OCHA reported that the overall funding gap was the largest in six years.¹⁴ The gap is greatest in the shelter and NFI sector where just under 7% of CAP needs were funded.

⁸ Fund for Peace - Failed / Fragile States Index 2014 ffp.statesindex.org; TI Corruption Perception Index 2013 cpi.transparency.org

⁹ UNDP, About Somalia www.so.undp.org/content/somalia/en/home/countryinfo

¹⁰ Michel Chossudovsky, (1994) Somalia, the real causes of famine, globalresearch.ca/somalia-the-real-causes-of-famine/25725; Abdi Ismail Samatar, Genocidal politics and the Somali famine, *Al Jazeera*, 20 July 2011

¹¹ Laura Hammond and Hannah Vaughan-Lee (2012), *Humanitarian space in Somalia: a scarce commodity*, HPG, page 16

¹² BBC, 28 June 2012, Somali and Somaliland presidents meet in Dubai www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-18635411

¹³ UNDP (2014), *UNDP Somalia Annual Report 2013*, page 2

¹⁴ OCHA, October 2014, Humanitarian Dashboard, August 2014

3.2 Shelter Cluster deployment

The countries identified for the initial roll-out of the Cluster Approach were precisely those where the failings of the humanitarian response had been most marked¹⁵

Somalia was one of four countries where clusters were piloted in early 2006. The Somalia IASC (now the Somalia HCT) had asked it be added to pilot countries in order to raise the country's profile (IASC 2006).¹⁶

Despite large-scale displacement in Somalia, the Shelter Cluster was not among the first activated. UNHCR and UN-Habitat drafted a terms of reference following a meeting by the two agencies in Nairobi in June 2006.¹⁷ Their aim was to merge the role of UNHCR in emergency shelter with that of UN-Habitat in permanent shelter (then part of a short-lived Early Recovery Cluster). Activation of the Shelter Cluster was endorsed in November 2006. The new cluster proposed joint projects and a common strategy in the 2007 CAP.

In a self-assessment report by the Somali clusters in 2006, informants underlined the challenges of security and lack of access to South-Central Somalia. Among their recommendations were appointment of dedicated coordinators in Nairobi and Somalia and cluster information managers.¹⁸ These appointments, together with adequate resources to implement coordination, were seen as necessary to ensure separation between the operational and coordination roles of the lead agencies and in order to hold lead agencies accountable. Clusters were regarded as UN-centric and had yet to demonstrate their value to NGOs or their compatibility with existing coordination structures. Nevertheless, improvements in coordination and identification of gaps were beginning to be seen.

The first Shelter Cluster minutes in August 2006 record discussions in Nairobi between senior staff of UNHCR, UN-Habitat, UNICEF, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Danish Refugee Council (DRC). Shelter agencies had by this time begun working together in Garowe and Bosaso. In November 2006 UN-Habitat reported the development of a common shelter kit, the need to link emergency and longer-term shelter, and forecast that demand for emergency shelter would increase owing to conflict.¹⁹

UNHCR conducted a real-time evaluation of its cluster role in Somalia in July 2007. South-Central Somalia remained largely inaccessible and evaluators found that, with the notable exception of Bosaso, the Cluster had insufficient resources to implement joint coordination or strategy. The evaluation found:

¹⁵ Jeff Crisp, Esther Kiragu and Vicky Tennant, UNHCR, IDPs and Humanitarian Reform, *Forced Migration Review*, FMR 29 page 13

¹⁶ IASC (2006), *IASC Interim Self-Assessment of Implementation of the Cluster Approach in the Field*, Annex 4 page 1

¹⁷ Note for File, 9 June 2006, Consultation between UNHCR and UNHABITAT, Shelter Cluster, 9 June 2006, Nairobi, Kenya

¹⁸ IASC (2006), *IASC Interim Self-Assessment of Implementation of the Cluster Approach in the Field*, Annex 4 page 2

¹⁹ UN-Habitat, 31 January 2007, Shelter Cluster established for the coordination of Humanitarian Aid in Somalia

*... a clear need to increase the number of posts in the field, (as opposed to using short term missions), commensurate with the size of the operation, including levels sufficiently senior to provide effective cluster leadership ... in a way that would enable devolution of decision-making to the field wherever possible.*²⁰

UNHCR and UN-Habitat were urged to replicate the approach to shelter coordination in Bosaso.

Blanket recommendations to clusters in IASC's 2007 evaluation of the cluster approach emphasised the need for all lead agencies to institutionalise their cluster commitment and to recruit dedicated field cluster staff with coordination skills. Such recommendations chimed with UNHCR's stated policy on mainstreaming.²¹



2006: A family 'compound' in Shabelle IDP camp in Bosaso. Although lacking most of the basic necessities, many people from [other] parts of Somalia prefer to live here because at least it is relatively peaceful and secure. ©UNHCR / K. McKinsey²²

²⁰ Enda Savage, Neill Wright, Esther Kiragu, (2007), *Real time evaluation of UNHCR's IDP operation in Somalia*, UNHCR, page 3

²¹ UNHCR, *Working with the internally displaced, UNHCR Global Appeal 2008-2009*

²² Bossaso port in Somalia unlikely El Dorado for the displaced, UNHCR, News Stories, 1 March 2006

Findings

4.1 Leadership

“UNHCR will deploy an appropriate number of staff members with effective coordination and communication skills and who have specific competences in the three functional areas in which UNHCR has assumed cluster lead responsibilities.”²³

“There is no such thing as a ‘cluster lite’ approach.”²⁴

UNHCR and UN-Habitat have co-chaired the Somalia Shelter Cluster since 2006 when they jointly presented cluster proposals to the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) in Somalia. UNHCR would take the lead on emergency / temporary shelter while UN-Habitat would be responsible for permanent shelter. There appears to have been no written agreement between the two agencies and neither appointed dedicated staff. Nevertheless, the arrangement appears to have worked well, particularly at the start and it was considered to be innovative and demonstrate good practice. The first Shelter Cluster coordinators were UNHCR’s Somalia Programme Officer and UN-Habitat’s Chief Technical Adviser. At UNHCR, the coordinator role was subsequently taken by successive deputy country representatives until 2010.

In 2010 the first dedicated shelter coordinator was recruited by NORCAP which provides surge capacity to UN agencies through secondment of *gratis* “experts on mission”, funded by the Norwegian government. He succeeded in re-establishing and re-energising the cluster, beginning a process of regionalisation and involving local partners. The second is regarded as a visionary and innovative coordinator whose work has raised the profile of both the cluster and UNHCR.

However, in a response where overall funding falls well below appeal levels, the Shelter Cluster has struggled to staff a very small secretariat and to secure financial resources for cluster activities. Successive coordinators have succeeded in securing funds for short-term personnel and activities from donors and partners. In 2014, UNHCR funded the appointment of a cluster support officer and an information manager shared with the Protection Cluster. With funding from ECHO, it has also paid the coordinator’s salary. Current support, while welcome, offers less than the ‘predictable leadership’ to which UNHCR made a corporate commitment in 2007.

²³ UNHCR, 30 January 2007, *Policy framework and corporate strategy, UNHCR’s role in support of an enhanced inter-agency response to the protection of internally displaced persons*, page 7

²⁴ OCHA, (2005), *Strengthening Humanitarian Response: Building a Stronger, More Predictable Humanitarian Response System*, Presentation

Recommendations

	Cluster leadership
C1	In accordance with IASC cluster guidance, draw up a memorandum of understanding between cluster co-lead agencies to clarify roles and accountability.
C2	Brief new UNHCR regional and country staff on the Shelter Cluster lead agency role. Continue to update UNHCR regional and country staff during SSS visits to Somalia.
C3	Develop budget strategy for cluster lead role in Somalia to enable predictable leadership, appropriate staff numbers, and ring-fenced resources for activities.

4.2 Cluster personnel

a) Capacity

Because of the security situation in Somalia, the cluster like most others, is led from Nairobi. Until September 2011 the first dedicated coordinator was assisted by a support officer shared with the protection and education clusters. A full-time Shelter Cluster Support Officer then worked until December 2012 when funding for the role was exhausted. A Shelter Cluster Support Assistant, formerly with DRC, was appointed in Mogadishu in July 2012 and remains in post.

The second coordinator began work in March 2013. He was assisted by two shared staff until the beginning of 2014. By October 2014, the secretariat had the equivalent of approximately four full-time staff (see Table 1). Two were shared with the Protection Cluster. One was a self-funding intern. Three were female. All support staff were on short contracts, ranging from four months to ten months.

This model of staffing offers flexibility and guarantees high turnover. By October 2014, the second coordinator had worked with one UNV, three interns and two cluster support associates. He was training a third support officer and the cluster's first information manager.

Table 1 Personnel capacity Somalia Shelter Cluster, October 2014

Staff member ²⁵	Office	Started	Average FTE
Shelter Cluster Coordinator	Nairobi	2013	1
Shelter and Protection Cluster Support Intern	Nairobi	2014	0.5
Shelter Cluster Support Associate	Nairobi	2014	1

²⁵ (UNHCR job titles)

Shelter and Protection Cluster Information Management Associate	Nairobi	2014	0.7 ²⁶
Assistant Shelter Cluster Support Officer	Mogadishu	2012	1

Both full-time coordinators received support from cluster partners and the current representative. The first appointed a local NGO to act as focal point in Gedo, using funds from the CHF. Assessment and monitoring capacity was extended via the global cluster's partnership with REACH in 2012. Similarly, the cluster's contract with Nairobi-based firm *mFieldwork*, funded by UNHCR and NRC, includes a training component. Since 2013, partners have seconded programme staff to act as part-time regional coordinators. In total, the Shelter Cluster has ten hubs with regional coordinators.

Regional coordinator terms of reference set out responsibilities and qualifications for the 50 per cent role. This is good practice and conforms to IASC guidance. However, shared leadership also requires monitoring to ensure that 'double-hatted' programme staff understand their additional role and are not overloaded: when funding is scarce, operational agencies too have to do more with less.

The global focal point for shelter coordination noted in 2013 that 'maintaining the enthusiasm and drive of the [regional cluster coordinators] will require a lot of interaction and time from the Nairobi office.'²⁷ It makes good sense to delegate authority closer to the field but, though the lead agency can delegate authority, it cannot delegate its responsibility.²⁸ Back-up from a deputy shelter coordinator would assist the cluster in this context.

b) Staff management and support

There is good support to the cluster from the UNHCR country representative in Mogadishu and sub-offices in Bosaso and Hargeisa. Support is provided by Geneva on request; the global focal point for shelter coordination conducted a management and training visit to Nairobi and Garowe in September 2013.

The relationship between Nairobi and Geneva could be strengthened by regular progress reporting and more frequent management visits from Geneva. More communication would benefit both. Somalia remains a volatile operating environment and this has implications for access and mobility and the recruitment of key staff. However, the Somalia Shelter Cluster has turned much of the challenge of distance management into opportunity, using technology that has, as the global focal point noted in 2013, potential in other contexts.

Recommendations

Cluster personnel

²⁶ The Information Management associate is formally contracted to work with both clusters. In practice, at the time of the evaluation most of his work was with the Shelter Cluster.

²⁷ David O'Meara, Mission report / Draft 1, Somalia – Garowe September 19th to 26th 2013, UNHCR (Internal)

²⁸ IASC, *Reference Module for Cluster Coordination at the Country Level*, November 2012, page 19

C4	Review staffing requirements to ensure the Somalia Shelter Cluster has appropriate levels of staffing.
C5	Subject to review of decentralisation (see C9) consider appointment of a deputy coordinator to support regional clusters.
C6	Institute monthly progress reporting to the SSS in Geneva.
C7	Institute six-monthly management visits by the SSS to Nairobi and Mogadishu.

4.3 Supporting shelter service delivery

a) Cluster objective

The Somalia Shelter Cluster aims to be a forum where all actors can discuss and agree on issues related to shelter and NFI in order to achieve effective action in the country.²⁹ Its stated objective is to enhance the coordination and effectiveness of provision of shelter/NFI assistance.³⁰

b) Partners

The cluster has expanded partnership from the group of five agencies – DRC, NRC, UN-Habitat, UNHCR and UNICEF – represented at its first meeting in 2006. Programme staff in these agencies remained its backbone in the period when there was no full-time coordinator.

By 2013 the first coordinator estimated that the number of most active partners had doubled. They now included three local NGOs, three UN agencies and four international NGOs. In 2014, the contact list includes 80 international and national NGOs, Red Cross and UN agencies of which approximately 20 are considered active partners.

The Shelter Cluster conforms to good practice by setting out in its 2013 terms of reference what partners can expect from the cluster and what the cluster expects from partners:

- Regular participation in meetings where available
- Monthly completion of Shelter Cluster 4W
- Participation in joint assessments and plans
- Adherence to agreed policies and standards

The global focal point confirmed the difficulty of engaging Somali government representation in Nairobi. Staff of government organisations in Mogadishu and

²⁹ www.sheltercluster.org › Home › Africa › Somalia

³⁰ *Terms of Reference*, Shelter/NFI Cluster Somalia, 25.08.13

Hargeisa who informed the present evaluation were well aware of its role in coordination and mapping. They had attended cluster meetings and infrastructure mapping training. High levels of engagement are notable in meeting records from Bosaso. How to build links with government was part of protection and shelter cluster training in 2013 and 2014. Maintaining engagement and advocacy with new governments by the shelter and cluster and others remains essential.

c) National coordination

*Our cluster is interactive, full of new ideas and initiatives ... To be honest [there's] very, very good coordination. I really find that ... We exchange tools. We are more technical, less bla, bla, bla!*³¹

*The national cluster meeting is in Nairobi [but] we are on the ground. I would suggest they could have it in Somalia.*³²

Cluster region	Chair
All Somalia	UNHCR UN-Habitat

Regular cluster meetings were held in Nairobi in 2006-07. No national cluster minutes are available for most of 2008-2011. The first full-time coordinator held national meetings on an as-needed basis and prioritised visits to partners. Minutes of meetings from 2011 onwards can be found on three different websites each of which holds a partial record (see Information Management below).

Approximately twenty agencies attended the last quarterly meeting for which complete minutes are published (December 2013). Evaluation informants found cluster meetings well-organised and practical and compared them favourably with some in larger clusters where consensus was harder to reach.

Unless redacted for purposes of security, meeting minutes should be made public to ensure transparency and aid inclusion of new partners and stakeholders. The calendar at www.sheltercluster.org could be used to advertise regional cluster meetings as well as meetings and workshops in Nairobi. This would make it easier for staff who frequently travel - many based in Nairobi have Horn of Africa roles - to attend local cluster meetings when in Somalia. Several Mogadishu informants wanted to see the national meeting take place there. The cluster should consider alternating meetings of the national cluster or the Sustainable Shelter Solutions Working Group (SSWG) between Nairobi and Mogadishu. This would accord with the Shelter Cluster's process of decentralisation while retaining the current base in Nairobi.

d) Regional coordination

³¹ SSI 08.10.14

³² SSI 21.10.14

They are strong at field coordination. All the NGOs are coordinating. All the coordinators are national staff ... The Shelter Cluster brings in local NGOs on an equal basis. It's a bit about funding but more about commitment.³³

Whenever they are needed here [in Mogadishu] they are here.³⁴

There is a Somali saying: one finger cannot wash a face! ... When there is a problem with government or with beneficiary selection, the Shelter Cluster is there.³⁵

The Somalia Shelter Cluster's earliest focus was regional: by 2007 shelter agencies already had a significant presence in northern Puntland and Hargeisa but most of southern Somalia was inaccessible.³⁶ UNHCR's 2007 real-time evaluation recommended an increase in cluster staffing to enable expansion to southern Puntland and to the accessible areas of South-Central Somalia, using the example of Bosaso as a model.

From 2010-2012, UNHCR or UN-Habitat programme staff continued to chair Cluster meetings in Somaliland, Puntland, Galkayo and Mogadishu. In Mogadishu, the first Coordinator was able to appoint a full-time national support officer. In Gedo, southern Somalia, he appointed local NGO DFI as the cluster focal point.

Following the appointment of the second full-time coordinator, the cluster was restructured. Partners were asked to identify Somali-speaking staff able to dedicate 50 per cent of their time to regional coordination. Others were asked to be cluster focal points. A generic terms of reference was drawn up. In summary, regional coordinators are asked to

- Report on 4W
- Maintain coordination
- Advocate on Housing Land and Property (HLP) to the SSWG
- Coordinate joint assessments
- Disseminate information to partners
- Promote community consultation

Six agencies offered staff and regional lead arrangements were agreed by the Strategic Advisory Group.

Region	Regional Coordinator
Juba (including Dhobley)	UNHCR
Juba (including Kismayo)	American Refugee Committee (ARC)
Gedo	DFI
Bay and Bakool (including Baidoa)	NRC
Benadir / Shabelles (including Mogadishu)	Shelter Cluster

³³ SSI 09.10.14

³⁴ SSI 27.10.14

³⁵ SSI 13.10.14

³⁶ Enda Savage, Neill Wright, Esther Kiragu, (2007), *Real time evaluation of UNHCR's IDP operation in Somalia*, UNHCR, page 15

Hiraan and Galgaduud	DRC
Galkayo, Mudug	DRC
Nugaal (including Garowe)	UNHCR
Bari (including Bosaso)	NRC
Somaliland (including Hargeisa)	NRC and UN-Habitat

Five-day coordination training programmes were held in Garowe in 2013 and Hargeisa in 2014. Both were delivered by staff of the Shelter Cluster secretariat, including the cluster coordinator, jointly with the Protection Cluster. In 2014, twelve Shelter Cluster regional coordinators and two government staff took part. Participants came from Somaliland, Puntland and South-Central Somalia.

Localisation of coordination makes good sense if host agencies can sustain staffing levels. A Norad evaluation of NRC in 2013 noted high turnover among local as well as international staff in Somalia (and see section 4.2 a).³⁷ As recommended by the global focal point for shelter coordination, the SAG should review decentralisation arrangements.

Evaluation informants, including most regional coordinators and focal points, were enthusiastic about the cluster's role in local coordination. Most saw the cluster as a good source of support on assessment, infrastructure mapping, inter-agency coordination and local advocacy. The cluster coordinator in Nairobi was seen as providing good support to regional coordinators by email and phone and was frequently in Mogadishu though, because the national cluster meets in Nairobi, some informants in Mogadishu felt that the key decisions were still being made elsewhere. Holding alternate quarterly or SSWG meetings in Mogadishu and/or appointment of a deputy coordinator may be ways forward.

Those least happy with the cluster at regional level were those who had seen funding applications rejected in CRC or CHF processes and expected more communication from the cluster in order to understand decisions and reasons. In Hargeisa there remained some uncertainty among informants about which agency leads the cluster - NRC, UN-Habitat or UNHCR - and who is responsible for designating coordinators.

Regional cluster meetings are expected to take place on a monthly basis with updates provided to the quarterly meeting in Nairobi. The secretariat is in the process of populating regional web pages on www.sheltercluster.org. It should also hold up to date lists of local partners and take the opportunity to pull together records from the different websites and regional offices (see Information Management below). This would provide a fuller picture of cluster activities and contribute to institutional learning and memory.

e) Strategic Advisory Group

The Shelter Cluster apparently started a Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) earlier than other clusters in Somalia but membership was never formalised. In 2010-12 members were selected from among the ten most active cluster partners. This appears to be the case still in 2013-14.

³⁷ Anne Davies, Björn Ternström, Ingela Ternström (2013), *Norad Evaluation of NRC, Case Country Report Somalia*, page 42

According to the 2013 Shelter Cluster terms of reference, the SAG meets on an *ad hoc* basis at the request of the secretariat or a member. Minutes are shared with the wider membership after redaction for reasons of confidentiality, if necessary. The cluster websites do not list the SAG members nor publish its minutes.

Quite properly, the SAG authorises major decisions, including cluster decentralisation in June 2013 and appointment of regional coordinators. Subject to any security considerations, the cluster should aim to publish these decisions and how they are made.

f) Cluster Review Committee

The Cluster Review Committee (CRC) comprises two international NGOs, two local NGOs and two UN agencies, together with the cluster chair or co-chair. It provides guidance and technical support during the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP) and Common Humanitarian Funds allocations.

Procedures and selection criteria are set out the Funding area of the www.sheltercluster.org website. A summary of funding decisions should also be circulated to regional clusters and individual applicants (that is, agency personnel) invited to request more information from the secretariat if necessary.

g) Technical Working Groups (TWIGs)

The draft Strategic Operational Framework was developed by the coordinator working with a TWIG in 2012. A NFI TWIG met once in May 2013. The main TWIG is the **Sustainable Shelter Solutions Working Group (SSWG)** which met monthly from May to December 2013. The cluster has no technical coordinator though this role has been effectively provided by UN-Habitat and until recently by UNHCR's Regional Support Hub in Nairobi. DRC, NRC and REACH have also provided technical support.

The SSWG's aim in 2013 was to produce policy and practical guidance, including tools and training. A number of topics and themes were identified in 2013 and partners and others led and/or presented work between and during meetings. Each one would probably warrant its own TWIG in a larger cluster:

- Assessment (Led by Cluster Secretariat, REACH, UNHCR)
- Cash approaches (CALP, Cluster Secretariat)
- Decision-making (Secretariat)
- Definition of durable shelter solutions (UN-Habitat)
- Housing, Land and Property (Protection, NRC, UN-Habitat)
- Mobile data collection (*mFieldwork* and REACH)
- Monitoring (NRC, UN-Habitat, and REACH)
- Shelter types (DRC, UNHCR)

Minutes of SSWG meetings in Nairobi in 2013 and a work plan are published on www.sheltercluster.org. Meetings were attended by 8-9 agencies or clusters on average. By 2014, one informant said, both SSWG and quarterly meetings were less regular which made planning harder.

Throughout the evaluation, infrastructure mapping through mobile data collection was the cluster's most talked-about product and, after funding, Housing, Land and Property its greatest challenge. These themes belong in the Strategic Operational Framework, as foreseen at the first SSWG meeting but strategic review is not included in the SSWG work plan.

h) Information management

It is clear that information management is the foundation for any Cluster.³⁸

Most of the clusters are struggling and very few consistently have information managers. We try to push to ensure they do but ... we don't control the budget or the priorities for the different lead agencies.³⁹

4W information Before the declaration of famine in 2011, Shelter Cluster partners were asked to submit 4W information on shelter and NFI distribution quarterly via UNHCR's sub-offices and field units. In 2011 when a support officer was appointed, weekly data collection began. Data were collected by phone or email, entered in an Excel spreadsheet then passed to OCHA's information manager. Each year consolidated data were sent back to partners for their own planning and reporting purposes.

The Shelter Cluster had no information manager until late in 2014 when a support officer was employed for this purpose. She works with the regional cluster coordinators to collect 4W information each month. By mid-2014, the cluster had also started to use to collect 4W information via its digital platform (see below).

³⁸ Richard Evans, Handover Note for Shelter Cluster Coordinator, UNHCR internal, 2013

³⁹ SSI 02.10.14

The electronic cluster (1): Digital platform

A digital platform is a collection of hardware and software which provides access to distant services that are supplied online. It is a club of sorts and, rather like a cluster, relies for its success on individual 'members' or users with whom the platform operator establishes a direct link. Services may be paid-for or free of charge.⁴⁰

Platforms have two kinds of user: those that 'consume' data, for example Shelter Cluster partners using shelter / NFI information in monitoring, planning or applications: those that 'supply' data are, for example, partners that share 4W or assessment findings. 'Consumers' and 'suppliers' may be the same organisations.

In the Shelter Cluster, the platform operator – the Cluster secretariat and *mFieldwork* - sets the rules, for example on data access and data confidentiality. Other platforms in use in the humanitarian sector include REACH, Open Data Kit (ODK), Ushahidi and, most recently, IRIN.

Acceptance of the Somalia Shelter Cluster / *mFieldwork* pilot platform lies partly in the fact that the secretariat and *mFieldwork* have understood users' needs and the Somali context well. They have provided tailored training and support close to where users work.

As part of a pilot project, the platform's hardware, software and support are currently free to partners in the Shelter Cluster and to other clusters with which it is working. This has enabled field staff, cluster staff, enumerators and managers to use the pilot platform rapidly and at little cost to themselves in an environment where humanitarian information is difficult or dangerous to come by.

Shelter Cluster website Confusingly, the Shelter Cluster, like others in Somalia, uses more than one website. In the case of the Shelter Cluster, information is held on six different platforms. Cluster information is still held on two OCHA-managed sites, on the global shelter cluster's www.sheltercluster.org and on the limited access *mFieldwork* web platform. Shelter technical information is posted on the website of UNHCR's Regional Support Hub; satellite maps and reports prepared by REACH are held on its website. This would not matter if information on each site were identical and sites up to date but inevitably gaps and duplication occur. Attempts were made to update www.sheltercluster.org in 2012 and 2013 but it proved difficult to do so from Nairobi.

Active partners appeared to rely on and be satisfied by frequent communications to and from the Cluster Coordinator. All the same, www.sheltercluster.org is currently the cluster's main storefront and back catalogue. The secretariat needs to complete the website makeover under way in 2014 with assistance, if necessary, from the global focal point for information management. This is consistent with the secretariat's commitment to digital information management. With the appointment of an information manager in 2014, there is a fresh opportunity to decide which site(s) to maintain and how to make navigation easier.

⁴⁰ Cf L. Meyer Digital Platforms: Definition and Strategic Value, *Communications & Strategies*, no. 38, 2nd quarter 2000, p. 127

Recommendations

C8	Consider holding alternate national cluster and SSWG meetings in Mogadishu and Nairobi.
C9	Involve the SAG in monitoring decentralisation and reviewing generic terms of reference for coordinators.
C10	Ensure CRC decisions are circulated to regional clusters and invite individual agencies to request more information from the secretariat if necessary.
C11	In line with the commitment to digital information, complete the current website makeover with assistance, if necessary, from the global focal point for information management and consider use of a Dropbox for internal record-keeping.
C12	Use the main website calendar for all meetings, including those of the SSWG and regional clusters. Continue to populate regional pages to include all meeting records.

4.4 Informing strategic decision-making for the humanitarian response and cluster strategy and planning

a) Assessment

*Aid workers are faced with security and logistics challenges when assessing humanitarian needs.*⁴¹

The 2012 Strategic Operational Framework included a standard shelter and NFI assessment form. This was developed in conjunction with cluster partners in Mogadishu and tested there in January 2012. The national cluster coordinator trained 61 staff from eleven national and international cluster partners

REACH was first invited to support UN-Habitat in a mapping exercise, part of the work of the Tri-Cluster Strategy in Mogadishu, in June 2012. REACH and UN-Habitat made use of remote sensing and trained local enumerators from fourteen agencies. It produced detailed reports, factsheets and maps which are held on www.sheltercluster.org. REACH later supported a detailed shelter sector review in Somaliland, Puntland and Mogadishu. The purpose of this was to help the cluster to prioritize needs during the next three years and to enable it to use validated, impartial information to fundraise for shelter interventions. By late 2014, REACH had facilitated assessments at ten sites in Puntland, Somaliland and southern Somalia:

- Baidoa
- Bosaso
- Doolow
- Galkayo
- Garowe
- Hargeisa
- Kismayo
- Luuq
- Mogadishu (Zona K, Daynile, Dharkenley)
- Qardho

In 2013, the Shelter Cluster also began working with Nairobi-based *mFieldwork* on use of mobile phone technology and a digital platform (see Information Management above). This technology is beginning to provide partners with the capacity to undertake rapid assessment and settlement infrastructure mapping more quickly and safely than before.

⁴¹ OCHA, Humanitarian Bulletin, Somalia, October 2014

The electronic cluster (2): Assessment and mapping

In 2011 NRC piloted a project called SIMS - Settlement Information Management Systems – in Somalia. The aim was to map the Ajuran IDP settlement in Bosaso and the public services available there. The SIMS system was thought to have potential for the Shelter Cluster as a whole in joint collection and management of humanitarian information.⁴² However, it took eight people two weeks to survey basic services, make a report and produce a map.⁴³

All agencies in Somalia face difficulties and delays in collecting the information they need. The situation is made worse by security challenges and the shortage of funds and staff. Outside the humanitarian sector, mobile phones and handheld computers are used to track goods, monitor trends and transfer data electronically. A former NRC monitoring and evaluation officer developed smartphone survey software for use by humanitarian fieldworkers. The Shelter Cluster has piloted the software and, with *mFieldwork*, trained field staff - non-specialists - in partner agencies.

Enumerators use smartphones to collect the information they want about shelter needs and settlement infrastructure, including WASH, street lights, shops, schools and health centres. They send the information to a data cloud. From there it can be downloaded and analysed by authorised users of the cluster's digital platform in reports, maps and information sheets.

The Cluster Coordinator says, "Using mobile technology, we have been able to roll out a mapping exercise in all forty settlements in Bosaso in ten days, with a team of twenty people. The report and map can be produced within a week."⁴⁴

So far, the Shelter Cluster and partners have piloted mobile technology in assessments in Baidoa, Bosaso, Galkayo, Kismayo, and Mogadishu in a project jointly funded by UNHCR, NRC, REACH, OCHA and ARC. Other clusters, including WASH and Protection, have joined the Shelter Cluster in developing questions that can provide settlement information which was previously unavailable or slow or costly to collect.

Access to communities continues to require the consent of local communities, local government and so-called 'gatekeepers.' Use of mobile technology in pilot assessments provides a snap-shot rather than in-depth research. Nevertheless, cluster partners say it is easy to use and is giving them information they have never had before. The Shelter Cluster makes aggregated data and maps publicly available on the website www.sheltercluster.org. It has developed a protocol to protect individuals and authorise use of data on the *mFieldwork* platform.⁴⁵

OCHA and UNHCR in Somalia have also recognised the potential of mobile data collection. The Shelter Cluster has provided support to partners to take part in inter-cluster assessments or to pilot their own.

⁴² John Leckie, (2012), Housing, Land and Property in Bossaso, Somalia Shelter Cluster

⁴³ Martijn Goddeeris, report to NORCAP, 24.09.14, UNHCR internal

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Daniel Gilman, Leith Baker and Matthew Easton, (2014), *Humanitarianism in the Cyberwarfare Age*, OCHA Policy Paper 11, OCHA and *mFieldwork*

It was seen by informants to the coordination review as a huge step forward both for the Shelter Cluster and the humanitarian sector in Somalia. Issues which the Shelter Cluster needs to clarify include, firstly, how the roles of *mFieldwork* and REACH complement one another.

*I like it but it duplicates REACH. The level of information is roughly the same as REACH ... You need to cascade the approaches, you need to prioritise them.*⁴⁶

*The development of the [platform] tool needs to be run in parallel with a similar tool being developed by REACH, SIP, to ensure a single package can be developed and there is not duplication or waste of limited resources.*⁴⁷

Secondly, dissemination of assessment findings must reflect the needs of different audiences. Reports and Shelter Bulletins from 2011 and early 2012 synthesize and simplify presentation, making it easier to use findings in advocacy with non-specialists.

Thirdly, many saw the digital platform as increasing their efficiency and the speed and quality of their assessments. International NGOs, such as ARC, were using the platform for their own surveys but it was not clear what local NGOs, in particular, would do when pilot funding ended, and the best evidence does not necessarily lead to better funding.

*Partners used to send bad quality assessments. But if there is no funding you have partner fatigue.*⁴⁸

Nevertheless, informants were uniformly appreciative of the Somalia Shelter Cluster's role in this work. They credited the cluster coordinator with innovation and drive in piloting technology and training which were transforming their approach to assessments of different kinds in little more than a year. In this process, the Somalia Shelter Cluster, despite its own limited personnel and resources, was also reaching out to other clusters. At the time of this evaluation, the Shelter Cluster was providing support to local NGOs in the Protection Cluster to assess the needs of IDPs facing imminent eviction from a government building in Mogadishu.

*They're pretty innovative. For example, [shelter coordinator] was giving a presentation ... on infrastructure mapping. It was the first time [our cluster] coordinators had heard this, and they said, "You're our heroes!" We've only talked: they - the Shelter Cluster- don't spend ages planning: they do it!*⁴⁹

It's phenomenal. It's in real time. If you are serious about what you do in the humanitarian world you can't not do it ... We're going to start doing it through mFieldwork not just through the Shelter Cluster ... I would like to see it become our needs assessment framework. We're trying to ensure we get a budget line.

⁴⁶ SSI 22.10.14

⁴⁷ David O'Meara, Mission report / Draft 1, Somalia – Garowe September 19th to 26th 2013, UNHCR (Internal)

⁴⁸ SSI 22.10.14

⁴⁹ SSI 09.10.14

*Infrastructure mapping is quite amazing work. [Headquarters] were very impressed. ... It's a very practical product - very practical training. My field staff have done the training ... they think it's wonderful. We feel that these devices are complicated but it's not ... [Headquarters] will probably use it.*⁵⁰

*Being able to collect data quickly in the field using mobile technology makes it easier when the weather is hot.*⁵¹

b) Strategy and policy

A Cluster Strategic Operational Framework for Somalia was developed in 2011 and published in February 2012. It includes policy and practical guidance and is based on three pillars:

1. Emergency response: enhancing the cluster's capacity to respond to new displacement
2. Transitional shelter in stabilized IDP settlements, mainly in Puntland and Somaliland.
3. Support for durable solutions.

As REACH's case studies in Bosaso and Galkayo illustrate, difference in land tenure or unpredicted population movements may require cluster partners to deliver transitional, permanent and emergency shelter at the same site.

Options for Mogadishu were developed in 2011 after 75,000 people arrived in the capital within the space of nine months, driven out of South-Central Somalia by drought, famine and fighting. The Shelter Cluster designed a three-phase strategy:

1. Emergency Assistance Packages (NFI)
2. Transitional shelter
3. Site planning to improve access to services such as WASH and health

Three clusters, Shelter, Health and WASH, developed a joint strategy to guide inter-cluster work in Phase 3 on land where IDPs were expected to stay longest. The Tri-Cluster Strategy at *Zona K*, where 70,000 people settled in make-shift *buuls* in an area of three square meters, is the subject of a case study on successes and challenges included in Shelter Projects 2011-2012.⁵²

In 2013, the global focal point noted that much of the original Strategic Operational Framework remained relevant but needed updating. The work of the SSWG was intended to feed into strategic review and the cluster's terms of reference indicate its commitment to update and revise strategy through consultation. In November 2013, the SAG undertook a review of the shelter CAP, moving the focus of the cluster's work more towards settlement and secure land tenure. Revised CAP documents held on www.sheltercluster.org indicate changes but the Strategic Operational Framework has yet to be revised.

⁵⁰ SSI 17.10.14

⁵¹ SSI 20.10.14

⁵² Somalia – 2011 – Famine / Conflict, *Shelter Projects 2011–2012*, Case A28, IFRC, UNHCR, UN-Habitat, page 89

Emergency shelter, Mogadishu⁵³

REACH began providing support to the Somalia Shelter Cluster in mid-2012 when partners were working with the WASH and Health clusters to provide assistance to newly arrived IDPs.

Improving security in Mogadishu meant that owners returned to reclaim their land. In late 2012 the government issued an eviction order to IDPs living within the city boundaries. More than 100,000 people were forced out. They settled along the Afgooye Road, north-west of Mogadishu. There they were joined by other families who had fled fighting between AMISOM troops and Al-Shabaab in southern Somalia.



2012: Settlements for displaced Somalis in Mogadishu could get even more crowded with new arrivals from the Afgooye corridor. © UNHCR / S. Modola ⁵⁴

The government had made no provision for IDPs in these new informal settlements. Households had no security of tenure. Accordingly, Shelter Cluster partners provided emergency shelter. In late 2014 UNHCR asked REACH to evaluate work by Shelter Cluster partners at two settlements in the districts of Daynile and Dharkenley.

REACH used satellite imagery to look at changes in the settlements since 2013. It trained thirty enumerators recruited with help from eight Shelter Cluster partner agencies. Information was collected using mobile phones from nearly 830 households in November 2014. Findings were compared with household data from June 2013 and infrastructure mapping in July 2014. The analysis compared household data, numbers and types of shelter and settlement facilities.

⁵³ Clay Westrope, (2014), REACH (edited)

⁵⁴ Thousands of Somalis flee renewed clashes into Mogadishu, UNHCR, News Stories, 17 February 2012

Satellite images showed that the number of shelters had more than doubled between June 2013 and November 2014, to nearly 26,800. This was consistent with continued evictions from Mogadishu and ongoing insecurity in southern Somalia. Despite the huge increase in IDP numbers and shelters, the overall quality of shelter available at the two sites had improved. This was evidenced by the fact that the percentage of *buuls* – stronger than tents or simpler structures – had increased. In June 2013, 80 per cent of the shelters were *buuls* but by November 2014, this had increased to 85 per cent.

The quality of shelter had also improved. In June 2013, 72 per cent of shelters had walls and roofs made only of cloth and rags. By November 2014, 73 per cent were covered with plastic sheeting. A small proportion of households (approximately 10 per cent) reported in November 2014 that they were using their plot of land to grow crops or keep livestock (10%). Only 1% had livestock in June 2013.

Shelter Cluster members provided 8,733 households with emergency shelter and 12,662 households with non-food item (NFI) support in 2014. The quality of shelter materials supplied by Shelter Cluster partners was higher than that supplied by other agencies or purchased locally by IDPs.

Despite an overall increase in the quantity and quality of shelter, settlement infrastructure had not kept pace with the increase in households at the two sites. By November 2014, satellite imagery showed that one-third of shelters was more than 50 meters from a latrine. Just over 70% of IDPs had to walk 20 minutes to reach a water point. Fewer people (19 per cent) said they felt unsafe than in 2013 (25 per cent) despite the fact that far fewer shelters had locks (66 per cent in 2013 but only 23 per cent in 2014). However, fears for personal safety in communal areas such as latrines and the market had grown. Most latrines were communal and there were no separate areas for men and women. Household data were not disaggregated by age or gender, in part because of the small number of female enumerators.

The difficulty of meeting Sphere standards in Somalia is recognised in the Shelter Cluster Strategic Operational Framework and in an evaluation by Norad in 2013.⁵⁵ GBV is acknowledged to be widespread in Somalia. IDPs, including those in the Afgooye Road settlements, are at greatest risk⁵⁶ hence eviction in Mogadishu and insecurity in southern Somalia continues to force IDPs into crowded settlements where women and children are at risk.

REACH recommends greater integration of inter-cluster work at Daynile and Dharkenley. It says: “As the humanitarian community begins to decide the next steps for the IDP population in Mogadishu, emphasis should be placed on coordinating the response with other sectors and promoting an integrated settlement approach in which design and services offered within the settlement are considered, along with individual shelter provision.”

⁵⁵ “All agencies in Somalia experience challenges in meeting Sphere standards regarding Shelter and WASH.” Anne Davies, Björn Ternström, Ingela Ternström (2013), *Norad Evaluation of NRC, Case Country Report Somalia*, page 48

⁵⁶ Human Rights Watch, “*Here, Rape is Normal*” A Five-Point Plan to Curtail Sexual Violence in Somalia, February 2014

Recommendations – Mogadishu

S1	Involve all clusters, particularly WASH and Protection, in needs assessment to improve emergency shelter planning and access to services and facilities in IDP settlements.
S2	Ensure that the quality of shelter materials and provision of locks meets cluster requirements and advocate for all shelter providers to use cluster specifications.
S3	Establish a more detailed information management system to enable tracking of assistance by shelter and other sectors at household level.
S4	Include households which have <i>not</i> received assistance in future evaluations of emergency shelter in order to compare outcomes.

c) Standards

*We need to hold ourselves to higher standards. I think the cluster should be an accountability mechanism.*⁵⁷

*We should measure progress against minimum standards, not gains made against an already terrible situation. With a third of the population in need of aid, Somalia is clearly in severe crisis.*⁵⁸

*The problem is money ... When they have funds, the quality of the [shelter] projects is OK.*⁵⁹

Records from Bosaso show a Shelter Cluster Action Team comprising DRC, NRC and UN-Habitat advocating in 2007-08 on settlement standards, particularly fire prevention, to good effect.⁶⁰ The 2012 Strategic Operational Framework referenced Sphere (2004) standards but acknowledged the difficulty of meeting these in the Somalia context (see Assessment, below).

⁵⁷ SSI 23.10.14

⁵⁸ *Risk of relapse, Somalia crisis update*, May 2014, Oxfam et al.

⁵⁹ SSI 22.10.14

⁶⁰ SSI 13.10.14; Filiep Decorte and Ombretta Tempra, Improving living conditions in Bossaso, Somalia, *Forced Migration Review* Issue 34, February 2010; Bossaso Shelter Cluster Action Team, Minutes, January and April 2008



2007 / 2008: Aftermath of a shelter fire in Bosaso

Photo: Jama Yasin Ibrahim⁶¹

The framework's aim was to try to harmonise approaches rather than set standards which, experience showed, were unlikely to be achieved overall because of the huge programme area, range of climates, lack of access and varying levels of funding and government support.

The Strategic Operational Framework recommended partners move toward:

- A minimum NFI package per household at least once in two years.
- Shelter of an acceptable standard with focus on physical protection and safety (with consideration of rain, privacy, theft and fire).
- Houses made with at least 30 per cent new materials (tarpaulin, CGI, wood, hessian, etc.)
- Non-acceptance of houses made only of recycled, combustible material.
- Use of Sphere guidelines for plot size and access to services for relocated persons (except for latrine coverage).

In a survey of 25,000 households in Mogadishu in 2012, the cluster found that even the most basic standards were difficult to meet.

- i. *Shelter from the elements: 66% of the buuls do not have continuous cover and so offer no protection from the sun, cold, heat or rain.*

⁶¹ Shelter Projects 2009, UNHCR, UN-Habitat and IFRC, Page 30

- ii. *Safety and Security*: 89% of the buuls cannot be locked while 78% are made from materials that can easily be cut open using a knife.
- iii. *Dignity*: 71% of the families live in a single room while 34% do not have a source of light at night. 70% do not have a place to cook while most alarming, 17% are living in less than 3.14m² of space, similar to an average 2 person camping tent.

*Setting the standard that a buul must provide all three of the properties listed above: shelter, safety and dignity means that the vast majority of the 25,000 households require assistance.*⁶²

In a context where cluster partners can assist no more than half those in need of assistance, shelter standards remain very poor for many people. In late 2012, a REACH report for the cluster noted that

*... hundreds of thousands of IDPs abide, often for years in makeshift shelters using available materials which are inadequate for shelter such as canvas or plastic sheeting in areas without adequate access to basic humanitarian services.*⁶³

The 2013 Terms of Reference state that the Shelter Cluster will promote use of existing standards, policies and guidelines, including Sphere and the ECB Project's *Good Enough Guide*. Coordination training in 2013 included Sphere (2004) and UNHCR (2007) shelter and settlement standards.

The Shelter Cluster's work in tri-cluster approaches and settlement mapping are evidence of its commitment to reaching higher standards. However, chronic under-funding and Housing, Land and Property issues put partners and affected people in an invidious position. The external consultant was told that house fires continued to affect families who have constructed *buuls* outside CGI shelters, and of transitional and permanent shelters too small for large families though REACH's household surveys indicated high levels of satisfaction with shelter supplied by cluster partners.

Norad's evaluation of NRC in Somalia found good understanding of Sphere standards but limited opportunity to apply them. It contrasted a settlement in Mogadishu with others in Bosaso.

*In a new settlement provided by the Mogadishu authorities, NRC has ensured safer spacing but project staff indicated that it was faced with a choice of either providing more shelters and therefore assisting more IDP families or adhering strictly to Sphere standards of spacing and assisting less families. Thus, a compromise solution was chosen.*⁶⁴

[In two sites in Bosaso] NRC in conjunction with other agencies was able to plan the sites according to acceptable standards of spacing between shelters, wide fire breaks, space for communal latrines and an open play area. The

⁶² Shelter Cluster, Shelter / NFI Cluster Mogadishu Needs Assessment, February 2012, Mogadishu

⁶³ REACH (2012), *Somalia Shelter Sector Review Shelter Cluster Final Report Rapid Shelter Assessment Somalia, Somaliland & Puntland*, December 2012 page 1

⁶⁴ Davies et al., (2013), page 25

*space provided has allowed for the construction of the more durable 'CGI' shelters made of fire-resistant materials.*⁶⁵

REACH's 2014 case studies on permanent shelter in Galkayo and transitional shelter in Bosaso illustrate how partners have been able to harmonise their approach to permanent and transitional shelter and achieve Sphere standards. Nevertheless, settlement planning issues have been harder to address.

Transitional shelter, Bosaso ⁶⁶

Bosaso, on the Gulf of Aden, has for many years been a gateway for refugees and asylum seekers from Ethiopia, Somalia and Sudan hoping to reach Yemen and the Gulf states. Since the start of the civil war in Somalia, the port city has also been a destination for IDPs. Living conditions were very poor. In 2004 OCHA described Bosaso as one of the world's most neglected and desperate humanitarian situations. In 2011, drought and violence in South-Central Somalia sent more IDPs to join those already there.

Until 2011, all IDP settlements were inside Bosaso's boundaries. That year the government provided a new site for IDPs east of the city. UNHCR intended to construct approximately 1,300 shelters there but in May 2011 15,000 suddenly people moved to the site, creating a new unplanned settlement, and the project plans had to be changed.

Because of clan relationships and the lack of public land, permanent land tenure was difficult to secure. However, the Shelter Cluster and its partners, in collaboration with the authorities, were able to secure between five and ten years' tenure for IDPs at what is now Bariga Bosaso. Following a pilot project, many more IDPs began moving to the area because of the low risk of eviction.

Deep rock and lack of good soil or timber make it hard to construct low-cost permanent housing in Bosaso. The Shelter Cluster therefore advocated for transitional shelter. This addressed the IDPs' main concerns: safety and protection, and a settlement timeframe of five to ten years.

Since 2011, shelter agencies have built more than 3,500 transitional shelters in planned settlements at Bariga Bosaso. The majority of IDPs in the area live in transitional shelters, built from plastic and iron sheeting. Others have constructed makeshift shelters using branches or wooden sticks for the internal structure, and cloth, waste cardboard or plastic sheeting for the external covering.

In November 2014 REACH was asked by the Shelter Cluster to conduct an evaluation of transitional shelter in planned settlements at Bariga Bosaso. A total of 887 households were interviewed by trained enumerators in November 2014. Findings were compared with household data from a Shelter Sector Review by

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Clay Westrope, (2014), REACH (edited)

REACH and the Shelter Cluster in November 2012 and with data from infrastructure mapping in June 2014.

REACH found that, compared to IDP settlements in Bossaso city, transitional shelters at Bariga Bosaso were built of higher quality materials: plastic and CGI, as opposed to cloth and rags. Transitional shelters had lockable doors and provided greater protection from fire and forced entry. REACH found high levels of satisfaction (85 per cent) with transitional shelter among beneficiary households. Almost all households in the settlements had access to critical services and infrastructure and an increasing number of kiosks was operating.

However, REACH questioned the use of CGI in transitional shelter construction. This was partly because it provided inadequate ventilation and partly because IDP households living in the transitional shelters were using plastic sheeting as roofing or to repair, modify or extend shelters. This was due either to the lower cost of plastic or because CGI was simply unavailable in local markets. Few families, in any case, had received shelter training hence lacked the skills to repair or extend CGI shelters.

The percentage of displaced households reporting that they felt safe had fallen from 86 per cent in 2012 to 75 per cent in 2014. Almost 60 per cent of those households that felt unsafe had concerns about the market area. Almost a third of those feeling unsafe linked this to use of latrines: although all water points and most latrines were sited in accordance with Sphere standards, 70 per cent of latrines were communal and there were no separate areas for men and women.

REACH recommended the Shelter Cluster reconsider use of CGI and that it provide more shelter construction / maintenance training. It proposed the moving of market areas and that those living in makeshift shelters also be included in future evaluations of transitional shelter settlements.

Recommendations – Bosaso

S5	Explore alternatives to CGI for use in transitional shelter because it has limited availability and provides little ventilation.
S6	Include IDP households in construction and provide them with training on shelter maintenance to ensure they can expand and repair their own shelter safely and effectively. Continue to promote owner-driven approaches.
S7	Involve all clusters, particularly WASH and Protection, in needs assessment to improve emergency shelter planning and access to services and facilities in IDP settlements. Concentrate markets outside residential areas to ensure safety and security of shelter occupants.
S8	Include households which have <i>not</i> received assistance in future evaluations of transitional shelter in order to compare outcomes.

Permanent shelter, Galkayo ⁶⁷

In 2007, approximately 12,000 people fled from southern Somalia to Galkayo to escape fighting. Galkayo already hosted large numbers of IDPs as well as refugees from Ethiopia. Living conditions for IDPs were extremely poor.⁶⁸ By April 2014 there were an estimated 43,000 in northern Galkayo.⁶⁹ Those with no clan ties had little access to livelihoods. As many as 20 per cent of IDPs in northern Galkayo were members of the Bantu (Jareer) minority who suffer discrimination and persecution, including GBV, in Somalia.⁷⁰

In March 2010, 225 IDP families were evicted by a private landlord. Threats of eviction elsewhere followed. In a project initiated by UNHCR, shelter agencies and local government worked to relocate them in planned settlements north of Galkayo.⁷¹ The shelter cluster provided a forum for local discussion and coordination of shelter and settlement.⁷² The local authorities were closely involved in planning, implementation, and the hand-over of land title deeds.

By 2014 1,256 shelters had been built to house an estimated 10,000 people at Tawakal, Haloboqad and Salama One. Between 10-20 per cent of those housed were members of the host community: this was consistent with the original project's aim to reduce tension between displaced and host communities and to promote integration.⁷³

In April 2014, UNHCR asked REACH to evaluate shelter in settlements at Tawakal where UN-Habitat had built 471 concrete shelters, at Haloboqad where NRC had built 553 concrete shelters and at Salama 1: here title deeds had yet to be distributed and DRC had built 250 CGI shelters.



Permanent shelter by UN-Habitat at Tawakal.

⁶⁷ Clay Westrope, (2014), REACH (edited)

⁶⁸ Catherine Weibel, UNHCR emergency team assesses needs in northern Somalia's Galkayo region News Stories, 15 January 2007

⁶⁹ REACH, May 2014, *Somalia Tri-Cluster Assessment, Fact-Sheet: Galkayo North*, Education Cluster, Shelter Cluster and WASH Cluster

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ Alessandra Morelli, *PBF/IRF-31 Somalia: Permanent Shelter and Social Infrastructure (UNHCR)* Final Narrative Report, UNHCR, 31 December 2012

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Alessandra Morelli, *PBF/IRF-31 Somalia: Permanent Shelter and Social Infrastructure (UNHCR)* Final Narrative Report, UNHCR, 31 December 2012

REACH trained thirty enumerators seconded by cluster partners. Data were collected from 622 households at the three sites. Enumerators collected information using smartphones. Key informant interviews were held with members of the community and REACH was also able to draw on satellite maps and a multi-cluster infrastructure mapping exercise which it had led a few weeks earlier. Household data in the three settlements were not disaggregated by age or gender, in part because of the small number of female enumerators.

REACH found that all planned shelters conformed to Sphere minimum standards, providing 3.5 square meters per person. Most informants wanted to expand and improve their living space but few (4 per cent) said shelter was their immediate need. This contrasted with 22 per cent of displaced persons in Galkayo city. Almost all the shelters (98 per cent) were within 50 metres of a latrine. At Haloboqad, just over one-fifth of shelters was more than 100 metres from a water point but at the other settlements distances conformed to Sphere standards.

Few households (less than 3 per cent) reported a poor relationship with their host community. Despite the overall perception of safety, however, settlement committees reported dealing with protection issues relating to eviction, violence against children and GBV. At Tawakal almost half the solar street lights did not work. A large proportion of those feeling unsafe at latrines were those who were using the communal facilities at Haloboqad where just over 20 per cent of the latrines had no inside lock. Although the majority (78 per cent) of households felt safe *inside* the settlements, most reported feeling unsafe *outside* them and at the market.

As well as those living in planned shelters, the settlements included approximately 1,000 'informal' households, people who had moved to the settlements before and during project implementation. At Haloboqad NRC had provided transitional shelters and latrines next to the main site but infrastructure mapping showed that settlement space and design would inhibit expansion of communal facilities or shelters in the future.

REACH concluded that the quality of planned shelters was high. This, together with community integration measures, had contributed to stability for households in the three settlements though the fact that IDPs had not been included in planning and construction had potentially limited their ability to maintain their housing and reduced livelihood opportunities. REACH cautioned that lack of a clear settlement plan and space to expand could undercut success as the settlements, which were up to 10 km from Galkayo city, started to need more services such as schools, markets, and hospitals. REACH also recommended a review of living conditions for those living 'informally' in the planned settlements, as a matter of priority.

Recommendations – Galkayo

S9	Include livelihood training and opportunities as an integral part of shelter response in permanent settlements.
S10	Include IDP households in planning and construction and provide them with training on shelter maintenance to ensure they can expand and repair their own shelter safely and effectively and/or gain a livelihood skill.
S11	When planning permanent settlements, allow room for expansion and construction of infrastructure such as schools or hospitals.
S12	Involve all clusters, particularly WASH and Protection, in needs assessment to improve emergency shelter planning and access to

	services and facilities in IDP settlements. Safety and security measures to be considered include the construction of police stations and plot fencing, in order to improve perceptions of security in settlements.
S13	Include households which have settled informally in permanent settlements in future evaluations in order to compare outcomes.
S14	Include protection from seismic events and flooding in future evaluations of permanent shelter and settlement design.

d) Cross-cutting Issues

*In 2011, the Shelter Cluster ... started to distribute [Women's Dignity] kits as part of its emergency assistance package.*⁷⁴

The 2012 Strategic Operational Framework does not explicitly reference IASC cross-cutting issues.⁷⁵ Age is barely referenced though the different needs of women, girls, boys and men are. There is no reference to disability, environment, HIV/AIDS or mental health. However, the strategy emphasises throughout the need for consultation with women. The 2013 Terms of Reference refer to HLP, protection and environment and to inter-cluster issues such as WASH and site planning.

The global focal point noted in 2013 the need to promote awareness of cross-cutting issues with regional coordinators. This is consistent with advice from GenCap on the need to disseminate awareness of gender issues in countries such as Somalia and Sudan where remote management is the norm.⁷⁶ However, there are no references to IASC cross-cutting issues on www.sheltercluster.org or in coordination training agendas for 2013 and 2014. Regional coordinator job descriptions refer to site planning, HLP and environment as cross-cutting issues but, apart from gender, no others. The cluster's concept paper on sustainable shelter solutions references environment, protection and human rights.⁷⁷

GenCap advisors were deployed in Somalia from 2007 and the gender marker was piloted there in 2010. One result was a decision by all Somalia clusters that no zero-coded (gender-blind) projects would be allowed in the Somalia CAP. The GenCap advisor was part of a multi-agency team led by the Shelter Cluster which assessed transitional shelter in Bosaso in 2011.⁷⁸

Shelter cluster monitoring in Somalia found that of greatest concern to affected people were security and protection from violence, including gender-based violence. This has informed the continuing use of CGI in transitional shelters and installation of lockable doors in both CGI shelters and *buuls*. All three case studies by REACH indicate that those provided with shelter by cluster partners tended to feel safer

⁷⁴Rita Maingi *WHD: Providing Somali women with dignity*, OCHA, 17 Aug 2012, OCHA

⁷⁵ Age, disability, environment, gender, HIV and AIDS, human rights, mental health, mines and other explosive devices.

⁷⁶ IASC, *IASC Gender Marker: Analysis of Results and Lessons Learned* February 2012, Page 25

⁷⁷ Somalia Shelter Cluster, *Concept Paper: Sustainable Shelter Solutions, Internally Displaced Persons In Somalia*

⁷⁸ Somalia Shelter Cluster, *Bosaso transitional shelter Assessment Phase 1*, April 2011

inside their homes though less safe in nearby communal areas such as latrines or markets.

In 2012, the Cluster Support Officer and cluster partner SSWC developed a standard “Women’s Dignity Kit” of clothing, head covering, underwear, soap, towels and sanitary materials. Work by the cluster and agencies such as Agrocare to promote-fuel efficient stoves was also intended to benefit women’s health and security and to reduce environmental damage.⁷⁹ These issues were articulated in Shelter Cluster bulletins until 2012.

The regional coordinator in Kismayo, a member of ARC staff, included questions about age, gender, mental health and chronic illness in a survey there in 2014.⁸⁰ Settlement infrastructure mapping, for example in Bosaso in 2014, included questions about access to psychological counselling. However, the mapping report noted that sex and age-disaggregated data had not been collected, contrary to UNHCR and GenCap guidance. It recommended methodology be improved in future.

“Due to budget constraints, it was not possible to use the UNHCR participatory assessment methodology which would recommend the use of different focus group discussions divided according to age and gender.”⁸¹

As in other countries, land tenure is linked to protection. It is fundamental to provision of all types of shelter in Somalia, as evident in the three REACH case studies. In 2008, UN-Habitat, UNHCR and NRC published a report on HLP in Somalia. HLP is prioritised in regional coordinator terms of reference, in the Shelter Cluster’s work with the Protection Cluster in Mogadishu, and by partners: examples include Kismayo (ARC), Baidoa (NRC), Bosaso (NRC, UN-Habitat), and Galkayo (DRC). UN-Habitat gave a presentation on HLP to the SSWG.⁸² The cluster has sought, so far unsuccessfully, to fund the post of a HLP advisor but NRC has provided training on HLP for cluster partners and DRC humanitarian assistance has provided training on protection.

The secretariat could also promote use of cross-cutting tools in the Shelter Cluster toolkit (for example on age and gender) and showcase projects by individual partners, the global co-lead IFRC or Somalia co-chair UN-Habitat.⁸³ (It already uses the SSWG for showcasing.) . Projects to showcase could include environmental issues by Agrocare in Mogadishu, ASAL in Bosaso and UNHCR in Hargeisa, solar lighting by DRC and UNHCR in Bosaso, and the mental health project by IOM in Hargeisa.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ Somalia Shelter Cluster, Bulletin, April 2012

⁸⁰ Eviction Assessment Tool : Version – 3 11/03/2014, *mFieldwork* for ARC Kismayo
www.sheltercluster.org

⁸¹ Shelter Cluster, Mapping Infrastructure Exercise, Bossaso, July 2014, page 4

⁸² UN-Habitat Housing, Land and Property Rights in Somalia (presentation) Nairobi, 26 July 2013

⁸³ Australian Red Cross, (2011), Gender and Shelter

⁸⁴ IOM Helps Mental Health Displaced in Hargeisa, Sep-26-2014, www.iom.int › Home › Press Room
› News › PBN 2014b

Recommendations

	Strategy, policy and standards
C13	With SAG partners, revise and update the Strategic Operational Framework and Shelter Cluster terms of reference.
C14	Post standards recommended on main cluster website. Promote common understanding of all IASC cross-cutting issues via website, by showcasing the work of cluster partners, and in joint exercises.
C15	Consider real-time evaluation of digital platform to assess costs, benefits, continuity and complementarity, and potential to contribute to accountability to affected people (and see R21).
C16	Include standards and all IASC cross-cutting issues in revised Strategic Operational Framework and coordination training.

4.5 Monitoring and reporting on implementation of Shelter Cluster strategy

Communication with Geneva is frequent but the cluster has been neither asked for nor produced progress reports. There is no Dropbox or equivalent for the sharing of information. In 2013, the global focal point recommended use of the IASC cluster performance monitoring (CPM) tool. OCHA expects to repeat CPM with all clusters in Somalia in 2015.

By late 2014 the cluster had, with assistance from REACH developed a monitoring and evaluation framework and indicators, and was planning to use it every six months after a training period scheduled for early 2015. As noted above, monitoring of cluster strategy and changes to it are effectively made via the CAP revision process, with input from the SAG. Changes should also be reflected in the Strategic Operational Framework.

Recommendations

	Monitoring and reporting on implementation of Shelter Cluster strategy
C17	Take part in cluster performance monitoring at national and regional level.

4.6 Advocacy

‘Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises.’⁸⁵

I know that ... from the information side they do the best that they can with the resources that they have. I think that one of the things [they need to do] is to explain the achievements and contextualise them.⁸⁶

There was no explicit advocacy strategy in 2011-2012 but the Strategic Operational Framework included a commitment to advocate on best practice in relocation of IDPs. The 2013 Terms of Reference stated that the cluster would identify advocacy concerns. As the cluster moved towards durable solutions, advocacy messages would promote:

- Participatory and community-based approaches in shelter needs, analysis, planning, monitoring and response
- Use of local materials and construction techniques
- Understanding of market systems, use of vouchers and cash-based systems.
- Move to owner-driven shelter approaches.

The need for participation by IDPs in shelter construction and the importance of owner-driven approaches is under-scored in REACH’s case studies in Galkayo and Bosaso. Informants to the coordination review noted that slow decision-making and/or tight donor or agency deadlines sometimes made it necessary to spend project funding fast. Participatory approaches, however, were slow. The challenges at *Zona K* in Mogadishu are described in partner feedback to the cluster and in a case study on the tri-cluster approach.⁸⁷

“Generally, once an organisation secured funding, the focus was immediately on implementing as quickly as possible in order to meet project targets. To combat this “tunnel vision” amongst organisations, the successful multi-agency approach invested heavily in communications and consultation. This always takes time.”⁸⁸

The global focal point recommended advocacy by regional coordinators. The Bosaso infrastructure mapping report recommended strong advocacy on land tenure and the possible need for a Housing, Land and Property TWIG. In Mogadishu, an informant reiterated the value of local advocacy by the cluster:

... with the shelter lead and OCHA we can go to the local authority and tell our concerns. We can share our collective concerns with the authorities, which has been a huge support.

⁸⁵ Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative, *Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship*, Principle 11

⁸⁶ SSI 02.10.14

⁸⁷ Author unknown, Tri-cluster review comments shelter cluster and partners compiled, 14.06.2013

⁸⁸ *Shelter Projects 2011–2012, Case A28*, IFRC, UNHCR and UN-Habitat

In Hargeisa, a partner felt more needed to be done on advocacy with government and donors.

The cluster lead agency should have a big role in advocacy with donors. There should be a big voice by the cluster to donors ... The Shelter Cluster should advocate for durable solutions.

REACH findings also echoed concerns in other reports about protection, WASH, settlement design and gender-based violence. Shelter funding needs both an advocacy strategy and the personnel to implement it. In 2009, UNHCR included Somalia in a competition linked to the global campaign 'Gimme Shelter.'⁸⁹ Funding needs and role of the Shelter Cluster featured in a UNHCR press release in 2012. In 2014, a group of NGOs, including partners in the national and regional shelter clusters, published an appeal, 'Risk of Relapse', highlighting the overall dearth of humanitarian funding in the Somalia response.

Three Shelter Bulletins in 2011-12 communicated facts and achievements in non-technical language and were used in advocacy with OCHA and donors. The global focal point recommended preparation of a Factsheet. At the time of the evaluation, the secretariat was starting to prepare one, using the Mali Cluster's as model. The Education Cluster in Somalia, after the Shelter Cluster the one that receives the smallest percentage of appealed-for funds, has developed an infographic to illustrate the impact of education under-funding.

Recommendations

	Advocacy and communication
C18	Provide global support for advocacy, including development of Factsheets and infographics, and a simple leaflet about the Shelter Cluster in English and Somali.
C19	Consider an advocacy TWIG to raise and maintain awareness of shelter funding needs.

4.7 Accountability to affected persons

The Strategic Operational Framework references accountability to donors, consultation with beneficiaries and complaints mechanisms. Some partners have feedback and complaints mechanisms in place, for example, DRC, whose SMS system in Hargeisa was funded by the Humanitarian Innovation Fund.⁹⁰

There are no references to accountability to affected persons in the Cluster terms of reference or on www.sheltercluster.org. UNHCR Somalia's 2011 post-distribution monitoring guidelines emphasise beneficiary accountability and the cluster prioritised security and protection from violence following consultation with affected people in

⁸⁹ UNHCR enters online fund-raising challenge for US\$50,000 prize, News Stories, 8 October 2009

⁹⁰ ALNAP, Humanitarian Innovation Fund Case Study, SMS Feedback and Accountability in Somalia (DRC) www.alnap.org/pool/files/drc-somalia.pdf; / Humanitarian Innovation Fund, Piloting Accountability Systems for Humanitarian Aid in Somalia (DRC) www.humanitarianinnovation.org/projects/large-grants/drc-somalia

2011. The Bosaso infrastructure mapping report noted, however, that there was insufficient funding for participatory evaluation.

The Cluster invited the Uganda Red Cross to present IFRC's participatory approach to the SSWG and participation is a feature of the emerging monitoring and evaluation framework. However, the Mapping Guide names as stakeholders only governments, agencies and donors.⁹¹

Accountability to affected people would be strengthened by providing feedback to communities to share the findings of joint assessment and review by REACH and cluster partners. This could be done partly - though not solely - through use of mobile technology, enabling communities that have contributed to these processes to know about findings.

Recommendations

	Accountability to affected persons
C20	Include accountability to affected population in revised Strategic Operational Framework and in coordination training. Showcase good practice by partners.
C21	Communicate the findings of joint assessments, monitoring and evaluation to the communities that contributed to them (and see R15).

4.8 Contingency planning, preparedness and capacity-building

*If the cluster task is capacity-building, we have to look at cluster capacity.*⁹²

The Somalia Shelter Cluster's terms of reference make a commitment to capacity-building and, despite limited personnel capacity and funding, the Somalia Shelter Cluster has done a lot. Assessment training for 61 personnel was delivered by the first full-time coordinator in Mogadishu in 2012. Decentralisation has been accompanied by training for regional coordinators in 2013 and 2014. REACH, *mFieldwork*, the second coordinator and cluster support personnel have provided training on assessment and 4W using mobile technology. Partners have shared agency capacity-building with others in the Shelter Cluster.

Training materials are held on wwwsheltercluster.org and recent achievements were summarised in June 2014 at the national cluster meeting.

- CALP: training of trainers
- *mFieldwork*: mobile technology and digital platform in Garowe (and later Hargeisa)
- NRC: Housing, Land and Property

⁹¹ Summary and Guide of Mapping Exercise - Shelter Cluster www.sheltercluster.org

⁹² SSI 17.10.14

- REACH: assessment and review in Baidoa, Doolow and Mogadishu
- Shelter and Protection Clusters: coordination, GPS and digital platform in Garowe (and later in 2014 in Hargeisa)
- UN-Habitat and Shelter Cluster: site planning and use of GPS in Mogadishu

In Mogadishu and Bosaso, capacity-building on different topics remained a priority for partners. Topics named included camp management, 4W via the digital platform, protection and shelter, and Housing, Land and Property. Regional topics should be shared at the national quarterly meeting.

The aim of contingency planning is detailed in the 2012 Strategic Operational Framework:

The Cluster will maintain the response capacity to distribute EAP minimum package for 70,000 vulnerable households / 420,000 persons, especially those headed by women or children, through emergency stocks and local procurement. These packages will be stockpiled by Cluster members at strategic points in Somalia and Kenya.

Commitment to contingency planning is reiterated in the Shelter Cluster terms of reference. However, the global focal point for shelter coordination noted the need to clarify with UNHCR the situation vis a vis IDP and refugee contingency stocks. Anecdotally, there appeared uncertainty among some informants about whether UNHCR stocks were accessible to cluster partners or only to UNHCR partners.

In response to a question at the quarterly national cluster meeting in December 2013 about whether the cluster had a contingency plan, a working group volunteered to take on the task of scenario planning and to develop a template. It is not clear whether this has yet been completed.⁹³

Recommendations

	Contingency planning, preparedness and capacity-building
C22	Finalise shelter and NFI contingency plan and share with partners and on website.
C23	Feed regional capacity-building requests into quarterly and/or SSWG meetings.

⁹³ Quarterly Shelter Cluster Meeting December 2013

5. Conclusions

When I look at the Shelter Cluster the problem is money. ... You have this huge [humanitarian] machine with people running round for peanuts. We become process-not results-oriented ... The sense of emergency is lost ... The Shelter Cluster has a central role to play because the house is everything. Everything else – WASH, education, etc., can come around it.⁹⁴

In 2006 UNHCR was new to shelter coordination. It had no shelter department in Geneva and the Somalia Shelter Cluster was a pilot. Both factors help explain why the initial approach was 'cluster lite', with staff of UNHCR and UN-Habitat trying to combine programme and coordination roles. Less clear is why, after evaluations by UNHCR and the IASC in 2007 and an explicit letter of request from the HC in 2008, no full-time staff were recruited until 2010.

Clusters in Puntland and Somaliland benefited from the experience of their first partners, DRC, NRC, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, and UNICEF. Bosaso was an early model of what clusters could achieve. Eight years later, it continues to demonstrate, as do Mogadishu, Galkayo and Hargeisa, the necessity of a three-pronged cluster approach - emergency, transitional and permanent shelter - and the importance of settlement planning.

Full-time coordinators in Nairobi and Mogadishu since 2010 have re-established the cluster at national level and expanded the role of national as well as international NGOs. For the most part, full-time coordinators have been able to fulfil the tasks that the HC expected of UNHCR as cluster lead agency in 2008. They have built good relationships with UNHCR colleagues in Somalia and with other cluster coordinators. They have developed inter-cluster cluster partnerships, for example in response to the arrival of thousands of 'new' IDPs in Mogadishu in 2011 and to evictions in 2014. But the cluster has also shown how hard it is to maintain partnerships when funding is flat or deadlines differ.



2014: Forced evictions in Mogadishu: displaced people in the streets of the

⁹⁴ SSI 22.10.14

Coordinators have exceeded expectations in areas such as decentralisation and assessment. In 2013, the present coordinator began to drive technical innovation in information management, assessment and monitoring. The use of mobile technology in a country where security, logistics and climate continue to make fieldwork dangerous and difficult is likely to pay dividends. This, together with the digital platform being piloted, has potential for the work of other clusters and for OCHA, as both recognise. This capacity-building has potential in other contexts and would repay evaluation by the global shelter cluster.

These achievements have been made despite frequent staffing gaps and turnover in the tiny secretariat and the constant search for project funding for cluster activities. UNHCR's present country representative for Somalia supports the Shelter Cluster. This is reflected in funding for staffing and information management initiatives. However, the overall pattern of funding since cluster deployment has been inconsistent with the predictable leadership and appropriate staffing levels UNHCR promised when it took up its new coordination mandate. Good people on short contracts soon leave. This increases the pressure on core staff working in insecure environments, not only in Mogadishu or elsewhere in Somalia but in downtown Nairobi where UNHCR's Somalia office is located.

The cluster has gone through a process of restructuring and innovation. UNHCR needs to consolidate the secretariat's impressive achievements since 2010 and plug the gaps that remain, primarily due to lack of staff. To consolidate, the cluster needs, at the very least, continuity of staffing in Nairobi and Mogadishu. Core documents such as the contingency plan need to be revised and/or finalised. The numerous web sites need rationalising. Work on cross-cutting issues and accountability to affected people need consistency and higher visibility.

The level of suffering which has affected Somalia since the 1960s is hard to understate. Most important in a response where cluster partners can assist only half of those in need is advocacy. The Shelter Cluster and its partners, including REACH and *mFieldwork*, know a lot about Somalia. They, with support from the global shelter cluster, need to share the evidence of assessments in plain language not only with affected people – 'no decision about me without me' – but with UNHCR, donors and the media, in a concerted campaign on why shelter and settlement in Somalia are so important.

⁹⁵ Insecurity, drought and lack of livelihoods force 100,000 to flee homes in Somalia, UNHCR, News Stories, 16 September 2014

Annex 1 Timeline of events noted in this report

1960	Independent Somalia created in merger of former British protectorate and Italian colony. Kenya and Ethiopia are granted some border areas in west and south.
1970	General Siad Barre seizes power.
1974	Famine in Somalia. 18, 000 people die.
1978	Somalia is defeated in war with Ethiopia in disputed Ogaden region after USSR switches sides. Refugees flee Ethiopia for Somalia.
1988	Hargeisa is razed. 5,000 people are killed, 1m people are displaced.
1991	Siad Barre is forced into exile. Somaliland declares independence.
1992	Famine in Somalia. 300,000 people die.
	UN troops monitor ceasefire after fighting that follows downfall of Barre. US-led task force delivers aid in Operation Restore Hope.
1993	'Black Hawk Down' incident.
1995	UN troops withdraw, leaving warlords to fight on.
1998	Puntland declares autonomy.
2005	<i>Humanitarian reform initiated by IASC.</i>
2006	Islamic Courts Union (ICU) controls Mogadishu.
	<i>Clusters activated in Somalia. UNHCR and UN-Habitat agree to co-lead Shelter Cluster DRC, NRC, UN-Habitat, UNHCR and UNICEF attend first Shelter Cluster meeting in Nairobi.</i>
	Floods leave at least 47 people dead and thousands homeless.
	Ethiopia sends troops to defend Somalia interim government and defeats ICU.
2007	African Union deploys AMISOM peacekeeping force.
	<i>UNHCR cluster RTE conducted in Somalia.</i>
2008	Al-Shabaab regains control of most of southern Somalia.
	Drought. In Somalia, food security in most of central and southern regions is precarious. The number of people in need across the country has increased from approximately 1.5 million in mid-2007 to 2 million through to July 2008.
	Torrential rains and strong winds hit settlements of hundreds of thousands of IDPs between Mogadishu and Afgooye, destroying makeshift shelters. Thousands of IDPs in and around Mogadishu have been left without shelter after heavy rains.
	<i>Somalia HC asks UNHCR to appoint full-time staff to lead Protection and Shelter Clusters.</i>
2009	Flash floods displace more than 15,000 people in south-western town of El-Waq near Kenyan border and submerge most homes and businesses.
	Al-Shabaab attacks Mogadishu and takes control of Mogadishu. President of Somalia appeals for international military assistance.
2010	Around 1,000 families displaced by flooding after heavy rains in area between Ethiopia and Somaliland.

	<i>First full-time Shelter Cluster coordinator is recruited via NORCAP.</i>
2011	<i>Shelter Cluster partner NRC pilots SIMS information management project in Bosaso.</i>
	<i>Full-time Shelter Cluster Support Officer appointed.</i>
	<i>Shelter Cluster Strategic Operational Framework developed.</i>
	Most severe drought and food security crisis since 1990/91 famine. At least 3.7 million people are affected. 75,000 people arrive in Mogadishu in space of nine months, owing to drought, famine and fighting.
	Heavy rains and flooding in southern Somalia displace 1,000 households.
	Kenyan forces enter Somalia in pursuit of al-Shabaab militia.
	<i>UNHCR Shelter and Settlements Section starts in Geneva</i>
	<i>Three clusters - Shelter, Health and WASH - develop joint strategy to guide inter-cluster work in Mogadishu among newly arrived IDPs.</i>
2012	<i>Full-time Shelter Cluster coordinator appointed in Mogadishu.</i>
	<i>Global cluster partner REACH starts work with Somalia Shelter Cluster and conducts shelter sector review in Somaliland, Puntland and Mogadishu.</i>
	<i>Shelter Cluster Support Officer and cluster partner SSWC develop Women's Dignity Kit.</i>
	<i>Shelter Cluster Support Officer leaves after funding runs out.</i>
	Floods centred on Beletweyne. 25 people killed and 20,000 displaced. Over 5,000 livestock drowned.
2013	<i>Second full-time Shelter Cluster coordinator is recruited via NORCAP.</i>
	Shelter Cluster begins work with <i>mFieldwork</i> on use of mobile phone technology in Somalia and digital information platform for assessments, mapping and 4W.
	<i>Six shelter Cluster partners agree to undertake regional coordination in Somalia.</i>
	<i>Shelter and protection regional coordination workshop in Puntland.</i>
	Floods in Middle Shabelle region. Heavy rain followed by floods in Tropical cyclone in Puntland followed by heavy rainfall and flash floods.
	1.1m people in Somalia are IDPs: 893,000 IDPs are in south-central Somalia, including 369,000 in and around Mogadishu; 129,000 are in Puntland; 84,000 in Somaliland.
2014	Group of NGOs make joint appeal for funds for Somalia in 'Risk of Relapse' campaign.
	<i>Shelter Cluster support associate and shared information manager appointed.</i>
	<i>Shelter and protection regional coordination workshop Somaliland.</i>
	<i>Shelter Cluster partners have piloted infrastructure mapping using mobile technology in Bosaso, Galkayo, Kismayo, and Mogadishu.</i>
	Floods in South-Central Somalia. Measles outbreak in several regions.
	UN staff convoys in Mogadishu are twice targeted by suicide bombers.

Annex 2

Natural disasters in Somalia 2006-14 ⁹⁶

GLIDENumber	Event	Comments
<u>FL-2014-000150-SOM</u>	Flood	<p>Starting in October 2014, heavy rains in south-central Somalia and in upper parts of the Shabelle basin in the Somali-Ethiopian border, have caused flooding along both the Shabelle and Juba Rivers.</p> <p>The worst-hit areas are along the Shabelle River: Beledweyne in Hiraaan region, and in the Middle Shabelle region, where there have been some river breakages. Along the Juba River, Dolo in Gedo region, and Jilib and Jamame in Lower Juba have been affected. Xudur in Bakool region has also experienced heavy rains</p>
<u>EP-2014-000093-SOM</u>	Epidemic	<p>Since early February 2014, measles outbreaks were confirmed in several regions of Somalia. In March and April, there were over 1,350 suspected cases - four times the number seen during the same period in 2013. Nearly 1,000 cases were reported in May alone.</p> <p>By June, the cumulative number of cases stood at around 4,000. On 14 Jul, the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) allocated US\$1.4 million for an emergency campaign to vaccinate 520,000 children under 5 years in the worst affected areas of Banadir, Lower Juba and Puntland.</p>
<u>FL-2013-000141-SOM</u>	Flood	<p>Seasonal rains started at the end of September 2013 across Somalia, contributing to flooding, especially in and around Jowhar town in Middle Shabelle region.</p> <p>A joint multi-cluster rapid assessment mission carried out from 7-10 Nov identified 33 villages affected by the flooding and corroborated the approximately 11,000 households displaced reported by the local authorities.</p>
<u>TC-2013-000140-SOM</u>	Tropical Cyclone	<p>A tropical cyclone made landfall on the Somali coast on 10 Nov 2013. The Puntland authorities declared a natural disaster emergency on 11 Nov, citing very heavy rainfall and flash floods leading to an estimate of more than 100 casualties and large-scale livestock deaths.</p> <p>Communication lines and road access are currently severed, hampering the collection or verification of information and the delivery of assistance.</p>
<u>FL-2013-000052-SOM</u>	Flood	<p>Several parts of Somalia - especially the south - have been affected by flooding following heavy rains across Somalia and the Ethiopian highlands starting with the beginning of the rainy season in April 2013.</p> <p>Flash floods in Wanlaweyn district in Lower Shabelle led to loss of property, damage to infrastructure and displacement of people. Xudun district (Sool) and Dharoor valley (Sanaag) also experienced flooding. In Cabudwaq (Galgadud) flooding displaced thousands of people.</p>

⁹⁶ www.glidenumber.net

<u>FL-2012-</u> <u>000173-SOM</u>	Flood	<i>The central Somalian city of Belet Weyne and surrounding areas were flooded late at night between 27-28 Sep 2012 when extremely heavy rains caused the already swollen Shabelle River to overflow.</i> <i>The flooding killed 25 people and displaced 20,000. Over 5,000 livestock drowned.</i>
<u>FL-2011-</u> <u>000161-SOM</u>	Flood	<i>Heavy rains and flooding in southern Somalia have displaced 1,000 households and impede delivery of humanitarian aid.</i>
<u>DR-2011-</u> <u>000029-SOM</u>	Drought	<i>Somalia faces [most] severe drought and food security crisis since the country's 1990/91 famine. At least 3.7 million people are affected.</i>
<u>FL-2010-</u> <u>000041-SOM</u>	Flood	<i>Around 1,000 families have been displaced by flooding after heavy rains in an area straddling the border between Ethiopia and the self-declared independent republic of Somaliland, according to officials.</i>
<u>FF-2009-</u> <u>000229-SOM</u>	Flash Flood	<i>Flash floods caused by four days of torrential rains have displaced more than 15,000 people in the south-western town of El-Waq near the Kenyan border and submerged most homes and businesses, say locals.</i>
<u>OT-2008-</u> <u>000196-SOM</u>	Other	<i>Current estimates suggest that large areas of Horn of Africa are in a state of humanitarian emergency as a result of a complex combination of factors including rapid food price rises, drought and insecurity</i>
<u>FL-2008-</u> <u>000185-SOM</u>	Flood	<i>Torrential rains and strong winds have hit a string of settlements for hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Somalis between Mogadishu and Afgooye, destroying makeshift shelters and leaving many homeless once again. Ten hours of heavy rain fell overnight Sunday, flooding many shelters and forcing many people to return to their homes in war-torn Mogadishu, despite the dangers.</i>
<u>FL-2008-</u> <u>000091-SOM</u>	Flood	<i>Thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) camping in and around Mogadishu have been left without shelter after heavy rains pounded the Somali capital over the weekend, officials said.</i>
<u>DR-2008-</u> <u>000043-SOM</u>	Drought	<i>In Somalia, food security in most of central and southern regions is precarious as a result of a combination of factors including two successive poor rains, civil insecurity, high-inflation, and trade and market disruptions.</i> <i>The number of people in need across the country has increased from about 1.5 million in mid-2007 to 2 million through to July 2008.</i>
<u>FL-2006-</u> <u>000169-SOM</u>	Flood	<i>Unusually heavy rains during the months of October and November have turned large parts of the Horn of Africa into flood disaster areas with loss of life, massive displacement, and loss of livelihoods and assets in particularly in Kenya, Somalia, and Ethiopia.</i>

		<i>Accumulated estimates from the three countries put the total number of affected people between 1.5 and 1.8 million.</i>
<u>FL-2006-000161-SOM</u>	Flood	<i>At least 47 people drowned and thousands were left homeless after two rivers that snake through Somalia burst their banks after heavy rains, residents and aid workers said on 8th November.</i>

Annex 3 Evaluation informants

Name	Agency	Role
Mohamud Abdullahi Mohamed	ACF	Emergency Field Officer
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Hassan Elmi	DRC	Deputy WASH and Infrastructure Manager, Somalia
Hindi Abdi Musse	DRC	Acting Area Manager, Somaliland
Kavita Shukla	DRC	Deputy Protection Cluster Coordinator, Somalia
Mohamed Allahi Abdi	DRC	Senior Infrastructure and WASH/Shelter Manager, Puntland
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Abdi Gudle	NRC	Project Coordinator Regional Shelter Cluster Coordinator, Baidoa
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Badar Abdulkadir	NRC	Shelter Project Coordinator
Hirad Abdirahman	NRC	Shelter Projects Coordinator; Regional Shelter Cluster Coordinator, Puntland.
Jama Yasin	NRC	Shelter Projects Coordinator
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Gemma Sanmartin	OCHA	Head of Coordination Unit, Somalia; Inter Cluster Coordinator
John Ndiku	OCHA	Humanitarian Affairs Officer, Somalia
Mohamed Hassan Abdi	OCHA	Humanitarian Affairs Analyst, Puntland

Imadi Abdaiziz	ORDO	Programme Assistance Shelter Cluster Focal Point, Lower Shabelle
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Mohamoud Jibril Younis	Republic of Somaliland	Director General (DG), MRRR
Mohamed Ibrahim Qandac	SCC	Education Supervisor
Ahmed Mohamed Gedi	SSWC	Deputy Programme Manager
Mohamed Ahmed Hussein (Blacky)	UN-Habitat	Senior Programme Assistant, Puntland
Alessandra Morelli	UNHCR	Representative, Somalia
Andy Needham	UNHCR	Public Information Officer, Somalia
Ayanle Mohamoud	UNHCR	Senior Protection Assistant, Hargeisa
Charlotte Ridung	UNHCR	Former Head of Sub-Office, Bosaso and Garowe
Dhanye Williams	UNHCR	Protection and Shelter Sector Support Intern, Somalia
Elizabeth Kigen	UNHCR	Protection Cluster Support Officer
Elizabeth Palmer	UNHCR	Former Acting Focal Point for the Emergency Shelter Cluster; Former Associate Programme Officer (Emergency Shelter), Regional Support, Hub East and Horn of Africa
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Irene Mutevu	UNHCR	Former Shelter Cluster Support Officer, Somalia
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Miriam Aertker	UNHCR	Protection Officer, Hargeisa Sub-Office
Nimo Mohamed	UNHCR	Associate Protection Officer, Mogadishu
Nina Schrepfer	UNHCR	Legal Advisor to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs
Nurta Mohamed	UNHCR	Assistant Shelter Cluster Support Officer; Shelter Cluster Coordinator, Banadir/ Lower and Middle Shabelle
Periklis Kortsaris	UNHCR	Senior Protection Officer, Mogadishu
Véronique Genaille	UNHCR	Head of Sub-Office, Hargeisa
Winnifried Baraza	UNHCR	Shelter Cluster Support Associate, Somalia
Yukari Nishino	UNHCR	Former Shelter and Protection Cluster Support Officer, Somalia
Yussuf Hussein Ahmed	UNHCR	Field Associate, Field Unit, Dhobley Regional Shelter Cluster Coordinator, Dhobley
Richard Evans	UNHCR (former)	Former Shelter Cluster Coordinator, Somalia
Patrick Laurent	UNICEF	WASH Cluster Coordinator, Somalia

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Annex 5 Inception report (coordination review)

Inception Report

Somalia Shelter and NFI Cluster evaluation – coordination aspects

**Sara Davidson
10 September 2014**

1. Introduction

1.1 Purpose and scope of evaluation

This is one of two mid-term evaluations of the Somalia Shelter Cluster commissioned by UNHCR in 2014. The main purpose of the present evaluation is to review the Somalia Shelter Cluster's achievements and challenges in meeting the needs of partners and stakeholders for coordination.⁹⁷ A second evaluation will consider shelter response. Findings of both evaluations will be combined in a joint report.

This evaluation will contribute to trial and review of the global Shelter Cluster's Evaluation guidelines. Development of the guidelines is a project of the global shelter cluster's Accountability Working Group (AWG). The project is funded by ECHO and led by UNHCR.⁹⁸ Its purpose is to develop a common approach to evaluation in the Shelter Cluster. Outputs of the project to date include pilot evaluation of the UNHCR-led Shelter Cluster in Mali, a draft manual on Shelter Cluster evaluation drawing on work by UNHCR, IFRC, IOM and others, and a discussion note on evaluation strategy in the Shelter Cluster.

This evaluation will consider the work of the Shelter Cluster in Nairobi and its hubs throughout Somalia. The period covered by the evaluation of shelter coordination is 2006-2014. No previous evaluation of the Shelter Cluster has been undertaken but its work, along with that of other UNHCR-led clusters, has been considered within multi-sectoral evaluations commissioned by UNHCR (2007) and the IASC (May 2012).

1.2 Background and context to displacement in Somalia⁹⁹

Somalia has witnessed more than two decades of conflict, violence, human rights violations and disasters, all of which have triggered repeated waves of displacement. Since its establishment in 2012, the country's federal government has worked to promote peace, good governance and improved relations with parts of the country seeking autonomy. The federal structure is, however, still weak and the potential for further instability remains. Despite being ousted from some of the areas it had controlled for years, the Islamic non-state armed group al-Shabaab remains a major threat to peace and security. Some parts of the country, such as Somaliland and Puntland, are relatively stable, but many areas of south-central Somalia remain volatile, with ongoing displacement and only limited humanitarian access.

There were an estimated 1.1 million IDPs in Somalia in 2013. Around 893,000 were living in south-central Somalia, including an estimated 369,000 in settlements in and around Mogadishu; 129,000 in Puntland; and 84,000 in Somaliland, including those displaced in the Sool and Sanaag regions. More than 80,000 people were reported to be newly displaced, many of them a number of times. (IDMC)

⁹⁷ A second evaluation by REACH will review shelter response in locations where the Somalia Shelter Cluster has provided support for assessment and monitoring.

⁹⁸ The AWG members are ACTED, CARE, IFRC, NRC, Shelter Center, UNHABITAT, UNHCR

⁹⁹ Source: DMC www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/somalia/

1.3 The Shelter Cluster in Somalia

The Somalia Shelter and NFI Cluster is one of the first clusters activated following the humanitarian reform process in 2005. Under UNHCR leadership, with UN-Habitat as co-lead, it began work in 2006.

Somalia has suffered numerous emergencies since 2006. These include floods, drought, famine, complex emergency and epidemic. In 2014 eight clusters are active:

Education,
Food Security
Health
Logistics,
Nutrition
Protection,
Shelter and NFI
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene

The Shelter Cluster's aim in Somalia is "to provide a forum where all actors can discuss and agree on issues related to shelter and NFI, supported by a coordinator and secretariat which aid cluster partners in achieving effective shelter/NFI action."

The Shelter Cluster has 16 partner agencies which aim to assist 495,000 people, the majority of whom live in Somalia's southern and central regions. The cluster's Strategic Operational Framework (SOF) for 2013-2015 responds to three phases of displacement: emergency, transitional and durable solutions.

- Emergency shelter is intended to contribute to the protection of newly displaced populations and those affected by natural hazards from life-threatening elements.
- Transitional shelter is intended to improve the living conditions of people in need in stabilized settlements (with a strong focus on ending humanitarian dependency through sustainable approaches).
- Durable shelter is intended to facilitate access to durable solutions for displaced populations through local integration.

In addition, the SOF addresses the need for enhanced coordination and capacity-building between cluster partners. It aims to harmonize strategy rather than provide standards. This is due to the following:

- Vast area of shelter programme coverage
- Geographic and climatic variation
- Different and variable access conditions
- Suitability and availability options in each region
- Type and capacity of implementing partners
- Varying community support

- Varying support from the local authorities.

UNHCR's appeal for IDP projects in Somalia in 2014 totalled USD 34,308,286. The amount budgeted for coordination and partnerships was USD 1,761,397

1.4 Cluster structure

The Somalia Shelter Cluster comprises:

Secretariat National hub	National coordination and the secretariat are based in the Kenyan capital Nairobi. Co-lead agencies are UNHCR and UN-Habitat.
Cluster Review Committee (CRC)	The CRC advises partners during the CAP and allocations from the CHF. It comprises a UN agency, one international and one national NGO, and the Cluster Coordinator.
Strategic Advisory Group (SAG)	The SAG has ten members plus the Cluster Coordinator.
Sustainable Shelter Solutions Working Group (SSWG)	Since 2011, governments in Puntland and Somaliland have provided support in identifying land for local integration of IDPs. The SSWG was set up to achieve durable solutions for IDPs in urban and rural areas, and to ensure that communities are more resilient to future shocks.
Other technical working groups (TWIGs)	The cluster website lists two other TWIGS: Housing, Land and Property (HLP), and shelter design.
Regional hubs	Cluster partners and the lead agencies provide regional cluster /hub leadership within Somalia. The Cluster website lists 10 regional hubs (see below).
Digital platform	The cluster uses mobile technology and GPS tracking to enhance information sharing, data management and analysis, and accountability.

1.5 Regional hubs

Hub	Area	Lead agency
National	All	UNHCR, UN-Habitat
Dhobley, Lower Juba Region	South-Central Somalia	UNHCR
Kismayo, Lower and Middle Juba Regions	South-Central Somalia	American Refugee Committee (ARC)
Doolow, Gedo Region	South-Central Somalia	Development Frontiers International (DFI)
Baidoa, Bay and Bakool Regions	South-Central Somalia	Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).
Mogadishu, Banaadir Region, Lower and Middle Shabelle Regions	South-Central Somalia	UNHCR
Hiraan and Galgaduud	South-Central Somalia	Danish Refugee Council (DRC)
Galkayo, Mudug Region	Puntland / Mudug	DRC
Garowe, Nugaal Region	Puntland	UNHCR
Bosaso, Bari Region	Puntland	NRC
Hargeisa	Somaliland	NRC and UN-Habitat

2. Methodology

2.1 Evaluation questions

In line with the Terms of Reference and purpose, questions asked by evaluation of coordination will include:

- To what extent do partners and stakeholders engage with and participate in the activities of the Somalia Shelter Cluster?
- Is remote coordination by the Shelter Cluster an appropriate solution in the Somali context of difficult access and remote response management? Is this model of coordination sustainable?
- Has contingency planning by the cluster been effective?

2.2 Indicators of shelter coordination

Indicators of shelter coordination will draw on the IASC core cluster functions:

1. Supporting service delivery
2. Informing strategic decision-making of the humanitarian response
3. Planning and strategy development
4. Advocacy
5. Monitoring and reporting
6. Contingency planning/preparedness/capacity building

Other indicators of coordination performance may be drawn from the Somalia Shelter Cluster's Strategic Operational Framework, the Somalia and global Shelter Cluster websites; Sphere core and shelter standards; other standards referenced in the global shelter cluster's draft evaluation guide.¹⁰⁰

2.3 Research

- Desk review, including review of documents relating to cluster start-up, planning, implementation and effectiveness and evaluations by others.
- A three-week visit to Kenya and Somalia to talk to cluster and hub lead agencies and partners in Nairobi and in Mogadishu, Bosaso and Hargeisa if security permits. Choice of hubs reflects different shelter response type, availability of partners and input by the Somalia Shelter Cluster into assessment and monitoring since 2012.

Hub	State / region	Hub lead agency	Shelter response type
Mogadishu	South-Central Somalia	UNHCR	Emergency shelter
Bosaso	Puntland	NRC	Transitional shelter
Hargeisa	Somaliland	DRC	Durable solutions

¹⁰⁰ Pages 11 and 12: e.g. Shelter Cluster tools; IASC Activation checklist; IASC Cluster Performance Monitoring process; Shelter Cluster Performance Management System; Sphere Core and Shelter standards.

- Key informant interviews, including face to face, Skype or email interviews and online/email questionnaire. Key informants will include:
 - Donors
 - Government officials (Somalia)
 - Humanitarian Country Team
 - NGOs and NGO networks (Geneva, Nairobi and Somalia)
 - OCHA
 - Other cluster lead agencies, including Protection, WASH and Education
 - Regional cluster lead agencies
 - Shelter Cluster co-leads, UNHCR and UN-Habitat, and partner agencies (Nairobi and Somalia)
 - Shelter Coordination Team members (current and former)
 - UNHCR (Geneva, Nairobi and Somalia)

Online / email questionnaires have been developed for cluster and hub coordinators and for partners. Contact with the affected population is likely to be limited owing to security issues. Where available, secondary data on accountability to beneficiaries will be sought from partners.

2.4 Deliverables

- Inception report
- Initial findings on shelter coordination
- Report on shelter coordination in Somalia. This will include lessons learned, best practice and recommendations.
- Revised shelter evaluation guidelines
- Joint report which combines findings of the coordination and response evaluations

2.5 Limitations and risks

Security and access issues may make it difficult to visit areas scheduled for research. In addition, this evaluation takes place approximately eight years after the cluster first began work. Since then, national authorities, cluster lead agencies and partners have had to respond to numerous different disasters in Somalia. The cluster has twice been restructured.

Because of these factors and because of staff turnover in UNHCR and partner agencies, it may prove difficult to gain access to some key data and informants and recall may be weak. Risks are summarised in the table below.

Risk	Likelihood	Impact on evaluation	Mitigation measure
Lack of access to field locations: due to volatile context and security / travel issues, some areas of Somalia may be out of reach and/or evaluation schedules disrupted.	High	Medium-high	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Questions for remote data collection have been developed.

Loss of corporate memory and staff turnover in the field: staff turnover, especially among international staff, is common in Somalia.	Medium to high	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Agencies will be asked to share any evaluations of their own shelter and NFI programmes. • Agencies will be asked for contact details of previous key staff. • Deepened data search in Geneva with UNHCR and UN-Habitat.
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Annex 6 Inception report (response review)

Terms of Reference (TOR) for:

Somalia Shelter and NFI Cluster evaluation – Shelter response aspects

Summary

1.1 Purpose and timing:	<i>To review shelter response achievements and challenges in meeting the immediate, medium and long term shelter needs of the affected population and making recommendations on future coordination and shelter response respectively.</i>
1.2 Audience:	Shelter Cluster coordination team, members, and global support will use it for lessons learned. Cluster partners, donors, and other humanitarian actors will use it for general information.
1.3 Commissioners:	The evaluation is being commissioned by the Global Shelter Cluster and UNHCR. The evaluation team will include the evaluation manager from UNHCR and the REACH initiative (shelter response).
1.4 Reports to:	UNHCR Shelter Cluster (Geneva and Somalia)
1.5 Duration:	3 months, from September 2014 to November 2014
1.6 Timeframe:	from 15 September 2014 to 5 ^h of December 2014
1.7 Location:	Kenya, Somalia and Switzerland

Background

Active since 2010, the Shelter Cluster in Somalia aims at addressing the needs of an estimated 1.1 million IDPs in the country. The national cluster coordination is located in Nairobi, Kenya, and a de-centralized architecture was put in place to ensure regional coordination in country.

The Somalia Shelter Cluster 2013-2015 strategy has three main objectives to address the needs of the different displacements types in country: **Emergency**, **Transitional** and **Durable Solutions**.

- **Emergency:** Contribute to the protection of newly displaced populations and those affected by natural hazards from life-threatening elements.
- **Transitional:** Improve the living conditions of people in need in stabilized settlements (with a strong focus on ending humanitarian dependency through sustainable approaches).
- **Durable Solutions:** Facilitate access to durable solutions for displaced populations through local integration.

A fourth pillar that looks at the capacity building/coordination component is also included, and community participation and ownership are underlying themes embedded in all cluster activities.

Since 2011 the government in Puntland and Somaliland have provided support in identifying land for local integration of IDPs. Consequently, a Sustainable Shelter Solutions working group (SSSWG) was set up to accomplish durable solutions for IDPs both at urban and rural areas, and to ensure that communities are more resilient to future shocks. Furthermore, to improve the accountability and information management of the cluster, a digital platform (through mobile technology and GPS tracking) was put in place and it has been provided to all partners to enhance the information sharing, data management and analysis.

Evaluation scope

To review shelter response achievements and challenges in meeting the immediate, medium and long term shelter needs of the affected population and making recommendations on future coordination and shelter response respectively.

This evaluation should be enriched by making a distinction between remote operational response and remote cluster related policy decision making

Evaluation questions

The overarching top-level questions that will inform the evaluation are:

Are the shelter and NFI provided by the shelter cluster members to the beneficiaries in Somalia met the needs of the affected populations?

- Has the emergency shelter response proven to be appropriate and to have provided quality solutions?
- Has the transitional shelter response proven to be appropriate and to have provided quality solutions?
- Has the permanent shelter response proven to be appropriate and to have provided quality solutions?

Evaluation Design

The shelter response evaluation will cover three different phases of the response:

- The Emergency phase will be evaluated in Mogadishu response.
- The Transitional phase will be evaluated in the Bossaso response.
- The Permanent phase will be informed by the REACH Galkayo evaluation performed in June 2014.

Appropriate methodology, tools and indicators will be selected after careful review of the relevant program documents including project proposals, reports and log frameworks. A matrix of project outputs and outcomes will be developed for each project and specific tools and indicators devised to assess these. The themes of the evaluation will be dictated by the objectives of the programs being evaluated and – along with cross-cutting issues such as gender, age, disability, unaccompanied minors, natural environment and sustainability.

The themes of the evaluation are likely to include the following: Housing quality and use of living space, Land tenure and forced evictions, Safety, protection and security, Access to services and facilities (including WASH and education), Sense of community/community activities, Access to livelihoods, Food security, Population dynamics, Land use, site development and planning, Host community, IDPs intentions

Deliverables

During the evaluation process, and by the end of it, the following products and documents will be delivered:

- **For each shelter response evaluation:** 1 evaluation ToRs, 1 tools set, 1 dataset, 1 early findings report.
- **Collated and systemized documentation** relating to cluster systems to support future activations. As annexes: Additional notes, summaries of interviews etc. as appropriate or supporting documentation. Summary of review activities undertaken including interviews, visits, documents reviewed etc. Pictures and graphic, easy to visualize information.
- **Comments** on use and applicability of shelter cluster evaluation guidelines

Timeline

#	Tasks	Timeframe	Location	Who
1	Identification and validation of emergency and transitional shelter response methodology and tools	15/09 to 10/10	Multiple	REACH, Rafael Matar Neri, Martijn Goddeeris
2	Permanent shelter response evaluation in Galkayo	Done		
3	Data Collection in Mogadishu (Emergency)	15/10 to 23/10	Mogadishu	REACH
4	Data Collection in Bossasso (Transitional)	13/10 to 25/10	Bossasso	REACH
5	Analysis and drafting of early findings (Emergency and Transitional)	By the 7/11	Nairobi	REACH
6	Validation of Emergency and Transitional evaluation	By the 15/11	Nairobi	Somalia Shelter Cluster
7	Drafting of Final Report	By the 3/12	Nairobi	REACH
8	Final Report dissemination and release at country level	December	Nairobi	Somalia Shelter Cluster
9	Final Report dissemination and release at global level	December	Geneva	UNHCR

#	September				October				November				December			
	W1	W2	W3	W4	W1	W2	W3	W4	W1	W2	W3	W4	W1	W2	W3	W4
1																
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Evaluation Team and reporting

Name	Role	Responsibilities for evaluation	Organization	Country
Rafael Mattar Neri	Evaluation Manager	Overall management and overseeing of evaluation	UNHCR	Switzerland
Miguel Urquia	Evaluation Technical Committee	Provides technical support and backstopping for the evaluation	UNHCR	Switzerland
Davide Nicolini	Evaluation Technical Committee	Provides technical support and backstopping for the evaluation	UNHCR	Switzerland
Vincent Annoni	Evaluation Technical Committee	Provides technical support and backstopping for the evaluation	REACH	Switzerland
Martijn Goddeeris	Shelter Cluster Coordinator	Facilitate the evaluation in country; Provides technical support and backstopping for the evaluation; oversees findings dissemination in country	UNHCR	Somalia
Clay Westrope	Evaluation / Assessment Specialist	Data collection and compilation in the field. Supervision of data collectors and data entry operators; Support in drafting and designing of assessment and project; data analysis	REACH	Washington Somalia
Daniel Brown & Kourtne Schaefer	REACH Somalia	Support in drafting and designing of assessment and project; data and geo-spatial analysis	REACH	Somalia

DISSEMINATION PLAN

Target Audience

Two main types of audience will benefit from the evaluation results and reports:

1) The shelter sector aid community within Somalia. Special attention will be given to the elaboration of operational recommendations that can easily be taken into consideration by aid actors and donors during the current support provided to the Somalia Cluster as for formulation of potential future coordination structures. The shelter cluster will be able to build on the results in order to promote the integration of the evidence produced by the project into future shelter response and projects. UNHCR as cluster lead will be of special importance.

2) The Global Shelter Cluster and broad international shelter sector aid community. It is expected that the evaluation results and reports will positively influence the development of best practices and lessons learned that the Global Shelter Cluster will be able to use and apply in those other contexts where limited humanitarian access and volatile contexts undermine coordination and response efforts.

Communication Strategy

At country level, a series of workshops and events will be held to ensure that evaluation findings and the final reports will be disseminated and discussed with the shelter sector aid community. At the end of each field data collection exercise related to the response evaluation (emergency, transitional and permanent solutions), the shelter cluster and REACH will present the early findings to the cluster members in order to collect feedbacks and additional analysis. In addition to that early state dissemination and communication

plan, the Somalia shelter cluster will organise specific meetings and/or events with key stakeholders in which the final result of the study will be published and the official report will be launched in country.

At global level, a presentation will be held in Geneva to launch the final report and illustrate its findings. Further to this, the report will be published on sheltercluster.org website as well as other relevant humanitarian web portal (such as reliefweb.int, alnap.org amongst others). The study will be published on UNHCR and REACH website and a limited number of reports will be printed and distributed during the opening event as well during key stakeholder meetings.

Evaluation Quality and Ethical Standards

The evaluators should take all reasonable steps to ensure that the evaluation is designed and conducted to respect and protect the rights and welfare of people and the communities of which they are members, and to ensure that the evaluation is technically accurate, reliable, and legitimate, conducted in a transparent and impartial manner, and contributes to organizational learning and accountability. Therefore, the evaluation team should adhere to the evaluation standards and applicable practices being used in similar type of evaluations globally and in native countries.

1.1 Risks, constraints and assumptions

Identification of risks	Likelihood	Impact on the evaluation	Mitigation measure
Lack of access: due to security / travel and transportation issues, some areas of Somalia may be out of reach for both evaluations.	High	Medium	Data collection could be re-scheduled if necessary otherwise alternative locations will be selected to perform the evaluation. In addition remote tools for data collection may be considered and methodology revised accordingly.
Security issues: due to Somalia volatile context, security issues may occurs on a day by day basis disrupting the opportunity to travel, held meetings, collect data with beneficiaries.	Medium to High	High	Data collection could be re-scheduled if necessary otherwise alternative locations will be selected to perform the evaluation
Loss of corporate memory & Staff turnover: staff turnover, especially amongst international staff, is quite common in Somalia. Therefore memories and experience may get lost as the staff who implemented shelter response and attended coordination mechanisms is not present anymore in the country	Medium to High	High	If the information is collected or stored ad HQ or country level, agencies and organisations will be encouraged to share it with the Shelter Cluster. If staff is still within the same organisation and/or agency but in an another duty station, it will be contacted through its agency/organisation hierarchy




SHELTER SECTOR THREE PHASE RESPONSE EVALUATION Emergency Shelter Case Study

**MOGADISHU - SOMALIA
JANUARY 2015**



Background

Map 1: IDP Settlements Evaluated



Mogadishu has been a destination site for internally displaced persons (IDPs) since large-scale drought and violence-driven displacements began to surge in 2011 and 2012. Large numbers of IDPs also returned to the city in late 2011 following the re-emergence of stability when Al-Shabaab withdrew in August 2011. Before these returns, the Afgoye corridor was host to around 300,000 IDPs. In late 2012, the government of Somalia issued an eviction order for IDPs living within the city boundaries, forcing them to move to locations northwest of the city in the districts of Dharkenley and Daynile between the kilometre markers of X-Control and Kilometre 13 along Afgoy Road. Additional IDP influxes as a result of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) offensives in the southern districts of Somalia have joined the recently evicted households in the location.

This area is currently home to an estimated 13,400 IDP households (101,840 IDPs)¹⁰¹ in the informal settlements shown in Map 1. The

majority (85%) of shelters in this area are built in a makeshift *buul* style using found branches or wooden sticks for the internal structure and either cloth and waste carton or plastic sheeting for the external covering. The remaining shelters are tent-like structures (8%) or rectangular hybrid structures (7%) using plastic sheeting.

Since the end of 2012, the Somalia Shelter Cluster and its partners advocated for transitional shelter to be built on this land following the high levels of displacement, however, following the government's inability to secure the land for this purpose, the Somalia Shelter Cluster abandoned this plan in favour of limited emergency shelter provision, given the security and land tenure concerns. According to implementing agencies in Mogadishu, Shelter Cluster members provided 8,733 households with emergency shelter and 12,662 households with non-food item (NFI) support in 2014. The majority of this assistance was in the form of direct distributions with a small proportion through cash or voucher means.

REACH was requested by the Global and Somalia Shelter Clusters to conduct an evaluation in the IDP settlements in Daynile and Dharkenley districts outside Mogadishu. In order to achieve this, a household survey was organised. The household survey employed a 95% confidence level and 5% confidence interval calculated for the entire assessed area in Mogadishu.

¹⁰¹ Based on a total shelter count of 26,798, divided by two (the average number of shelters per household) for total households. For total IDP population, this figure was multiplied by 7.6 (the average number of individuals living in each household).

The sample size was calculated from the entire household population of this area and then divided proportionally among the settlements based upon the number of households located within each settlement. A total of 832 households were interviewed in November 2014, as part of the quantitative portion of the evaluation. These data were compared to household data available from June 2013 and a comparative analysis of infrastructure mapping conducted by the Somalia Shelter Cluster in June 2013 and July 2014, were included.

Summary of Results

Evaluation findings show that the emergency shelter response in Mogadishu IDP settlements has had a positive impact on the quality and availability of shelter for the IDP population. As a direct result of the humanitarian response, which reached the vast majority of the IDP population in the evaluated area, expenditures on shelter materials and household items have decreased between June 2013 and November 2014. This, in turn, may have enabled the limited household income to be used for other expenses beyond basic shelter. Either as a result of better shelter materials provided by the humanitarian community, or due to the indirect benefit of being able to purchase better quality materials in the market, shelters have better quality roofing and walls and are often larger now than they were in June 2013. Household perception of safety within the shelter has also drastically improved. It should be noted that quality of materials varies across settlements with many of the households using lower quality plastic sheeting than the cluster recommends. While this is a limitation of the response, the use of plastic sheeting in the place of materials previously used, such as cloth and rags, can be seen as a positive trend.

Despite these positive trends, there has also been a critical failure by the humanitarian community in Mogadishu to provide sufficient water and sanitation services to the evaluated settlements and beneficiary satisfaction levels are low. The government has also failed to provide sufficient conditions for a more substantial response. An increased number of households are now farther from latrines or water points and are, thus, exposed to increased security risks. This is especially an issue for women and children, who are often tasked with the duty of collecting water or are forced to use non-gender segregated or non-lockable latrines at night.

While the emergency shelter response in Mogadishu has been successful in providing sufficient shelter for the IDP population by following the delivery-oriented strategy of the Shelter Cluster, the evaluation findings prove that the humanitarian community has been unable to work within a settlement perspective. As the humanitarian community begins to decide the next steps for the IDP population in Mogadishu, emphasis should be placed on coordinating the response with other sectors and promoting an integrated settlement approach in which the design and services offered within the settlement are considered along with the individual shelter provision.

Table 1: List of Evaluation Indicators

Results	Indicator	June 2013	November 2014
Increased quality of construction and materials	1. Shelter type	Buul: 80% Non-buul: 20%	Buul: 85% Non-buul: 15%
Increased quality of materials	2. Materials used for shelter roof and walls construction	72% cloth and rags	73% plastic sheeting
Increased provision of assistance by cluster members	3. % of households reporting having received shelter assistance	7%	40%
Slight increase in access of beneficiary households to markets	4. % of households without physical access to functioning markets	64%	56%
Decrease in shelter expenditures	5. % of households that report shelter as a top three expenditure	68%	20%
Increase in non-emergency shelter construction	6. Number of shelters per plot	1.7	2
Decrease in temperature as a major shelter problem	7. % of beneficiary households reporting X problem related to their shelter assistance	93% hot temperatures	31% hot temperatures
Moderate satisfaction level	8. % of targeted households satisfied with their shelter or non-food item assistance they received	-	47% satisfied/very satisfied
Decreased household access to critical services/infrastructure	9. % of households with access to services/infrastructure	Latrines: 14% outside 50 metre radius Water points: 29% outside 200 metre radius	Latrines: 34% outside 50 metre radius Water points: 13% outside 200 metre radius
Increased perception of safety and security	10. % of households that perceive that they are safe from security-related issues and natural hazards	74%	81%
Decreased problems between IDP households and local community	11. % of households that report problems with the local community	7%	2%

Recommendations

1. **Access to Services and Facilities:** Inter-sector coordination and planning must be improved in order to increase access to services and facilities in IDP emergency shelter settlements. This is particularly important for the WASH and protection sectors. The increased proportion of households outside the recommended distance from latrines and the fact that the majority of latrines are communal and not separated by gender suggests a lack of coordination and engagement among clusters in providing safe and sufficient services for IDPs.
2. **Safety, Protection, and Security:** Given the varied quality of plastic sheeting and the relative dearth of locks on shelter doors in Mogadishu IDP settlements, shelter partners must ensure that the quality of their materials meet the requirements suggested by the cluster. Furthermore, linked to recommendation one, protection actors must be actively engaged in latrine design and placement, as the current number and lack of gender segregation presents a protection concern for inhabitants of these settlements.
3. **Assessments and Evaluation:** The comparison between shelter-assisted and non-assisted households is vital to understanding the outcomes of the shelter response. A more detailed information management system should be established to enable tracking of assistance at the household level. This could be linked to recommendation one with input from all relevant sectors.

Rationale

The evaluation was commissioned by the Global Shelter Cluster in order to better understand the impact of cluster coordination on the shelter response, and the resulting impact of the shelter response on the IDP population. The evaluation is expected to inform future cluster strategy and to be used as an advocacy tool for future targeted shelter response planning in Somalia.

Process

The evaluation team followed six key steps in order to conduct the evaluation of the Somalia Shelter Cluster coordinated emergency shelter response in Mogadishu. First, REACH shared an evaluation terms of reference, analysis framework, and household questionnaire with the Global Shelter Cluster and Somalia Shelter Cluster for review, feedback, and approval, ensuring collaboration and contextually-appropriate lines of inquiry. Second, REACH hired and trained staff from implementing agencies in Mogadishu to collect quantitative household data using a questionnaire built on the mFieldwork mobile phone application. Third, REACH coordinated with the appropriate district commissioners in Dharkenley and Daynile as well as all settlement umbrella leaders to allow for enumerator access to the settlements. Fourth, a consultant for the Global Shelter Cluster concurrently collected qualitative data from cluster partners and associated stakeholders on the cluster's role in coordinating the shelter response in Mogadishu. Fifth, REACH shared the preliminary findings from the quantitative household data with the Somalia Shelter Cluster's Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) and implementing partners in Mogadishu to ensure findings were accurate and allow for clarification where needed. Sixth, the evaluation team combined the validated quantitative and qualitative data into a series of case studies and a final report covering the shelter response across three locations and shelter response modalities in Somalia. This case study and the corresponding report includes comparative analyses between data collected in June 2013 and during the most recent data collection exercise in November 2014 as well as infrastructure data collected by the Somalia Shelter Cluster in July 2014. The comparative analysis included household data as well as comparisons of numbers and types of shelter and facilities in the intervention area.

People and Resources Involved

The evaluation team drew upon the expertise and knowledge of a wide variety of stakeholders in order to carry out the evaluation in Mogadishu. REACH provided five assessment and GIS staff to design and manage the quantitative data collection portion of the evaluation and to analyse the data. As part of this portion of the evaluation, eight cluster partners provided a total of 5 team leaders and 25 staff to collect data, including Daryeel Bulsho Guud (DBG), Diakonie (DKH), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Humanitarian Initiative Just Relief Aid (HIJRA), Haweenka Horseedka Nabadda and Noloshka (HINNA), Islamic Relief, Mubarak for Relief and Development Organisation (MURDO), and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). Accommodation for the evaluation team and the training venue were provided under contract with the Peace Hotel in Mogadishu. UNHCR provided support for the external consultant responsible for the qualitative coordination data collection portion of the evaluation. The Somalia Shelter Cluster provided access to and use of the mFieldwork platform to support data collection and database management.

Challenges and Limitations

As with many parts of Somalia, Mogadishu provides unique challenges and limitations to the research process, notably in terms of security and access. During this evaluation, there were four critical challenges and limitations. First, the REACH evaluation coordinator was unable to travel to Mogadishu to conduct the training due to security concerns. To mitigate the impact of this, an experienced

REACH national staff member conducted the training with direct and regular oversight by the REACH evaluation coordinator.

Second, some settlements originally sampled during the planning phases of the evaluation were not present anymore when the enumerators arrived to collect data due to frequent movements of settlements within the area. Alternate sites were identified and a 20% buffer was added to the sample size in order to allow for error that might be introduced by this methodological alteration.

Third, female enumerator participation was limited due to cultural norms and practices. There were a small number of female enumerators and every effort was made to ensure female enumerators spoke with women in households where no men were present by distributing female enumerators among as many teams as possible.

Fourth, due to movements into and out of each of the settlements and the conception among IDPs that underreporting aid will encourage agencies to provide further support, it was difficult to identify households that had received assistance and those that had not. In order to attempt to analyse differences between households that had received assistance and those that had not, a random sample was taken across the entire area to capture both types of households. The responses of households regarding the assistance they had received was then triangulated with geographic information about assistance provided to identify any possible patterns in responses (**Map 2**). However, it is likely a significant underestimation of the actual proportion of households that have received assistance.


Evaluation Results

Shelter Response

Shelter Type & Materials

According to satellite imagery analysis, between June 2013 and November 2014, there was an increase in total estimated shelters from 12,375 to 26,798, a 117% increase in the number of shelters in the area. Disaggregating by shelter type using household data, the largest increase was among “*buul* structures” – a 130% increase. The large increase in *buul* numbers coincides with the recent influxes of IDPs to this area as a result of continued evictions in Mogadishu and insecurity in southern Somalia. *Buuls* are the traditional shelter type for many parts of Somalia and are commonly built in situations when land and material resources are scarce. **Map 3** illustrates these results.

Figure 1: Shelter Types



While there has been a very rapid increase in the number of *buuls* constructed between June 2013 and November 2014, the quality of the materials used for these structures has improved by providing greater protection from weather elements – a key outcome of the shelter response.

In June 2013, 72% of all shelter types used cloth and rags for the shelter walls and roofs, while in November 2014, 73% of all households were observed to be using plastic sheeting for the external covering of their shelters – a vastly more weather-resistant roofing solution. This is likely a direct

outcome of the increase in humanitarian assistance in this area as well as associated increases in market access that will be explored below.

Shelter Source

Using caseload estimates from population calculations and reported distributions, the vast majority of the IDP caseload in the evaluated area has received humanitarian assistance, leading to a decrease in the amount of household income spent on shelter expenses between June 2013 and November 2014.

In November 2014, only 40% of households reported receiving any humanitarian assistance. While this is an increase from June 2013 in which only 7% of households reported receiving support, it is likely a significant underestimation of the actual proportion of households that have received assistance due to the conception among IDPs that underreporting aid will encourage agencies to provide further support.

Evidence of the breadth of the humanitarian emergency shelter response can be seen in that 73% of households have plastic sheeting as the external covering for their shelter¹⁰², as stated above. Only 27% of households report shelter construction materials being available in the market, thus, it can be assumed that this plastic sheeting comes from other non-market sources. This is further supported by the fact that shelter implementing agencies report distributing 12,662 NFIs to IDP households in the evaluated area. Using the estimate of 13,400 IDP households and assuming distributions were not duplicated at the household level, 94% of households could have received shelter assistance. 8,732 households also received emergency shelter – 65% of the households.

Further highlighting the impact of the humanitarian shelter response, only 20% of households report shelter items and materials as a top three expenditure in November 2014, compared to 68% that reported shelter as a top three expenditure in June 2013. This could be a proxy indicator for households feeling that their shelter is at least sufficient enough for them to focus their household spending on other necessities.

Shelter Use

Households are constructing more structures and are using these structures and their plot of land for purposes other than sheltering household members – a possible sign that basic shelter needs of the household have been met.

On average, in November 2014 each household has about two structures on its plot of land. Every household has at least one structure used for its main shelter, with 39% having an additional structure used for a kitchen. This is a slight increase in number of structures per household from June 2013 when households had 1.7 structures per household and only 28% of these were used for a kitchen. Having a separate structure for a kitchen as opposed to a shelter for sleeping is often an indicator that the basic sheltering needs of the household have been met.

Further to this, a small proportion of households report that they are currently using their plot of land for growing crops (11%) or holding livestock (10%). This is compared to only 1% of households that reported using their land for holding livestock in June 2013. This is yet another sign that households are able to begin activities beyond provision of basic household needs.

Shelter Improvement

Concerns about weather within the shelter have been vastly reduced between June 2013 and November 2014. Similarly, households have begun to expand their shelters. Both of these signal

¹⁰² The orange plastic sheeting seen on a number of shelters does not meet the quality standards set forth by the Shelter Cluster. Some of this plastic sheeting has been purchased in the market by individual households, while some was purchased in the market by an aid provider and distributed to households.
Somalia Shelter / NFI Cluster 2015

improvements to the shelter whether directly impacted by the provision of shelter materials or the indirect decrease in expenditures for basic shelter needs.

Despite the rapid increase in *buul* construction in a short period of time, the quality of some elements of the shelter construction seems to have improved as evidenced by only 31% of households reporting weather as the primary concern related to their shelter compared to 93% of households reporting as much in June 2013. Connected to this is the fact that, while nearly all shelters still consist of one-room structures and only 5% have more than one room, 84% of households reported having upgraded their shelters, including 92% of which that report extending the size of their shelter. This is likely influenced by the provision of basic shelter materials by the humanitarian community and the use of higher quality materials such as plastic sheeting, which has allowed for scarce household income to be used for shelter upgrades. The quality of this plastic sheeting varies widely.

Shelter Assistance Satisfaction

Overall, households are ambivalent about their satisfaction of the shelter response, likely due to a number of factors both within and outside of the humanitarian community's control. However, the modality of assistance and timing of arrival of households have a clear effect on satisfaction levels.

On a four-point scale from very unsatisfied to very satisfied 53% of households report being unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with the assistance they have received. This could be explained by the limited nature of the emergency shelter response that was used as an alternative to a transitional response due to lack of land tenure and a decision by the government to halt any transitional shelter construction in the area. While the overall satisfaction level is low, the direct and indirect impact of the response has largely been positive.

When further analysing satisfaction based on time of arrival, there is a small positive effect among households that have been living in the settlement for longer. Only 20% of households living in the current settlement for less than one month rate their assistance satisfaction as very satisfied or satisfied. This is compared to 61% for those households that moved to the current settlement over one year ago. All other timing of arrival are between these satisfaction levels.

Furthermore, when disaggregating the modality of distributions with satisfaction levels, there is a clear preference for direct distributions. Only 2% of households who received their assistance through vouchers were satisfied or very satisfied and only 18% of households that received cash. 57% of households that received direct distributions indicated that they were satisfied or very satisfied with the assistance they received.

Access to Services & Facilities

Construction of critical infrastructure such as latrines and water points has not kept pace with the rapid population growth of the evaluated area, leading to critical shortages of the provision and access to key services.

SPHERE standards indicate that access to a latrine within 50 metres of the shelter is a minimum requirement for emergency shelter. In July 2014, satellite imagery shows that 34% of shelters are outside this 50 metre proximity buffer. When referring to [Map 4](#), it is clear that many more shelters now lie further from latrines due to the expansion of the settlements since June 2013. This has the potential to encourage open defecation and is a security concern for individuals – especially women – at night. Furthermore, 76% of the existing latrines are communal, and 79% of these latrines are not separated by gender. Separation by gender and provision of inside locks is recommended in order to avoid gender-based violence and other safety risks.

72% of households use water tanks as their main source of water with an average walking time to the water point of about 20 minutes. When referring to [Map 5](#), it is clear that the number of shelters located more than 500 metres from a water point has been drastically reduced, but the proportion of households still located 200 to 500 metres from a water point has not changed markedly. Distance to

water points is a potential security concern for vulnerable populations who have to travel long distances to collect water.

Safety, Protection & Security

IDP households perceive themselves to be safer and more secure in November 2014 than they did in June 2013. This perception, however, is only for within the shelter, while perception of safety outside the shelter has increased.

25% of households considered fearing for their physical safety in June 2013, while only 19% reported this perception in November 2014. While this is a promising trend, two locations – the market and the latrine – were perceived to be more unsafe now than they were in 2013 from those who reported security concerns. 74% of households that fear for their physical safety now perceive the market to be unsafe, compared to just 21% in 2013. Similarly, only 29% of all households perceived latrines to be unsafe in 2013, while 51% do so in 2014. This is likely linked to increased distance for some households to travel to latrines, as 68% of those households that are outside a 50 metre radius from a latrine report safety concerns, compared to 46% of those within the 50 metre radius. With this said, fewer shelters in 2014 have a lock (23%) than in 2013 (66%), yet the perception of security has increased, possibly partly due to strong relationships with the host community in which only 10% of those households reporting strong relationships report security concerns.

Additional Information

The evaluation was conducted by REACH as part of its partnership with the Global Shelter Cluster. In Somalia, the shelter cluster is led by the UN Organisation for Refugees (UNHCR) as cluster lead. All of the reports, web-maps, static maps, factsheets can be accessed directly from the REACH Resource Centre: www.reachresourcecentre.org, as well as through the Shelter Cluster website: www.sheltercluster.org.

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REACH is a joint initiative of two international non-governmental organizations - ACTED and IMPACT Initiatives - and the UN Operational Satellite Applications Programme (UNOSAT). REACH was created in 2010 to facilitate the development of information tools and products that enhance the capacity of aid actors to make evidence-based decisions in emergency, recovery and development contexts. All REACH activities are conducted in support to and within the framework of inter-agency aid coordination mechanisms. For more information visit: www.reach-initiative.org. You can write to us directly at: geneva@reach-initiative.org and follow us @REACH_info




SHELTER SECTOR THREE PHASE RESPONSE EVALUATION Transitional Shelter Case Study

**BOSSASSO - SOMALIA
JANUARY 2015**



Background

Map 2: IDP Settlements Evaluated



The town of Bossasso in north eastern Somalia has historically hosted large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs). In 2011, drought and violence triggered a surge in large-scale displacements from the south central region into Bossasso. At the time, all IDP settlements were located inside the town boundaries. Beginning in 2011, the government provided a relocation site with permanent land tenure for IDPs from Bulu Eley settlement in town near the current Bariga Bossaso site. UNHCR was tasked with constructing transitional shelters on this relocation site for IDPs. Due to land tenure complications and squatting of other evicted IDPs on the land, the relocation site was abandoned. The Shelter Cluster, UNHCR and other agencies, in close collaboration with the authorities, were able to secure longer term land agreements with the individual landlords in Bariga Bossaso for 5 to 10 years. Following the construction of a pilot transitional shelter project, many other IDPs began moving to the area because of the lower risk of evictions.

The evaluated area of transitional shelter

settlements shown in **Map 1** is currently home to an estimated 3,763 IDP households (24,460 IDPs)¹⁰³. The majority of IDPs in this area live in transitional shelters, built from plastic and iron sheeting. Makeshift shelters have also been constructed in these settlements using branches or wooden sticks for the internal structure, and either cloth, waste carton, or plastic sheeting for the external covering.

Since the beginning of 2011, implementing agencies in Bossasso have built more than 3,500 transitional units in planned settlements. Transitional shelter is one of the main objectives of the Shelter Cluster in Somalia, yet due to complex clan relations and the lack of public land, permanent land tenure has been difficult to secure throughout the country. Furthermore, the physical characteristics of Bossasso – layers of deep rock and a lack of good soil or timber to build with – make it difficult to build low-cost permanent housing and settlements. In response to these issues, the Shelter Cluster advocated for transitional shelter to address the main concerns of the population: safety and protection with a timeframe of five to ten years for these shelters to remain a viable shelter solution.

REACH was requested by the Global and Somalia Shelter Clusters to conduct an evaluation in the IDP settlements in the transitional shelter settlements outside Bossasso town. In order to achieve this, the evaluation team employed a household survey with a 95% confidence level and 5% confidence interval, stratified across two groups: settlements with less than 5 year land tenure agreements; and settlements with 5-10 year land tenure agreements. The sample size was calculated from the total household population of each group and then divided proportionally among the settlements based upon the number of households located within each. A total of 887 households were interviewed by trained enumerators in November 2014. These data were compared to household data available from the November 2012 Shelter Sector Review

¹⁰³ For total IDP population, the household figure was multiplied by 6.5 (the average number of individuals living in each household).

conducted by REACH and the Somalia Shelter Cluster, and data from the infrastructure mapping conducted by the Somalia Shelter Cluster in June 2014¹⁰⁴.

Summary of Results

Evaluation findings show that the transitional shelter response in Bossasso consists of a number of positive outcomes for the IDP population living in these settlements with some key improvements to the shelter typology that should be considered. The expansion of transitional shelter is a promising sign of household investment and a desire to remain in the current location, however, the materials being used to do so may suggest that changes need to be made to the original design. Overall, when compared to other IDP settlements in Bossasso, the transitional shelters in the assessed settlements use higher quality materials – plastic and iron sheeting, as opposed to cloth and rags. The safety and protection of this shelter type is also commonly high due to its fire-retardant properties, its impenetrability, and the ability to install a lockable door. However, the current proliferation of plastic sheeting used to cover shelters that were built by cluster partners as corrugated iron sheet houses calls into question whether corrugated iron sheeting is appropriate for this context. Some of this plastic sheeting could be used for repairs, while for some households it may be used for expansion or improved ventilation. Regardless of the reason for the high levels of plastic sheeting use – expansion or repair – there seems to be either an inability (due to lack of access to materials or lack of knowledge about maintenance) or a lack of interest among the IDPs to use the same corrugated iron sheeting materials in their housing. With this said, the corrugated iron sheet shelter typology was chosen due to the scarcity of natural materials. In a dry region with few trees or shrubs and very poor soil, the options for building materials are limited. Furthermore, this shelter type could be transported and reused should the beneficiaries experience eviction – a key element of transitional shelter in Somalia. In a context in which permanent land tenure is challenging to obtain and where there are limited resources for building materials, the corrugated iron sheet shelter typology served as an interim solution while other building materials could be explored.

Another positive outcome observed as a result of the transitional shelter response is the larger proportion of kiosks compared to non-transitional settlements. This is a possible sign that IDP households are able to invest household income in livelihoods—usually an indicator of overall sustainability of a transitional shelter project.

The transitional shelter response in Bossasso has been successful in encouraging greater livelihood investment and the use of comparatively higher quality shelter materials. There is also a very high level of satisfaction among the beneficiary households and nearly all households have access to critical services and infrastructure within an appropriate standard. However, most households have not been provided training on proper maintenance techniques, and also lack access to high quality materials to maintain their shelter at the level at which it was built. While the purpose of the response was to increase safety and protection, the percentage of displaced households reporting to feel safe decreased over the past two years. This could be due to a variety of factors related to the shelter and settlement situation or separate externalities, but should be a concern for shelter actors going forward.

¹⁰⁴ It is difficult to compare findings on security and satisfaction between data sets from different periods, as people will provide different answers depending on the time of the evaluation. IDP insecurity can also be perceived differently in two different time periods.

Table 2: List of Evaluation Indicators

Results	Indicator	November 2012	November 2014
Increased use of high quality materials, however not of equal quality to originally constructed transitional shelters	1. Materials used for shelter roof and walls construction	<u>Walls</u> Plastic sheet: 3% Iron sheet: 65% <u>Roof</u> Plastic sheet: 7% Iron sheet: 67%	<u>Walls</u> Plastic sheet: 33% Iron sheet: 80% <u>Roof</u> Plastic sheet: 32% Iron sheet: 81%
Signs of shelter self-improvement; a proxy for sustainability	2. % of households using additional material inputs for shelter improvement or repair	-	86%
High proportion of households reporting problems with shelters	3. % of beneficiary households reporting problem related to their shelter assistance	-	81%
High satisfaction level among beneficiary households	4. % of targeted households satisfied with their shelter or non-food item assistance they received	-	85% satisfied/very satisfied
Higher levels of livelihood investment in beneficiary settlements	5. % of livelihood infrastructure in beneficiary settlement compared to non-beneficiary settlement	-	57% transitional 43% non-transitional
Higher level of infrastructure/service access among beneficiary households	6. % of beneficiary households with access to services/infrastructure	-	Latrines: 19% outside 50 metre radius Water points: 0% outside 200 metre radius
Decreased perception of safety and security	7. % of households that perceive that they are safe from security-related issues and natural hazards	86%	75%

Recommendations

- Shelter Materials:** Given the limited access to corrugated iron sheeting and the fact that it provides little ventilation to inhabitants, it is recommended that alternative materials be explored for transitional housing in Somalia. While the iron sheeting was chosen due to the lack of natural materials in Bossasso, it has not been proven to be an appropriate shelter material. The current corrugated iron sheet shelter design has few openings for ventilation and the sheeting used in this design radiates heat within the shelter. Many households have begun to use plastic sheeting to expand their shelter even though it is a less durable material than the iron sheeting. Furthermore, the corrugated iron sheeting is not available in the markets, making expansion and maintenance difficult.
- Shelter Maintenance:** IDP households should be included in the construction process and provided with training on maintenance of their particular shelter typology to ensure households expand and repair their shelter safely and effectively. Many households reported needing repairs, yet also reported that they had not received training on how to maintain and expand their shelter safely and effectively. Those households that had expanded their shelter did so using inferior materials to those that were initially used. While this could be due to a number of factors, including lack of materials in the markets, desire for greater ventilation, or lack of knowledge about shelter maintenance, beneficiaries must know how to maintain their shelter and the lack of training and lack of quality maintenance suggest that this should be a focus for any transitional shelter project in Somalia. The current push by the Shelter Cluster in Somalia for more owner-driven approaches should be continued.
- Settlement Planning:** During settlement planning, involve all clusters, particularly WASH and Protection, in needs assessment to improve emergency shelter planning and access to services and facilities in IDP settlements.
- Safety, Protection, and Security:** Concentrate markets outside residential areas to ensure safety and security of shelter occupants.

5. **Assessments and Evaluation:** The comparison between shelter-assisted and non-assisted households is vital to understanding the outcomes of the shelter response. Future evaluations should sample from both assisted and non-assisted households to compare outcomes.

Rationale

The evaluation was commissioned by the Global Shelter Cluster in order to better understand the impact of cluster coordination on the shelter response, and the resulting impact of the shelter response on the IDP population. The evaluation is expected to inform future cluster strategy and to be used as an advocacy tool for future targeted shelter response planning in Somalia.

Process

The evaluation team followed six key steps in order to conduct the evaluation of the Somalia Shelter Cluster coordinated transitional shelter response in Bossasso. First, REACH shared an evaluation terms of reference, analysis framework, and household questionnaire with the Global Shelter Cluster and Somalia Shelter Cluster for review, feedback, and approval, ensuring collaboration and contextually-appropriate lines of inquiry. Second, REACH hired and trained staff from implementing agencies in Bossasso to collect quantitative household data using a questionnaire built on the mFieldwork mobile phone application. Third, REACH coordinated with the appropriate district commissioners in Bossasso and all settlement umbrella leaders to allow enumerator access to the settlements. Fourth, a consultant for the Global Shelter Cluster concurrently collected qualitative data from cluster partners and associated stakeholders on the cluster's role in coordinating the shelter response in Bossasso. Fifth, REACH shared preliminary findings factsheets based on quantitative data with the Somalia Shelter Cluster's Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) and implementing partners in Bossasso to ensure findings were accurate and allow for clarification where needed. Sixth, the evaluation team combined the validated quantitative and qualitative data into a series of case studies and a final report covering the shelter response across three locations and shelter response modalities in Somalia. This case study and the corresponding report includes comparative analyses between data collected in November 2012 and during the most recent data collection exercise in November 2014, as well as infrastructure data collected by the Somalia Shelter Cluster in June 2014. Where possible the comparative analysis included household data and comparisons between the number and type of shelters and facilities in the intervention area.

People and Resources

The evaluation team drew upon the expertise and knowledge of a wide variety of stakeholders in order to carry out the evaluation in Mogadishu. REACH provided five assessment and GIS staff to design and manage quantitative data collection and analysis. Two cluster partners provided a total of 5 team leaders and 26 staff to collect primary quantitative data, including Danish Refugee Council (DRC) and Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC). Accommodation for the evaluation team and the training venue were provided by cluster partners. The Somalia Shelter Cluster provided access to and use of the mFieldwork platform to support data collection and database management.

Challenges and Limitations

During this evaluation, there were two critical challenges and limitations. First, a sufficient number of households were not sampled, in order to have a control group and compare the outcomes of assisted and non-assisted households. Where possible, responses of households regarding whether they had received assistance or not were used to make comparisons between these groups. However, given the understanding among IDPs that underreporting aid will encourage agencies to provide further support, it was difficult to identify households within these two groups. Household responses regarding assistance received were

triangulated with geographic information about assistance provided in order to identify any possible patterns in responses (**Map 2**). The addition of a large enough control group to provide statistically significant results would be an important methodological change for any future evaluations in Bossasso.

Second, female enumerator participation was limited due to cultural norms and practices. Despite this, there were a small number of female enumerators and every effort was made to ensure that female enumerators spoke with women in households where no men were present.

Evaluation Results

Shelter Response

Shelter Materials

The use of higher quality materials such as plastic and iron sheeting, in place of the cloth and rags seen in other IDP settlements in Bossasso, is a promising trend. However, the current proliferation of plastic sheeting used to cover shelters that were built by cluster partners as corrugated iron sheet houses calls into question whether corrugated iron sheeting is appropriate for this context.

When comparing transitional shelters in November 2014 to transitional shelters in November 2012, clear changes can be observed. In 2012, 65% of the transitional shelters used iron sheeting for the walls, while in 2014, this proportion had risen to 80%. There was a related increase in the use of plastic sheeting for the walls between these two periods from 3% to 33%. Similarly, the roofs are covered with iron sheeting for 81% of the shelters and with plastic sheeting by 32% - up from 67% and 7%, respectively, in 2012. These increases can be connected to the continued construction and expansion in these settlements illustrated in

Map 3.

Assuming that plastic and iron sheeting are superior materials to cloth and rags, the increased use of these materials at the exception of cloth and rags is a positive trend. However, given that the transitional shelters built in these settlements were corrugated iron sheet houses in which the walls and roofs were constructed of iron sheeting, the widespread use of plastic sheeting as a roofing and wall solution may suggest that an alternative to iron sheeting as a shelter material in Bossasso should be explored.

Shelter Improvement

Using shelter expansion as a proxy indicator for household investment in shelter and the sustainability of a shelter intervention, the construction of transitional shelters in Bossasso could be considered a success. A positive progression can be seen in the 86% of households having upgraded their shelters recently: 74% report extending the size of their shelter, while 57% report partitioning their shelter in some way or adding decoration (49%). Shelter self-improvements are often considered a positive indicator of a sustainable shelter solution. With this in mind, the use of plastic sheeting across a large proportion of households in the assessed settlements could also be connected to the extension of the shelters in which iron sheeting was too expensive or not available in the markets, thus, households were forced to choose an alternative material. Despite self-improvement, 81% of households report needing repairs to their shelter, with nearly half of these reporting they need better materials. Given that the Shelter Cluster intended these shelters to last for at least five years, if not more, and the average age of these shelters is 23 months, the fact that such a large proportion of the transitional shelters need repairs calls into question the sustainability of using a building material in a context in which many beneficiaries may not be able to maintain their shelter or expand using the same quality of materials.

Shelter Assistance Satisfaction

Satisfaction levels are generally high among transitional shelter beneficiaries, however 15% of households remain dissatisfied. The lack of training and community consultation before construction has likely played a part in this and is likely connected to the lower quality of shelter maintenance. Shelter implementing agencies have addressed this concern as the “contractor-driven approach”, common prior to 2014, has been largely replaced by an owner-driven approach in 2014. The impact of this change in approach remains to be seen. On a four-point scale from very unsatisfied to very satisfied, most respondents report being either satisfied (61%) or very satisfied (24%). 10% of households report being very unsatisfied with the assistance they

received. One possible contribution to the dissatisfaction is the fact that households did not report being consulted during the planning process, nor has there been any sufficient training on shelter issues. 92% of households report having not been involved in the planning process and 95% report having not received shelter-related training.

Access to Services & Facilities

Beneficiary access to household services and facilities is at a higher level among beneficiary households than other IDP households located in Bossasso Town. All households located in the transitional shelter settlements have access to a water point within 200 metres of their shelter. **Map 4** illustrates this and shows the comparison with non-transitional households where a small proportion are outside the 200 metre radius. Furthermore, there is a much higher proportion of households located in the transitional settlements that have access to latrines within a 50 metre radius than households located in other IDP settlements. **Map 5** illustrates that 46% of households in non-transitional settlements are located outside the 50 metre radius, compared to only 19% among transitional households.

Access to Livelihoods

While livelihoods promotion was not an explicit objective of the Shelter Cluster in the transitional shelter response, a medium-term shelter solution such as this would commonly consider the possibility of livelihood development. It is difficult to attribute any impact on livelihoods to the shelter response, but the existence of a larger proportion of kiosks among transitional shelter settlements suggests a higher degree of livelihood investment.

78% of households report working outside the settlement they currently live in. The main form of income for surveyed households is garbage disposal (40%) followed by stone mining, herding, assistance from relatives, begging and the sale of goods produced in the household – each reported by 11-15% households. Without comparisons with IDPs living outside of the transitional settlements, we cannot make any conclusions about whether these livelihood strategies are more stable than those found outside the settlements.

Using data from the Shelter Cluster Infrastructure Mapping exercise, conducted in June 2014, there is a clear difference in number of kiosks that can be found in the transitional settlements compared with the non-transitional settlements. **Map 6** illustrates that 57% of the kiosks in IDP settlements in Bossasso are found in transitional settlements. Given that the population of these settlements is a relatively small proportion of the IDP population of Bossasso, the existence of a disproportionately large number of kiosks points to a higher degree of livelihood investment – a possible indirect outcome of the transitional shelter intervention.

Safety, Protection & Security

When comparing perceptions of safety and security among transitional shelter households between 2012 and 2014, there is a slight decrease in those households that report feeling secure, 86% in 2012 to 75% in 2014. It is unclear why the perception of security has decreased among transitional shelter households, but could be due to the expansion of the settlements with newly arrived IDPs (illustrated in **Map 3**) along with the development of small market spaces and kiosks in the settlements (illustrated in **Map 6**). Indeed, 59% of those households that perceived that they were unsafe responded that the market was the source of these feelings of being unsafe. IDP households across Somalia often identify markets as a source of insecurity, thus the proliferation of them within the settlement could be introducing higher levels of insecurity. Other external factors, however, could play a part in this change in security and safety perception.

Furthermore, a large proportion of households (32%) report feeling unsafe in the latrines. This is likely due to the fact that 70% of the latrines are communal and not separated by gender. While the latrines in the transitional settlements are effectively located to allow for access to all shelters within a 50 metre radius, as seen in **Map 5**, the fact these facilities are not gender segregated could be contributing to gender based violence or the perception of this possibility.

Additional Information

The evaluation was conducted by REACH as part of its partnership with the Global Shelter Cluster. In Somalia, the Shelter Cluster is led by the UN Organisation for Refugees (UNHCR) as cluster lead. All of the reports, web-maps, static maps, factsheets can be accessed directly from the REACH Resource Centre: www.reachresourcecentre.org, as well as through the Shelter Cluster website: www.sheltercluster.org.

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
SHELTER SECTOR THREE PHASE RESPONSE EVALUATION Permanent Shelter Case Study

**GAALKACYO - SOMALIA
JANUARY 2015**



Background

Map 3: IDP Settlements Evaluated



Gaalkacyo is the capital of the north-central Mudug region of Somalia. The city is divided into two zones, where the main northern portion forms part of Puntland state, while its southern tip is governed by the Galmudug administration.

This evaluation focuses on three permanent settlements to the north of Gaalkacyo Town (shown in blue in Map 1). The three permanent settlements are located within 5 kilometres of each other and approximately 8-10 kilometres north of Gaalkacyo town.

The permanent shelter programs have delivered a total of 1,256 permanent houses, home to an estimated 10,000 IDP residents. In addition, an estimated 20,632 individuals have relocated to the settlement areas, half of whom are thought to have settled informally in and around the permanent structures.

All three sites are located on private land and are governed by the Puntland government, which was closely involved in all stages of the program cycle from planning and design of the projects to implementation and finally the hand-over of official land tenure documentation. The settlement residents are represented by community settlement committees and the sites have been divided into grids with community-elected officials providing oversight and management to each section, including engagement with the landowner and local authority when necessary.

Land tenure is one of three components considered crucial to durable solutions, the other two are community participation and sustainable livelihoods. These form the basis of the cluster strategy. Prior to the implementation of the planned settlements, a number of IDP households and host community members in Halaboqad and Tawakal had already acquired their own land deeds or relocated to the planned settlement sites showing a strong willingness to integrate locally. The beneficiary selection process varied across the settlements, but to ensure local community integration, approximately 10-20% of project beneficiaries were reportedly selected from the host community, a majority of whom already owned land on which their permanent shelters were constructed.

REACH was requested by the Global and Somalia Shelter Clusters to conduct an evaluation in the IDP settlements of Halaboqad, Salama One, and Tawakal outside Gaalkacyo Town. In order to achieve this, a household survey, key informant interviews, and community discussions were organised. The

household survey employed a 95% confidence level and 5% confidence interval for each of the permanent settlements based on the number of permanent houses built in each settlement. A total of 622 households were interviewed in April 2014 by trained enumerators. This was complemented by key informant interviews and discussions with community members. Data was also available from a REACH-facilitated Shelter Review assessment conducted in Gaalkacyo Town in the weeks just prior to the evaluation.

Summary of Results

Overall, the evaluation suggests that the permanent shelter programme in the three settlements outside of Gaalkacyo Town – Salama One, Halaboqad, and Tawakal – has successfully provided beneficiaries with high quality housing that protects inhabitants from the elements and serves as a secure shelter for the household¹⁰⁵. Furthermore, there is a clear desire from households residing in the permanent houses to further improve and develop their homes beyond the current structure that was provided to them. Household needs have shifted from a focus on basic shelter to financial and livelihood support to further invest in their land and home. These are both strong indicators of the sustainability of the housing project. Households also report a strong relationship with the local community and good dispute management mechanisms that will serve them well into the future. Given that the majority of the beneficiary households are from the Mudug area, integration is expected to be high.

The evaluation found that very few beneficiaries were involved in the construction process and lack the skills necessary to maintain their own shelter or contribute to the development of the settlement. This is a missed opportunity, as involvement or management of the construction process can provide a form of livelihood training and lead to improved maintenance of infrastructure after the completion of the program. Furthermore, the lack of a clear settlement plan with the needed space to develop infrastructure such as schools, markets, and hospitals could undercut the successes of the housing programme, as households begin to need more services and are unable to access them.

The permanent housing programme in Gaalkacyo is an example of a highly successful delivery-based housing programme in which higher quality housing was provided to the beneficiaries. This delivery-based and contractor-driven approach that is currently preferred by implementing partners in Somalia due to difficult access, clan-based tensions, political support and lack of existing capacity, however, limits household investment. The Shelter Cluster should continue to push towards owner decision making processes where the shelters can be built by the beneficiaries themselves, while taking a settlement-based approach that ensures there is ample room for settlement growth and that basic services are provided throughout the life of the settlement.

¹⁰⁵ The extent to which the permanent shelter typologies provide protection from flooding or seismic events was not evaluated.

Table 3: List of Evaluation Indicators

Results	Indicator	April 2014
All housing uses high quality materials	1. Materials used for shelter roof and walls construction	Salama One: CGI sheeting Tawakal: Concrete, CGI sheeting Halaboqad: Concrete, CGI sheeting
Signs of shelter self-improvement; a proxy for sustainability	2. % of households using additional material inputs for shelter improvement or repair	Salama One: 60% households Tawakal: 40% households Halaboqad: 10% households
High levels of temperature and weather-related shelter problems	3. % of beneficiary households reporting X priority problem related to their shelter assistance	Temperature: 80% households Weather: 50% households
High levels of desire for further shelter improvement; a proxy for sustainability	4. % of beneficiary households desiring improvements to their house	72% households
All houses meet minimum criteria for covered floor area	5. % of targeted persons with sufficient covered floor area per shelter (minimum 3.5m ² per person)	100% houses
High levels of financial support requested; a proxy for movement out of emergency	6. % of beneficiary households requesting X type of additional support	Financial: 89% households Shelter 4% households
High level of infrastructure/service access among beneficiary households	7. % of households with access to services/infrastructure	Latrines: 98% households within 50 metres <u>Water points (outside 100 metres)</u> Salama One: 3% households Tawakal: 0% households Halaboqad: 22% households
High level of perceived safety and security	8. % of households that perceive that they are safe from security-related issues and natural hazards	78% households

Recommendations

1. **Livelihoods:** Livelihood training and the creation of livelihood opportunities within these permanent settlements should be integral to the shelter intervention. Livelihood interventions are important because they provide the basis for subsistence – a key objective of a permanent shelter intervention. Livelihood activities also allow those individuals interested in investing further in their house to do so. Livelihood support in new settlement interventions is extremely important to ensure appropriate development and well-being of the inhabitants.

2. **House Maintenance:** The permanent shelter intervention should ensure that beneficiaries are involved in the settlement planning and housing construction process. This is important for two reasons: (1) to understand the spatial needs of the beneficiaries, and (2) to ensure that the beneficiaries have the skills to maintain the housing and settlement assets after the implementing agency has left. Furthermore, this also potentially provides some livelihood training for individuals that may be interested in specialising in housing construction in the future. The permanent settlements currently have very little space for expansion and many of the individual houses need repairs. Some of these issues could be resolved with additional planning with the beneficiaries and maintenance training.
3. **Settlement Planning:** The permanent settlements evaluated provided very little room for expansion or construction of infrastructure and services such as schools or hospitals. Critical services such as these must be taken into account when planning a settlement to encourage inhabitants to continue to live and further invest in the settlement. During settlement planning, involve all clusters, particularly WASH and Protection, in needs assessment to improve emergency shelter planning and access to services and facilities in IDP settlements.
4. **Safety, Protection, and Security:** Households in Halaboqad, particularly, report feeling insecure in their houses at night. In the other planned settlements of Gaalkacyo, household members report feeling insecure at night, but at lower proportions, possibly due to the presence of police stations and fences around the plots. Safety and security measures to be considered include the construction of police stations and plot fencing, in order to improve perceptions of security in settlements.
5. **Assessments and Evaluation:** Data from informal settlers within the planned settlements must be collected for any future evaluations to ensure the outcomes of IDPs living in permanent houses can be compared with them. This will provide a reference point from which conclusions can be made about the impact of the shelter intervention. This is also important in order to evaluate the success of the response to understand whether host and IDP communities are fighting over limited resources and how assistance to the IDP and host populations affects the sustainability of the response. Furthermore, the extent to which the shelters provide protection from seismic and flooding events should be evaluated.

Rationale

The evaluation was commissioned by the Global Shelter Cluster in order to better understand the impact of cluster coordination on the shelter response, and the resulting impact of the shelter response on the IDP population. The evaluation is expected to inform future cluster strategy and to be used as an advocacy tool for future targeted shelter response planning in Somalia.

Process

The evaluation team followed six key steps in order to conduct the evaluation of the Somalia Shelter Cluster coordinated emergency shelter response in Gaalkacyo. First, REACH shared an evaluation terms of reference, analysis framework, and household questionnaire with the Global Shelter Cluster and Somalia Shelter Cluster for review, feedback, and approval, ensuring collaboration and contextually-appropriate lines of inquiry. Second, REACH hired and trained staff from implementing agencies in Mogadishu to collect quantitative household data using a questionnaire built on the

mFieldwork mobile phone application. Third, REACH coordinated with the appropriate district commissioners in Gaalkacyo and all settlement umbrella leaders to allow for enumerator access to the settlements. Fourth, a consultant for the Global Shelter Cluster concurrently collected qualitative data from cluster partners and associated stakeholders on the cluster's role in coordinating the shelter response across Somalia. Fifth, REACH shared the preliminary findings from the quantitative household data with the Somalia Shelter Cluster's Strategic Advisory Group (SAG) and implementing partners in Gaalkacyo to ensure findings were accurate and allow for clarification where needed. Sixth, the evaluation team combined the validated quantitative and qualitative data into a series of case studies and a final report covering the shelter response across three locations and shelter response modalities in Somalia. This case study and the corresponding report includes comparative analyses between data collected in Gaalkacyo Town in April 2014 and in the planned settlements in May 2014.

People and Resources Involved

The evaluation team drew upon the expertise and knowledge of a wide variety of stakeholders in order to carry out the evaluation in Mogadishu. REACH provided five assessment and GIS staff to design and manage the quantitative data collection portion of the evaluation and to analyse the data. As part of this portion of the evaluation, four cluster partners provided a total of five team leaders and 25 staff to collect data, including Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), Danish Refugee Council (DRC), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), and Somalia Birth Attendants Cooperative Organisation (SBACO). Accommodation for the evaluation team and the training venue were provided by cluster partners. The Somalia Shelter Cluster provided access to and use of the mFieldwork platform to support data collection and database management.

Challenges and Limitations

As with many parts of Somalia, Mogadishu provides unique challenges and limitations to the research process, notably in terms of security and access. During this evaluation, there were two critical challenges and limitations. First, female enumerator participation was limited due to cultural norms and practices. There were a small number of female enumerators and every effort was made to ensure that female enumerators spoke with women in households where no men were present by distributing the female enumerators among as many teams as possible. This is especially important for the Gaalkacyo evaluation, as the UNHCR-led project targeted female-headed households, so a high percentage would have been female-headed households.

Second, there were no data collected among informal settler households living in the three planned settlements. These data would have provided a strong reference point to compare households living in permanent houses with households living in non-permanent houses that have access to the same services and infrastructure. This should be a priority for any future evaluations in Gaalkacyo.

Evaluation Results

Shelter Response

Shelter Type & Materials

In the planned settlements outside Gaalkacyo Town, the permanent housing sufficiently provides beneficiaries with physical security from the natural elements and also from protection and security concerns. These houses are a vast improvement upon the shelters currently inhabited by IDPs in spontaneous settlements in Gaalkacyo Town.

The majority of permanent houses were composed of concrete block or CGI and were classified as being in good or poor condition, thus were deemed to require no more than small repairs. By comparison, IDPs in Gaalkacyo were living predominantly in short-term shelter solutions such as transitional shelters (30%), buuls (24%) and tents (21%). The condition of these structures was poor with 73% to 87% classified as requiring immediate humanitarian action.

Figure 2: Shelter Types



Throughout the planned settlements two main shelter designs were observed: cement block and CGI shelters. NRC provided 533 concrete hollow block houses in Halaboqad; 471 concrete homes were also built by UN-Habitat in Tawakal. In line with the less-secure land tenure situation at Salama One, DRC oversaw the construction of 250 corrugated-iron shelters there.

The permanent shelters at Halaboqad and Tawakal are 23.5 square metres consisting of one 16 square metre room and one 7.5 square metre veranda. The structures were constructed with concrete hollow blocks, mud mortar and finished with cement rendering. The walls contain two steel windows with ventilation slots above each, while the roof is composed of CGI sheets with white wood roof truss. The standard CGI structure found in Salama One is 4 x 4 metres and consists of a wooden frame covered in iron sheeting with a simple pitched roof. In general, the shelters can be easily dismantled and moved while the materials can be re-used or sold.

Shelter Improvement

Using shelter expansion and improvement as a proxy indicator for household investment in its shelter and sustainability of a permanent shelter intervention, the permanent housing program in Gaalkacyo can be considered a success. While the overall proportion of households that have conducted improvements is low, the types of improvements desired correlate with expansion of the house, as opposed to improvement of current features.

Across all three settlements, 37% of households reported to have conducted shelter improvements. When disaggregated by settlement, 60% of households in Salama One and 40% in Tawakal, have conducted improvements, while only 10% in Halaboqad reported to have done so. The type of shelter improvement implemented varied per settlement. A large number of households in Salama One reported partitions (40%) and extensions (35%) as the main improvements – this in-line with the transitional nature of the shelters there. Decoration and extension was most frequent in Tawakal; Halaboqad has seen very few improvements.

The majority of households (70% to 74%) across the settlements reported the desire for shelter improvements, with almost two-thirds requesting more space, half requesting access to better materials and half requesting more light. Further to this, 89% reported financial rather than shelter-related needs. A lower proportion of respondents (4%) reported shelter as an immediate need compared to IDPs in Gaalkacyo (22%); this suggests that needs in the planned settlements have begun transitioning from emergency to more of a focus on durable solutions.

Housing, Land, & Property

The provision of secure land tenure is expected to contribute towards levels of integration and the overall economic security of a household. 98% of households in the planned settlements reported not paying rent, lowering their expenditure considerably compared to informal settlers in Gaalkacyo, who reported paying 11 USD per month. At the time of the evaluation, land tenure documents were in the possession of residents at Halaboqad and Tawakal but still had to be disseminated to residents at Salama One. While Salama One residents did report feeling less secure on their land, they did not report they feared the threat of eviction any more than those at other settlements.

Access to Services & Facilities

Access to critical infrastructure and the ability for settlements to build missing infrastructure is limited in the planned settlements of Gaalkacyo. In terms of WASH facilities, the amount of water available (58 litres per household per day), the distance travelled to collect water (5 minutes in Tawakal and Salama One, 12 minutes in Halaboqad) and the amount of money paid by residents for water (2 USD for 20 litres) is similar to that reported by IDPs in Gaalkacyo town. As shown in **Map 2**, this is consistent with spatial analysis which demonstrates that 231 shelters (22%) in Halaboqad were beyond 100 metres of the nearest water point compared to only 3% of shelters in Salama One and 0% in Tawakal.

Map 3 demonstrates that nearly all (98%) shelters across all three settlements are within 50 metres of a latrine. The majority of latrines mapped in each settlement were reported to be separated by gender (94% Halaboqad; 98% Tawakal; 67% in Salama One). The small number of latrines that were not disaggregated by gender were mainly private household latrines in Salama One. While the majority of latrines were private in Salama One (99%) and Tawakal (97%), almost half of latrines in Halaboqad were communal. Furthermore, while more than 93% of latrines in Salama One and Tawakal provided locks on the inside and outside of latrines, locks were less prevalent in Halaboqad (75% provide locks on the outside and 78% on the inside).

Infrastructure mapping (see **Map 4**) identified very little open space for development inside any of the settlements, which will make future expansion difficult. The Tawakal site provides an estimated 50 square metres surface area per person overall, but many of the structures are concentrated in the centre of the site. Salama One and Halaboqad provide 29 square metres and 26 square metres per person respectively; this is less than the 45 square metres usable surface area per person recommended in the Sphere standards. This lack of open space will likely impact how the settlements will be able to develop in the future. Specifically, there are very few open spaces in the centre of all three settlements where additional facilities may be constructed when deemed necessary – to do so, would likely require the relocation of residents.

Local Integration & Livelihoods

Local integration and livelihoods are two of the most important aspects of a durable shelter solution. In addition, community participation in both the planning and construction processes is increasingly recognised as an important component of durable solutions.

Participation in settlement planning and decision-making was reported at all three settlements and is expected to lead to increased ownership of the process and continued sustainable and safe development after the end of the interventions. However, nearly all households assessed reported not being a part of the construction process, which is a missed opportunity for further skills building and further ownership of the settlement process.

Building solid relations with the local host community, authorities and informal settlers is important to ensure the settlements and surrounding areas remain sustainable and peaceful. Beneficiaries demonstrated a promising trend towards conflict resilience and peace building. This was achieved through organized dialogue with local communities, local authorities and the formation of informal settlement committees. A low number (<3%) of households reported a poor relationship with the host community. The difficulties reported by these households were mainly related to robbery and fighting. Positive and regular interactions were also reported between informal settlers and residents to address issues such as land tenure and protection. There are thought to be around 1,000 informal households at Tawakal and 667 at Halaboqad that arrived before and during the implementation of projects. Careful management of informal settlers is an important issue that agencies must consider during the implementation of permanent housing projects. NRC managed this in Halaboqad by providing transitional shelters and latrines in a space adjacent to the main site.

Of those beneficiaries in planned settlements that intended to stay in the next six months, the main reasons given were because they wanted to stay permanently (70%) and to continue receiving humanitarian assistance (56%). Less than one-quarter of respondents said that lack of information or insecurity in their place of origin were reasons why they wanted to remain. This suggests that residents in the planned settlements are interested in staying due more to pull factors rather than push factors; suggesting that with further investment in livelihoods durable solutions will likely be reached. Common obstacles to obtaining a job were lack of skills and education across the settlements. Separately, transport was recorded as a main issue - 60% of households reported their current source of income to be outside the settlement at an average of 60 minutes walking.

Safety, Protection & Security

IDP households perceive themselves to be safer in the planned settlements than those IDPs living in Gaalkacyo Town, however there are key measures that need to be taken, particularly in Tawakal to ensure continued safety.

78% of respondents reported they did not fear for their physical safety within the settlements. Despite the overall perception of security, the settlement committees reported having to deal with protection issues including eviction-related matters, violence against children and gender-based violence. The majority of respondents reported feeling unsafe outside of settlement (69%) and going to the market (53%). A large proportion of those reporting feeling unsafe at latrines were users of communal latrines at Halaboqad. Almost half of the solar lights in Tawakal were not functioning.

When compared to the informal settlement population in Gaalkacyo town, a higher proportion of households in the permanent settlements reported to fear for their safety inside their shelter at night. A large proportion of residents at Halaboqad (64%) and Tawakal (50%) felt unsafe in their own shelters at night despite the majority of respondents there reporting having locks on the inside and outside of their doors (Halaboqad (97%) and Tawakal (87%)). Only two-thirds of residents at Salama One reported

having locks on doors; the majority of those who didn't have locks reported feeling unsafe inside their shelters.

The 'feelings of insecurity in their shelters' seems to correlate to the number of police stations at each settlement. For example, the high feelings of insecurity at Halaboqad may be linked to the lack of a police station there. Interestingly, the majority of residents at Salama One felt secure in their shelters where there were two police stations. At Tawakal, there was only one police station identified. Furthermore, Halaboqad residents were also the least likely to have a fence around their plot which might have contributed to feelings of unease there. Residents were more likely to have a fence at Tawakal (59%) compared to Salama One (42%) and Halaboqad (38%).

Additional Information

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